It will comes under pain. The report we are putting out today is probably the most complex to date. It represents a new foray for our modeling and simulation effort. I once acknowledge the considerable effort put into the report by the author, who will be here momentarily. Researching, modeling and analyzing this problem, there were about a million in relation runs that we did to make this happen. Next, i want to acknowledge and thank those who made it possible on the sponsorship side. I want to thank those who came out in person. They generously provided some contributions for the Software Side that made it possible to depict visually. I would say very colorfully, it has been a more abstract topic. All of the subject matter experts, most of whom we listen to over the course. I will say a few words at the beginning and then turn it over to summarize. John hale testified about 10 days ago that in this era, active Missile Defenses have become an element. They are no longer niche weapons. Looking across the full vessel spectrum to hypersonic things. But you cannot defend against what you cannot see. Many of the threats depicted here include high speeds and trajectories, and other features distress designs. Thus the need for new architecture. Last year, we put out a report cyprus hypersonic defense, which nod e characteristics of Hypersonic Missiles may come to define the future of missile warfare. It is often a key driver for transforming a system into the Missile Defense system. The single most important element of that future. Todays report, getting on track , builds on that past work. One thing that we realized early on was that there is not a perfect architecture design. It is an exercise in tradeoffs. It is as much art as science. Policy decisions informed design. Unpacking those tradeoffs, making them explicit is the purpose of this report, to hopefully improve the public discussion related. It certainly contains a list of alternatives. Our teams compiled this information about what you see is how the past emphasis on Missile Warning has begun to give way to more missile tracking. That depicted in orange, relative to blue. We are at a shift point. But not all is of quality support. The same funding when converted reveals similar trends, not surprising, a shift to leo. This report comes in, at a point in the conversation. It would be nice to have all discussions, a mix would be nice and now it is a question of how you go aindi the right mix. Over the course the panel today, we will hack we will be hearing reference to various institutions to tackle this problem. It is one thing to track generally and another to do somethinabout it, to be able to do something out it. They are also relative measures contingent on other elements in the Missile Defense chain. We have paid attention to this with recent defense bills and the launch and test before it goes to sta. A final word about our approach is the emphasis on those applicable to regional coverage. They are sometimes used differently, but when we talk about regional, we are talking about the latitudes most irrelevant. That is what you see here on the right. So, many of the necessary policy programs and institutions are in place or coming online. What remains is a conversation about oversight to make the future architecture architecture resilient. It must first be timely and deploy with sufficient coverage. That is where i am going to pause and invite him. To lock us and invite her up here to discuss. Over to you. [applause] thank you so much, tom. This report would not be possible without time, so i want to thank him for his time. I would not be happy here without him. Im glad to be a key part of making this happen. It was a great view. We are at an Inflection Point and it starts with sensors. This report will show you why that is the case. The goal there are many things coming online and want policymakers to understand what meases are for success. You design every other quirement for Missile Defense around them. It is simportant to get this piece right. Is report does to be of things, demystifying the tradeoffs involved in the acquisition programs. These tradeoffs directly impinge on schedule and architecture. They are the first link in the chain and you have to design everything around them. They impinge on every other piece. After reviewing these pieces, we want to go into pathways and pitfalls. We will not prescribe what to do, but instead, given the policy and technical trends will want to identify what to look out for. The first piece of this is unpacking the tradeoff. This is the reason why we take we pick such a knowledgeable panel. It is the first time we have used key modeling and simulation tools. On the left, you see some of the simulation and an analysis of the perfect and optimized designs that we used. There are other things. We are trying to unpack a complex network of tradeoffs, so we do coverage analysis and signature analysis. That is probably where i will start. The whole story starts with sensors. They drive every other piece of the puzzle. There are to be of the things that i want to tell you. I think the first thing that i want to say is that the same things that make Hypersonic Weapons so unique and difficult to counter are the same things that introduce new vulnerabilities into theystem. We will be talking mostly about infrared, but i want to say that there were other signatures to look f. The surface of the vehicle reacts with the highpressure air and generates unique gas products that could be detectable in other wavelengths. I just want to say that is important. I want to tell you how the tradeoffs affect the final architecture. We are primarily talking about infrared and i want to show you some of the complexities with this problem. They change in brightness over time, but i do not think a think tank has ever shown you what it could look like as a background signature changes and as the satellite moves over its trajectory. This problem is so challenging because Hypersonic Weapons are targets. Smaller than the pixels used. They get diluted with all their surroundings. It is like finding a cup of tea that you dropped into a swimming pool. It is a simple dictation. In reality, the fieldofview will be much larger. Because the target signatures you need to extract them from their backgrounds. This is something that we did with our analysis. On the right, you see the signature that comes out of our environment. We texture it th various temperatures. We do not model plumes and we do not model leaks. That is the signature that we see based on opensource information. The middle slide shows the optical flow of each pixel over 20 frames that we captured. It was an algorithm that we used to extract the motion vector. They are then illustrated in the center. These are things you cannot see. The reason why we talk about this tradeoff is because we are i think the panelists will get into this more. You want to get a coverage of a larger area. You might need a resolution that you can fix with a better supply chain, but we will get into that later. Those differences matter. Here you see different