American public for one reason. Vietnam. Johnson is the president identified with the vietnam war, although there is a famous quote from october 13, 1967 where he said to a journalist, this is not Lyndon Johnsons war. This is americas war. If i drop dead tomorrow, this war still be here. He was right. But the way it was fought has been ascribed to Lyndon Johnson. It is considered his tragedy, failure, the trail, depending on your position of the spectrum. There are two books both entitled Lyndon Johnsons war, and both advancing compelling if contradictory analyses of the reasons behind the series of decisions made between 1964 and 1868 that led to justification for escalating the war, the gulf incident of 1964, the first landing of u. S. Combat troops to defend the base in 1965, the stepped up escalation of forces in the country over the next two years until the total was greater than half a million men, the changeover from based security to enclave security, to finally what was called search and destroy. The shock and humiliation of the tet offensive and johnsons decision to turn down a request by William Moreland for 200,000 more troops and johnsons decision to withdraw from the 1968 president ial race. Certainly there is ample justification for referring to vietnam as Lyndon Johnsons war. He escalated more steeply than any president , troop levels peaked during his presidency. Most of the 58,000 who died, died while he was in office. There are also important senses in which it was not his. He didnt make the commitment to preserve the amount from communism or french indochina. That dates back to harry truman. Johnson didnt create the nation of South Vietnam as an independent entity allied with the united states. That happened when Dwight Eisenhower was president. And vietnam was not his more in the sense he really didnt want to fight it. There is a slew of biographers that have made clear the last thing johnson wanted was to be a war president. He had a domestic agenda, the Great Society. He was by far the most liberal president we have ever had, if we define it in the manner it has come to be defined in the last 100 years. He believed in the capacity of the federal government to affect positive change in domestic arena. You understand nothing if you dont get that. He experienced grinding poverty growing up in texas. And he had seen the capability of the federal government to alleviate the suffering of millions of americans. This was his passion and what he hoped would be his legacy, reform in domestic politics. He felt totally illequipped in the field of foreign affairs, unlike his predecessors john f. Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower and richard nixon, all of them thought they excelled at Foreign Policy and found Domestic Affairs a chore and kind of tedious. Johnson, who grew up idolizing franklin roosevelt, wanted to carry through what he saw was the unfulfilled promise of the new deal. Nipped it in the bud. He wanted to carry it through to fruition. Vietnam, as johnson recognized from the moment he was thrust into office, was an obstacle. The war was consuming a great deal of money even in 1963. He had a domestic agenda he knew would require massive funding. The war was a potential siphon funding. Siphon but it was also a commitment. President s dont renege, especially if those are widely perceived to have been made by a recently assassinated president. As johnson put it in one of his most voted remarks which points out the distinctly gendered way in which he conceptualized problems, i knew i would be crucified whichever way i moved. If i left the Great Society, then i lose everything at home. All my hopes. If i left the war and let the communist takeover South Vietnam, i would be seen as a coward and my nation and appeaser and we would both find it impossible impossible to republish anything anywhere. Accomplish anything anywhere. As a journalist writes, Lyndon Johnson had always drained of being the greatest domestic president of this century. He had become without being able to stop it a war president and not a very good one. How did this happen . What happened to his dreams . A good place to start looking is to start with the dynamics playing into the president ial lection of 1964. Even though it was a total blowout, it was one of the most significant contest in American History. The candidate views of the future of america diverged so wildly that it is one of the few elections where you can see the electorate making a choice about which way it wants the country to move. The election doesnt have to be close to be fascinating. Look at roosevelt versus uber in 1932 or reagan and carter in 1980. Johnson inherited the vietnam commitment from kennedy. There were roughly 16,000 u. S. Advisors in South Vietnam and the situation was crumbling. The man who succeeded the South Vietnamese leader, he was utterly incompetent. He was no administrator. He lasted a few weeks in office and was succeeded by someone who was slightly more competent but also corrupt and from to passing on misleading reports to his american benefactors. That is one thing johnson has inherited. Johnson also inherited the kennedy teams. They were the best and the brightest. It is customary for a new president to choose his own cabinet but johnson believed and with some justification, that his transition into office would be easy. He believed the National Trauma might be less acute if he kept kennedys cabinet. Dean