kevin is a licensed battlefield guide at the antietam battlefield. and he's co-author of an upcoming book for the emerging civil war series about the maryland campaign. he's going to talk to us a little bit about what he considers to be a great defense, robert e. lee at antietam. it's my pleasure to introduce one of the great emerging voices in the field, kevin pollock. >> good morning, everyone, thank you to chris for that humbling introduction and thank you all for being here at my bachelor party. i think we might set virginia state record for the largest bachelor party in all of state history. it's about to get a little crazy in here. talking about robert e. lee at the battle of antietam. even before last year's symposium when a letter was sent out asking for topic ideas for great defenses of the civil war there was a caveat left in the email that allowed us to quote think outside of the box. and the topic that i propose is the one that i'm proposing or presenting to you now, robert e. lee at antietam and i thought to myself that was going to be a very straightforward presentation about a great defense of the civil war. and the more i started looking into it. i realized that there's a bit more to robert e. lee's defense at antietam than what we had always thought. so as human beings we are always products of the past. as history buffs, people who love to study the american civil war, we are always reading and looking into what historians before us have said. what i'm going to ask you to do now. is for the next 40, 45 minutes, forget everything you have ever heard about the battle of antietam. not everything. because then i got to go from square one. but close to everything. and we will look into exactly why does robert e. lee make what many consider to be one of the most controversial decisions of his entire military career. and what is his plan? why does he not stand there, what's his idea? what is he thinking in his mind? i don't pretend to be a mind-reader, but if you look at lee both before antietam and after, you might start foig out some interesting things. so we're going to start where dr. jordan left it off last night on the evening of september 14th, perhaps one of the worst days in robert e. lee's life up to that point. his army, as far as he knows, has been pushed from two mountain passes, turner's and fox's gaps in the north where you see the nice picture of robert e. lee on the screen. as far as he knows, nothing has happened at crampton's gap, he doesn't know yet at this point that lafayette mcclause's command has been driven from crampton's gap so robert e. lee will ride out, with mcclause saying the day has gone against us, telling mcclause, do whatever you can, but get out of here. get out of maryland, the rest of the army is going back to virginia. the campaign that lee had waged so much on in september of 1862, is over. lee is getting back into virginia. but let's look at the situation as lee did. if lee disappears from the map, and goes back west across the potomac river into virginia, this is going to open up lafayette mclaws to a very bad situation. caught between the union army of the potomac with nowhere to go behind him because the union garrison at harper's ferry is still in existence so what lee will decide on the morning of september 15 is that temporarily he is going to make a stand behind antietam creek on the high ground overlooking the creek, at a place called sharpsburg. lee is only standing there temporarily, momentarily, to save lafayette mclaws, draw mcclellan and the union army away from mclaws and towards lee. that's the idea. but when lee arrives on the east bank of antietam creek on the morning of september 15th, he is greeted with something that you probablies could not expect, but certainly it is something that he likes very much. and it's this. it's a great view today. anyone wants to go up to the pry house and see this view, you can get it. robert lee wasn't exactly where the pry house was when he had this view on september 15th and the view would have been even better. far less trees. lee would have had a great view of the ground on the other side of the antietam. today of course you can see as i've labeled up there for you the new york monument, visitors center, the cornfield, dunkirk church, things like that lee didn't have anything to look at. what he saw with his trained engineer eye was the first thing, is that ridge. the high ground. running on either side north to south, on either side of the town of sharpsburg. what lee sees in that ridge, and remember, robert e. lee on september 15th is getting the same exact view that george mcclellan is going to have on the battlefield a couple of days later thanks to rob orson for pointing that out. so what lee sees and likes is not only is it high ground, but the ground is incredibly tricky. and lee knows that he will be able to hide his troops on the other side of that ridge. conceal his troops. use interior lines, as was discussed last night to move troops from one point of the battlefield to another, very quickly with the union commander, george mcclellan being entirely blind to it the other thing lee sees is the landmark for which this battle is named, the antietam creek. some people come to the battlefield today and they say that