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Transcripts For CSPAN2 Key Capitol Hill Hearings 20140918

recommended they not be used? >> i read reports of that, sir. >> okay. you were once an rso, correct? >> yes, sir. >> in your distinguished career, do you ever remember recommending that a service not be used? that being hired over your protest or yourar recommendation? >> not in my experience, sir. >> okay. but you would have at some point recommended somebody or maybe not recommended anybody? was it your job to look at the performance of these people tht you were w aware of? >> when -- >> when we have barredded contracts. when we find the contractor is not performing we have variety of ways to deduct money and ultimately find they're not performing. if they're found to be lacking and not performing contract they can be terminated. they can be barred if that goes that far. >> you mentioned. february 17th, martyrs' brigade i believe what it was called. we were told that was the host company security. is that true or not? >> i, i would hesitate to call that host country security, sir. at best it probably had sop control in that area of the city but this is based on what i read from the reports. >> is there an individual that would be at the post that would be responsible for insuring that theon 17th brigade was responsible and dependable? sir, i wasn't there at the time. as a former rso i can probably tell you there were likely limited choices and one of the things that an rso would do at that point if he was faced with limited choices was try to tran them as best he could, to try to make the best of whatever situation he was handed. >> he would have to train the february brigade? >> if he found that they were not up to the levels that he wanted, he would engage and assist in the training, making sure they understood the guard orders. making sure they had capabilities that were necessary. into okay. let's say, and they were hired in case there was an attack inside of the compound to respond. who would have had the contact information and who would have been responsible on the poet for contacting the, this protective brigade of martyrs? >> there were, as i read the report, sir, again, i was not here at the time, there were personnels? on the compound. they hadad telephone communicatn with their own groups. the agent that was in the -- >> with their own groups? >> with other personnel in the group. with other personnel. and there was communication on the part of rso who was in the operations center, lo was making phone calls and there were phone calls that were being made by the annex. >> okay. let's go to the tripwires that mr. cummings was talking about. the foreign affairs handbook defines tripwires as events that activate, initiate or set in motion post plans to prevent harm to the post, its personnel, the u.s. citizen community or other u.s. national interests. the handbook also notes that when a trip wire event occurs, it requires that an action be taken. are you familiar with that? >> yes, sir. >> it's my understanding that the tripwires, are preplanned, preapproved measures that should be taken in light after security-related incident or threat, is that true? >> that is true, sir. >> has the state department emphasized to post the purpose of having tripwires? >> has the state department? >> having tripwires? >> yes. >> p when a trip wire is breach, meaning something bad has happened, that breach is the trigger to take specific action, is it not? >> at a minimum it is a, it is a warning that the post must review what has occurred and then determine whether action needs to be taken, at a minimum. >> take action, rather than just requiring that they set around and reevaluate the situation? >>mi well, sir, tripwires are written in advance of activities. we try to cover a wide variety of situations that could occur. predicting the future and exactly what your actions are going to be is very difficult. i think the purpose of tripwires really is to indicate, wait, happened.has just this could be significant. we need to consider whether or not we need to take action in this case. >> okay. >> as i said previously it was normally a post activity. now c once a trip wire is tripp, it is looked at both by the post and by the various sections in washington. >> would you consider a hole being blown in the perimeter wall of the temporary mission facility, would you consider that a trip wire? >> i would certainly say that is a good indicator sir, probably crossed the tripwire. >> that event would have probably, should have caused some action or discussion, correct? >> yes, sir. >> would an attack on another diplomat's coming into benghazi that caused that country to pull out, would that have been a trip wire? >> i assume you're referring to the attack on the british ambassador, sir?ng >> i am. >> that is another tripwire, yes. >> okay. >> i certainly think that is an indication of security problems and instability. >> and so those were two tripwires that you would consider significant, would you not? >> yes, sir. >> and what was done with the security after those two tripwires weret, tripped? >> sir, as i said, i was not here at that time. i was not in diplomatic security. >> you read reports. >> i read the reports. i'm aware that the rsos were increasing physical security. they were engaged in building safere havens inside of the facility. they had engaged in training with the guards, training routines. they had run drills with the annex. i think they were, from what i read they were doing the types of things that an rso would do when he sees the situation beginning to deteriorate. >> thank you for your testimony. thank all of you for being here. and let's hope we can get some results out of this tragic event. >> thank you, gentleman from georgia. the chair recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. schiff. >> thank you. at the outset, mr. chairman, i want to thank you for conducting the hearing today and for the way you worked with us to bring together witnesses and follow-up on the arb recommendations. i greatly appreciate it. i want to ask you gentlemen something that is in a bit after differenti direction than the questions you've had thus far and that is, i also serve on the appropriations subcommittee on state and foreign operations and i have a opportunity to meet with a lot of foreign service officers o and here in washingtn and aroundns the world. many described to me what they consider the benghazi effect on their jobs and by that, they refer to such a heightened concern about security that many of them feel they can not fulfill their mission anymore. that they are confined to a bunker. that they're not allowed to undertake things they think are necessary, the job responsibilities. and i think this sentiment was best expressed in june by vice president of the american foreign service association, matthew asada who wrote, does our collective response to benghazi threaten to the make the foreign service less knowledgeable about the world, less effective on the ground and ultimately less influential with the host country and with the u.s. government itself? that's a question that ambassador stevens might have asked and wonder if you could share your thoughts on it as we implement the recommendations of the arb and of your panel. how do w we make sure that we're not preventing our, people from doing their job? we all acknowledge this is a dangerous thing and, as my colleague pointed out, our facilities have beenen attacked, literally hundreds of times over