rusk remained, secretary of state. Mcgeorge bundy, and most important robert mcnamara. As we know from the testimony of many people at the time, johnson was in absolute awe of these men. He felt insecure in foreign affairs, as much a master in Domestic Affairs, he was a tenderfoot when it came to Foreign Policy. He felt he needed the services of these brilliant and worldly advisors. Kennedy is killed in november 1963. Johnson became president almost exactly a year before the next election which meant he had to start running for Office Almost immediately. The area in which he knew he was weakest, in which a republican opponent would be able to score the most points was in Foreign Policy, his lack of experience. One event everybody seems to forget which was terribly important at the time was the communist chinese explosion of a nuclear bomb in action 64. This increased the perceived threat of china to the west. There is a racist dimension to this. In the minds of most american policymakers, the soviets, although evil, were at least perceived as intellectually sophisticated enough you could negotiate with them. They would accept the rational proposition that no gains could be worth a nuclear confrontation. American policymakers in the mid century a different view of asians. Iran into a document in the National Archives in college park, maryland in which eisenhower used that, you never can tell about these fanatical easterners. They seem to be willing to sacrifice millions of lives to attend their objectives attain their objectives. There was a fear about possible nuclear war especially with the communist chinese as 19 secure or drew closer. Johnson had a dilemma. He had to appear tough on communism. No one could get elected in 1954 if he was and appeaser. He also had to assure the americans he would not take measures that would lead to a nuclear holocaust. It is a allison act. And the republicans made matters easy by nominating arizona senator marigold water, a hawkish cold warrior whose freemarket small government philosophy could not have been more at august with the Great Society at odds with the Great Society. Barry goldwater was without question the most conservative candidate of a major party since the 1920s, since calvin coolidge. Many historians consider goldwater a pioneer of the reagan revolution. Goldwater made a remark during the campaign that we are told many people lack skills and cant find jobs, because they didnt have education. It is like saying people have big feet because they have big shoes. The fact is people that have no skills or education for the sum same reason, low intelligence or low ambition. In Foreign Policy management, johnson and goldwater differed the most. Goldwater made a number of remarks that caused some pundits to dub him the mad bomber. He said i would like to live a nuclear bomb into the mens room at the kremlin. He actually said that. Why the mens room, i am not sure but it made people nervous. And then there was full of waters famous address at the Republican National convention when he accepted the nomination. He said, extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue, which when you think of it is a 1960 thing to say. Malcolm x. If you put them together in the same category, malcolm xs definition was different but the principle is the same. Johnson made great Political Capital out of goldwaters mad bomber image. Goldwaters slogan was in your heart, you know he is right. Johnson lampooned that with in your heart, you know you might. And this reached the most famous Political Television commercial in American History. Some of you may have seen this. It has been shown hundreds of times in documentaries. Let me show it to you now. Seven, six, 6, 8, 9, 9. 10, 9, eight, seven, six, five, four, 3, 2, 1, zero. These are the stakes, to make a world in which all of gods children can live or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die. Vote for president johnson on november 3. The stakes are too high for you to stay home. Not exactly subtle. It was a tremendously effective ad. Goldwater did score points on Foreign Policy, the alleged timidity in the face of communist provocation. Goldwater taunted johnson for not responding forcefully to the viet cong and North Vietnamese brutality. Why are you doing more to defend the ally . Johnson just killed goldwater in the greatest electoral triumph to that point. It seems ludicrous johnson doubted whether he would win. There were at least two pressing issues that caused him to feel he might lose. Barry goldwater might be elected president. There was a colossal scandal involving the chief aide Walter Jenkins in the in october 1964. He was caught in the mens room of a ymca with another man in a sexual encounter. This was long before gay liberation. There is no glee or broke back mountain. The American Psychiatric association didnt remove the diagnosis of homosexuality from its manuals list of mental until 1973. That is obscene but it is true. If you look at the press, not only do commentators revile him for his perversion, but they go on and on about how he is a Security Risk and susceptible to blackmail. Every story on this affair asked to what extent has American Security been compromised . What other risks does johnson have . All the way with lbj got a new connotation. Goldwater said lbj for moral decay. This is a month before the election. The other one is difficult to sum up. Goldwaters crowds when he came to