doesn't look like a creek. that looks like river and other people will say that doesn't look like a creek, it looks like a tiny stream. but in 1862, antietam creek was only crossable in several places and about three to four feet deep on the day of battle. so it was a pretty substantial barrier that robert e. lee could put between his army of northern virginia and his adversary in the union army. the other thing lee sees as he crosses over antietam creek and begins moving up the high ground that i refer to as the sharpsburg heights, he doesn't have the luxury of measuring it out. but i do. lee must have seen it the three main approaches that the union army can take to lee's line on the sharpsburg heights, the average amount is approximately 185 feet. in ascent. you want a comparison, gettysburg is only 160 feet. little round top, 130 feet. lee likes very much the position that he has. so he will gather up his army and decide to try and resurrect his campaign in maryland. and this is where the critics come in. just a couple of quotes up there for you. from early historians, of the american civil war, people who would have been alive at the time of the war calling this one of lee's boldest, most controversial military decisions. because not only is he fighting with the antietam creek to his front, but as more people like to recognize, they don't think about the creek in front of him. they think about the river behind him. the poke potomac river is about three miles behind his lines. most people come to the antietam battlefield and they expect to see the potomac river and they expect that lee has one foot in the river and one foot out. that what is not the case, lee has three miles to maneuver behind his lines and there are several other ridges behind lee's lines if he does have to fall back, he lass a perfect place to do so. and one thing that these quotes do not always take into consideration, is what was going on in robert e. lee's mind exactly? why did he make the decision to stand and fight at sharpsburg? in his own words in 1868, i went into maryland to give battle. and you don't have to read the tealeaves on this one to realize what he's talking about. went into maryland to fight a battle and more importantly for robert e. lee, i went into maryland to win a battle. lee has not done that yet. and he is still looking for that victory. as dr. jordan was mentioning last night, lee is waging everything, he's waging confederate independence on this very campaign. and robert e. lee is going to push his army beyond the limits of human exertion in order to achieve that one victory. so we got the first part. taken care of. what is lee's plan or why exactly does he make a stand behind the antietam creek? you'll notice of course on this map, the potomac river is hardly on the map. he's not fighting with his back to the river. the body of water that lee is more focused on, not behind him, it's in front of him. antietam creek. it's a barrier. again between himself and the union army. so we discover, we've looked at why exactly lee decides to stand and fight on september 16th and september 17th. what is lee's plan? and again, so often in the past it has been depicted as lee is simply going to counter george mcclellan's blows. as my good friend and fellow antietam historian tom clemens is eager to point out that george mcclellan and robert e. lee are the only two generals fighting against each other an a civil war battlefield, they don't meet each other midfield and do a coin toss to decide who is going to attack and who's going to defend. so often we think that lee is simply defending. but again there's a bit more to that. i'm going to jump a little bit off of what dan was talking about earlier with confederate strategy and what chris talked about last night. here's an 18 a 50 portrait of robert e. lee, been in the army three decades by the time this was painted. robert lee was a student not only of military history, but of history in general. you can see the quote down here, from jomani. the best thing from an army on the defensive is to know how to take the offensive at a proper time. and to take it. basically what that quote says, it's talking about one big word that i will toss around a few times through this talk. initiative. robert e. lee is always looking to hold onto the initiative. if he has the initiative, george mcclellan and the union army or whoever lee is fighting is going to have to dance to his tune. that's very important to the confederacy. so lee wants to take the initiative. and he knows from his studies, the only way to do that is to take the offensive. a defensive battle is going to do no more for robert e. lee and the army of northern virginia than get a stalemate, a draw. and robert e. lee and the confederate army of northern virginia are not in the business of fighting for a stalemate. they're looking for one more battlefield victory to achieve confederate independence in september of 1862. go back a few months from september of 1862, a picture that i'm sure all of you have seen, union siege guns at the siege of yorktown on the virginia peninsula on april and early may of 1862. so often when we talk about the siege of yorktown, the focus is on the union army. the disconnect between george mcclellan and abraham lincoln