Wow, along with these television companies, support c span2 as a public service. I want to welcome you to the 2023 american benefiel trust annual conference here in frankly, tennessee. We really appreciate you all coming out of being a part of this event. The next speaker is going to talk specifically about the battle here at franklin, which is one of the most famous, or infamous, battles of the American Civil War that took place in november 1864. Many of you will travel out to franklin to check out the battlefield site the next couple of days. We will have great historians, as well as aaron jacobson, part of the battle of franklin trust. He wants the carter house, which was the epicenter of the battle at franklin. We are excited to get you out to the battlefield. We know some of you are out here for the first time. We have done a lot of work with our partners out here. To hit that 56,000 acre mark, we had to do a lot of work in places like franklin, nashville, and beyond. The next speaker today is andrew bledsoe. He received his phd in history from Rice University in 2012 and teachers at Lee University in cleveland, tennessee. He is the author of citizen officers, the union and confederate junior officer corps in the American Civil War. That was published in 2015. It is a fantastic book. I have it at home. His latest book, decisions at franklin, the 19 critical decisions that define the battle , is set to publish this may through the university of Tennessee Press. He has been a fellow at the u. S. Military academy at west point, the Civil War Institute at gettysburg college, the u. S. Army heritage and education center, Ulysses S Grant president ial library, and the Virginia Historical society. Are happy to welcome him here. [ applause ] thanks for allowing an academic historian to serve as a kind of interloper among you and i really appreciate the opportunity. I teach afte hello, faq. Thanks to the benefiel trust, thanks to all of you for being here. Thanks for allowing an academic historian to serve as an interloper among you. I really appreciate the opportunity. I teach afternoon classes. I understand how difficult it can be to strive to stay alert and awake after lunch when you have had a long day. I will try to keep this going and try to keep us engaged here as we talk about the battle of franklin. All right. The night of november 30 and december 1, 1864 must have seemed endless for the union and confederate soldiers on the field in frankly, tennessee. With widespread confederate failure to break the union line, and with the onset of darkness, the fiercest of the fighting began to wind down by 7 00 p. M. Sporadic musket fire continued until about 9 00 p. M. When the moans and screams of the wounded and dying began to replace the popping sharpshooters and the crackle of fires. The night turned cold and windy, adding to the misery of the injured on the field when the eerie sound of music began to echo through the halfway. The defensive Union Soldiers began singing the battle cry of freedom. The assault of general at franklin came at a horrendous cost, including at least 6000 confederate casualties. Among the dead and wounded were some of the best among the union, i am sorry, the army of tennessee officer corps, including patrick labor, john brown, john adams, and others. The huge number of brigade commanders had become casualties as well, and also included among the dead and wounded were 68 field officers, including commanders of 55 regiments, 12 of them in the division. Remains unclear whether hood comprehended the incredible loss of Senior Commanders in the afternoon assaults , along with the obvious damage to his army command structure. And yet, it seems entirely certain that hood in the hours and days and weeks after franklin must have reflected on the sequence of actions and decisions that led his army to this valley of the shadow of death in the key role he and others played in charging that course towards ultimate disaster. Thinking about the scene on the night of that battle, walt whitman comes to my. He wrote, the shadowy forms of men and horses looming, large sized flickering. And the sky, far out of reach, breaking out the eternal stars. Like his Anonymous Army huddled beneath the stars, the 204 is opposing forces of franklin, awaited at dawn the uncertainty about their future. These armies in the midst of a desperate effort to shift the momentum of the civil war in the western theater had come to the bloody slope the dark streets of franklin and the consequence of a series of decisions. Choices made of various levels of leadership within the respective organizations of the army, which are all intended to force a certain outcome in the face of fierce resistance and the complexity and difficulty intrinsic to war in the 19th century. Depending on which historians one chooses to read, the battle of frequent was an epic of heroism and sacrifice, a lurid tragedy of murderous incompetence, or the final poignant flickering of the soon tobe extinguished military hopes of the confederacy. It is also replete with distortion, halftruths, erroneous assumptions, and more than a little postwar mythmaking. All these narratives led way to the overall mystique of franklin, but at the cost of obscuring the true nature of the engagement, as well as its factual, actual history. In consequence, franklin invites us to take a crack at unraveling something closer to the essence of the whole episode. Military outcomes usually depend on the decisions and actions of military leaders. War is, after all, organized by was with some political object in mind, in the choices and behaviors of the leaders of military organizations dictate the cause and consequences of war. I think theres also important historical value to a thoughtful engagement with ideas like command, generalship, and the decisions that inform these things. History is a story, of course, about people. The past only truly becomes legible to us when we start seeing those connections between decision and agency, the people who are making these choices, and their experiences as consequence. Decisions illuminated idea of contingency, which