speak, were hysterically adoring. He was treated like a rockstar star. They might have been only a small minority but they were as interpreted by a lot of pundits and quite a few members of johnsons own staff is representative of a golf larger groundswell for very goldwater. The fact is he was handsome and commanding. He was a skilled speaker with a feel for the wellchosen phrase, moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue. Lyndon johnson had to come to terms that he was just about, the least charismatic man ever to run for president. I might have to amend that. I know it is maddening to try to boil it down to personality but this was an issue with johnson and it has been for historians. If frequently affects scholarly judgment. Johnson once said to a former secretary of state in 1967, i have done more for new growth since negroes since linkedin. I have done more for poverty. Why dont people like me . She said because you are not a likable man. It is true. He just wasnt. Some of us just arent. Some of the most touching quotes you run across have to do with his enormous insecurity. His need to be liked. If you listen to the white house tapes, he has lengthy conversations with george reedy in which he talks about how poorly he comes across and describes himself as a hick and freckle belly and packer was surrounded by glittering Ivy League Kennedy people. And he wasnt wrong. He rubbed a lot of people the wrong way. He was an overbearing sweaty person. The theorist observes in a recent book, Lyndon Johnson tried his hardest by means of looking summer to the point of intestinal discomfort to convey integrity but made you think of a large quickly dishonest warner bros. Brewster, foghorn leghorn. Johnson taped all of his conversations while he was president. I would like to play you one from mr. Hagar from august 1964. This comes from a documentary about johnson and the makers of this had actors standing in for the people on the tape. The actors standing in for johnson doesnt look anything like him, but it is his actual voice around august 1964. Im saying i hope he was drunk. Go ahead, sir. Hello. You made me some real lightweight. I need about six pairs for summer wear. I want them a half inch larger in the ways than they were before except i want to or three inches of stuff left back in so i can take them out, 10 or 15 pounds a month. When you sit in the chair, the knife and your money comes out. I need another inch in the pockets. Another thing, the garage crotch is always a little too tight. Give me an inch to run out, because it cuts me. It is like writing riding a wire fence. See if you cant leave me about an inch from where the zipper ends round under the back of my bumhole so i can let it out if i need to. I would sure be grateful. [laughter] leader of the free world. Incidentally, michael, the Pulitzer Prize winning who edited the transcripts and turned into a book, he cuts off that conversation after i am riding a wire fence. He said the word bunghole is not appearing in my book. You have this unattractive insecure guy who doesnt feel comfortable with Foreign Policy and inherited the collapsing situation in South Vietnam and the kennedy name of the best and brightest advisors and believes he needs some gesture in the realm of Foreign Policy to prove he is not soft on communism. Number two, he is not a mad bomber like Barry Goldwater and number three, he can act in a mature president ial fashion when dealing with a crisis. He wants a gesture that doesnt appear as though it will siphon off a lot of money from the Great Society programs which he is constructing. They got his opportunity with what came to be known as the tonkin gulf incident of august 1964. Let me give you a background here. In november 1963, president john kennedy had approved the plan with the colorless name Operations Plan 34a. This entailed the South Vietnamese these commandos would blow up defensive positions, supply dumps, attack a coastal transmitter and usually traveled in u. S. Navy patrol boats. After meeting the targets, they would return to the base in South Vietnam. While they were supplying them, the u. S. Was providing advice. No american soldiers were involved. But the u. S. Navy was simultaneously carrying out topsecret spy missions on the coast of North Vietnam. These were codenamed de soto missions. These were conducted by large intelligence gathering destroyers that recorded radio and radar signals. The de soto missions were conducted in conjunction with the 34a raids. U. S. Navy would obtain information about facilities that would help the commandos of the raids. William bundy, the assistant secretary of state, he came up with the early draft of a resolution whereby the congress would delegate sweeping powers to the president in military emergency to take whatever action he seemed fit. Johnson wanted this because it would remove the war issue from the 1964 campaign and give him a huge Foreign Policy victory in which congress would have to rally around. All that was needed was an incident. That was provided august 2, 1964. What happened was this. On july 22, the destroyer maddox was ordered to the gulf of tonkin on a mission. On july 30, there were heavy raids against islands in the gulf. The next day the maddox arrived, and on august 1 it cruised within gun range of one of the two offshore islands that had been under attack by the South Vietnamese commandos. Then it returned to international waters. On august 