CFIUS Q4 Developments
USA
December 23 2020
In the fourth quarter of 2020, the major CFIUS development was the significant revision of one of CFIUS’s two mandatory filing programs. Specifically, on 15 September 15 2020, the Department of Treasury (the Treasury) issued a Final Rule revising CFIUS’s critical technologies mandatory filing program and making certain other clarifying amendments to the other mandatory filing program.
In the fourth quarter of 2020, the major CFIUS development was the significant revision of one of CFIUS’s two mandatory filing programs. Specifically, on 15 September 15 2020, the Department of Treasury (the Treasury) issued a Final Rule revising CFIUS’s critical technologies mandatory filing program and making certain other clarifying amendments to the other mandatory filing program. The most significant changes in the Final Rule can be summarized as follows:
To embed, copy and paste the code into your website or blog:
On December 14, 2020, the U.S. Department of State initiated a series of sanctions pursuant to Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) that target the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB). The sanctions deny new U.S. export licenses to SSB and limit the SSB’s access to credit from U.S. and international financial institutions. In addition, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated several principal executive officers of SSB as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). However, the U.S. action is calibrated, and does not designate SSB or its affiliates as SDNs, nor does it apply broader sanctions on Turkey or the Turkish defense industry.
United States Rescinds Designation of Sudan as State Sponsor of Terrorism
Key Points
On December 14, 2020, the U.S. Department of State officially rescinded Sudan’s designation as an SST in light of Sudan’s actions to normalize relations with Israel and resolution of terrorism claims.
This action paves the way for the lifting of mandatory U.S. trade restrictions on business involving Sudan, the government of Sudan and Sudanese nationals that was based on Sudan’s previous SST listing.
Before embarking on any activity or transaction involving Sudan, companies should be diligent to assess the extent to which remaining federal and state restrictions, including state level divestment sanctions regarding Sudan, as well as contractual or other relevant restrictions regarding Sudan still in place, may affect new business opportunities.
Transnational Criminal Organizations
Country-Level and Policy-Level Programs. Certain of the sanctions programs are focused on individual countries (the “country-level programs”), while others target specific activities on a global basis such as terrorist and non-proliferation sanctions (the “policy-level programs”). Under a number of the country-level programs (such as Iran, Syria, N. Korea, Cuba and the Crimea region of Ukraine – the “comprehensive sanctions programs”) U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into effectively all business transactions with the targeted country, its government and its nationals, including the export and import of products, technologies and services, payments and investments, subject to exceptions described below.[5] For other country-level programs, such as Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela, certain business activities within the country are prohibited but others are permitted (the “partial sanctions programs”). For
The Department of Commerce was one of many agencies and companies attacked worldwide by Russiaâs APT 29 via SolarWinds Orion servers. Todayâs special columnist, Kelvin Coleman of the NCSA, offers some analysis and practical advice for security pros. Tim Evanson Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.0)
Although the true scope of the SolarWinds attack has not been fully uncovered, thereâs no doubting the level of sophistication required to carry these attacks on numerous government agencies, including the US Treasury, Commerce Department and the Department of Homeland Security.
Considering how long its discovery remained dormant, the amount of coverage weâre seeing in the mainstream media and the levels of concern out of the intelligence community are no surprise. As details emerge â almost in real-time â weâll continue to have better clarity as to the logistics, tactics and motivations behind the incident. In the meantime