is a foundational come up very couple, historical concept that considers things like options and decisions and outcomes, is certainly, i think tries to push back on the idea that the past is predetermined, which i believe it is not. All right. So how do you arrive and unravel something as complicated as a civil war battle and the decisions that led to it . I am glad you asked, although you didnt. The way i approach the study, and the idea of command decisions and more, is through a methodology that is, interestingly enough, part of the methodology applied to a series in which i am publishing, not coincidentally. University of Tennessee Press command decisions in the civil war series. At this point, is 15 books and county, all of which apply a certain methodology where different authors attempt to look at what happened of a battle and campaign, and also why it happened and what caused it to happen. I think these are deceptively simple questions with very complicated answers, but these critical decisions that we try to look at in this series are decisions that, had they not been made, the way they were made, or if a different decision was reached, the sequence of events of that particular operation, that battle, that campaign, might have unfolded differently, resulting in a very different history, a very different past for us here in 2023. I want to introduce you to my favorite of these books. This one. Decisions at franklin, which of course, as chris pointed out, involves the analysis of 19 discrete medical decisions of which, i promise, we will not cover all this afternoon. Fear night if you are starting to worry and look for the doorway. In fact, my purpose is not to assess the merits and faults of every possible decision the civil war commanders made in the franklin operation. That would be impossible. There are literally thousands of decisions that go into everyones day, including the days of civil war generals and commanders, everything from what you had for breakfast this morning, or in the case of the confederates, the union forces and frankly, where do i deploy this for grade and at what time and in what sequence . That is not what we are here to do. I dont know that that is necessarily the best use of time and mental energy. Also, i want to point out and suggest that there can be a temptation, certainly for historians, when looking at decisions of past actors, to play monday morning quarterback. To engage in a kind of command performance evaluation approach, which i also suggest is potentially problematic. Certainly, the decisions that are made under pressure, under time constraints with limited information, 160 years ago, or sometimes very different that the decisions we might make in the safety and comfort and armed with hindsight. Certainly a measure of humility, and even a measure of empathy, are important when you are starting to do things like analyze critical command decisions, and certainly when you begin to critique those decisions. So with that rather leasing lengthy windup, you probably wonder when this guy will talk about franklin. Lets jump into what i humbly submit are just a very few, a small fraction, of some of the critical decisions that help shape the battle of franklin november 30, 1864. Here we see the first of what i think are the important critical decisions. Davis in command. On paper, at least, John Bell Hood looks like the right man for the job. His rise to command was nothing short of meteor, having begun at the regiment level, and eventually Division Command any Major General see in the army of northern virginia. He carved out a reputation for physical courage and aggressiveness in battle, leading his texas brigade in a costly, but overwhelming, charge in 1862, and guiding his division in pivotal attacks and second manassas the very same year. He was wounded in the left arm at gettysburg in july 1863 and returns to the field that september, temporarily commanding an entire army corps during the confederate victory at chickamauga. He was at chickamauga that he received his most devastating injury, shot in the right leg, which is capitated just below the hip. He recuperated from the wound enrichment and was back in the field by the next spring and summer. A pretty remarkable turnaround. During his recuperation time in the capital, hood struck up a fortuitous relationship with the president of the confederacy, jefferson davis, along with Braxton Bragg, now somewhat disgraced, but now serving as the personal military advisor to the president. Davis, who as you probably know, greatly valued loyalty, he seemed to have seen the young hood as a loyal ally and a source of intelligence information on matters in the army of tennessee, which of course, under joe johnson, who was expressing problems and controversies by that time. Hood traded very heavily on his reputation as a brave and aggressive combat leader and one of the rising stars of the confederacy. These political and personal connections help to pave the way for the promotion of Emerson OpdyckeLieutenant General in 1864. Keep this in mind. Hood was only 32 years old when he returned to the war that spring with that rank. This time he was in georgia. He helped his own prospects for retaining army command by engaging in some, lets say, extrajudicial politicking with the president while he was commanding under joe johnson and the army of tennessee. While considering hood as a possible replacement for the unpopular, at least in the mind of davis, joe johnston, hood im sorry, david davis reached out to robert e. Lee for an opinion. He wanted an assessment of John Bell Hood. Lee, of course, praised his ability, but he was, he did so very carefully and not without some ambiguity. He famously told davis that tran20 is a bullfighter, i am doubtful as to other qualifications necessary. Not exactly a ringing endorsement. Despite these reservations, davis eventually will remove johnston from command and placed hood in charge. Unfortunately for the city of atlanta, it was too little and too late. Moreover, once hood was given command, once he assumed command in the army of tennessee, he quickly demonstrated