about union strategy perhaps the slowness of george mcclellan, the hesitancy to attack, frontal attack with thousands of his infantry and the great story of prince john mcgruder doing his theatrics to try to bluff the union army. so little do we look at what the confederate reaction is to what george mcclellan has planned. robert e. lee at this point, his military adviser to jefferson davis in rich mpd. lee is in almost daily exact with confederate commander joseph johnston down on the battlefield. a few days before johnston and the confederate army pull out of their works at yorktown this is what joseph johnston writes to robert e. lee. i'll read almost the entire letter. april 30, 1862. johnston says to lee, we are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win. it is plain that general mcclellan will adhere to the system adapted by him last summer and defend for success upon artillery and engineering. we can compete with him in neither. we must therefore change our course. take the offensive. collect all the troops we have in the east and cross the potomac with them. our troops have always wished for the offensive, and so does the country. please submit this suggestion to the president, we can have no success while mcclellan is allowed as he is by our defensive, to choose his mode of warfare. what mcclellan is doing is he's putting the confederate army in a no-win situation. mcclellan is using the superiority in artillery, engineering and naval power at yorktown to fix the confederate army of northern virginia in one spot and pummel it. the confederate army can neither attack mclittlen's works, they cannot stay there much longer because they will be pummeled. mcclellan has put them in a no-win situation, as johnston says, and lee's reaction to this letter from joseph e. johnston is written the next day. he says the feasibility of the proposition has been the subject of consideration with the president for some time. so far as advancing a column to the potomac with all the troops that can be made available. he concurs in your reviews as to the benefits to be obtained by taking the offensive and is very desirous of being able to carry into effect. one month later joseph e. johnston is wounded at the battle of fair oaks, late may, early june of 1862 and roernt e. lee is the one sprung to take command of the army of northern virginia three weeks after he takes command, as doug crenshaw is in the crowd, has written a book about the battle of seven days, lee strikes and attacks. look at where he does that. he knows his army for the most part, throughout the war, the confederacy is going to be outnumbered, lee knows one main thing -- first he's got to keep the initiative. but also in order for him to win decisive battles, he has to use a tactic used by napoleon. napoleon is often outnumbered as well. mass your troops at one point. put more of your troops at the point of the spear than what the enin i can put. where does lee choose to attack in the battle of the seven days? george mcclellan and the union army are divided and split by the chickhominy river. lee masses his troops north of the chickhominy river where mcclellan has less men and that's where lee strikes. in massing his troops, putting more troops at the tip of the spear, than what the union army can do. lee will constantly look to get around the enemy's right flank, turn it drive it out of position or maybe even worse, or even better in lee's mind. try to destroy it. this quote that you see here on the right, comes from lee's after-action report of the seven days. under ordinary circumstances, the federal army should have been destroyed. lee, a student of napoleon, is looking for that napoleonic victory, always. until the very end of the war. lee is always grasping at straws, looking for that napoleonic victory. now this using of a body of water to divide his enemy is something that lee will do several times during the war. of course the seven days comes from before our topic right now, the battle of antietam. but later today you'll hear about another time when robert e. lee will use a body of water to divide his enemy. put it in a very bad situation. and as you'll hear from my colleague chris mckousky this afternoon. in a battle of 1864, lee does exactly that and is looking to strike a blow against a divided union army. as you can see on the screen, divided into three sections, by the northern anna river. which brings us back to antietam. this is the situation, the map you see on the left, on the morning of september 17th of 1862. i've highlighted what i want to you look at of course. with that big red circle. george mcclellan and the union army of the potomac are divided. by a body of water. and not only that, but there's a lot of green space between joseph hooker and his troops on the west side of the antietam creek, and the antietam creek itself. lee follows this movement of union troops to the west side of antietam creek on the afternoon of september 16th. he knows how long it's going to take for union troops to get reinforcements over there. and it's telling, look at what james longstreet writes in 1896. what you can see up there on the screen. hooker believed his movement so far from support extremely venturesome and he was right. if jackson could have been put into this fight and also more brigades. hooker's command could have been fought out, if not crushed. before the afternoon was out. now perhaps this is just james longstreet recognizing a good what if, like we always like to discuss and debate. 