the last couple of decades. it has happened in the past. it will happen again. we want to protect our people as best we can but we want them to be effective. that's why they're there. so if you each could share briefly your thoughts on are we striking the right balance or has the benghazi effect meant that we're undermining the ability of our peep to do their work?an >> kong an man you are going to the heart of risk management and how we implement risk management. tell you over many years with the support of congress we've made great stride in building safer and secure facilitagy is o that an attack on a facility that could hurt everybody, in one attack we've, done great things in terms of protect that. if you look at the number of attacks against our facilities and how few are been successful. most have been driven off with the casualties by our security personnel or others only. we have made great strides in that but we can't lock people inside of embassies. the whole point of diplomacy to get out and, i think we need to understand, and a lot of processes that we've been talking about are at our highest threat, highest risk posts we have got the most security and in many cases it will be the most restrictive for our foreign service personnel. but we've got to have the security programs in place to get them outside of the wall as well. that means protective security details. it means armored vehicles. it means working with host country security services. every single day that we run motorcade outside of our embassy in kabul or in iraq or sanaa or the ones we ran in tripoli we were taking risks. but every single day we were judging what that risk was versus need to get out and making sure we could balance those risks and we were not running most motorcades or not getting people out for very good reasons. they had to be very important reasons. in lower threat level posts we're operating almost normally around the h world. we have physical security at our posts but our people get out every single day. that is the work of diplomacy. talking with people. understanding the country, representing the united states and bringing information back and you don't do that without talking to people. so i think all the efforts that we've made in terms of recognizing what are our high threat, highest risk posts, doing risk management and making sure we're getting people out when we can but understanding if too many people get injured or it is too dangerous we can't operate or if we're negligent or we're not taking the threat seriously enough we won't be there either. we'll close that post if we get too many people killed or too many people injured or the threat is too high. those are the types of things that we need to weigh every single day. and we do. i can understand the frustration of foreign service officers at our highest threat level posts. no, sir, they can not live out in the open economy. they can not just go to a coffee shop but we are still even in the highest threat locations getting them to meetings they need to get to. >> i don't think that is the issue for them much as they would like to be accompanied by spouses and go to local coffee shop. what they have expressed to me is not that which they understand but that they can't undertake the meetings they want in places they need to go to have those meetings and have contacts they need to be able to gather the information for our government. to be t able to convey the u.s. position to people. they can't do their job because they are, they're confined by, ander hyper conservative point f view perspective back in washington. and, you get that feedback. and are there any situations where you feel the pressure has been such to be so risk avoidant that we're not alouing our people to do their job? >> i think in the immediate aftermath after benghazi there is a deep appreciation of that attack and we may have, the pendulum may have swung the other way for a while. i think today, with the systems that we have put in place, with the risk management that we are doing every day, with things like pbvp, the additional sources you're giving us i would not agree with that statement, sir. i think we need to take certain precautions and we do but i talk with ambassador deb jones when we were still in tripoli. i talked with the ambassador in sanaa about whether we're getting out enough and doing things we're need to be doing and they say yes, we are and it is the right balance. >> chairman, let me ask a very different question because i have very limited time. one of the props we have in benghazi was overreliance on willingness, ability, or loyalty of local militias to provide security. are there any places around the world today where you feel we're continuing to place an overreliance on local militias fothr security of our facilitie? >> you know that was something that, we talked an awful lot about, congressman. the fact when you go into a situation like that you have to be able to evaluate the will and capability of a particular guide force and i think no matter where you go in the world you will always have to come up with that evaluation. if you don't have that will and don't have that capability, no amount of morn any you did not money you pay on the contract will resolve that. that's why it goes back to the risk management. if you don't have the capabilities locally you have to go and bring them in your sell. i can't speak to where they aren't, who has them, who doesn't have them where in the world but i really do think, when you look at the reaction of that guard force there, even leading up to that, tripwires that were, that were spotted there, i mean that was a real concern and again i just go back to, there wasn't the will. there might have been the will but there just was not the capability. >> on either question. >> well, i think, first of all, sir, one of our recommendations, to start with as mr. sullivan pointed out in his opening statement, when we first started withl, our panel we thought we were going to look at these tactical issues of building bunkers and building higher walls. we quickly realized that wasn't the answer because that doesn't facilitate diplomacy and we looked at strategic and looked at department and overseas posts and risk management. we asked ambassadors, deputy chiefs of missions and foreign service officers as we traveled overseas tell us about the state department's risk management process. without exception, each one said there is none and they make it up. sadly to this day, while they may be making progress, that is still a significant concern. risk management process, as you indicated, sir the foreign service is a dangerous business. we have to be out there. we have to do these things that are national security priorities but we have to do it under a risk i management process that effective and sustainable and transparent. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> we'll recognize gentleman fromac ohio, mr. jordan. >> how many years do you have in the security field? >>tl approximately 30 years. >> how much did you serve in the state department in that area. >> almost 23. >> did you get good valuations high reviews, strong reviews. >> yes, sir. >> so good in fact, i looked at your resume' you were put on security detail to protect the secretary of state, is that accurate. >> yes, sir. secretary warren christopher and madeleine albright. >> two recent secretaries. >> that subpoena anment from the obama administration? >> yes, sir. you. >> trust the agents in the field, mr. keil. >> i trust them implicit think. they have the best perspective. they know what is going on. >> out of their assessment, their instock exchanges, guys on the ground putting their lives on the line just like you did, when they make a recommendation to the state department, you take that seriously? >> yes. i would. >> and are you familiar with the fact that the twice on the ground in benghazi repeatedly asked for additional security repeatedly denied? >> yes, sir. from what we saw. >> routinely denied? they said, this thing is out of control. we need some more good guys here. and repeatedly asked for that and repeatedly denied. it was worse than that, mr. keel? >> s possibly, sir. >> what they asked for. we need nor but what they had was actually reduce is that accurate? >> yes. wa >> we heard year-and-a-half ago testimony from colonel wood on in benghazi and he said this, quote we were fighting a losing battle. we couldn't even keep what we had. mr. keil, my guess, we're the united states of america. we got facilities all over the globe. my guess is every facility the security people would say, we could use a few more folks here. we would like a few more. my guess is that happens. but wasn't the situation in libya and benghazi somewhat unique? >> sir, when you look at the intelligence, the threat reporting, the deteriorating security environment, and the numerous incidents, yeah, i would prioritize benghazi that is what i'm talking about. ied attacks, assassination attempts on british ambassador and they said this is as bad as it gets. the state department says no, we'll reduce what you had. if you were agent on the ground, mr. keil, would you have been lobbying for more help to come to dawes gauze. >> i would probably do more than lobbying and extremely frustrated and push every button that i could possibly push. >> flip it around. you're guys in washington get requests from guys on the ground with more help, would you have fought to make that request happen. >> as a matter of fact, sir, my last position way as regional director for ds regional bureau vetting requests from the field. would i have put a significant amount of priority on benghazi requests. >> so you had that job? >> yes. >> before the benghazi you had that job? >> correct. >> you would have went to bat for these folks? >> yes i would have. >> mr. keil, what is the overseas security policy board. oversease security policy board is inneragency board is a genesis from the beirut embassy bombings, the inman commission, which created the diplomatic security service, inman standards. it is inneragency board that creates physical security, technical security, procedural securityvi requirements. >> so these were standards developed interagency that the state department standards, is that correct. >> state department leads ospb. >> this resulted from the embassy bombing in beirut, 63 people killed, 17 americans. >> yes, sir.or >> and were the standards followed at the benghazi facility? >> sir, we saw a memo which authorized the continuing opening of the benghazi mission which referred to it as the special mission compound and talking with people and based on my experience, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the standards. >> so the standards weren't followed. >> no. >> now my understanding is there is waiver process you have to follow if in fact you're going to deviate from the standards. was the waiver process followed. >> that was one much our recommendations sir. when you're not following the standards you don't have to follow the waiver process either.at >> didn't follow standards or the waiver? >> correct. >> mr. keil, what is your, what is your overall impression of the arb report? >> mr. sullivan and i testified before house oversight and government reform committee. ambassador pickering referred to the arb as being fiercely independent. in that same hearing admiral mullen admitted to oversight and government reform that here is reporting on arb proceedings to the senior staff of the state department. outside of the precepts and requirements of being a member of the arb. i don't think that fits anyone's definition of being fiercely independent. >> you don't think it was independent at all. >> not based on -- >> frankly i share your belief. when the secretary, when secretary clinton gets to appoint the cochairs of the board, when cheryl mills calls them up and asks them to serve, when neither secretary clinton or cheryl mills are interviewed, when they get a draft report before it goes public, in they get to he had it the report before rest of the world gets to see it, as you point out when admiral mullen told the committee, told the committee, i think about this. he has been on the job a few days. as the co-chair of the supposedly independent arb, been job a few days he interviews charlene lamb, he discovers, charlene lamb two days later coming in front of the oversight committee and realizes she will not be a good witness. what does he do? just what you reference, mr. keil. he gets on phone and calls chief of staff to the secretary of state, hey, charlene lamb will not be a good witness. she will not reflect well on the state department. give as heads up to the very important he is supposed to be investigating. of course this thing wasn't independent. think about, we asked mr. mullen, why do you care? whether she is good witness or bad witness. your job is to get to the truth of american people and families of four individuals to that lost their lives not to give heads-up to higher ups at stay department. it was not anything but independent. one good thing came out arb in my judgment, one good thing. they created best practices panel you and mr. sullivan sat on, right. >> yes. >> you made a whole bunch of recommendations. >> yes. >> how many recommendations. >> 40 recommendations. >> 40 recommendations. some are more important than others. >> yes. >> the most important is which one. >> creation of undersecretary already diplomatic security. in our executive summary we said one clear overa arching implementation of the recommendations in this report is the creation of an undersecretary. >> is the that first recommendation you listed in your report. >> recommendation number one. >> so recommendation number one. most of the others hinge on the implementation of that recommendation. >> yes, sir. >> it is designed to give accountability and responsibility to one particular person at the state department, is that correct. >> to identify those who are -- >> something miss brooks talked about, miss brooks talked about in her opening questions. >> yes, sir. >> designed to give accountability and responsibility to someone at the state department and is this first time that this recommendation has been put forward, mr. keil? >> no, sir. our board, our panel, excuse me was, was a bit surprised to uncover a memo from now 15 years ago, that secretary of state madeleine albright signed after the east after dry can embassy bombings ordering creation of undersecretary for diplomatic security. >> we have the overseas security policy board after americans were killed in beirut. that wasn't followed. we have a recommendation from madeleine albright, the lady you protected, that says we need to get an undersecretary after people, americans were killed in east african embassy bombings. >> yes, sir. >> and that wasn't followed. is the state department said they will implement this at all? >> they said it is one of the recommendations they're not going to implement. >> they're nots. going to implement it. they're not going implement