his aggressiveness and attempted to counterpunch against William Sherman outside atlanta at peachtree creek, jonesboro, and by the end of september, he had managed to reduce the army of tennessee greatly to around 40,000 defectives at that point. With these losses from combat, from desertion, morale had dropped precipitously among his army. Atlanta was firmly, at this point, an enemy hands. Hood somehow , thrall this, managed to convince himself that it was the army of tennessee who was at fault. The army, itself, lacked nerve, particularly as he thought when confronted with a well entrenched m a we force enemy force. I would have asked her what army would not be intimidated by the situation in the civil war. In any case, by september 1864, hood had enough fumbles under his belt to sow seeds of doubt even in his staunchest allies minds, president davis, as well as engendering fierce criticism among the southern press. Something i think is important to remember. The southern media, like the northern media, was critiquing constantly the performance of their generals in the field. So media considerations were something generals had to account for. Eventually davis and hood held several conferences , one of them in palmetto, georgia planning next steps after the fall of atlanta, and hoping to try to reverse the confederacy decline in fortunes. Davis, in particular, have to consider every possible option that fall, including possibly even relieving hood of command and replacing him with yet another general. It is not just president lincoln who has trouble with his generals. Certainly, davis had tremendous difficulty with the army of tennessee. Hood had done exactly as expected. In fact, exactly as asked. That is, behaving aggressively, focusing his energy upon attacking, upon trying to regain the initiative and seize the offensive back from sherman and the union army outside atlanta. The problem was that this offense of mindedness, while it was consistent with his experience as a protigi of lee and Stonewall Jackson to a degree, that had cost the army tremendously heavily in men and material, and it had not achieved any significant success. So any additional defeats of that kind from the fall of 64 on would likely be unsustainable, and certainly, losses would be largely irreplaceable. Given the inability by the confederacy to do so. So during this conference at palmetto, which took place in the late summer and early fall of 1864, hood proposed a new plan. He had an idea that he wanted to cut off the lines of communication by sherman into atlanta and try to switch over to what he thought of as an offensive defensive posture rather than really merely defensive. This appeal to davis because it kept the possibility of recovering atlanta alive theoretically, or at least promised that sherman zone plans to continue invading into the confederate heartland might be disrupted. The question davis faced was whether hood was the man for the job. Here are several options facing davis at the time. Obviously, the most obvious one is that davis could retain hood a command of the army of tennessee. Just stay the course and hope things turn around. Of course, davis and hood had to think about their critics, particularly critics in the press. So they also needed to think about the best way forward that would indicate that they were concerned and aware of the problems that came along with a guy like John Bell Hood in command. One of the proposals that davis apparently broached to hood was putting a more senior general in place. A man like joe johnston, which of course, to hood was at this point out of the question. Also beauregard, a very Senior Commander with a great deal of experience, who could be giving a role as a theater commander, a kind of babysitter or supervisor, if you will, who could oversee operations in georgia, alabama and tennessee, and can be drawn on for advice and counsel, perhaps. Under this arrangement, hood will retain feel command and execute his campaigns as he saw fit while the theater commander, whoever that would be , could advise and assist and help. The problem, of course, is twofold. There were very few candidates for that scene or supervisory position available. Johnston probably out of the question. Hood had just replaced him. The most senior Corps Commander at the time was william hardy. Fortunately, they despised each other. Hood adamantly said it cannot be hardy, i wont have that. So hard he was transferred out of the army. That left robert e. Lee lee said, thank you, no, i am happy here in virginia. Although, i dont know how happy he was at the time either. But he did not want to go to georgia. That left really beauregard is the most senior available potential commander. The problem was that beauregard was on the naughty list from davis already. These men did not like each other at all. By 1864, beauregard was pretty desperate to redeem himself. He wanted anything the president might be willing to give him, any scrap, and beauregard was willing to jump on that opportunity. And so, it would be beauregard. Beauregard would be given command of a new department called the department of the west, which encompassed territory in five states, including across the Mississippi River as well as the army of tennessee. A department of the west sounds very impressive, it is a paper department. Theres not much to it. It is a title, and that is about all the extent of the authority of beauregard, except he was apparently given permission to visit the army of tennessee, and if you felt necessary, assumed command at the time, which he never actually did. The palmetto conference began to resolve the question of what to do next, but certainly what comes out of that conference and that decision on the part of president davis to retain hood , is that it would be hood in the saddle for the rest of 1864, and potentially beyond, depending on what happened next. And hoods thinking, his earlier philosophy of offensive operations with actually sound. He felt he made all the right choices after atlanta, despite losing atlanta and a good portion of his army. In his mind, the problem with