Cafeteria and i hope you can all come back. Please, thank you. I was always all the way back here and the republicans called a doomed to fail procedural worlds. I have to go back to the floor again. Here is our time around here. Lets proceed to questions. Since i just got back i want to gather myself for a minute. Okay. I presume will be five minutes. I had to ask. Thanks. I want to thank the folks for being here. Doctor im seeing it discussion regarding Human Factors where the issues were looking at Going Forward and how we change if we should change i think we should how we change acidification process and what changes ought to be made. How should we think about incorporating Human Factors analysis into the certification of airplanes . The daca report talks quite a bit about and we concur with the recommendations to emphasize Human Factors more in a certification process. The real value certification is getting a second set of eyes and what is going on. Its way too easy for even very knowledgeable wellintentioned engineers to make incorrect assumptions or errors in their analysis and the ability to have that independent set of eyes looking at whats going on in the process is being used in the outcomes of the results, i think is a showdown early valuable. We need to make sure those teams are equipped with well qualified Human Factors engineers who understand a lot of the complexities of Human Behavior that are involved in these sorts of events particularly with things like automation and alarm situations such as we saw here. In your opinion you may not have an opinion or knowledge maybe someone else does, that have an answer to lock him die. Does the faa currently have people in line to redact Human Factors analysis of airplane designs in system designs . Yes. The faa has at some very well qualified Human Factors professionals. Doctor insider certification of human factor side and very knowledgeable about this. I think the issue is one of having enough people and having those people involved in that process slash other getting the information they need our involved all along the way. That is the most valuable way to incorporate the. You cant just lose empathy and you really have to be involved early on and continuously. Anyone else want to answer that question from an factors skills. Keep really do the faa . Mr. Kyrsten and hearing testimony elicited last year some of the Vice President agreed to conduct a thorough analysis to determine if you production environment has caused safety risks. Two knowledge was that analysis conducted . Thank you the microphone please. Not to my knowledge. Not to run all. It did you do any followup on that whose role would have been to follow up on high . The general managers responsibility with appropriate because of the other organizations like engineering in that circumstance, was mr. Campbell within the over the a or was youre concerned made into the olc a at boeing or was this outside of that . This was a discussion i had with him oneonone. It was involving anybody else. If you argument in a testimony that this is the problem with pressure because of economic factors only problem with the way boeings organized to build and certified airplanes . Drew phrase that again congressman . Is your argument or the point youre making with you testimonies a very good point, because of economic part is only or because of a problem with how boeing cases doj . I dont have a comment about the olivier as far as economic factors go, im not an economist. Why issues were what i saw in the factory in the environment and the things that were happening at the time when those plans were being built and i was in there when the second plane was built. I retired prior to that. That was my concern. I will say just on the topic theres been a lot of discussion about certification process and a lot of discussions on the left side if you will of the process which is the design and the flight training. The right is on the far right which is called the production and boeing has issued a certificate that expects every plane built with the same incredible quality, so thats a really important part of the airplane process airplane certification that we should forget. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. I recognize myself now. Current harks. Weve heard from some through these hearings who have said well if this had happened with u. S. A european pilots, who would not have been a problem because theyre superior training can, yet i believe you were aware of u. S. And european pilots who knew this problem was coming and simulator and around successful and managing it. Is that correct . I am aware of some anecdotal tests that were done with european and north american pilots i went to the airplane. Over speed conditions. I dont believe this evidence that could support the premise that exclusively new to the countries that these accidents were caused by this. Also i think was a you who used the word pen the moon . What are you referring to there. . The fact that when this situation occurs, when the airplane breaks ground you get somewhere between seven simultaneous very distracting really the color in your hands shaking you as a pilot the train comes into how do you sort through the and when you come back to the commonality and sort through that where priority without much noise with the simultaneous failures the word pandemonium is. I think hes had coughing easter where there used. Ive had go off an airplane with passengers and verify itself is enough of a challenge much less now compounded with six to seven other simultaneous warnings and failures, it would be a real hand for. That would fit into the Human Factors approach of solving a pilot could solve that . That was a big factor pilots could respond in three seconds it is a lot of things has to be a recognized to a well trained