architectures. Completely different fields of regard. One sensor has 120 degree and the other has just 10 degrees less. The one on the left is satellite and the other one that is a real difference. These tradeoffs are linked to schedule tradeoffs. They are linked with a bigger story about how we think about these architectures. In this report, we talk about the many decision points that exist. I want to focus on one thing. I want to talk about what it takes to get persistent coverage. The late 20 20s will be a decisive and dangerous period. How do we make sure that we are covering consistently . If there is one take away, it is this one. You can propose two designs that generate the same amount of coverage at the end, but those designs can have dramatically different capability on the way to getting there. Since we care so much about regional coverage, how do we think about that . It is Good Practice to have many constellations of highly inclined orbits, if you want to sufficiently cover the globe. If you look at this, you will achieve Global Coverage, but it is not persistent. You are covering one portion. We want to get to this kind of persistent coverage. It delivers global and persistent coverage, but it is made with the same orbital plane that you saw earlier. That is the same as seven out of nine deployed. You are not getting consistent coverage when youre already 80 there. The problem is that it does not achieve persistent coverage until you reach the very end. How do we get to that line . One approach might be to split coverage up into several steps. You could deploy earlier and get back coverage that you want, and it looks like this, before you step it up to a combination to get that coverage that we care about later. This is the direction that they are moving towards. It includes lower inclination payloads. We think that is a welcome development. For reference, here is what that coverage looks like. The idea is that you can step things up. But it raises a related issue. We do not get coverage of these regions that we care about so much most densely. We do not get dense coverage near the equator but near the poles. We do some analysis to show. But how can we get more coverage near the equator and regions that we care about for other things . One method might be if you look at this, you notice that the biggest poles are in the middle of the map. And so, an alternative approach might be to leverage the unique defense and drawbacks. A lot of arguments have been advanced for why mixed orbits are useful and resilient, but we have not seen an argument that they are also useful for coverage and filling in gaps. We noticed that here with just eight additional satellites, you can compensate for a lot. A final point. We can also add under ladies. A key point is that we could use Airborne Sensors to provide point coverage of the regions that wca about. This technology is mature and you can really expand coverage of these targets. There are obviously a lot of tradeoffs to consider. It is something worth investigating and something to be explored in the report. The report notes that there are policy temptations. There is a rocky road and some things that we need to avoid. We need to build a resilient architecture. We need to emphasize staying on track and building an architecture. It is only recently that we paid attention. They offer great modalities. It might be possible soon to put satellites up more cheaply than adversaries can shoot them down, but we want to have a complex capable of challenging the ability to synchronize. Synchronize attacks. We cannot put all of our eggs in one basket. In the past year, the amount of Collision Avoidance maneuvers that needed to happen were in order of magnitude greater than the last few years combined. It could pose an area threat. Another area threat that we talked about in the report are nuclear pumping threats. This has not been discussed since the cold war in enough detail. Nuclear tests, even performed over an old territory could pump the constellation with radiation. It does not go straight out. It is kept in those bands by a magnetic field. We cannot put all of our eggs in one basket. The other we have to watch for is the temptation to over optimize for coverage efficiency. In other words to prevent from going to that yellow line that we were talking about. They are built around it for a reason. They are intent on spiraling. But we welcome the addition of more lower inclined layers to build that little part of the capability. We think that should, moving forward with the architecture. Equally crucially, we need to make sure that the systems will in place before they reach orbit. Finally, i want to close by talking about fire control. Were at a key junction. By fire control, we mean the capability to detect and track missiles with enough ability to deliver that capability. These challenges are linked. Better sensors mean cheaper interceptors. Sensors determine every other part of the kill chain, which is why it is so important to get this right. It is on the cusp of launching to be prototyped satellites. They are slated to launch early next year. They will incorporate six sensors, pictured inink. But how do we scale this . How do we move the schedule and make sure that those requirements make it into the final architecture and make it . I want to thank everyone. I want to take a step back. This mission is really important. Peoples lives have been saved by missile detection and missile tracking. The time to modernize this and add tracking capability is long overdue. The future missile threat is going to look like the Hypersonic Missile threat. It will be lower and faster, more maneuverable. It is why im so excited to release this report. Im grateful to everyone and i hope that you read it. Im happy to introduce the leader of our aerospace program. Thank you so much. [applause] good afternoon and thank you. Congratulations on this excellent comprehensive report. I was the person in the back room doing analysis, but i know that was not the case here. This report does a superb job of analyzing and visualizing the key issues and tradeoffs described. I would like to emphasize a key finding, the future of Missile Defense will be contingent on the development of the characteristics and timeline. The report highlights that there are no silver bullets. It talks about the need for Global Coverage and providing capabilities. I appreciated your discussion on ground fusion and data integration. You mentioned it is underappreciated but it is essential to making it work. They do not do well unless they are integrated. One of the great things about the program here is that we have a lot of projects where we have common interest and a superb bench of scholars who are willing to collaborate. Im glad that we could contribute to the research. Im glad to be here and part of the relief and to introduce this next segment. I would ask the panelist to join me on stage while i introduce them. First i would like to welcome john hill, the secretary of defense secretary of defense. He has deep Institutional Knowledge and has been a leading