execution, particularly poor execution on the part of his officers and the men and the army of tennessee, which did not attend his mind, compared to the men in the army of northern virginia. In any case, it would be hood driving , you dont really thrive train, but he is on the train and behind the controls, and it will be him directing things going forward. Now, the organizing principle of hoods thinking between the fall of atlanta and the palmetto conference with davis later in september 1864 was rooted in finding a way to frustrate or defeat the union army in atlanta. That is really the primary focus that John Bell Hood had in december 1964. The overtime, as davis allowed hood a looser kind of leash, a little bit more rope, what John Bell Hood began to discover in the myof tennessee was that William Sherman did not want to pl their game. Sowh hood wanted to do was to try toattack sherman and his lines of supply a icularly communication thatlefrom atlanta into chattanooga. The western atlantic railroad. At end, what hood attempted to do into e early fall of 1864 was to try to cut those supply lines, which again, is sounmilitary thinking. I think is the proper course of action given the limitations of hoods army and the circumstances at play at that particular moment. At a minimum, hood hoped that by seininitiative from sherman he could at least prevent further damage to the confere cause in the west, and potentially, protect and husband the streof his army for decisive and victorious battle. The problem, of course, is that a capable enemy, and sher was, that a capable enemy usually does not do what you expectof them. They dont nessarily do what you want them to do, other words. Sherman was not going to do what hood wanted. For a bit of timesherman did play along. He attempd chase hood through georgia and even into alabama at times, but finally, ce he realized what hood had in mind, sherman simply refused to play the game. So what sherman decided to do is to call off the chase. Instead he began making preparations in the fall of 1964 for targeting savannah in the confederate heartland in the famous march to the sea. Meanwhile, sherman, thinking about the possibility of cutting loose from atlanta, and even from his lines of supply and heading east towards the atlantic, have to worry about the problem of hoods army in his rear. That is a threat. You dont want an enemy Army Operating unfettered in the rear, and you dont know what hood wants to do. What sherman decided to do was to assign the defense of the region, particularly of tennessee, to George Thomas, Major General, the rock of chickamauga. Turned out to be a very wise decision. With thomas, eventually headquartered in nashville, serving as the states primary defender, sherman was then free to shift attention towards the confederate heartland. That also meant the hood was 320 tennessee, which is something he had raised the possibility of with president davis early that fall. So hood decides to invade, but the problem, of course, that hood had was really twofold. First, supply shortages. The army of tennessee was short of everything but weapons. Many of the men were running short on clothing, shoes, certainly food was in short supply, the livestock, the wagon trains and so forth. The animals tended to be undernourished and the range and endurance was much less. As a consequence of that, hood immediately had adjustable issues. Will complicated it even more with the rickety nature of the confederate logistical system by 1864 relying on, basically, one Railroad Line and a handful of wagon roads to try to keep hoods army fed and supplied and alive in the field. This is where beauregard was supposed to step in and fix the problem. Beauregard, despite his flaws, was a very capable administrator and organizer. A very well schooled logistician. Certainly, beauregard understood that hood was a battlefield commander, but not much of an administrator, in his mind. So beauregard quickly attempted to try to get enough stuff together to fulfill hoods which, which at this point was to invade tennessee. Beauregard and hood never seemed to get along very well. On the surface, the relationship seemed fairly cordial, but beauregard was constantly frustrated by hoods unwillingness to communicate, his unwillingness to confer, and at times, beauregard could not even tell where hoods headquarters were. He had to go through the countryside simply defined him. In any case, finally, by early november hood decided it was time to launch his longawaited invasion of tennessee. A little side note, in military operations, generally i would submit it is not a great idea to broadcast your intentions to the enemy. Unfortunately for John Bell Hood, almost immediately after the palmetto conference with the president , davis had gone on a kind of whistle stop tour all the way home, giving public speeches explaining hood was about to invade tennessee. It made it into all the papers. Information security was a real problem as well. That was not a problem they needed at the time. In any case, hood attempted to find the crossing of the Tennessee River, which you can see here. This the main water obstacle between aba and middle tennessee. Hoods it. the campaign was to act swiftly , to move rapidly into the centrapart of the state oftennessee down to nashville. We think according to his plan, according to is the more, was ve upon nashville to seize the citytostore it is one of ys he put it, to rescue the mounins of union supplies that ew were waiting there. Once that was accomplished, to rallhis forces, to cruit men from tennessee, if there were any less, i dont ow that there were at this point, at this point, and then hiding hopefully head north to kentucky. The idea then was to push on into kentucky to turn a border state, a union stay, a confederate state i guess no one told him that Braxton Bragg tried this in 1862 and it dit work then either. In any case, had for e ohio river and either attack cincinnati and keep going, i guess, or maybe go to the Cumberland Gap and had for robert e lee and join lee in virginia and smash granted there. Does this plant have much of a