procedure. We had all kinds of competing alerts mr. Pearson. He mentioned id like to revisit it after your persistence when you finally getting to see how this have been 37 program what you just give us a little color on that meeting . A little more than a testimony. Congressman, here referring to our july 18th or 2018 meeting, as far as just commentaries in the meeting started though the fallout of the evil that i had rain requesting such shut down. I worked in the office and they asked me why youre here, and im here to follow up to my earlier communication with you. He asked me how i was going and i explained it was getting worse in my opinion, and that i echoed my recommendations. How did the person looking at that point and we talked gettable putting overtime records and how much work they were asking about human employees and thats obviously really important, but also the managers are overseeing them and then the engineering quality analysis that are requested to be done to see if there was any possible issues require us to alert our customers. And nothing changed . Not to my knowledge. I retired in august. We asked to see you in the last hearing off to pick of the recommendation from you, did you close down the line and on the abuse you asked for over time of years they were disregarded were you positive from your experience with the navy, this would say no. Weve got to stop, and revisit this. And you know, and fix it, but he did say to you something about the navy isnt a profit making, was that . He said when i explained to him that in the military operations we have these kinds of indications with unstable safeties things we would stop. And he said that military is not a profitmaking organization. Now mr. Collins, your involvement in the issue regarding the placement of and lack of protection of the runner control cable, i understand it. In the end there were how many people involved in the non, wht did you call it a non concurrence . There was the srp non channel recommendation was rejected, and the board recommendation. So i think it was a total of 13 engineers, one project pilot and four managers documented they did not agree with the decision. And this was to the best of your knowledge of overruled by a single manager who is in the off bowing in washington state. Yes he was in a consolidated office he was the manager at the time that signed it and took responsibility. Others supported other managers supported him. And there were questions raised by the minority that we should bring in former faa administrator or someone else. To the best of your knowledge did the decision on, and only this is one decision and there have been others and we are gonna track these down. But do you think anyone higher up like in the National Office was involved in the better cable issue or even aware of it . While the safety, srp report that the boards recommendation, the manager had to come back and explain why he disagreed with that. That went up to air two, the Deputy Director of aircraft certification. The earlier decision, it has been my experience in issues like this they are discussed with the aircraft certification s deputy or director. And that is someone based washington. Yes in washington. Good that is a string to follow for us we will see what goes from there. Thank you, that is helpful. With that i dont have any questions at the moment and i recognize were presented nor. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i appreciate you inviting these witnesses as well. Because they have broadened our understanding i think i would like to begin with mr. Pearson because your testimony as i understood it focused primarily on the written washington factory. But in past hearings, ive raised things about the South Carolina factory which makes the boeing 787 dreamliner. There we have reports of concerns by employees of defective manufacturing. Even pressure not to report violations. Each time my office raised concern with boeing representatives, they have assured me and my staff that the problems found in South Carolina were not systemic. Your testimony indicates some of the same issues were present and written and washington. To your knowledge how widespread were are these issues do you believe . Mr. Pearson. Yes congresswoman, i have no experience with the South Carolina facility. But what you speak of, i did witness at the written factory. And there are certainly and an ornament amount of schedule pressure placed on the employees and we had a lot of challenges with the parts when the factories running well, then we kind of had a cascading problem and it just kind of got out of hand. I dont know why we would want to do that. Without making sure that the faa should go farther in would you one that . Of the faa doing investigation of the boeing factories . I would encourage that i would be encouraged or the faa would go in and do a thorough investigation. I really feel that is necessary. And i guess it before not even going in and identifying but maintaining the president the presence going into the future. Mr. Collins you say that the culture, at the faa shifted from supporting faa technical specialist to favoring industry positions. This is something that concerned me and my questions this morning. I would like to know what immediate steps you think faa leadership can take to return the agency to a culture of safety. You apparently experience when you first began . Yes i think the culture has evolved so would take something to turn it around. Maybe i had experience working with Flight Standards for a bit and they rewarded employees with who raise safety issues. They rewarded employees and managers to address safety issues, that would be a good help. I mean ive heard but i dont have evidence, that managers bonuses and things were based on impart applicants schedules. What. For projects