counselor for 70 who have picked who have passed through the office over the years. He served as the principal director for state policy in 2013 to 2021. He was a representative in negotiations with afghanistan and the agreement that enabled a presence of u. S. And nato forces. He is deeply respected internationally. He has played a key role in shaping our relationships with japan and as a director for northeast asia. We are especially fortunate to tap into his extensive knowledge. Next we have the colonel, chief of the tracking layer. He is in a key position, ensuring the development of a satellite constellation that will enable us to track hypersonic and advanced missiles. The architecture at the agency is breaking the mold. An extensive background and nearly every Ground Combat system relies on gps. His job plays Key Management roles. He has served as the first product manager as part of Army Futures Command and the executive office. Over his career, he has served in a variety of deployments, including deployments to kuwait. Next we have rich ritter command and control. Mitch has been involved in 70 aspects of Missile Defense since he arrived. He currently serves as the Program Executive for command and control. It is actually the work that rich has been doing for years in the missiledefense domain that brings it to life for me. The acquisition and ensuring the connectivity of missiledefense systems. Testing detection data to tracking radars and targeting information across Different Military services and different companies. And also excited to have ryan with us today. He is a professional staff member for the strategic forces. Having been in his position, i know a tremendous amount of work that he does. He serves as a key expert for leadership. Congratulations for getting the act to pass last week. He also served on the National Security council. He is also an Intelligence Officer and has extensive congressional knowledge on the intelligence committee. Lastly. Thank you. I would like to turn the floor over. Thank you to all of the panelists. We are glad you can join us. I have a lot of questions for you and we will have a great conversation, but we also want to emphasize that you can i can present them to the panel. To start off with policy perspectives, this was an important feature in the review that came out last november. Talk to us about how we got here on the policy side and maybe some of the key policy challenges that have yet to be tackled. Sure. As noted while testifying, i thought it was good, a we are going to have to deal with . That is a topic we are going to have to deal with in its own right. Once it is launched, you are trying to increase your probability, engagement success and you are trying to improve your confidence in your Battle Damage assessment. So you have sensors for detecting and tracking. You have sensors for as you noted, adding in fire control is something coming in with modern and a rations. In the past we are focusing on Missile Warning. Which can tell camorra about the hypersonic ballistic center. You have the sensors of the interceptors themselves. And the fusion of all of that which kerry was speaking to. It is a critical part of things. That is why i was thinking i did not much like the title of the report does not do it justice. Getting on track is kind of i thought if you went with sensors and sensorabilities or Something Like that that would be more likely to sell at least in the literature stores. It is really fundamental. The policy we put out is very much saying this is where we have to go. I need to reduce the numbers whether it is regional, homeland Missile Defense, i want to reduce the numbers of interceptors i have to use for any engagement. As we talked about in missiledefense review and as i said in my testimony last week, the missiledefense is part of a posture. The posture has to include your ability to respond to someone who has made the mistake of choosing to shoot at you. How about that for an opening remark . More jane austen illusions in our report titles. I was wondering if you could pick up in terms of giving an overview of the missions and how mda has been thinking about those. I dont like the title either. What you outlined is not unique. All the missiles are given as pointed out in your charts. For a lot of oldtimers i have been working with, you know this. We cover 18 time zones with the ground sensors and other equipment we are responsible for. The problem is the enemy is not going ballistic. They are rapidly going to maneuvering and other type of weapons. Not just hypersonic. A long time ago, we started realizing there were not enough islands in the pacific to put radars on. There has got to be another way to do it. We have been working the ability to go to space for some time. It has taken not just the Technology Perspective but as well as the funding perspective from the commercial world but as well as getting people to understand space can be affordable and provide a mission. People in the past always thinking about Missile Warning. Missile warning is it has launched. It does not answer the question where is it going. In the past we were comfortable because when it was boosting, you figured out where it was going. Cannot do that anymore. That gets to missile tracking and missiledefense. I would submit while we try to argue money on Missile Warning is cheaper, to do missile tracking, Missile Defense is actually supports Missile Warning in the original functions. Todays day and age, thousands and thousands of tracks we get every year. The Political Party in power want to know where it is going. How soon do i have in what do i got to do . I cannot do that with the existing systems. The problem we had is that we know we have to go lower altitudes. To get the department to understand the need for a constellation was much bigger than what can happen from a missiledefense agency perspective. That is what brings together a lot of the jointness. The commercial world has proven you can build satellites cheaply. In one of our original programs, the killing was the launch cost. The cost has come down drastic sense the falcon 9s became available. We can have Affordable Access to space. We can build smaller satellites. We can monitor constellations and that kind of thing. Our role from an nda perspective, we understand fire control. Our expertise is not necessarily in operating constellations and that kind of thing. If derek was here, dereks job is to take not the high risk but low risk technologies and bring it to the next stage and operationalize it and bring it in. Hbt cs, our two vendors proved on the ground, you sell the one chart of being able to suck the target out of the environment. That was the big seller. The next trick is to prove you can do it in space. Two of the birds and four of the wide view birds going up. We will demonstrate the ability of being able to do this with high confidence. After that point, it is over to him to go deliver. We are tightly connected. As a group, not just with the space stuff but with the facilities on the ground. We have a combined Program Office structure