chance of coming to fruition . Probably not. It is grandiose, however, it is bold and very John Bell Hood. It is aggressive. That is what they hired him to do. Beauregard is skeptical. He doesnt think this will work. He tells hood a number times at this will not work given the supplies and circumstances. Hood ignores him. Finally, beauregard realizes that if he doesnt go allowing with the plan, he has no future. This is his last chance. By november 17, beauregard cave in and fully endorsed hoods plan to invade middle tennessee and head for national. The army of tennessee had, for toms sometime, struggle to get across that river. Union forces at decatur had stymied the effort. He had tried a number of times, hood had, to find a suitable crossing safe enough to get his forces across. It is not until november 20 that hoods army is fully across the Tennessee River and able to head north across the alabama line heading up the pulaski, columbia, franklin, national axis. That is the road he chose to take. What is the problem with this . The problem is that hoods timetable was destroyed. His entire premise, the entire thinking behind this operation, depended on speed, the enemy not knowing where he was, what he wanted to do, and when he was going to do it. What had he done now for four weeks on the banks of the Tennessee River . Sat there gathering supplies, gathering rations, waiting for the calvary with Nathan Forrest to come back and tell them what was going on. But that is a delay hood could not afford to do. Meanwhile, what is the union army doing for four weeks . They are preparing. George thomas is getting the chest pieces in place on the boardhe has forces at pulaski, chattanooga, big forces at nashville, reinforcements rushing from across the Mississippi River under general smith. Thomas is getting the pieces in place and have a month now that he ordinarily might not have had had hood active with more speed and secrecy. Now, this is not a history of the battle of franklin, as you can tell. I am jumping around a bit. I hope that is okay with you all. Lets talk about the union side a little bit. There has been a lot of hood, and he matters a lot to the battle , but lets not discount the importance of the decisions of union commanders, particularly commanders like John Mcallister schofield, one of the top subordinates of George Thomas at the time. The initial burden of turning back are slowing hoods invasion would fall on schofield. There he is. He is on the left. On the right is jacob cox, one of the core commanders under schofield. Will he was uncertain about hoods plans , general thomas still recognized the importance of that pulaski, columbia, franklin access of advanced. That seems the most likely path that hood would take from alabama into middle tennessee. As a consequence of that, thomas, very logically, ordered the 23rd corps under schofield to reinforce major stanleys fourth corps at pulaski as well, and schofield would assume command upon arrival. Schofield had 18,000 infantry, 4 degrees of calvary, about 23,000 troops. That is not as many as hood had with 28,000, give or take. Over the next several days , after the crossing of the tennessee line, schofields makeshift army experienced sharp clashes, narrow escapes. Famously, the miraculous near death experience at spring hill, which you may know about. Hood to attended over and over to do what any good 19th century west point trains civil war general would have done. That is, to steal a march and to turn the union forces out of their position. In fact, what hood did, and we tend to forget this given the disaster in the battle of franklin , what he did from november 20 through november 30, about a 10 day period from crossing into the tennessee territory in the battle of franklin itself, hood acted like a textbook general. In fact, i would submit that hood hoods operational concept is very found and well within the thinking of some of the best generals of the civil war. Stealing marches and turning the enemy out of their position by going around their flank. It is exactly what was taught at west point. But had not paid off. Schofield , who probably doesnt get as much credit as he may deserve, had cautiously and decisively managed to get out of the way of hoods flanking movements over and over again until he almost failed to do so at spring hill. It is only through a series of real errors on the part of the Confederate Army, very frustrating to hood, that schofield managed to get his forces out of spring hill at all. By the morning of november 30, with dawn still a couple hours away, the union army was on the way here to the small village of franklin. It was a little village, not that little at the time. Hapo about 2000. It was situated on a band of the Harpeth River, the final geographical obstacle before they hit the road to nashville in the open terrain and clear shot to safety that they were hoping was there. So schofield that early dawn pressed ahead and overtook jacob cox here, one of his commanders, which was in the lead along the columbia pike. After schofield and jacob cox paused to converse in the dark, schofield, who at this point had been awake probably 24 hours straight, if not longer, was exhausted and decided at that point to turn the disposition of the marching forces over to harpeth. Schofield had bigger problems on his hand the simply figuring out where these troops ought to go once they arrived in the town of franklin. The biggest problem on his mind that morning was how to get across the Harpeth River before the hammer fell. Hopefully, you can see the arrangement here. This is the village of franklin. Here is the columbia pike, the main road leading into the town. This would be the avenue of the confederate entry into the position. Here is the Harpeth River that flows here. Here you can see the Union Position as it was arraigned by the afternoon of november 30. Now, during the march from spring hill into franklin, which had taken all night before , schofield had been out of communication with George Thomas in nashville. No telegraph lines were available at the time. He was more concerned with getting his