finishing on time. Isnt that what leadership tell about . They cant change and a comprehensive way if you dont have somebody at the top of a complicated organization forcing change down. Do you think the present leadership, for example, at faa has the capacity to bring that kind of change, or make that kind of change happens at boeing . Well, and i can speak to the faa. At the faa i think they have the ability to do that but i think is going to take work to change the culture at the Different Levels it is evolved over time. Yes, and apparently this has by now built into the culture of places like boeing, thats what my question to mr. Pearson was about what you see it one boeing factory wont be the case at another. It seems to me that given what we have learned, there are issues with boeing. It is going to be on us if we do not take the steps to systematically look at boeing factories across the united states. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Since thank you gentle lady. Thank you, doctor ensley of the faa is looking at in incorporating Human Factors in consideration of design and certification process. Can you tell me about that . Yes that was one of the recommendations to the j atr and we certainly concur with that. What needs to be done is to increase the staff, thats available. We also need to increase research thats needed to look at the weather were having challenges with such as multiple learning with lots of interactions. This needs to be done to enable the certification to really consider Human Factors. I think its really important that they are part of that team and that they get the kind of data thats needed in the process. From the analysis to looking at the design, to reviewing test procedures and test results. And thats really important thing to be incorporated all the way through. That was sort of my second question as well. So you are talking about multiple factors, multiple Human Factors in the beginning of your statement. Yes. So Human Factors is really looking at every aspect of how humans perceive think, how they move, all of the human characteristics and human capabilities and limitations. And in designing the systems to be compatible with how we work and how to guard against were some of our known failure points are. So its a systematic way of divide signing system based on the research on how they work. And thats really the way to improve human performance. It works to not only improve the efficiency of your system but to guard against errors that lead to accidents. Some people freeze. Other people the adrenaline starts to flow. So that will be difficult unless they are trained consistently how to react to specific problems, dont you think . Training is extremely important its of what we look at with Human Factors. The first thing we want to do is design the system appropriately. Very hard to train for bad design. You want to design it appropriately first. And then he went to train people. In training people on what to do an emergency situation is important. Its very important for doing things like automation, automation failures, and getting into these sorts of edges of the envelope for the automation does not behave properly. And you have to really expose people to that know what cues look like, how to prioritize information, how to respond, how to communicate. Those wellearned behaviors can be executed much more smoothly when the real thing happens. How do we tackle that automation surprise . We try to avoid it. So the way we have to address it is one, training some people actually get good training on the automation which didnt happen in these accidents. But we know its very important for automation its very complex. Even if you are an experienced pilot they dont know how the operation is going to happen. Training is important. The other thing is really the displays we provide. Even well trained pilots are going to the right thing if they dont get the right information. For example here, they didnt have information on what theyre doing. They didnt have the information to even understand the angle of the tax sensors were disagreed, or had a problem with it. They did not have the information they needed. To overwrite it so to speak . So having all the procedures and all the training wont work if you dont have the situation information. Thank you youll back my time. Thank you gentle lady. Thank you chairman, mr. Pearson thank you very much for being here today. It gives me a great deal of comfort to know that there are people like yourself out there, that when you see something wrong you are willing to speak out. And let people know what is going on and how you feel. I think as someone who travels on planes is very comforting to know that you would try to do the right thing. You went to the management, they ignored you. And this morning, i just cant believe that after all we have gone through, this morning we finally got a commitment for mro investigate. Theyre going to investigate all of your emails and the reasons that happens. So that is amazing to me after all of this time, it took this hearing for them to just to even look and investigates what your comments were. So, i thank you. You are reckoned youre welcome mr. Congressman, its the right thing to do. Was this person with unique employees with boeing or just because of the 737 max and how to get them out . Or was this something that was all the time at boeing . Is it a cultural pressure to push push push . In my experience at boeing the other positions i was in at boeing, i didnt see that. It was my vantage. It was the factory, it was in the Production Facility, thats where the pressure and the scheduling after 30 years the military i never thought that level of schedule pressure put on people. When you put people in that kind of pressure, and theyre tired, mistakes are made. And i think the doctor