34 years after the fact. but it's clear that there is some intentions in the confederate high command that they were thinking about this. as you'll see in just a moment. so i have done a very poor job of making maps. i know ed stander from last year when it comes to these. but i want to show you some of the movements of the confederate army. on the morning of september 17th. here as i've drawn are, the positions roughly of the confederate army. there's no union troops on that map. from 6:00, at 6:00 in the morning, on september 17th. and real quick, we're going to do a blow-by-blow, battle narration, early in the army, joseph hooker's are going to launch their attacks. hooker and jackson have pummeled each other, beaten each other inside of that 24 acres of corn. and lee is going to have to start shifting troops up to the northern end of his line by 8:00 in the morning. it's initially and has mostly been thought of as this is a plan by lee to parry and thrust with george mcclellan. where mcclellan is going to throw in and attack. lee is going to throw in a counterattack to maintain his lines. but look at what happens starting at 8:30 in the morning. here's the situation. 8:30. watch where the center of power in the confederate army shifts, g.t. anderson's brigade goes north. two divisions of the confederate army will swing north to the west woods and the third, anderson's division will help out in the sunken road. again that may be seen as lee is simply masking where mcclellan is massing most of his troops. but let me offer this to you. 6:00 in the morning, here is the disposition of lee's army on the antietam battlefield. roughly half of it is north of sharpsburg. 9% is in the center, you have about a quarter each on the southern end of the battlefield and a quarter left in reserve. here's the situation by 10:00 a.m. 90, nine out of every ten infantrymen in robert e. lee's army is north of sharpsburg. 90%. to look at that and think that this is simply robert e. lee getting involved in a heavyweight boxing match with george mcclellan, that does not scream defensive to me. lee is looking to do something. if you put 90% of your army at one point, you are clearly trying to mass your troops for something big. and i should also note, that when lee's army is defeated, even a couple of days before lee's army is defeated at the battle of south mountain, robert e. lee is holding the initiative in his hands. his defeat at south mountain, mcclellan's unexpected rapid movement from washington that catches lee's army divided, lee loses the initiative. he never gets it back. in the maryland campaign. but he's looking to take it back. every single moment that he possibly can, lee wants that initiative back in his hands. again make the union army dance to your tune. can you pick the mode of warfare. just like joe johnston said at yorktown if we allow the enemy to pick his mode of warfare, this is a war we cannot win. lee has to pick his mode of warfare. now the offensive potential of robert e. lee's antietam offensive, not defensive so to speak and i will shield myself from anyone who is throwing rotten tomatoes at me for speaking about an supposed offensive. this is so often portrayed as a defensive, it gets overshadowed. the offensive potential of lee's army on the northern end of the battlefield as he's shifting 90% of his army to the northern side of sharpsburg is splayed at about 9:30 in the morning on september 17th. the union's second corps has arrived on the battlefield and edwin sumner has led one division of his troops, 5,000 men under the command of john sedgewick from east to west into the west woods. in 15 minutes, sedgewick's division is cleared from the west woods and loses 42% of its soldiers. an entire division of the union army, nearly wrecked. and this attack by lee which by the way is the only point on the antietam battlefield where the confederates are going to have more troops at the tip of the spear than the union army will is in the west woods. this attack is going to force the union army, the union high command on the northern end of the battlefield, most specifically edwin sumner back into the defensive. so now the initiative is not in george mcclellan's hands, it is resting in no man's land, waiting for somebody to grab it on the northern end of the battlefield. you see what jeb stewart rights in his after-action report. talks about the pursuit of sedgewick's division from the west woods. stewart is talking about getting more troops to follow up the success. the confederate army is looking to grab that initiative in no man's land, take it and turn the tide of the campaign once again in their favor. throughout the late morning, early afternoon of the 17th, this is the situation on the northern end of the battlefield, you can see the confederate battle line is starting to coalesce, lee is gathering more troops on the northern end of his line. he's bringing up soldiers that had been engaged in the morning's battle and bringing them once again to the north. trying to do whatever