2, three torpedo boats attacked the maddox. It opened fire and left one dead in the water, the other two were damaged but returned to port. On the maddox, radio intercepts of North Vietnamese traffic made clear North Vietnam considered the maddox court of the overall 34 operations taking place. It wasnt part of those. The Missions Work on related. But one can understand why the North Vietnamese leaders would have drawn the conclusion that they did. You have attacks and destroyers off shore. Obviously they are in conjunction. It is not unreasonable for ho chi minh to have made. That was cabled back to the pentagon. Johnson, reacting to this although it was totally unprovoked. He ordered the maddox back into the gulf of tonkin and ordered another destroyer, the turner joy, to reinforce the maddox. He also ordered two aircraft carriers into the gulf. On august 4, 1964, an extremely stormy night in the gulf of tonkin, radar and sonar operators on the maddox and the turner joint reported that the sea was alive with torpedoes. A few hours later when the phone the storm subsided, no one was sure there had been enemies at all. The commander on board the maddox radioed the headquarters, review of action makes many reported contracts entered desperadoes fired appearing doubtful. No actual sighting, suggests complete the valuation before any further action. And ulysses sharp, commander in chief of the pacific, sent that to the pentagon. It went to robert mcnamara. He sat down with the joint chiefs of staff to discuss whether or not it could be concluded on the basis of the evidence that a Second Attack against u. S. Ships had in fact taken place. During the deliberations while the camera was talking, Naval Intelligence provided him with intercepts of North Vietnamese radio flashes that convinced my mcnamara a Second Attack had taken place. To this day there is no Persuasive Evidence all the oceans of ink have been spilled arguing. I have read a lot of analyses of the gulf incident. I am confident in asserting the second alleged incident was an illusion. The best study of this episode is tonkin gulf and the escalation of vietnam war. I can recommend many other texts. For a long time the secretary of defense intercept the said the intercepted radio messages referring to combat between patrol boats and destroyers proved there was a Second Attack. But when the National Security agcy finally declassified the full set of intercepts in 2005 and 2006, it became clear there were glaring translation and dating problems with the august 4 messages. They were describing the combat on august 2 that had been misinterpreted to describe a later encounter. It was a rush to judgment. You may ask why did it take so long to become declassified. That is a good question. I would like to know. Doesnt square with my notions of democracy. A more deliberate approach would have revealed there had been no Second Attack, no second incident and number two, the first attack was almost certainly a case of the North Vietnamese retaliating what they thought was a part of aggression on behalf of the u. S. They werent overreacting. The only problem is Lyndon Johnson was in a hurry. He wanted to demonstrate his firmness and president ial resolve to the people because the people would be voting soon. On august 4, the same day of the second alleged attack, he met with a number of leaders and informed them he would submit a resolution to congress that would grant him lead way leeway in responding to the unprovoked act of war. He did not tell the congressional leaders about the 34a operations which were still secret and described the attacks as unprovoked. We did nothing to deserve this attack. Long story short, the tonkin gulf resolution sailed through congress with minimal debate. It passed unanimously 4160 and 882 in the senate. Wayne morse of oregon and one from alaska voted against him and only wayne morris, my hero, subjected a figure to difficult questioning. He gave johnson quite a fight. For three days, august 5 through seventh, he railed against the resolution, challenged the account of the gulf of tonkin. He predicted johnson would use this as a functional declaration of war. If you read it today, his diatribes for all most uncanny in their accuracy. Everything he said would happen happened. If it had been by anybody else, they might have been influencing more members of congress. But he was not influential. He was about the least popular legislator in washington. People thought he was a bore that would drone on. When he confronted robert my robert victim are a, he didnt have any clout. He asked whether the recent raid was in any way related to the activities of the destroyers. The South Vietnamese raids on North Vietnamese territory are taking place. Our destroyers are in the gulf. Are they related . Robert mcnamara said, our navy played no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of South Vietnamese actions if there were any. The attacks were deliberate and unprovoked assaults on American Naval vessels on routine patrol. I say this flatly. This is a fact. End quote. Robert said he didnt know about it. He said my statement was honest but wrong. It could be argued the secretary of defense should have known. Many historians conclude he is lying ended know about them but figured the war would be over quickly and no one would be the wiser. Although the resolution was never in jeopardy, johnson told senator william fulbright, from arkansas