would agree with that. Can you give me other examples of what was going on . I am not reversed on the factory and some of the issues. What you saw. Well very quickly with you the factory everything is planned. Everything is planned in is supposed to be done in accordance with their faa approved production certificate. And when things are working fine, parts are getting delivered on time, the people are working in position, the plane moves down the line and is benchley is properly flight tested et cetera. So the end of 2,172,018, what i started observing and thats why been adamant about talking to others at the site. We started having flights with our parts being delivered and it wasnt just big parts like the engines, but which was a chronic problem, we had other things they were very important. Every part of the plane is very important but wiring and wire bundles are really important things. This starts to lead to a lot of out of sequence work. So resources are stretched. People are used to working in one position or two are now being asked to work all the way down to the factory and maybe even outside. And so that means the managers are also stretched. And the equipment is stretched. Theres a lot of stuff going on. And its very challenging in my opinion to route maintain a level of quality that we are expected to maintain. Do stay in touch with some of your former workers and coworkers . You know i have a lot of friends at boeing and for the most part havent, with the exception of two employees, been in contact with. I decided it wasnt really the right thing to do, to talk to them about what i was trying to do and get the investigators to go look. So i havent really talked to them. Its been. I was wondering if that same process is happening today . Has anything changed . Thats a great question and again im really encouraged faa is going to go and enjoy a thorough investigation. Talk to employees, and start with the employers who are actually building the plane. The people who are the mechanics, the elect tronics, the inspectors. Those of the people are getting get the best perspective overall of how things are going and how how the doing. There is a lot of data and production reports theres a lot to look out. Im encouraged theyre committed to do that. See encouraged by what mr. Dixon said this morning that he is going to followup on this. I am encouraged, im a little skeptical right now mr. Congressman. Well chairman i hope our committee follows up and make sure hed says hes gonna do what he said hes going to do this morning. I can can guarantee you we will follow through with that and make sure he follows up on that commitment. In my. Appreciate mr. Pearsons persistence in this matter. With that i recognize bromley. Thank you, mr. Chairman i just want to also note to the committee thats concerning to me is that mr. Pearson also reached out to ntsb and to the department of transportation and his effort to get someones attention. And in both cases with ntsb and the Department Transportation they did not take any action from your notifications. Is that correct . It is correct congresswoman that it wasnt effort to try to get the investigators as trying to get to them and share information and it took over three months before theyd even agreed to meet with me. They did not want to receive the documents. What eventually they did meet with me they offered to give me 15 minutes. And my attorneys and myself said thats not nearly enough time so they only gave an hour and a half, and at the end of it all they said they referred us to the department of transportation ig. And said that is outside their scope. That we had asked him to once again pass information to the investigators then take him out it was the beyond the scope of their responsibilities and investigation. Thank you, i heard a podcast on boeing probably six or eight months ago, i cant remember how long it was. But it was another boeing whistleblower who was talking about production of the airplane and the intensity that boeing was putting on the employees to produce and produce in a timely way. And in this podcast they referenced the fact that they were directed at one time the there were engines that were not allegedly fully functioning and they were marked and painted in a way that said there is some malfunction going on with the engine. And in this push to move the Assembly Line they were actually instructed to go use an engine off of that item if you ever observed anything like that the podcast went on to say that there were tools and so forth left in the belly of the plane or the tale of the plane just sort of lost sloppy work that was not being inspected and just you know, i dont know if you witnessed anything like that . Congresswoman i did not work in South Carolina if thats what youre asking about. I dont ever remember anyone saying anything that going get a pardon that wasnt approved. I never saw that. Okay very good. And mr. Collins in terms of talking about the faa culture, and how it really needs to change, when you were was there a crash that occurred when you were employed by the faa . Yes, i actually investigated two accidents. One was near france and tahiti that ran off the runway and nobody was hurt. The other was the twa 800 accident where everybody died. I was at the hangar, i was the lead faa engineer on it when it became clear that it was a fuel tank explosion. And renew her at the faa in those incidents occurred, did you see changes in the way faa operated . Did you see changes in the culture of the organization . It was kind of under the initial culture we did a lot of work. We work to prove safety. There were hundreds of directives as we learned about different failures that could create ignition sources. It was really after implementation of the 2,001 fuel tank safety rule a few years later, where i saw industry