forces out of destruction and into safety. Schofield had hopes that once he arrived at franklin and reestablished communications with thomas that he would have some good news waiting for him, in particular, what schofield was hoping was that a force under aj smith, which had been hastily brought over to reinforce him, would be near enough to franklin to provide support. But upon arrival, schofield got some bad news. Thomas had telegraphed and told him that smith would not be there in time. It was just getting off the boats, and there was no way he would arrive at franklin in time to help. Furthermore, as general thomas at a, schofields orders were to make strong efforts to cover wagon trains, protect them against the enemy, and reach franklin and get into position there. I can imagine schofield is saying, what have i been trying to do the last three or four days . But certainly, worst news would follow. Earlier on november 28, schofield sent a message to thomas baking thomas to send pontoon bridges, temporary floating bridges, to get his forces across the Harpeth River at franklin. Those bridges had not arrived. They were not there. In fact, the only way to get across the harpeth was true two old bridges. One of them was a wagon bridge, and one was a narrow railroad bridge. The wagon bridge have been pretty much demolished. The only thing left for the pilings and support. The railroad bridge is only suitable for foot traffic trying to roll wagons along. It would have been disastrous. The exhausted unit infantry might have been able to get across the harpeth by forwarding and crossing the entire army across with a confederate force nipping at your heels is a very hazardous, even suicidal, proposition. Certainly, the 200 and more wagons that had to be gotten across the river almost immediately would have to take priority. That is where the supplies, the buddha, ammunition, all the most important assets and only had army had were. So schofield found himself under tremendous pressure. He had just escaped destruction at spring hill. He is at the end of his rope. Is exhausted, panicked, concerned. Nothing is going right. And schofield had a decision to make. So what did he decide to do . He met with cox. And cox, it turns out, with the right man for that particular encounter. Jacob cox a very capable, aggressive, and i think probably coolheaded general, was very confident in the position at franklin. Franklin had been the site of a previous battle. There were fortifications already there. The position, itself, according to cox, was one of the best he had seen in his experience. His advice to schofield was, general, we can make a stand here. This is what we had been hoping for. This is a good defensive position. If hood tries to attack us here, he is going to fail. Schofield, on the other hand, said, i dont know about that. Think about the tactical situation at franklin. What is at the rear of the union army . The Harpeth River. Is a smart militarily to fight a battle with a river immediately at your reader . What happens if disaster strikes . How do you escape . It is very hazardous and risky. Certainly, schofield was concerned about this. George thomas counseled him earlier , defendant, but make sure the river is in front of you and not behind you. At this point, but early morning, midmorning, the union army is not even fully in the town. Some are streaming in,but the army is not ready. Certainly, they are not going to be in a position to cross the river along with the wagons. Schofield basically had the choice , do i save my artillery and wagons . To a semiarmy across and sacrifice my artillery . Or do i do Something Else . What did he ultimately do . Schofield followed the suggestion by cox. The suggestion was, general, let me handle the defense, you look after the wagons. You look after the artillery. That suited schofield just fine. He agreed. He decided to go ahead and begin planning for the evacuation of the trains across the river, which he began in the midday period. By around to a copy of, most of the wagons were across the harpeth , most of the artillery was across. There on the road to nashville headed toward safety. Meanwhile, cox ordered the union army to dig in , and dig in they did. Digging and along this very defensible position of high ground just on the edge of town. Harpeth minutes headquarters at the carter house. Using artillery that is very will cited and looking at the approach of the confederates, he was thinking this is a chance we wanted. Schofield made the right choice, it turns out. You might say, did he have any other option . Could have done anything otherwise . He could have. He could have panics. It looks like at one point he may have been on the verge of panicking. He did not want to fight at franklin. But schofield, i think, to his credit, did what he had to do, which is make a stand, hope for the best, and get what he to get out of there, hopefully, saving the army. Okay. Back to twin hood. Hoods decision to order the attack at franklin is probably the first one that came to your mind, i would imagine. Certainly, if you think about the battle of franklin, that is probably the decision most people argue about and talk about more than, potentially, and the other one. It is certainly the decision i think that is the most controversial of the battle. Why did John Bell Hood attack at franklin . What was this guy thinking . Now, context. The same morning that schofield and the union army are fleeing and heading to franklin and making their decision of whether to stand or leave, the same morning hood is also not a happy man. He is having a breakfast conference with his chief subordinates the house just outside spring hill. At this conference, Benjamin Franklin cheatham and Nathan Forrest were likely present. Patrick cleburne, several other top commanders were not. They were trying to get their forces on the road and in position that morning. But certainly, affect conference, which we dont have a verbatim record of, but we have impressions of, hood seemed very upset. He expressed displeasure with the performance of the army at spring hill. He blamed mostly