he can to take this initiative back. you'll see the union army is also massing troops. on the northern end of the battlefield. but the confederates are certainly trying to do something new. trying to take the initiative back. here's what james longstreet had to say. again in 1896, he said the enemy's nonaggression suggested an opportunity, another word that robert e. lee is always looking for, an opportunity for the confederates. i ordered mclaws and walker to prepare to assault. hood was back in position with his brigades and jackson was reported on his way. if our columns could be massed and in goodly numbers pressing severely upon a single point it would give the enemy much trouble and might cut him in two. and break up his battle arrangements at the lower bridge. of course at this point george mcclellan, ambroseburnside and the 94 have crossed the antietam side of the battlefield. lee is looking to not only do something on the northern side of the battlefield, but also lee is looking to continue follow up the success from the morning's assault into the west woods. and that's exactly what's going to happen. there are five characters up here on the screen. you recognize many of them. jeb stewart in the upper left, stonewall jackson, james longstreet in the bottom right. division commander john walker, one of the divisions responsible for the fighting in the west woods is up there in the right. and one of his brigades, belong to robert ransom, who is in the bottom center of the screen. and at about 3:30, 4:00 in the afternoon, john walker and robert ransom are sitting together inside of the west woods, using the terrain to conceal their numbers. and robert ransom receive as note from james longstreet. the note basically says i want to you mass your troops, move forward and attack the union batteries in your front. walker looks at this and says no, this isn't right. according to walker, what had happened is that stonewall jackson had ordered walker to wait to attack until jeb stewart could turn the enemy's right. get around the right end of the enemy line. keep the union troops occupied there. and then lee would send his forces straight at the union army. on the northern end of the battlefield. so walker rides back to james longstreet, discusses this with longstreet. longstreet says i didn't realize that jackson was trying to do this. so longstreet was trying to delay the assault. but jackson surely is trying to do something on the northern end of the battlefield in conjunction with jeb stewart. it is interesting to note that the entire day of september 17th, if you look at the holy trinity of the army of northern virginia, all three, jeb stewart, james longstreet and stonewall jackson never go south of sharpsburg the entire day. all three of them are north. lee will only go south of sharpsburg later in the day. he's mostly north of sharpsburg as well. so the idea is to get jeb stewart a decently sized force, as many troops as he could, 4,000, 5,000 men and begin snaking along the potomac river. looking for the northern end of the union line and trying to get around it. turn the enemy's position, force them back across antietam creek or cause some havoc there, in order for stonewall jackson to send his legions out of the west woods toward the massing of union guns. stewart's flanking column, about 4:30 in the afternoon on the 17th, you can see highlighted in red. it's only about 2600 cavalry, 1300 infantry and 21 guns. not all that large. but again lee is looking for anything. grasping at straws to try and gain the initiative back. basically in a nutshell stewart's flanking expedition is a failure. he masses, puts nine of his guns under john pelham on the northern end of the confederate line, you can see a few guns there. and what they run into is about 50 union artillery pieces. pelham's guns are deployed for less than 15 minutes before being repelled away. the union line is too strong on the northern end of the battlefield, too close to the potomac river. we don't have enough room to maneuver and get around the right end of the union line. they are so massed, they have so much artillery that an attack for us is going to be suicide. so lee puts that off and the battle on the northern end of the battlefield comes to an end. by the end of september 17th, the confederate army has lost nearly one out of every three soldiers that it began the day with on the 17th. the union army loses about 25% of its men. as we know, robert e. lee does not decide to leave. on the night of september 17th, he brings up as many of his stragglers as he possibly can, perhaps hoping that he can gain something new the next day. and that's exactly what robert e. lee is going to try. remember, he has thrown all of his chips into the center of the table. he's not going to give up this easily. so on the morning of september 18th, lee and jackson have a conference. and jackson is still telling lee this can't happen. this isn't going to work. and lee says well let's get a second opinion so lee calls on somebody who has the same name as him, not related, but an artillery battalion commander in the army of northern virginia, the gentleman pictured on the right, steven dill lee. and jackson says let's go for a ride. the two of them ride in silence. and they get