resistance and management supporting it start to creep in. Would you say that was the beginning of a cultural change starting to happen . Yes that was my first started seeing engineers not concurring on issue papers. I dont remember that happening before them. That was in 2,000 to 2,003 ish. That wasnt just the boeing it was within a manufacturer . No it was across the board with manufacturers. Its not just boeing. Thank you sir i yield back. If i could add, that example was the most dramatic because theres really unprecedented to have that many people document their disagreement like that. Thank you. I like to thank the gentle lady and we will follow up on that. You mention the name of one individual who we are going to seek to discuss this with, you mentioned there were others. Do you happen to recall their names . When they overruled everybody. On the rudder control issue . Yes, one of the managers was a Victor Wicklund he was manager. We are looking at pursuing more interviews with the faa. And the other was jeff dubin. I actually i thought was the ng, the engine was slightly smaller than the previous versions. And therefore, at that not had failure spreads even though the max engine was much larger, they thought it would be very dependable and never have an engine failure. How do you know that . I agree as a propulsion engineer i didnt see a validity in that argument. The energy rotor, and you have to on the airplane side assume you get the engine contained a failure and you protect against it. When the engine is being approved, their job is to show that its not going to eject parts. But on the airplane side on the installation sides you have to assume its having those failures and protect the airplane from those failures. Thank you. So, you would say that during your lengthy tenure with the faa, and you just mentioned it in response to representative brownlee, you saw a change aftee non concurs before to the fuel tank issue. Yes it kinda creeped and after that. You never saw in your 30 years one where that many people got non concurred and got overruled . No, and that we had the part of the new voluntary reporting process that broadens specialists that werent working on the project, and reviewed it and came to the same conclusion as those with the issue paper. And then that was overruled. It was disappointing to go through that process and not see any change. What you think is, i think it would be impossible without oda, and i agree. If youre going and some aspects of the plane, some things, my concern is anything that will take a plane down the faa should be directly, fully informed of and directly involved in. What you think about the current process and how might we change it . I agree, when i first started i was taught to the federal aviation regulations define the minimum level of safety. And this is where it the needs compliance, Lessons Learned from accident should be incorporated in that. There are a lot of exceptions under 2101 for the new rules arent incorporated in another type design. And exemptions also. Worked too often to me, the interest of the applicant was again over the interest of the traveling public. One example in my testimony is about an exemption that was granted for fuel quantity and wires in the fuel tank. Were a time limit was granted on the 737 and five years is all it takes for a new type design. At the end of the four years, no changes been made, and it was a permanent exemption exist granted instead of making the manufacturer fix it. You have a lot of years in the air and i think you flew earlier versions of the 37, and one of the hearings i showed an image of a flight deck from a 100. And in the image of a flight deck from the max. And it just really didnt look like the same plane. Do you think we should consider how many times you can amend a certificate versus actually going through certification . Its an incremental step process so that pilots, i flew the 20300 and theres quite a bit of difference between those two. To the. That we finally split the fleets, were only 200 pilots would only fly those. We in essence treated it like a separate airplane. And some airlines have been willing to do that and others were for economic reasons have elected not to. There is a lot of difference between amax and the firstgeneration 737. I think it would be unreasonable to ask the pilot to fly a one or 200 on monday wednesday friday and on tuesday thursday fly amax. The incremental steps that were taking, i can understand how the faa approved it. But i think the 737 is a bit unique. I dont think we have another airplane in the fleets that has as many derivative types of certificates or that has been in service as long. And i dont think therell be another version of the 737. I think the max is the last one. So i think the problems to some degree is going to cure itself. Yes on with anybody can answer this, but they are trying to amend the certificate for the triple seven with folding wings. And say that this doesnt require recertification. Im not aware of any commercial transport aircraft that have folding wings. It seems like a pretty radical departure. It is, but as an example the 20 and 21, there were subtle differences between the three airplanes, but for the most part they flew virtually identically. The 73730400 were very close. The 73770800 are very close. So there are cases where these types are, the differences are minor but the differences are significant. I guess at that. , i dont think i have further questions which when, where am i. Kevin cox of former pilot and safety consultant. How important is it for a pilot to be knowledgeable and trained on a new Flight Control words unique such as mcas . I think the training is critical in the fact that the assumption was made that the pilots would instantly recognize inappropriate stabilizer trim movement. With 