it. my question is, mr. chairman. what will it take? what will it take for the state department to put in place practices that will save mile-per-hour lives? they didn't listen to the guys on ground, the pros that know what they're doing in a situation anyone looks says wow, we need more americans to help. they didn't listen to the guyson on the t ground who put theirs lives on the line. they didn't listen to their own standards developed after the 1983 embassy beirut bombings. and now they're not following the best practices panel number recommendation. what is it going to take? the ranking member in his opening remarks said this is a transformational moment. well somebody better tell the state department that. because, i mean, think of this track record. i hope, i hope the member is right. i hope they get it. if they're not going to listen to two guys with the experience mr. keil and mr. sullivan have one thing we need, one main thing we need this person with accountability. one main thing, that, everything else hinges on, i meep, talk about the arrogance the state department? so hopefully one of the things we can, this committee can do at least convince them to follow these guys what they said. at least convince them of that. mr. keil, thank you for your service. amazing record what you've done for our count very. mr. sullivan, yours as well. appreciate the work on best practices panel. 42 seconds i yield. >> why don't you ask the question of the state department? >> you can ask them that question. the wayy. this works -- my time, you're welcome to do it h it, mr. chairman. you spent a lot of time on mr. starr. i chose to focus on mr. keil who has 30 years of experience, appointed by obama administration. 23 years in the statofe department. viewed so highly hechoc was acty on the protective detail for secretary of state warren christopher, secretary ofra stae madeleine albright. i chose to use my ten minutes on mr. kyl. minority can use ten minutes on y want.r the this hearing they called you can handle however they want to. i yield back mr. chairman. you, gentleman from ohio. i recognize the gentlelady from california, mr. sanchez. >> i thank all the witnesses fr joining us what i hope will be productive and forward-looking hearing and what can be done and what is currently being done and what we have yet to do in terms of trying to prevent a tragedy from benghazi happening again or at very least minimizing the potential for something like that to happen again. i'm going to begin my questions, sort of in the same realm where the questioning left off. talking about the security accountability frail framework within the department of state. the best practices panel led by mr. sullivan determined, quote, clearly defined accountability and responsibility for security at every level i, s fundamental for effective security management within an organization. and the panel recommended that the development of an accountability framework, is that correct, mr. sullivan? >> yes,ve ma'am. >> in response to that recommendation, the department the department created a security accountability framework that the department explained clearly defines key actors, their roles and responsibilities and governance mechanisms. mr. starr, i would like to begin with you. can you please describe the responsibilities at each of the various leadership levels. >> i think the first leadership level starts with the secretary of state. secretary acknowledges that he is ultimately responsible for the security of our personnel overseas. beneath that in the accountability framework, the next person that has the direct responsibility for security is me, assistant secretary for diplomatic security. and i would have to say that we looked long and hard at the recommendation whether it needed to be an undersecretary position or assistant secretary position. it was a recommendation by the panel. the department looked at this very seriously. ultimately, weighed all of the points behind it and made a decision that what was probably more important is whether or not i, in my position, had the direct access to the secretary that was necessary. and under bothci the accountability framework and in the fam we have modified it so that i am directly reportable to the secretary for security threat information and security threats against our people. i doco still report to the you know secretary for management. and we think that's key because isolated and alone, diplomatic security would not have some of the capabilities that we have when we work closely with the management bureau, with overseas building operations with irm and others. i just want to put that back on the record. one of the things that the accountability framework does talk about all of us in the department of state are responsible for security but it specifically defines the roles of deputy secretaries and what they do. it defines roles that the undersecretary for political affairs and undersecretary for management has. the mostle important thing it ds define roles for other assistant secretaries, the people i work side by side every day, run regional bureaus. nea bureau, weur bureau and assigns security responsibilities to them. in fact their job descriptions have been changed to reflect the security responsibilities. all of this is contained in the accountability framework. and one final thing which i think is critical, we can't do the security that we need to do unlessin every individual forein service officer understands that theyon have a role in their own security as well. and it goes to defining that. >> so those expectations have been communicated then on down the securityll framework, is tht correct? >> yes. >> and state department employees have ath clear understanding of what the chain of command so to speak is for, for security decisions and just security decision-making? >> overseas it was always clear. it ran from the rso and deputy chief of mission to the chief of mission andur that letter of responsibilities that the chief of mission had. so it was always clear overseas. it was a little less clear within the department who had the responsiblities and this document goes a long way it taking information that was already in the fam and putting it tooth into a clearer framework, yes. >> if i can go back just a second to the number one recommendation about creating a different position that would be in charge of security, explain some of the thought-making process that went into the ultimate decision not to accept that recommendation and to essentially make you responsible for security. >> first and forever foremost it has to be acknowledges i'm responsible about assistant secretary or changed to deputy, sorry, undersecretary position. the department looked at this and had to weigh different things. an undersecretary typically has additional responsibilities than one focus on something. if you look at other undersecretaries and range of things that they do, one of the things the department made sure of was that this position, my position, a, had access we need to the secretary and the other leadership, and second, that i wasn't being diverted from the just pure security role by other duties. undersecretary positions in many cases would care underduties, other duties. my predecessor was the assistant secretary for diplomatic security and the chief of overseas foreign missions, the office of overseas foreign missions. one of the things we did in the aftermath of benghazi was to separate those two functions. now there is an ambassador in charge of