with l. A. And s as c and ourselves. Typically what happens, if youre a career space guy, you get the satellite and everything is catching up. We have the ground environment now. I can talk to the fed or whatever. We have the infrastructure. We can get it to them quickly. And close the kill chain. We are waiting for the space sensors to come in and do their thing. One of the things that came up, you mentioned the idea of fusion. We have worked on that. We know how to take 2d and 3d data and turned it into 3d data and get it to the shooter. We know how to take opi data and radar data and bring it to the shooter. We are doing a lot. The real issue is, can the space domain deliver what we are saying we can deliver on time in the cost . That is what we are working together with sta and ssc is not here but they are part of the structure. The other thing is our contribution to the space dies in reverse is we have the radar out there. They need space for awareness. Starting to work out the combination between the two where we can provide the data. In turn, they can work the space opi are and bring it back to us. It is an enterprise within an enterprise working very well together. The challenge for the future. I think it has got high payoff. That segues nicely over to the colonel. Give us an update on the vision and where you are at on the tranches and a peek at where you are going. I want to say that was a great report. I appreciate covering everything from policy to the deck. That was outstanding. It is good to have an external entity looking at the problems we are looking to deliver on. For sda, we are after delivering targeting. Moving targets everywhere in the world and get after the most pressing threats, hypersonic or advanced missile threats. Satellites are fine but we have to get the data where it needs to go. We are focused on low latency. Initially using existing data formats and architectures. We are plugging into those. The integration has already started taking advantage of the fusion efforts. We are looking at the beyond line of sight targeting to get after the most pressing threats and using the existing data formats we have today. It has been a good partnership. We are focused on what we need to do, what we need to deliver. Even the importance of the mission and how fast things are moving in terms of space and technology in the threats. We have sda focusing on that layer. Our teammates and working with mda on fire control. A couple things we will highlight. I think it is a Great Success story. Sda is going to exploit the successes there that has passed through the valley of death as they say. We have part of it in t1 and t2 and able to proliferate moving down to the future. A great story and i know there are more things in the pipeline. We are talking about how nda is reducing risk so sta can proliferate that every couple of years. We are working with everybody. Cannot you had buyer ourselves but we are focused on the war fighter and the cocomes and the services themselves. We meet with them on a regular basis with the nda. Saying, what are they seeing for a threat . How are they going to respond to the threat in terms of tactics . And what do they see in terms of technology . We take advantage of the Spiral Development approach. Every two years we are launching new capabilities. We can defer easily to the next tranche and the war fighter does not have to wait long. I am part of that. Sda has been a joint organization. That is what i am the army person up here with the Space Development agency. Working with our space force partners. I have to leave with a trivia question. You can all look up who was the first one in the u. S. To launch 8 the first woman in the u. S. To launch a satellite for the u. S. . We will come back to it. I know the answer but i am not going to say. I was wondering if youd give us a snapshot of the congressional perspective. How are you seeing the issues, capabilities discussed on the hill from a multiparty perspective and how things might have changed on that front . First of all, sensors and sensibilities is going to be the topic of our first hearing in january. You are all invited. One of the nice things about my job and it is much different from when Carrie Haddad or a couple folks in between is it has morphed from being one of the more partisan contentious issues to one of the more bipartisan issues where you are seeing a lot of consensus. Part of the technology involving over the last decade or so. A lot of it has to do with our adversaries. What you are seeing in ukraine and israel. How Missile Defenses are able to buy policymakers time for decisions and buy them decision space. That has proven to be invaluable in a lot of these conflicts. You are seeing the demand for Missile Defense assets go up. When we are developing the ndaa or the appropriations bills, it is one of the things you are seeing the most consensus. The thing where you are seeing the most contention is how fast should you go and how much money and resources should be put behind it. Those are conversations they are having within the margins. They are intellectually honest. They are policy decisions. You are seeing a lot of rigor behind those things. John is getting questions that are much more policy oriented and not more politically oriented than some of the other committees on capitol hill these days. That is nice. That is refreshing. Another incident i will give is when we had the nda market this year, the Missile Defense used to receive dozens of amendments. You would have votes on 20 or so of those. We had zero defense votes this year. 2 00 in the morning hashing it out. It is a little bit different. That is refreshing. Do you want to react to some of the things said so far . First, in our defense with regards to the title [laughter] i believe it was aerospaces carrie sorry, caitlin johnson. I did a look up before we were coming up with the title. I thought of that exact title i thought of it too. We looked it up. Caitlin johnson was there before us. As she has been with so many other things. Shout out to caitlin if she is listening. I really wish we could have taken that name. Why dont we start to nerd out here on some of the themes the paper talked about in terms of things like resilience . What does regional coverage mean . Why is that important . How do we think about balancing efficiency versus schedule and these kinds of things . Do you want to take a stab at some of those . Some of the themes that were brought up. A lot of the things mentioned we are trying to get after and take advantage of entire community in terms of what is needed. We want to provide multiple sensors looking at any part of the globe at any time where we say stereo coverage or greater than that, robust coverage. Whatever orbit elegy works best. In tranche two, we are bringing it down to get closer to equatorial. That is to get after how do we provide the best coverage across the globe to all of the war fighters . We are learning as we move forward. In tranche three, we may tailor that more closer to the equator or in between. We are open to that. We are taking advantage