to a high piece of ground called nicodemus heights on the northern end of the battlefield. they crawl up to the top of the heights and jackson asks steven lee, the question that you see there at the bottom of the screen -- colonel lee, i wish to you take 50 pieces of artillery and crush that force. which is the federal right, can you do it? and steven lee, kind of taken aback by this and says -- well, general, where am i going to get 50 guns? all i've got is about 20. jackson says don't worry, i'll get you the guns. can you crush the federal right? and lee kind of dodges the question, doesn't really want to answer and continues to say well i don't know where i'm going to get the 50 guns from. and jackson says don't worry, we'll get you the 50 guns. can you do this? and lee sort of says well i think if i'm reading you right, think if you're reading you right, general, you're asking for my honest opinion. and jackson says, that's exactly what i'm asking for. so lee takes a deep breath, peers one more time into his binoculars, looks at the union position at the northern end of the battlefield and turns to jackson and says "no, general, it cannot be done." >> and jackson says, "that is enough then." and the two get back on their horses and they ride back towards lee's headquarters. on the way jackson gives steven lee the task of going back to robert e. lee in person [ laughter ] and telling him -- and having steven lee tell robert e. lee this ain't gonna work, general. so you can imagine steven lee doing this. and steven lee rides up to robert e. lee and says "this isn't going to work." and as lee later recalled he said "a shade came over robert e. lee's face." and it's shortly after that that robert e. lee decides it is time to leave maryland. and this is where we think that the story of antietam typically ends. lee leaves maryland, gets back into virginia and the armies don't do anything for a while until fredericksburg. but lee's withdrawal from sharpsburg on the night of september 19th is not even really a withdrawal, it's a change of plans. it becomes known as the williamsport plan. here's lee's idea. september 18 his army will cross is that correct with his call calvery will cross upstream from sharpsburg, swing north as quickly as possible, get a bridge head back into maryland at williamsport when lee is going to then follow behind with his infantry, swing it north, recross the potomac river into maryland and keep the campaign going. lee is simply looking for room to maneuver when he pulls back from his position around sharpsburg. from there what is lee's intention when he gets to hagerstown? here's what he says, one week after the battle of antietam to jefferson davis, when i withdrew from sharpsburg into virginia it was my intention to recross the potomac at williamsport and move upon hagerstown, but the condition of the army prevented it. in a military point of view the best move in my opinion the army could make is advance upon hagerstown and endeavor to defeat at that point. lee is still talking defeat but his williamsport plan will fail for several reasons. firstly, he's run the wheels off of his army. it's not reacting, james longstreet has to line up a row of canon across the road threatening to fire on his own men if they don't move. george mcclellan has something to do with this. firstly he he pursues the confederate army to the potomac river and at the battle of shepherdstown he is able to put enough force that lee has to put the brakes on his movement towards williamport and turn the army around to shepherds town to make sure that george mcclellan won't try any trick there is, at the same time he'll send portions of his army north to williamsport and will basically kick jeb stuart out of williamsport back into virginia so lee loses his bridge head. so lee will decide on the morning of -- excuse me, the afternoon of september 20 that this thing is over, the campaign is done. he's run the wheels off his army, time to give it up. we've tried our best. so what is lee's reaction to all of this? there's the movement south to try and strike the arm of the potomac. october 2nd of 1862 robert e. lee writes a general order to the army of northern virginia, the soldiers of the army of northern virginia and basically it recounts everything they had done from the seven days through cedar mountain 2nd manassas and south mountain and sharpsburg. in the end, this is what lee says about that very quick, incredible turnaround that the army of northern virginia is able to start in the eastern theater of the war. it says history records few examples of greater fortitude and endurance than this army has exhibited, and i am commissioned by the president to thank you in the name of the confederate states for the undying fame you have won for their arms. lee is looking at this positive tiffly. but the last sentence, the second to the last sentence of this order is this. and you cannot help but reading it and hear when you read it in lee's voice a sense of disappointment. that his offensive campaign into maryland, his offensive battle at antietam had filed and this is what he said. "much as you have done, much more remains to be accomplished." thank you all very much, i'd be happy to answer any questions. [ applause ] >> anybody have