and chairman of the senate for relations committee, to secure passage of the resolution as fast as possible and by the largest possible vote. He was it an overwhelming win. Unanimous win. Anything less, he explained, would tarnish the image of unity that was so important to americas reputation. So fulbright, who later became a critic of the war, he portrayed it as a moderate measure calculated to prevent the spread of war. Fulbright went to work on doubters like George Mcgovern of south dakota and cooper of kentucky, he allayed fears the president would begin in power. He went to work on Gaylord Nelson of wisconsin. He wanted to call for efforts to avoid a direct military involvement in southeast asia. Fulbright told nelson that this is superfluous since the last thing we want is to become involved in a land war in asia. Nelson, to his regret, dropped his amendment. The Senate Approved it with only two people dissenting. The house passed it unanimously. And the language granted the president extraordinary latitude. According to the joint resolution, the Congress Approves the support of the present as commanderinchief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the u. S. And prevent further aggression. Wayne morris, my hero in this episode, stated to a virtually empty hall, all of his colleagues basically got home, he said we are giving this president warmaking powers in the absence of a declaration of war. I believe this to be a historic mistake. The other guy who voted against the resolution said all of vietnam is not worth the life of a single american boy. It covers everything. It demolished Barry Goldwater. If the president was a tenderfoot, then why have the congress voted unanimously to give him the power to wage war . He must have an admiral grasp or the congress wouldnt have abdicated its responsibility and allowed one man to decide what was appropriate. More important, the resolution was a wonderful counterpoint to Barry Goldwaters mad bomber image. Now the congress had passed it so overwhelmingly, Lyndon Johnson could do whatever he wanted. He could invade North Vietnam or drop a Hydrogen Bomb on hanoi. If you ordered conventional bombing and ticked up the number of advisors in South Vietnam, he looked like a moderate. It was a masterstroke, temporarily very rewarding but would have horrible costs in the long run. The gulf resolution has been condemned rightly as an absolutely inexcusable abuse of the public trust. The president deliberately misled the congress to obtain powers to wage war without a required declaration of war. He lied to the people and he put american soldiers in harms way in order to renew his own craft. This is one of those issues i talk about on the other hand it there really is no on the other hand. It was a rotten thing to do and johnson could be condemned for it. On the other hand, i have two stress these were not unprecedented powers the congress conferred. They had done the same thing on previous occasions. Once in 1955 when they granted Dwight Eisenhowers request for a formosa resolution and in 1957 when they granted the socalled eisenhower doctrine for the middle east. As we know from this course, ever since the onset of the cold war, congress had been loathe to limit president s. Congress gets very involved in taxation or infrastructure, but when it comes to Foreign Policy, they are willing to allow the president to chart his own course. I mentioned in a previous lecture, harry truman never got one to fight in korea in 1950. He was required to buy the restitution but didnt get it. It was not a war. It was a u. N. Police action. In 1954 eisenhower asked the congress to grant him the authority to launch an airstrike to relieve the French Garrison at dien bien phu. But in this instance congress, led by minority leader Lyndon Johnson, turned eisenhower down. It was too soon after korea. Memories were too fresh. But when the islands were being bombarded by the communist chinese in the straits of formosa and the mainland, eisenhower asked for what came to be known as the formosa resolution. It granted him the power to take whatever action he felt was necessary to protect the nationalist chinese on formosa. It was granted. In 1957 when there was evidence of communist insurrection in lebanon, eisenhower asked what he termed the eisenhower doctrine that gave him the freedom to protect interests in the middle east and Congress Passed this by an overwhelming margin. Johnson made clear without asking for the resolution that, i dont ask for anything beyond the discretion granted to eisenhower in 1955 and 1957. So while the manner was indefensible, it is some that itself was not unprecedented. The consequences were. I will see you next week. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] you can watch lectures in history every weekend on American History tv. We take you inside College Classrooms to learn about topics ranging from the american resolution to 9 11. That is saturday 8 00 p. M. And midnight eastern on cspan 3. Next, to historians present talks about world war ii. Donald miller discusses the Strategic Bombing of germany, followed by conrad crane who focuses on air power during the dday invasion of normandy. This is part of the world war ii annual conference. Our final panel, for what has been a great day and is only going to get better, is supremacy in the skies, allied air domination in europe. Moderating our panel, i have to say i feel a certain sigh of