Summary
Over the past three decades, Lebanon’s ruling class which comprises intertwined political and business elites has run the country into the ground. To survive its ongoing accumulation of challenges, including the financial crisis that erupted in October 2019, Lebanon requires a revamped state backed by a new economic model with social justice at its core. Tax reform is central to such an endeavor and to ensuring that the state has the means both to deliver basic services and to tackle poverty and inequality.
Key Themes
Since 2005, Lebanon has been characterized by extreme inequality in both income and wealth. The richest 1 percent of the population receives, on average, 25 percent of national income, while the poorest half receives less than 10 percent. Regarding wealth, the richest 10 percent of the population owns almost 70 percent of total wealth. Additionally, the middle class and the poor have little chance of upward mobility.
Higher unemployment rates, gender disparity, income and wealth inequality: these are some of the side effects of the coronavirus pandemic. While a number of vaccines against Covid-19 was developed in record time, it might take decades to undo the social and economic damage caused by the virus. The crisis has exacerbated inequalities across all major fault lines in society and undone hard-won gains in poverty reduction across the globe.
Inequality is the gift the keeps on taking. While wealthy nations have been able to secure enough Covid-19 shots to inoculate their populations several times over, the People s Vaccine Alliance an international watchdog that includes Amnesty International, Oxfam and Global Justice estimates that poor countries will only be able to vaccinate one in 10 people during 2021. Rich nations, needless to say, will be able to save more lives and help their economies recover faster.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Source: Getty
Summary: By pushing economic liberalization in the Middle East without requiring transparency and fighting corruption, international donors have allowed the regionâs elites to hog power and resources. The result is a combustible mix of anger and disillusionment.
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On the 18
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