of the spiral approach. You said one other thing. The mixed orbits inclinations and the concept of resilience. John paloma it was here a couple john paloma was here a couple months ago. He said what we are finding is resilience is a never ending quest. How do you answer how much is enough on the resilience side . Our number one approach is proliferation. What is the right number there . We worked through the simulations on that. We also have in coordination with ssc, how do we make sure we put our orbits in the right inclinations in the right spacing so they have the right coverage at all given times and run those simulations . How many satellites do you have to take out before one of the architectures have a problem . We do a lot of that thinking. We dont want to get we want to keep the satellites at a certain price point. We do look at some basic resiliency items in our layer. We are using proliferation and bringing on a new tranche every two years. Let me stay with a piece of the hardware in general for infrared. That is the point raised. I have been curious how you are thinking about the size of the fpas. Whether it is wide view. Use all the depictions of those tradeoffs. You saw the depictions of those tradeoffs. We are looking to provide the global stereo coverage so we have the ability to do fire control anywhere in the world. Initially we are doing wide field of view for t1 and t2. We dont dictate the size of the fpa. We look at performance. We have had good engagement on the maturity of the fpas and the new fracture ability which is a big thing. We dont really dictate that. For wide field of view, the ndp is the checking and fire controls down. Looking to proliferate in t3. What we are going to look to learn is specific to the polls where we have any one place at one time, how good can the precision get . As we saw in the charts where we have the wide field of view, if you have three or four wide field of views looking at the same place at the same time and im kicking that over to nda, that may get you down to narrow sensitivity. Having a solution does give you the ability in terms of tasking. We are going to have other Fire Control Solutions in t2 to inform where we are going. Do we need to have a medium fieldofview or can we do it with persistent fixed sensors . We have no preference. We have a set of requirements. We are looking to industry to help solve the requirements. We have them next. One of the answers we have provided before is how big a production line youre going to have and continue etc. I believe that is the wrong question. I believe the real question is back to as d. A. Strategy two sda strategy. There may be other approaches they can come up with and bigger fdas are not necessarily the answer. That causes a problem in some of the loading. The architecture and some of the physical structure of the satellites i tranche three, no doubt in my mind a little different than what we have in tranche one or zero. The other thing is, i think there is some payoff for the future of the Space Community and the Space Enterprise themselves. Hopefully the satellites when they are up there, they are not tracking ballistic missiles. They can be used for other functions. The interesting thing im going to take you on a tangent a little bit. There are 3500 satellites up there at leo right now. When we do a missile test, we have to get within seconds to launch so we dont hit something. It is that cluttered. It is going to get worse. To tie in the space domain awareness with the Missile Defense guys is critically important. Let me pull the thread with your complaint about subtitle only saying hypersonic in the ballistic thing. Stay with that. The nda i think it was last year had some legislative provisions about the fire control requirements and things like that. How do you see the congressional language in terms of the ballistic track as well . The hypersonic stuff is getting a lot of attention but what about that legacy . Ballistic threats from space. I think it was definitely 23 nda. Requirements for fire control data requirements. It is something not lost on us. Hypersonic and ballistic in the name. One of the ways we are looking at it is to make sure this relationship is as good as everybody says it is. But also when you are looking at fire control data, it is what the Program Offices say they need for the individual munition. It actually gives the war fighter what they need. That is how we look at it from the oversight perspective talking to the different Program Offices. Trying to understand the whole gamut of things rich hit on. We are going to have some different hearings next year. This is going to be an issue a budget of our members are going to want to head on. One of the other things i think are the synergies between what were doing on the offensive side and the defensive side. And how if the cph and lh w these guys can look at that more and tone their algorithms and adjust what they are doing from the defensive side. There definitely some synergies. One of the reasons we are trying to increase core doors where you can do testing to get some of the eas requirements out of the way. You said you cannot just slap fire control on like a bumper sticker. It is going to be contingent upon the other elements of the kill chain. Let me come back to you two gentlemen and whoever else wants to jump in. How do you know about refining the fire control requirements lets just say with hyper glide defense seeing as we dont have the missile yet . It is still in the competitive phase. How do you think about that . Within the Missile Defense agency, we have a set of rigid standards and engineering descriptions of what we need to get the job done. That includes the fire control data you need. A fire control quality that we meet all the time. Sitting in the gulf right now. That relationship exists. We have documented that same standard. What do we need for fire control it is documented in operational requirements. It is documented in system specifications. They are down there today reaffirming what do they need to go do the interceptor. The glide faced interfetzer interceptor, if you look at the massive distances and range it can go within overhead, it is unbelievable. We are trying to document it. Just like we did with interoperability and everything else. This is what you need to be a team member and play in the game. The latest ndaa that just passed, had some privations about the glide faced intercepto r. You added 2. 