cheatham. I happen to agree with him. I think cheatham deserved some of the blame. He also , i think rather unfairly, blamed the absent cleburne. It was certainly displease, and we could probably give him a pass for this, understandably upset about what happened. Certainly, his demeanor was far from sunny. According to later accounts, some of them years later, at least one of his generals may have left that meeting rather shaken, in fact, at hoods anger. This is where we get the infamous rattlesnake quote the some of you may have heard about his attitude that morning. The truth is, as a historian, we rely on evidence. Of the evidence isnt there, we probably should be careful about the conclusions. We should not make those conclusions. The evidence is really thin as to what really took place. Certainly, i think its fair to say hood was, no doubt, angry, but as far as i have seen in many other good historians have looked into this have seen, i dont think there was any compelling evidence that hood was either outofcontrol or acting irrationally that morning. He was mad, but he wasnt crazy. I think there is an important distinction between those two ideas. Certainly, we do know is that hood made it emphatically clear that he wanted to maintain the pursuit aggressively of schofield. Something that his army had actually achieved fairly well and effectively to this point. Again, we tend to forget that. Things are gone not that badly up to this point. It looked as if maybe the next step would be a victory, or certainly a decisive confrontation. That was only really part of the pursuit of his purpose. He also wanted to deliver a final blow, a heavy blow, to schofields forces before they could escape. To hood, escape for schofield meant escape into nashville. Thomas was already there with tremendous force behind tremendous fortifications. Hood knew this might be one of, if not the last, opportunities he would have to bring schofields forces to pay before they could slip away. So for hood that morning of november 30, time was absolutely of the essence. Already. Sometime after about 1 00 p. M. , the first of the main body of the army of tennessee, stewart and cheatham, began arriving rit outside town. There were real tactical probmsimmediately. First, the Harpeth River, which you can see here, near the tself and was ollen and largely paable. There were fords at various poin ong the stream, but they were ide of the wn and not near the union army position. The Harpeth River also, although we cant see it on this map, converges at angle. To ods mine, any confederate approach would ha to negotiate this bend in the river. That meant that forces particularly on the ghof the confederate assault, if it were to take place here, would be funnedmore and more towards the middle of the position as they got nearer to the river. That anthey would potentially collide with confederatfoes here in the center, which would force him to shift to the left and someone. You are potentially looking at real tactical issues that had to be dealt with. Also, on the approach off the map, there are a couple of important hills. When stettin breezy hills, which are not small. They would also have to be dealt with as the Confederate Army began to deploy. Again, the obvious problem once these tactical issues were worked through was the approach to franklin. About two miles of rolling, much of it open, farmland, which presented a real challenge facing enemy forces in such a commanding sweep of a physician. Position. Cheatham and Patrick Cleburne, who was known for his immense physical courage, apparently went forward and evaluated the Union Position that afternoon. Looking at it through spy glasses and even for a rifle scope, they pronounced it as a well fortified and strong position and Patrick Cleburne said it is very fermentable. When he says something is very formidable, you can be confident it is. I think he understood the hazard of this. Hood knew all of this. In fact, he was present during all of this. He also had an earlier encounter with his, shall we say, colorful calvary commander, Nathan Forrest. Forrest apparently briefly conferred , and according to his postwar biographer, he said the position was exceedingly fermentable. There is that word again. And his opinion, he said it could not be taken by direct assault, except by great and unnecessary loss of life. Hood apparently did not agree. He said, i dont think the federals will stand strong. He thinks theyre not willing to take a stand. Hood apparently, i am sorry, forrest then responded by basically begging hood for permission to lead a flank maneuver. He wanted to take his calvary, potentially reinforced with an infantry division, and hopefully get in the rear of the Union Position, presumably before nightfall, and cut the road to nashville. That was something that hood forrest strongly pushed for. Hood rejected that out of hand. This apparently led to a tantrum on the part of forrest, which may or may not have included profanity , knowing him, it probably did. He apparently stormed off in a huff. According to his biographer, he told hood come if you give me one Strong Division of infantry with my covering, i will flank within two hours time. We will see. Certainly, that did not happen. Now, forrest proposed flank maneuver was exactly what schofield was terrified of. In fact, had forrest been given the green light , who knows what might have happened . We dont know. This is certainly something that schofield was very worried about. But it was not to be. Hood decided to make his charge. Now, really quickly, as we get close to the end of time here, there is famously a narrative that hood made the decision to attack at franklin out of a fit of rage to punishes man, or as some have said, out of a drunken, drug fueled theory furey or hayes. Supposedly he was an addict. Let me just say this, i have found no compelling evidence that hood was even taking laudanum. His medical records, would you guys probably know were unearthed recently, indicate that while he had taken it in treatment of his wound from chickamauga, he was not taking it by that point. I dont know if that makes