overseas foreignmissi. i am not distracted by that role. i t focus exclusively on securi. >> okay. i appreciate the answer. i have two other questions i would like to ask and i would like to get to them. mr. sullivan, do you think the new framework that the department of state has adopted clearly defines accountability responsibility for security? >> congresswoman, we haven't bp fully briefed on that. what i heard just now, i mean i think that's a great start but clearly there does have to be accountability. people doul b have to know who n charge of security and also to the point that was made earlier, how the, how all the employees feel around the world. i think that leadership is important to let them know that they're valued, that they're supported and that those people that are making decisions will be made accountable for those. every employee will be made accountable for those decisions they're making. >> thank you. let me hit on the issue, very quickly, i have very limited time about temporary staffing. several investigations into the attacks in benghazi found that the temporary staffing of security officers was what contributed to poor security at the benghazi facility. the bipartisan senate homeland security and governmental reform committee found, i will quote from that report, for example, ds agents stationed in benghazi were always on temporary duty assignments, remaining there relatively short periods, often no longer than a month. the independent accountability review board concluded that utilization ofrt temporarily assigned agents in benghazi was problematic. i'm quoting from their findings. theio short-term transitory nate of benghazi staffing to be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in benghazi. staffing at time was woefully insufficient considering the post-security posture and high-risk, high threat environment. the end result was lack of institutional knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard work alone although the board found ample evidence of both in those who servedge there. so based on one of the arb's recommendation the department set a policy for one year minimum tours at high-threat posts and a minimum of 120 days for temporary duty assignments. mr. starr, you held a number of positions during your tenure at the department, including that as regional security officer. why is it valuable for security officers to spend longer durations of at posts and what is the benefit of developing an understanding of the local environment if. >> it is critical. your first 30 days on the ground in a place you are just trying to figure out where you are, how things are operating, where the s are. we absolutely concure with that recommendation of taking steps to insure that the personnel we put on the ground are there for longer periods of time. >> and has the department been able to achieve those requirements in its actual practice. >> yes, it has. the fact we don't have any temporary facilities at the moment. ice can give you an example though, that when we just reentered bendinggy, we had mobile security teams of agents on the grounds with u.s. marines that are there. those marines will stay much longer period ofh time, probaby days until we're sure we have thefo proper security we can thn start replacing them with a permanent personnel that we're going to have on the ground. the t 30-day rotations as the ab pointed out were not conducive to the security operation. >> ares there any other incentives the department can provide or can think to provide for personnel to undertake those longer assignments? >> i don't think it's a question of necessary or additional incentives. it's a question we needed to understand that constantly rotating like that was not in our best interests. i think my agents clearly understand that and i think it really isn't about additional incentives. it is about just knowing that's not the proper procedure and we needed to change it. >> not a great practice. thank you for your forthright answers and i yield back to the chairman. >> thank the gentlelady from california. the chair would recognize the gentlelady from the state of alabama, miss roby. >> thank you, mr. chairman. returning to the questioning by mr. jordan about the waiver process briefly, mr. starr, the overseas security policy board sets the physical security standards that must be met and it is also my understanding that they're either temporary, interim, orhy permanent, correc? >> yes. >>my and overseas diplomatic facilities can be further classified as residential, r other categories as well? >> yes. >> okay. and how was benghazi classified in 2012? >> my understanding from the reports is that it was the temporary mission facility. >> okay. and what, was that classification found in the ospb standards? >> no. >> are there any ospd standards for a temporary office facility? there's not, right? >> our outlook on that is that whether it is temporary or interim, or permanent, that we should be applying the same security standards that the ospb has put in place and that if we can't, then we need to look closely at what risks we run -- >> sorry to i interrupt you the office in residential do not require a higher level of security if they are in that category? >>rr office, there are higher levels. when we buildf office, when we build facilities, those have higher level of security than residences do. >> the benghazi facility was being, used as both? correct? >> yeah, i would say that a accurate portrayal from what i understand. >> in the dual case where it is being used as residential and office what standards apply? the higher standards, correct. >> correct. >> and so those ospb standards should have applied to the benghazi facility? >> that is the way that would apply them now. say i wasn't here, but if we had a i am lar situation, we would be applying the higher standards. >> is that, want to make sure this is very clear. your policy that that anytime a facility is being used for more than one purpose, whatever type of facility has the higher or, highest level of physical security standards, those standardpe should be applied? >> that is correct. >> okay. but that didn't happen in benghazi? >>gh i'm not, i would have to s, i can't b answer that question. >> looking ahead, when you talk about, in this era of expeditionary diplomacy, is it possible for the state department to open a temporary residential facility? >> we don't have any at the moment. i can't imagine that we would or that i would approve it. >>a okay. let's turn to the marine security guard detachments. were marine security guard detachments ever deployed to the benghazi compound? >> no. >> the benghazi compound, we've already established, by multiple questions here, it was a temporary facility. and marine security guard detachments are never deployed to temporary facility is, correct? >> not in my experience. >> okay. so the increase in marine security guard detachments as a result of the arb recommend 11 would not have helped in benghazi, correct? if it's a temporary facility and they can'tgh be deployed then it won't help? >> just want to make the point. i'm not saying that additional personnel on the groundli would not have helped. but, yes, you're correct we would not, in my experience, we would not have put a marine security guard detachment into a temporary'r facility. >> so we've also already established here today currently there are 30 posts considered high-risk, highls threat. how many have benefited, of those 30, from the marine security guard personnel? >> i would have