20 5 million. How do you think about the relationship between gpi timeline and the sensor timeline . That and also the trend timeline because we are in that window. When you talk to not just the ic but also our partners and allies about what youre seeing in ukraine with patriot going up against certain missiles with hypersonic capabilities, the threat is here now and based on what we have heard, it is not a Technology Development issue. It is more of a resource issue. John and i had a discussion before we came out here. It is a prioritization issue too. If you put the resources behind gpi, could it get there and do us in the japanese see that same threat space . We do from our committee. We put the additional funds behind it. We will see if the appropriators match it. The threats here and we believe it should be accelerated. The committee has the ndaa provision that will be having to take on the question you asked. Analyzing those various questions. What are the options for adjusting the timeline on that . As ryan notes, you have got lots of challenges across the Defense Budget and where you are going to put your priorities. Youre going to see some hard choices made across different programs. The nice part about us is we get to go second. You get to swing your budget first. I want to add a real quick and it was clear the tracking team went down to the gpi office. Let it number of virtual connections. This was the in person visit. To Start Talking regardless of how the timeline and set fleshing out, they are working on the plan together. It is not just data format. What does that interceptor need initially on the ground using existing architecture ethically down the road. We are talking space to agents or the actual interceptor to reduce latency. Not just talk. There is actual work going on between the agencies to get after the fire control capability. From everything we have heard, there are good teams working on it from the industry perspective. We prefer to see the competition go forward. We have seen the benefits of the competition. Some tough decisions should be coming down as far as what is in the top line and what is not. Something really important when youre getting to the range of missiles that can be going thousands of kilometers. Your sensor coverage has to be able to cover trends regionally, globally. They can be used for strikes on the others the world against the united states, strikes against our allies. The sensor area in particular is an area where you have opportunities where if you get your standards right and data formats right, leveraging allies and partners who have a shared interest in being able to defend themselves and defend alliances to prevent a deterrence perspective from an alliance. That integration you can achieve in the sensor side is a Growth Opportunity for us but i think that is something we will be seeing more too. I know it sounds like the sensors are an easy policy issue, we talk about bipartisan but you just mentioned the allies. Now we are going to be in cooperative development with japan. From a policy perspective, how are you thinking about the data sharing on the front end so we dont get into a situation where everybody wants a hyper glide killer but dont have access to the data . It is essential. It is important to japan. They have been clear about that. Because they know having a missile that does not have access to sensor data it is going to need to do the mission is not going to give you a very good return on your investment. That is understood upfront. That you have to do that. We do a lot of data sharing with our allies. Another aspect and this gets to the airborne layer portion of the study. A lot of current generation Airborne Sensor capabilities not in the missile area but battle space awareness, they are moving to space because they have to because of excess area denial. Just because data moved to space does not mean you have to have a new classification regime. If you have been sharing this data in your combat and commands for years because you have been fighting coalitions, you should be doing it the same way in space and continuing to share. As we think about what is the for space project visions to missile dissent, but as the mindset we have to have. It is some culture change but we are leaning into the. Into that. Missile defense is 18 time zones. I went to bring up the point we do share shooting data with japan, nato, israel at a number of the gcc countries. That basis has been set to the other thing that is interesting, Missile Defense guys we talk about messages. They deal in space vectors. Traditional space guys do collection data things. Trying to convince the space guys it was different and you have to have a 3d capability to nail the guy is a tough learning curve. It is a cultural change. But now the Space Community in addition to having Missile Defense so uf so if you are talking about tracks, ground moving targets to space, that is a mission were space people are realizing i am not just supporting watching things. I am supporting the terrestrial domains either targeting domains. Youre going to see this in multiple areas. I agree. If you cant share it, useless. If you dont enable if your coalition is strategic advantage and you dont work with your coalition, maybe it is not strategic. You have to do it. We have done this across domains. We just need to keep building on that. It is something they bring in every single one of their eating spirit we have a quest one of their meetings. We have a question come in. Steve from aviation week asks and this is a two parter. Geo has reported hp tcs can provide engaged on remote capability and sta pw essay is limited he says to lunch on remote. Can you break down what that means, what is the minimum necessary for defense and is it possible to provide capability given latency problems . Not much. Sounds like you have a definition problem. Launch on remote means like i have got it underway but im going to close the fire loop. Gage on remote means im going to send it or that is an important distinction. On the hyper glide, we are still trying to sort out on the gauge and remote it can jinx all over the place and how to work those issues is still in development stage. I lost track of the other part of the question. We took the requirements from hb tss. T1 is the actual hb tss payload integrated into the pw essay. We can learn about not just the performance but the concept of operations. How you get that data into the nda network into the cocom so we can start getting the agents that way. In t, part of our source selection and we are looking at the requirements to get that. The gauge and remote and lunch remote, we are trying to reduce the timeline for that sensor. We will use the exist the existing networks should expertise already there. As we can, spiral in the capability to go from space down to hs cruiser or to the interceptor. We are working on what that requirement is. It will be informed by the mission. What we propose to Industry Partners is you have to get it within a box. If you can get it within a box, you can execute it. We are going to be heavily tied to the ground initially as we grow on, the point is to get more of it up to space. We are making progress. Instead of waiting for the ultimate answer 10 years from now, we are getting capability now. And proof that we can do it. Since you just mentioned the ground a couple times along the way, the report talks about a constellation design will live and die by the transport constellation. How are you thinking about using that data about fusing the data but the background clutter and all the ground stuff and the resiliency of the ground assets as well . A couple things. We have to have the ground in place before we launch. We have had