One of the managers is victor workland. We are looking for more interviews and want to discuss this with them. The director and manager was jeff dubin. The rationale i saw was the engine was slightly smaller than previous versions and therefore had not had uncontained failures so even though the engine was larger they thought it would be dependable and not have an uncontained failure. I agree. As a propulsion engineer i saw validity and that argument. You have 2 on the airplane side assume you get the uncontained failure and protect against it. Their job is to show it will not inject parts on the airplane side and installation and to assume it will have those failures and protect the airplane from it. You would say during your lengthy tenure, it was unusual to see, it creaked in after that. You never saw, we had the additional voluntary safety recording process. We had processes that were not working on the project and came to the same conclusion. It would be impossible . If you go to minor aspects, it was fully informed in that aspect. What do you think of the current process and how we might change it. I agree when i first started i was taught aviation regulations define the minimum safety, Lessons Learned from accidents should be incorporated into ensuring compliance. There are a lot of exceptions. New rules are not there and exemptions also where too often in the interest of the applicant over the interests of the traveling public. In the ignition of the fuel tank, the 737 ngs, 5 years is all it takes for a new type design approval. At the end of four years no change was made and it was a permanent exemption granted instead of the manufactured 6. A lot of years in the air and you flew earlier versions of the 37 and one of the hearings, i showed an image of the flight deck from 100 and the image of the flight deck from back there. It didnt look like the same plane. Do you think we should consider how many times you can amend a circuit versus going through certification . It is an incremental step process. I flew 300 and there was a lot of difference between those two. A max in the first generation 737. I think it would be unreasonable to ask a pilot to fly one or 200 on monday wednesday friday and on tuesday thursday friday max. As the incremental steps we are taking, i can understand how the faa approved it but the 737 is a bit unique because we dont have another airplane in the fleet with as many derivative certificates or has been in service as long and i dont think there will be another version of the 737. I think the max is the last one, the problems to some degree will cure itself. They are trying to amend the types we get for the 777 with folding wings and say this doesnt require recertification. Im not aware of any commercial transfer aircraft with folding wings. Seems like a radical departure. There were subtle differences between the three airplanes but for the most part they flew identically. The 737, 300, 400. The differences are minor but there are some that the differences are significant. I guess i dont have further questions. Maybe staff has a further question, okay. Okay. Kevin cox, pilot safety consultant, how important is it to be knowledgeable for Flight Control systems, particularly something novel or unique such as mcas to. The training is critical, the fact that the assumption was made that pilots would instantly recognize appropriate stabilizer trim movement, 737s starting with the 300 series, the trim system moves because of a system call the speed trim the system so you would have to recognize movement in and of itself, uncommented movement by the pilot in and of itself would not necessarily be a trim run away. Multiple failures, the recognition, it was trained as a possibility that if you see a stricture that comes on, recognize at the moment the flaps are retracted, you may get significant nosedown input. That was not done. I think the failure of that training to be widely disseminated is a contributor. Human factors in the first accident not in the manual, in terms of Human Factors approach, pilots havent been made aware of something running in the background, radically altered the behavior of the airplane . Absolutely. It is very hard to diagnose what the plane is doing when it is something you have never heard of. There was no information why it was acting erratically. As captain cox pointed out, they didnt have the procedure boeing assumes they would be able to run very rapidly. The whole combination of factors of no information in the flight manual, no training and no adequate displays that were the worst possible combination. We kept you a long time. I ask anybody or everybody who wants to respond, what do you think is the biggest concern this committee should focus on regarding faas capability of overseeing boeing and production of novel systems giving everything you heard today. I will start with captain cox. Based on what i learned over months of watching this i would encourage the committee dont get too focused. The report was good in taking a holistic view. There is not a single cause of this accident and you have a rare opportunity if the committee will view it in its entirety, of the complexity, you can help significantly promote aviation safety Going Forward and i think that is reinforced today. Theres a lot of focus on the faa and boeing and they are major contributors to these tragedies but not the only ones so i would encourage in the strongest possible terms keep the focus broad. I would agree in terms of the aoa, we had a company on lion air, they lost their license. If i might, the installation of that angle of attack sensor on the lion air airplane, there is a calibration procedure that has to be followed and the Maintenance Department signed off that they did it. It is not possible that they did. That is specifically what the procedure is for, to determine the accuracy of the sensor output. I come full circle. There is a lot of contributing factors. Doctor ensley . There has been considerable discussion today and previously in the press about concerns about Safety Culture at boeing and the faa that underlie a lot of failures in design. The faa administrator and boeing made some announcements how to fix that and we are glad to see that changing culture is hard. You cant just give a 1shot, it is something you have to do every day. Has to do with actions. The importance of following up on the actions of taking safety issues seriously, prioritizing safety with regard to production, cost, and schedule, those changes require a lot of continued interaction by management, bringing a lot of people who are knowledgeable about these things to move those changes through the organization and the ntsb talking about Safety