questions for kevin? all right, we'll head in this direction. please introduce yourself, tell where you say you're from and be sure you have a question. >> bob layman, youngstown, ohio. at what point did lee know there was a possibility that a.p. hill was going to get to the battlefield and give him maybe into his mind-set what he was going to do with shifting the troops? >> lee -- ap hill arrives at sharpsburg about 2:30 before his troops get there. that's when he reports the lee. so lee knows that something is on the way at that point. you have to think, though that robert e. lee is very disappointed, whether the disappointment lies at the feet of stonewall jackson or ap hill himself or whoever the disappointment lies at, that lee is disappointed hill isn't there sooner. again, for them to put 90% of his army north of sharpsburg and leave only 8% of his army within a mile and a half of his escape route across the potomac river knowing full well the union troops have troops across antietam creek, i think lee really hoped, thought that hill was going to be there sooner. and so i think that does factor into his plans. now, what were lee's intentions in his mind for what he wanted ap hill to do when he arrived on the battlefield? we'll never know. we have no idea. but, of course, when hill does arrive on the battlefield lee sends him to the southern end of the battlefield to help plug the gap there. so very good question, yes. >> other questions? >> i'm doug pauley from chesapeake, virginia, and bear with me here, i kind of scribbled some things. >> sure you're fine. >> was lee -- was he kept informed and in the loop with jefferson davis on everything that the confederacy was doing politically and in other military theaters that might have contributed to lee's decision to do something like go to maryland which was labelled by some as hazardous? and did jefferson davis, when lee wanted to do such things, did he give him -- pardon the pun -- leeway to do that or did lee have to jump through hoops like through the war department of the confederacy and whatnot to get those types of maneuvers or initiatives approved? >> sure. let me go ahead and answer the first question. lee is aware of other confederate movements in the western theater of the war, kirby smith, bragger moving into kentucky, things are starting to stir around northern mississippi as well. lee is fully aware of those movements and i think does view his movement into maryland as a piece of that. it's basically a confederate offensive along a thousand mile front. lee is well aware of that, that's why he throws so much into the campaign, he thinks at least at the time that this is the best chance the confederacy is going to have of winning the war, winning its own independence. the second question about jefferson davis and lee being in -- did lee have any leeway, so to speak. it's often portrayed that when lee writes his very famous september 3 drainsville letter to jefferson davis saying i'm going to cross the potomac river, that lee then continues to move forward with his invasion of maryland in the first place even without receiving permission from jefferson davis. it's not exactly the case. lee and davis had been talking about this for quite some time and the confederacy has been talking about a movement into maryland for quite some time, even going back to the fall of 1861. even before stonewall jackson was stonewall jackson, when he was thomas jackson at harper's ferry, he does have troops technically on maryland heights. now robert e. lee did not put much stock in the fact that marylanders were going to rise up by the thousands and join the army but he knew that was the aim of the confederacy to throw the yolk of yankee oppression, as lee called it, off of maryland and bring maryland into the folds of the confederacy so lee, he did have leeway in that. again, pardon the pun but jefferson davis was fully aware of what lee was wanting to do. >> ladies and gentlemen, kevin pawlak. [ applause ] weer been on the road meeting win ares f this year's student cam video competition. at royal oak high school in royal okay, michigan, jared clark won a prize of $3,000 for his documentary on the rising cost of pharmaceutical drugs. and the second place prize of $1500 went to classmate marry sire for her documentary on mass incarceration. and third place winner won a prize of $750 for her documentary on gender enequality. and grace novak won an honorable mention prize of $250 for her documentary on the relationship between the police and the media. thank you to all of the students who participated in our 2017 student cam video documentary competition. to watch any of the videos, go to student cam.org and student cam 2018 starts in september with the theme "the constitution and you." we're asking students to choose nep provision of the u.s. constitution and create a video illustrating why the provision is important. moern history tv is in primetime on c-span 3 every night congress is in recess. next we'll focus on the civil war and america's 16th president, abraham lincoln. we're starting at gettysburg civil war institute for a look at president lincoln's lasting legacy. good evening, i am peter carmichael. professor of history at

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