that guidance from lessons learned. There are a lot of scars on ground where we launched cool stuff and could not do anything with it. Ill ground is already in place. The ground integration is already ongoing with nda and others. Can geek out a little here. We have standardized messages. Messages are not that standardized. You have to go through each block of the message. And to define exactly how do you put a front types of sensors in there . We have different partners delivering different approaches. How does the fusion get after that . We have come together, gone through that line by line, that message standard format and got it approved by the people who manage that. That is how we are getting after that initially, kicking out on that on the ground. For fda we have multiple Operation Centers on that. That is one of the ways we get out to resiliency. With the pw essay or the proliferated war fighter space architecture, going to be the backbone. We have multiple data pathways we can get the data into a feeder whether it is existing networks we have or down the road. A particular service can receive that data. That is where we will have resiliency in terms of where the data flows. The other thing we have been working together with, you go out to spacex or the other places, you have a handful of people running the whole constellation. Typical air force, space force, hundreds of people. We are trying to get the people to understand we have to have constellations with automation that is self autonomous. We cannot have large armies on the ground supporting these things. They are doing a lot of work in the ai portion of the world and how to get that manning down and that is a key one. Your point was well taken. It is part of the resilience. It is the ground as well. General dickinson was here last month and he loves to point out the army is the biggest user of space. Let me try to bring up another policy question for you. The report talks about the nuclear pumping issue. How do you deter that . How do you work around that . It seems a hard fit for our Nuclear Retaliation kind of threat. How does that inform how we think about the resiliency and that sort of thing . It has always been there. It has always been there. Most nations figured out a long time ago probably testing in ways that would cause those disruptions is not in their own individual interests, much in anybody elses individual interest. The challenge with deterrence is when things are going ok, you assume maybe deterrence is working or nobody has an interest in doing it in the first place. When deterrence fails, that is the trouble with it. We have already had the design. The one that halfs to be in the nuclear environment. That will continue to perform the mission in the nuclear environment. That is part of deterring. That is part of ensuring my ability to impose in response is assured. The related question you ask is one of is there anyone who is so desperate they want to do that kind of damage to the worlds use of space . It is actually an attack on the worlds use of space and the world can be so dependent on that. It is something you want to continue to maintain an environment in which no one sees that to their advantage. Let me shift to some of the alternative sensors. We talked a lot about infrared, fpas and that sort of thing. I would be curious to get folks reaction and feel free to jump in as well about hyperspectral space based radar, frequency in general. Stuff up there but also socalled legacy groundbased radars as well today. As we think about this moving beyond just the infrared, what are the aspects there . Line ldr coming on board, that will be huge. Repurposed thing the radar down to guam, that will be a big add down there. All the systems we have. It is part of the resiliency party talked about earlier. From a Foreign Policy perspective, when your adversary is coming up and need to put a munition on land that will take Service Members lives, it is a different calculation. I think this is a really exciting area. In last years report, we had a lot of talk about Hypersonic Weapons, the things that make them so dangerous are the things that make them so vulnerable. Flying in a hypersonic environment, maybe they are vulnerable to different kyl mechanisms. They fly on the edge of design margins. That was the theme of last years report. The same applies this year. I wish i had more time to go into this at the beginning. Of course we are on a timeline. The Hypersonic Weapons have novel signatures. There might be other ways of looking at a hypersonic weapon or detecting them that are not just infrared. The report calls for a little more attention to exploiting some of those unique characteristics. There is a lot of work being done for example on the wakes and the plumes left by Hypersonic Weapons. These things flying at extreme speeds through air. Rips molecules off of the vehicle surface. The chemical reactions that release novel wavelengths of light. There is more than one way to get at this problem. That is something i hope will receive more emphasis. Do you want to say in thing about the radar given your portfolio . A couple things. We will always have a mix of radar and overhead. The overhead will not necessarily be continuously opi r. The o th is an interesting capability. I believe and we are experimenting with that as we speak. The issue the general wants to know about the our threat to the united states. It is not just hypersonics or all that. It is the regular cruise missiles. We talked about if anybody has seen a screen on a radar, you have to be like the sonar guys in the old movies. You need something to cue it off. If we had opir, we tip it off and it is on its way, you can pass it to an o th operator and he can tag it. In figure out where it is going. We have got to get out of this one bullet takes care of all. It is clever operators like you see in ukraine. Put things together to baffle the enemy. Comes back to fusion engines on the ground. We have another question come in. Given the timing of the deployment of hd ss, what nearterm testing tools will be available to demonstrate capabilities of those systems against enemy hypersonic threats . A couple things coming up. They will have easier tracking satellites on as well. They will be on the same plane. Well be able to do some tipping between them, see what it looks like hbc ss is looking at something of the same time. We are plugged into the entire enterprise whether it is offensive or defensive in terms of tested or ongoing. There is a lot going on. Opportunistically, we participate in any test as long as it works out for timing of orbits and their schedules. We have those schedules. We have a near opportunity to look at an nda test recently. Did not quite line up. Well have four for t0. Early next year we have plans to purchase a pay in ndaa tests and other agencies as well whether it is offensive or defensive. Maybe we will shift to the Industrial Base and to supply chains. This came up in your hearing last week. For the panel, for anybody who wants to chime in, what are some of the supply chain chokepoints for this set