737 starting with the 300 series, that trim system moves because of the system known as a speed trim system. So you would have to recognize that movement in and of itself, on command and movement by the pilots in and of itself, would not necessarily be a term runaway. And when you have multiple failures that are going on, the recognition of an mcas activation would be much more difficult. Hence that needs to be trained as a possibility that if you see a stick shaker that comes on with multiple failures, recognized at the moment the flaps are retracted, you may get a significant nose down inputs. That was not done. That training, i think that lack of, the failure of that training to be widely disseminated is a contributor here. Okay thank you, and doctor ensley, again Human Factors, mcas, at least in the first plane, the first accident not in the manual. Do you think in terms of Human Factors approach that pilots should have been made aware something was running in the background that can radically alter the behavior of the airplane . Absolutely. Its very hard to understand and diagnose with the plane is doing when something youve never even heard of. They didnt have any information about why was acting erratically. And as captain cox just pointed out, and they did not even have good cues that would match up to running the procedure that it going assumes it would able to run. It was a whole combination of factors, no information of the flight manual, no training, no adequate display of the worst cost possible combination. Thank you. I know it kept a long time is of the last question and i might ask anybody and everybody who wants to respond, what do you think is the biggest concern this committee should focus on concerning the faas capability of overseeing boeing and production, and novel systems given everything youve heard here today. And i will start with captain cox. I think based on the things that ive heard today in what ive learned over the months of watching this, i would encourage the committee dont get too focused. The rope data report was very good and taking a holistic view. There is not a single cost of this accident. And you have a rare opportunity, if the committee will view it in its entirety of the complexity. You can help significantly improve safety Going Forward. And i think thats been reinforced here. Theres an awful lot of focus on the fna. Thats an awful lot of focus on boeing. And theyre two of of the major contributors to these tragedies. They are not the only ones. So i would encourage in the strongest possible terms, keep the focus broad. I would agree in terms of the aoa, we did have a company that had prepared the a eai think it was a lion air, they have lost their license. Yes, sir, and if i might, the installation of that angle of attack sensor on the lion air airplane, there is a calibration that has to be followed. And the Maintenance Department signed off that they did it. It is not possible that they did. No because. Because that specifically with the procedures for is to see the accuracy of the output. To come full circle, this is the reason i said theres a lot of contributing factors. I get that. Doctor ensley do you . Yes there is been several discussion here today and previously in the press about concerns about the culture at both boeing and the faa. That sort of underlie a lot of the failures we saw, and the process, and being good design. The faa administrator and boeing have made a number of announcement the things theyre going to do to try to fix that. We are glad to see that. Changing culture is really hard. It doesnt just, you cant just give it one shot and its done. Its something you have to do every day. It has a lot more to do with actions than words. And so the importance of really following up on those actions, of taking safety issues very seriously and reprioritizing safety with regard to production and scheduling, those changes require a lot of continued interaction by management. Thats in a require bringing in a lot of people who are knowledgeable about these things to get those changes moved through the organization. Theyve been talking about the importance of Safety Culture for the last 20 years. Its something we really need to emphasize as well as solving some of these basic process problems. I agree with you on that one 100 . In my first meeting mr. Dixon when he was nominated, i talked to him what i would do is a principalities within faa who seem resistant to administrators and changes from that level. He assured me he was going to be reaching down and the organization and try to change the culture. So mr. Collins. I growth everything she said about changing the Safety Culture. When administered dixon talked about was all hands meetings, and things. I think he needs to get down in the working level more. Talk to groups of people. I was a union representative, the union reps feel little more free and protected in discussing issues than most employees. Talk to them and the offices to see, im, i want to talk about the conversation of resources. You could use more aerospace engineers, and maybe manage resources better. But the lesson i would like to leave is that when you have those resources and they identify safety issues, that really concerns me. The ones that are missed, you can do better oversight, but when managers are aware of safety issues, compliance issues, i wish serbia Culture Shift so they would be more credibility and more thought to compliance versus production schedules and things. Thank you. And finally mr. Pearson. Congressman iselin to keep it simple. First on the investigation, the detailed investigation of the Production Facility is definitely in order. Very important thing is to maintain the presence in the factory. I shouldve mentioned earlier that i was there for three years and honestly i never saw, i never met