Culture for the past 20 years, it is something we need to emphasize as well as solving basic process problems. I agree with you. In my first meeting with mister dixon when he was nominated i talked to him about the principalities within faa who seem resistant to administrators and changes and he assured me he would reach down in the organization and try to change the culture so mister collins. I agree about changing the Safety Culture and what administrator dixon talked about with all hands meetings, he needs to get down to the working level, talk to groups of people. I was a union rep, a little more protected in discussing issues but talk to them in the offices, the seattle office. We hear about resources, you could use more Aerospace Engineers and manage resources better but the lesson i would like to leave is that when you have those resources that identify safety issues that concerns me. The ones that are missed you can do improvement and better oversight but when managers are aware of safety issues and compliance issues i wish there would be a Culture Shift so there would be more credibility and more thought to compliance versus production schedules and things. Ms. Pearson mister pearson. To keep it simple, a detailed investigation of the production facilities in order and the important thing is to main presence in the factory. I was there for three years and never met an faa employee in my three years and never remember any of my employees saying they talked to an faa employee. They were not visible and present. Shouldnt they be wearing a jacket or something . If we are not getting the problem resolved in the normal chain we need regulators to do that and the last thing i would say is you can have the most amazing defined by the most brilliant engineers and flown by the most talented pilots. If you have a tired mechanic or electrician that is overworked that they havent had a chance to take care of their family, dont lose sight of the fact that we have to do the whole thing from design all the way to ongoing production in the future. Reflecting on your comment about not seeing an faa employee on the floor a number of years ago i raised concerns as we went to an agency in terms of maintenance more than production but they were spending much less time at maintenance facilities and more time reviewing paperwork they received from maintenance facilities and it is vital for them to have a presence, they may not personally observe something when they are there but maybe some employee would want to say to them i have concerns here and i want you to hear this. Thanks for your generous allowance of time. I appreciate your testimony and we will continue with this investigation. My condolences to the families and thank you for your constructive i have 2 do some stuff with my script. We will remain open, any questions can be submitted in writing. So ordered. I ask unanimous consent the record remain open 15 days for additional comments. Information committed by members and witnesses, without objection so ordered and i thank you and have nothing to add so the committee stands adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] bracket inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] a system that says one, 2 or 3 times out of compliance, like flies on whatever, that is an interesting idea. Who are you interviewing from faa . I dont know. Boeing officials are agreeing as well . A lot of the boeing people have to deal with their lawyers. After the interviews, transcripts or summaries. Do you give a sense of the timeline in these hearings . This is unprecedented, most difficult and important investigation we have undertaken in 200 years of history so i do not have a defined end point. How high did this go . If the decisions were made higher up, we gave a few threads to a few people are one thread that comes back to the national office. That is not the mcas tissue but is a certification issue by allowing boeing to proceed. What were the gaps listening to what you have . We still are not totally sure, certain of how it was ever allowed to put this airplane in the air with a safety critical system of failure, that is not done and also the report we have, i would hope there is no other Passenger Transport airplane in the world flying except allusions, dont know if you fly those things anymore. And we will lose a bunch of these things over time. It is supposed to be a one in 1 billion chance and return to be one in 1 million, that is 1000 times below the standard. Were you satisfied with what the faa offered when you asked mister dixon about that document and who knew about it and the decisionmaking process . What role it would be, to not ground the airplane. I did not have answers to that. We came across this document recently. Do you think that should have been a hard stop for the faa . That is when they should have made the decision . Since that is predicting a crash i cant tell you, 30, 45 years are produced, it is over one in 1 billion. 12 that 109. Something will cause a critical failure. The head of safety came in to see me after that was reduced. In the transcribed interview with them, he never saw that document and there is a big problem there. Were you surprised in general by that . He doesnt seem to know much of anything. Great. [inaudible conversations] i dont know what the impetus is. This was even if you think about 45 years of flight this is more than one to the 109 which should have signaled alarm bells but it didnt but we will be getting into that. The statement says something to the effect we use this to validate the decision of a warning to pilots. They sent out the warning to pilots but they thought it was sufficient even though they came up and said 15 of these planes will go down over the life of the fleet. That should have been the warning to pilots was not sufficient. Thank you, mister chairman. To get through [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] House Democrats move ahead with articles of impeachment against donald trump charging him with abuse of power and obstruction of congress. Read the text from the articles of impeachment on our website cspan. Org impeachment and at 9 am eastern members of the Judiciary Committee convene to write the final language. Watch cspan 3 through the markup process. The based on amendments and votes to move the impeachment proceedings to the house for. Follow the impeachment process live on cspan 3, online, cspan. Org or listen live on the free cspan radio apps. Defense secretary mark esper and mike milley testified for the house armed services, the. Both received questions about the decisions withdraw troops from syria and the turkish invasion that followed. [inaudible conversations]