of capabilities you are tracking . What are some of the cost drivers . What other trends do you see there . Those are a couple things to kick off. Workforce is one. Providing critic ability to the Industrial Base. Mostly budgetary. A lot of multiyear procurements. We were able to update some of the procurements, language in the bill to give the departments and agencies a wider scope for what they can use it for. Authorizations mainly relating to replenishment for ukraine, israel for the taiwan scenario. Also trying to encourage coproduction and codevelopment. Sharing technology but also sharing workforce. Trying to alleviate some of the Human Capital bottlenecks. Anybody else on the supply chain base . A question for the record last week. You have already answered it. Supply chain issues for equipment and all that and sometimes it is not the big guys. It is sub tear down that may be stretched. What i am seeing on my side, software engineering. And Critical Mission system software. Most of those people cannot work from home. Trying to get the talent has been as we are making lastminute changes in hb ss to get those folks in has been tough. One of the other things i would say is facilities. You want to make sure everything is so we dont have another program we are not going to name here. Access to those type of facilities. There is a bottleneck to try to get into a lot of those places. There is also a bottleneck of programs coming up that are going to need access whether it is gpi, sentinel, for all the same facilities. I would mention the funding stability. Predicable competition for industry across sda, tracking layer as well as ssc. It is aligned where every year youre going to have some competition to be able to compete. We look at having multiple vendors or partners in east in each tranche helps reduce risk in terms of having everything with one crime. Investing in a lot of different suppliers. One of the successes we have had is oct. T1 between tracking and transport. Some more coming online. As they continue to scale up, reducing risk for future tranches. And a similar story for ftas. Three different fta providers which is good for the future as well as other subcomponents. Also highlighted the fpa matter. It is so hard to take these esoteric supply chain things and tie them in with the mission and tie them in with why we should care, why is this a goal we are going for. We had a good conversation earlier about that. If youre looking at these traits between fields of view, fire control versus traffic, persist tracking, the availability was really important. Important to getting that precision. I was glad to see that reflected in the final material. I wonder if we could wrap things up by looking to the future. Here we are 2023, a lot of stuff going on in the 20 20s, this decade. What are some things that still need to be done . You mentioned dss program for the future. As we think about the threats of 2045 and just how bad everything seems to be getting, just on the s nt t side of the house to begin looking at those things. Future oriented whether it be policy, what have you. Sure. As i started off, and you mentioned space sensor, hypersonic ballistic tracking sensor, proliferated architecture, the ground radars people put in, they are not going away. Architecture is a different balance and mix of what you are looking at and recognizing different parts of the architecture have different vulnerabilities so you are spreading your risk at different points and reducing the advantage in adversary gets by attacking any individual node. Your network is able to reroute in multiple ways. That is what you have to at the grand scheme level try to put out there. We want to do that first and foremost, you want to be tracking where your threat is before your threat gets launched so that is another part of the problem. It is a sensorbased mission area in part. And then you have to recognize the sensor tying into the missiledefense is missiledefense is a piece of your posture. It is part of assuring your ability to respond with ever best with whatever military force is nesser. Whether it is to yourself or your interests seen in your alliance. We will continue to see that broad framework at a strategic level. The technology will go down many of the pads we have been discussing but i will turn to the experts on that. What does 2045 what sort of thing should we be looking at for the future . The key thing is our account the competition going on with the glide phase and the gbi. We have got to bring that to a conclusion to get through cdrs and get the strong basis to execute. The threat is changing drastically. The koreans are catching up. We used to treat them like the third world whatever but they are getting closer to peer peer kind of stuff so we need to start focusing. You know what i am getting at. Prepare for the future, the best thing we can do is build that foundation now so continue to respond and adapt and take advantage of advances to technology to respond to threats. A big part of that is not just the tech. Sometimes we focus on developing the tech but we need to changes in the policy, acquisition to support a very responsive approach. Every two years doing this. How can we change institutions and cultures to have that more time focus now so we are not surprised later is what we need to get after and we can work on the tech pipelines, all those things and we can continue doing demos like we do with ht pss and t1 so we can maintain the overmatched against the threats. Big thing in my mind is build the foundations all the things you mention in your support in your reports what the delivery of the capability. 2045, Industrial Base. The Industrial Base. Ukraine has exposed a lot of the flaws that are there. You have also taken steps to increase our ability to produce munitions to get the Human Capital problem right. To get the workers we need. It is not just munitions. It is submarines. It is a host of things across the Industrial Base. Taking the next couple years to get that right so we are better prepared for what the next conflict as pretty nine next conflict is. What you think about the future and the next topic we have to tackle . 2045, we will come up with better report names. When im thinking about the future, the big take away to me from this report is how complex the problem is. How many things you need to integrate across various domains, various organizations. This is the region the reason we have such a big panel. When i look at this problem, i think, how do you measure success . How do you get better at doing that . How do you get better at connecting your discussion of the requirements for the kill box you need we are codeveloping with japan . If we can think of better oversight mechanisms, better ways of assessing programs and analyzing them, i think that would be a successful future. Thanks to everybody who came out. Thanks to everybody who has contributed in one way or another to this undertaking. Thanks to all of you folks for coming out and eliminating us on what is going on. Please join me in thinking the panel for their thoughts. [applause]