to get back to you with the exact number. i think about 20 we have opened for marine detachments since benghazi at our high threat, high-risk posts. there are still some that do not have marine security guard detachments. there are a variety of reasons why they do not. >> okay, is it your intent to get to a place where you have these marine security detachments at all of the high-risk, high threat location posts? >> i would like to have marine security guard detachments at everyone of our high threat, high-risk posts. there impediments in some cases that can not be overcome. >> how, at the ones that currently do not have the marine security detachment, how exactly does the department plan to augment security at these high-risk, high-threat, without highly trained marine security guards? >> in some cases we have made up by using diplomatic security agents. some cases it mix turf diplomatic security agents and other security elements that we have within diplomatic security. in some cases we have made risk managed decisions where we have taken personnel out. and lowered our presence. some cases their families are not there or lowered the number of employees to minimum numbers. in many cases we make representations with the host governments and now we analyze whether or not the host government has both capability and the will to provide the necessary level of protections. if wste find that we don't have those types of protections or we think that the risks are too high, then we won't be there. >> okay. if an ambassador at high-risk, high-theft post picks up the phone and calls the seventh floor of the state department and askss for physical securit, personnel, who ultimately makes the decision to grant or deny that o request, mr. starr? >> the last person in the chain would be me. the request would probably not go to the seventh floor. probably go to me on the sixth floor or go through the rso or to our personnel. but i can tell you that today i have available mobile security teams to deploy. we work very closely -- >> ultimately i'm asking, who makes that decision? >>te it can be approved at lower levels. >> what is the lowest level it can be a approved. >> i think lowest level would be the regional director of diplomatic security. >> and if an ambassador sends a t be the same, rather than picking up the phone, would be -- >> exactly the same. >> okay. and would it, would the decision-making process change if it were not a high-risk, high threat post? >> no, it would not. >> okay. was benghazi considered high-risk, high threat or critical threat? >> pardon me. i actually don't know what the rating was of benghazi. we did no have the 30 identify ied high risk, high-threat posts. >> who denied the additional security in benghazi by those working and living there in tripoli? who was the person that denied that. >> iaz will have to refer you to the results of arb. i came back five months after the attack. >> what i'm trying to get at that>> same person was also responsible for. insuring physical security in benghazi, is that the same person that is vested with that responsibility today? >> i think the board pointed out that there were lapses in judgment on the part of the director and several others, including the director for international programs. >> okay, but ds agents at the post writes back to headquarters, requesting additional physical security upgrades or increased personnel, performing security duties. who is responsible for making the decision to deny or grant that request from a ds agent? >> i think the first thing that would happen is that the discussion would go on, is this an individual request from ds? has it been vetted through the emergency action committee at theh post? is this a post request? >> okay. is it affected by whether you categorized this as high-risk, high-threat? >> we pay more attention to our high-threat, high-riskte posts n daily basis. i would tell you any ask for additional security resources for any of our posts overseas will be met with immediate action. we would make decisions on how we can best pull fill those requirements. >> so to get to the point, even if a post is not high-risk, high-threat, we know in certain parts of the world things are very volatile and can unravel in a moments time. despite threat assessment or not and what i'm getting at is, is the department now, today, in light of what happened in benghazi, prepared to pay better attention when the folks on the ground are saying, we need help and, which was not what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the attack in benghazi? >> my answer to you unequivocally yes. that is what i have been spending my time since february 1st, of 2013n on. making sure that we have the resources, the programs, the knowledge, the capabilities, to respond quickly and effectively to any cry for help. moreover, not just respond to the cries for help, but to try tof better place ourselves befoe those come in and make sure we're ready for these things. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you gentle woman from alabama. the chair would recognize the gentlewoman from illinois. miss duckworth. >> thank you, mr. chairman. as member of the oversight and government reform committee and armed services committee i spent a great deal of time working on all of the, working my way through all of the reports on the attacks in benghazi and as the committee begins our work here today i think the most appropriate way we can honor the brave americans who lost their lives in benghazi to make sure we learn from those past mistakes and never ever make them again. and i heard that from the family members as well. let's never let their buddies down the way we let their family members down. and so, i want to go back to this, the discussion on the security and interagency cooperation. but first, you know, mr. keil, i was there the day admiral mullen testified. i have to disagree with you of you may question his professional integrity but when admiral mullen, a man who served vietnam, 43 years of military service defending this great nation and comes before our committee swears an oath of office and says, testifies he was fiercely independent in the would tend to believe him. and in fact the arb was incredibly scathing of the state department in its report. and i want to go to that report. mr. starr, i want to follow up a little bit on what my colleague the gentlelady from alabama, her line of questioning about the marine security guard details. so if you don't have, if you have a post that does not have a detail, because they're not at a temporary facility, for example, can you talk about other details that can be there? are there other military options that can be at assigned to thoe temporary details? you talk about the mobile security teams. marine augmentation units. are thered other options if thee are,ut if the marines can't actually be assigned there full time? >> yes. there are other options. we currently are trying to expand 35 more detachments. but i should be noted at the moment we have 270, we have more than 275 diplomatic facilities counting the embassies, consulates and consulate generals. we have only 173 marine security guard detachments. we never had enough marines, nor will we ever to cover every single posts. in many of our posts around the world, ifd we put a marine security guard detachment in, we would probably have more marines than foreign service officers in some of these places. we look carefully where we need to use this scarce resource. we have had excellent cooperation