it worse or better, but i think he was clear minded when he made his decision to attack. Now why did he order this assault . By his own admission, he had lost confidence in the ability of the army to assault positions. He thought his opportunity was slipping away. I will leave on this note, i think the most important factor , why did hood attack at about four clock p. M. . He was running out of time. In 1864, november 30, you could check the astronomical data if you would like, which i have done. Civil twilight, the time when it is almost impossible to start making out objects at a distance, was at 5 02 pm. He was running out of daylight. He had maybe two or three hours to get the job done before darkness fell and commandand control became impossible. I think more than anything else, hoods aggressive nature, plus this desperate idea that i am out of time, this is my last chance, that informed this decision. The consequences, of course, disaster for the confederates. 6000 casualties for the confederates, the gutting of their leadership and officer corps. They would go on within the next few weeks to complete disaster outside nashville with roughly half the army destroyed and the confederate hopes by the end of that year were largely attached. Thank you. I think we have time for some questions. [ applause ]. So. You didnt cover this, but go back to that diagram you showed with the union army and before we take questions, your new book comes out next month . Hopefully the end of this month. Iperfect. We didnt cover this but go back to the diagram you showed with the union army and i believe cox has a regiment out front. Yes. The one earliereon that. That was a decision. What was that all about . In fact, that was a decision in my book. Mo i just did not have time to talk about it. Vewe are talking about here wegners advanced position. A division under general wegner who at the time of the franklin set up that day, that morning, was serving as the union armys rearguard. Weidner, who had several brigades, was covering the rear of the union retreat, hoping to hold back the confederates and sold them down a little bit. His affirmative orders from stanley who i think was the Corps Commander at the time was to hold back the Confederate Forces and serve as the rearguard. He largely executed that very well i think in a textbook kind of way. And after complicated orders, fiascoes and frustration on the part of wegner, wegner will decide kind of at the last minute if he has seen the Confederate Army approach to take a position here in advance of the defensive line. We dont quite have all the story here. It is very complicated and there are a lot of recriminations after this. But wegner will take this advanced position. One of his brigadiers, a famous officer named colonel updike from ohio will refuse to comply because you are mad or crazy. And disobey and take his forces here and park them right behind the union main position near the loads house. O wegner will get overwhelmed. He will get steamrolled. Everybody thought that he would. I think even worse, wegners retreating forces served as a human field to confederates as they stormed in. Partly partly because of wegners misjudgment, there will be a breach in the union line near the porterhouse and Confederate Forces will penetrate at least 50 yards and potentially even break the Union Position. And it is a timely counter attack, rileys division and other artillery will seal the breach and prevent disaster from taking place. This is not a cakewalk for the union army. It was nearly disastrous. What happened to wegner well, what do you think happened to him after this . He lost his job. He got canned. Thank you for a great presentation. What is part of the reason though that forest was not approved to do the man over, because of wilson on the other side of the river . Potentially, yes. Wilson and i think woulds division as well. So schofield was concerned about being outflanked especially on this side of town. And so he sent wilson out to try to guard the flank. He also detached the division here to make sure there is a greater reaction force, if you will there. I will say that schofield was pretty heated in his critique of wilson. He did not seem to have a very high opinion of James H Wilson and his efforts to try to stymie. Of course schofield doesnt have a high opinion of too many people other than schofield. With that as schofield for you. I happen to like wilson. I think wilson probably did what he could. Certainly i think one of the reasons that this potentially might not have worked in one of the decisions in my book, was er schofields decision to try to secure its flank. Had he gotten his wish and gun reinforcements and it one of the several fords, would he have done it on time . I dont know. I think he likely would have gotten caught in the act by woods and by wilson and it might have been a disaster for the confederate staff. I think with a two or three hours of nightfall, that forest would not have done much had he gotten across. Dark. He doesnt know nwhere he is. Who knows . The night before the battle, what was the closest distance between the Confederate Union lines . It almost defies logic. You can move an entire army and escape and even undercover t darkness, you figure horses, will moving, you think he would have heard something and been alerted so how was schofield able to pull this off . At spring hill . Yes. I dont know if i could tell you the exact distance. I know that the union troops talked about it or wrote about it later and said that they could see the campfires right off the road in that case. And they were under strict orders to be as quiet as possible, to whisper and not let anything rattle. They were literally tiptoeing along the road and the confederates were certainly within earshot. They could hear the confederates talking, coughing, rattling, laughing. Ve who knows . It was close enough to where it had the union forces, had they found out and the confederates got their act together, it could have been a disaster, no doubt about it. Extremely close. A miracle even. Thank you very much. Thank you. [ applause ]