an faa employee in my three years. Really. Yes i dont remember hearing my employees say that they talk to nfa employers. Somebody said maybe they should be wearing a jacket so that we know that they are faa. We are not getting things solved by her normal chain we need regulators to do that. Blessings i would say was that you could have the most amazing design, by the most brilliant engineers and flown by the most talented pilots. But if you have a tired mechanic, or an electrician this overworked or a technician that is stressed because they havent had a chance to take care of their family because they been working so many hours, it could all be for not. So dont lose sight of the fact that we have to do the whole thing. From the design, all the way out to the ongoing production. And into the future. Thanks, and just reflecting on your comment about not seeing an faa employee on the floor. I mean a number of years ago i raised concerns as we move more toward an agency, this was more in terms of maintenance and production. But where they were spending much less time at maintenance facilities and more time reviewing paperwork they received from maintenance facilities, and i think thats vital for them to actually have a presence. They may not personally observe something while they are there, but it may be some employee would want to come up to them and say they have got them concerns you hear from the faa, one should hear this. Absolutely. Thank you all very much for your allowance of time. I appreciate your testimony and we are going to continue with his investigation. I went again give my condolences to the families and thanks you for your constructive. Wait i have to do some stuff. I have my script. This open until witnessed such times the mission questions can be submitted in writing. Order that i must consent the record remain open for 15 days for additional comment. Information to be submitted by witnesses with the records is so ordered. And again i thank you and i have nothing else to add. So the committee stands adjourned. [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] are boeing officials agreeing as well . A lot of them are lawyering up, we have to deal with their lawyers. Ill get transcripts or summaries. Can you give us a sense of where it goes from here, so i sort of a timeline . This is unprecedented this is over 200 years of history. So i do not have a defined endpoint and were still pulling threads. There are some of the minorities how high does this go. And i have that same question. Its a decision to overrule, if its higher up, we need to find out about that. Today we get a few threads to a few people, and one thread it sounds like comes back to the National Office. It is a certification issue or rethink the agency went awry by allowing boeing to proceed without protecting that cable. So what are the major gaps for you listening to all you have. We still are not totally sure certain of how it was ever allowed to put this airplane in the air, at a critical system and a single. Of failure. That is not done. And also with this challenging. We have, i am not aware of this, and i would hope there is no other Passenger Transport airplane in the world flying there going to predict were gonna lose a bunch of these things. Over time. Its supposed to be a one in a billion chance. In it this case it end up one and a million. Thats a thousand times below the standard. Review at all satisfied with anything the faa offered when you asked about when you asked mr. Dixon about that document and who knew about it . And what decisionmaking . No i did not get a new answer of how it was circulated who sought, and wrote rules made in the decision to not ground the airplane. No i did not get any answers on that. But he assured me they would follow up on that or we are going to followup on that. We just came across this document recently, its one of the 500,000 weve got. Do you think that should been a hard stop for the faa when they got that report back . Is that when they shouldve made the decision of 2018 . When that is predicting at crash with a way more, and i cant tell you its 3045 years they produce, how much they fly, but i believe that was a way over there one in a billion chance. And thats the standard they are supposed to follow. One to the ten minus nine. One and a billion chance that something on the plane is going to cause a critical failure. Sewn your mind that she indeed should build on the ground the plane. And im very disturbed that the head of safety came in to see me after that report was produced. He did not mention it. Tell me as a oneoff. And in our transcribed interview with him, he said he never saw that document. Will theres a big problem there. Three surprised in general about this thing . Guess i dont know what he does on a daily basis since he doesnt seem to know anything. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. [background noises] there is not supposed to be an airplane certify the nine states of america or anywhere, i dont know what the overseas are. But ours to the ten minus the nine if there is a thorough be an issue to cause fracture. If you think about over 45 years of flight this is way more one to the ten minus nine which means that should have brought on alarm bells, and apparently it didnt. And we are going to be getting into that. To the statement basically said something to the effect that we use this disorder validate our decision and about the warning to pilots et cetera. No, they said they sent out a warning to pilots they thought that was sufficient even though they came up with a document that said that 15 of these planes or can i go down over the life of the fleet. That shouldve been waiting minute, the warning to pilots was not sufficient. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. [background noises] [background noises]