from the marine corps augmenting different units, getting more detachments. we have opened 17 more detachments since benghazi on our way to opening 35 totally. we should be done by end of next year. additionally the marines created marine security augmentation units where we send additional marines under the rubric of the marine security guard program that helps us where we have different situations. but the thrust of your question was, what do we do in places where we don't have marines or we don't have permission to send marines. we have different capabilities. we have diplomatic security agents, high threat, high-risk trained. high level mobile security operators. we have the ability to request from the department of defense and they have never let us down, for things like fast teams to come in and protect our embassies and consulates when we need that. we have a robust program where we have security contractors. many cases they're americans, many cases they're third country contractors. we have used contractors many years. there are downsides to that and some countries won't allow them. and we learned very painful lessons over the years about contractors. we have to incredible amounts of oversight and make sure we're using them properly but it is still a tool. we have local guard forces and local protective elements we hire directly from the country we're in. i would tell you some of these units in places around the world, evenem unarmed have done amazing acts of heroism, protecting our people. then ultimately we have host country services we evaluate for whether they have the cape abs to protect us or the will to protect us. and those cases where they may not have the best capabilities or we may think we're challenged one of the things that the additional funding that congress has given us is the ability to start a program where we can train those host country forces whether it be police or national guard directly around the embassies and increase their capabilities. number of different possibles. >> you had said, mr. starr, that the state department has always engaged in the process of risk management and is well-experienced at it. i have to say i was disappointed with the risk management process that was undertaken leading up to the benghazi attacks and, i would hope that that risk, risk assessment and mitigation process. has become more robust. i want to speak specifically to interagency cooperation between dod and department of state. you said that dod has never let you down. on that night, the arb in various reports, including armed services committee has stated that there was no way that those f-16s, that those military, u.s. military forces could have made it there in time to, to save our americans lives. what have we done since to make sure that in the future they can be present in time to save american list? are these special dates, come up, september 11th, anniversaries as you hear more chatter going on and you think there might be potential for greater risk, what tripwires are in place, what processes in place for you to call the dod to say, hey, maybe you need to help us and reposition some forces if we do have another benghazi we can call and those teams can be there in time in the future so we don't lose american lives? what process is happening between dod and department of state at this point? >> department of defense has put together a program that they essentially refer to as the new normal. we looked closely what capabilities dod can bring for defensive use of american embassies ande consulates overseas. there has to be realization that we don't have bases everywhere in the world. in many cases, while we would like to be able to say that the department of defense could respond to any one of our embassies within four hours, physical distances, just, the amount of distance between where our military is stationed and where our kip low mat fake silts -- diplomatic facilities make it impossible. if theyta could respond in certn amount of time, this idea we're magically going to get paratroopers coming out of back of r planes and they will land n the roof of the american embassy is still not realistic. we have to go through airports. we hav oe permission from host countries to give them in. transport them from the airport to the embassy somehow. in the midst of a crisis this is not realistic what is going to happen. what we worked with dod on making sure we're better prepared to predict what is going to happen, looking at instability, and as dod often said, we would rather be on the ground in advance of something happening than trying to react after something happens. now it doesn't mean in certain cases that they haven't been on a very close leash with us. i can give you the example of tripoli recently where we had in many cases, special forces and helicopters and marines on, less than one hour notice to respond to the embassy. in high, high-threat, critical threat situations those are types of things we're working with dod on to make sure they have very close at hand response capabilities. but i can tell you that with 275 locations around the world, we can't do that often. we can't do that every place. dod is seeking increased basing options.of i would highly recommend discussion with dod on this about where they're going in terms of basing closer and more closely to u.s. embassies and facilities. they have excellent plans. they're working closely with the state department on this but ultimatelyel we've got to do a better job making sure we have the right preparations on the ground in advance. in those situations that are absolutely critical, we'll have dod very close to us and they have worked tremendously with us in places like tripoli and sanaa and other places. so, i just have to tell you i have the utmost respect for the way thatip the department of defense, u.s. marine corps and army and air force and navy responded to our needs. >> in the last minute i have left, what level of state department does the request to dod have to make place? for example in the case of tripolior you said they had them on aac one-hour leash to respon, can that come from you or lower? if an ambassador determines through his risk analysis assessment through the diplomatic security team there that he needs this, how far does he have to go before you have something like a f.a.s.t. team that is ready to come in or something along those lines? how high up through the state department bureaucracy does he have to go? >> in an emergency the ambassador will call commander of nearest combatant command. they meet all the time. they talk with each other. in an emergency situation he can pull the string immediately. in a last than emergency situation, in a way we're looking to pry to reposition ourselves we may make a request to say that you need this we work throughg the offices executive secretaries. can instigate it. the ambassador can instigate it. the assistant secretary of regional bureau can instigate it. most cases we're talking with each other or we're having phone conversations. but in the most extreme cases the ambassador can go directly to the combatant commander closest to him and request support and even notify us afterwards. >> thank you. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you, from the gentlelady from illinois. the chair would recognize the gentleman from illinois, mr. roskam. >> i thank the chairman and panelists testimony today. mr. keil what is special mission compound. >> sir i like to take two seconds. clarify a pint miss duckworth made. i was not making judgment on mullen. i was saying simple fact. you can not discuss proceedings outside of arb. admiral mullen admitted he did that. is it is statement of fact. >> in legal terms that is ex parte communication. >> i didn't go to law school. >> what is a special mission compound? >> i don't know. to be honest, when our review undersecretary kennedy in authorizing that, made up that term in order to avoid the ospb secured standards. >> interesting thing, yesterday in our office we did a nexus lexus search of special mission compound, nots. benghazi. now there may be other ways to search. there may be other ways to look out over the landscape. the result of looking for that term yielded nothing. throughout all those data files, all across the fruited plain, absolutely nothing. so what does it mean if something isth simply then redefined? what does it mean if something is said, well, we're just going to declare this as something other than that which is to be regulated? that means you have no regulations, isn't that right. >> correct, sir. >> mr. sullivan, you mentioned in your opening statement one of thave regrets that you have as a member about panel is that the department of state didn't adopt your recommendations as it relates to waivers. what is your recommendation as it relates to waivers? >> we think, we believe waivers are, waivers are needed and we want tyoo see those waivers because when you have a waiver, what that will do and set in motion standards and people all recognize that once you have those standards you have to meet those standards. what we saw in this particular instance was since there were no standards,yo there was no waive, there really were no standards set, and i think somebody brought up the fact before a lot of people coming in. . . fact before that there were a lot of people coming in tdy, and some very dedicated people, some very hard working people, and some extremely well-intentioned people and dedicated people. however, these were people that were extremely inexperienced and they were coming in for 30-day periods. and they would come in for 30 days. they would identify vulnerabilities, take care of that vulnerability. the next person would come in and that process would continue. >> so, you're saying you need an orderly process by which things are waived, not declarations on the part of the department of state, that it's all waived, is that right? >> right. it goes back to what we talked about before, risk management. risk management is all about identifying the threat, identifying the vulnerability and then coming up with the >> secretary starr, question, you said earlier in answer to congressman smith that on benghazi they didn't get the threat information. now, i understand that threat information may be term of art, but to mr. westmoreland point earlier, certainly a bomb blowing up on the side of a wall, the whole litany of events that took place beginning arch 18, 2012, after the first time there was a comedic asian from ambassador stevens, isn't that enough information? so you're not saying nobody was aware of the nature of the threat. is the threat a term of art a? >> congressman, and defer the question. i think the distinction is, what i was trying to make, there was no specific threat information that have been developed by the intelligence community. >> in other words, people are coming over the hilltop at this moment in time. >> correct. we don't normally get there. i think your point to write a number to do things going on, i think people were unaware of the overall level of instability. >> here's my point. the senate intelligence committee report, they reported on june 6 of 2012 ambassador stevens recommended the creation of teams and so forth. the team was never greater in benghazi despite the ambassador's recommendation. there were other events subsequent to that. then ambassador stevens reaches out again, since a cable to the state department headquarters requesting a minimum of 13 temporary duty personnel and the state department never fulfilled his request, and headquarters never responded to the request with a cable. they follow-up on august 16, 2012, 1 month before these events. again a cable to the state's headquarters. stevens raised additional concerns, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. now, go to the arb. the arb says one thing to times about ambassador stevens, and it's worth noting. they said this about him. his status as the leading u.s. government advocate on libya policy and his expertise on benghazi in particular cause washington to give unusual deference to his judgment. they said that on page six of the report. they cut and pasted, they liked it so much they put on page 34 of the report. and yet ignore the ambassador who, by their own admission, is the expert in the area, and ignoring his request for support, that's not getting unusual deference to his judgments, is it, mr. secretary? >> difficult question, congressman. >> no. it's very straightforward. >> no, i don't think it is. i think it's a difficult question. i think that chris stevens was a tremendous ambassador with a tremendous -- >> look, there's no question he was tremendous. there's a question he was a hero. he made specific requests of the department. the department in the arb said this person is uniquely qualified, secretary, and he was ignored. >> and i think this is why the arb recommendations are what they are. >> this is why the arb recommendations and the panel say, you ca you can't have thisf waiver authority. when ms. roby asked you to question, are there any plans for tempered facilities in the future, you were pretty clever in how you responded. you said, we don't have any plans for it, and i'm not likely -- and i'm paraphrasing now -- are not likely to approve the. you know what that tells me? that tells me you can do it all again. that tells me you can take a special mission compound, you can call it something else, you can call it a temporary consular facility. you can take two adjectives and put it in front of a noun and call it some other thing, and do it all again. so here's the question. is madeline albright signed off on certain recommendations, if the best practices panel make certain recommendations, why is it that the state department is clinging to this legacy of power that has failed? why are you grasping on it so much? why not walk away from it? and nobody is criticizing a very tough job. but the nature of the job, mr. secretary, means that is, to mr. cummings point, needs to be a transformational moment. why not be the transmission moment to say, would not just going to choose to redefine things and we will revisit how we do these waivers, and we're going to do everything we can in cooperation with congress to honor chris stevens' legacy, to honor the legacy of those who suffered, you start with and you know, but why cling to this whole thing that just isn't working? are you the only one that doesn't see it? >> congressman, i think i have a distinctive view having served 29 years with the state department, four years with united nations, and i'm back again. i think that in accepting all of the recommendations of the accountability review board, i think in accepting 38 out of 40 recommendations made by the best practices panel, i think the department has made tremendous progress and efforts in the time that i've been back and -- >> but the opportunity -- you want to knock it out of the park right now. >> not every recommendation is gold. every recommendation needs to be looked at from the recommendation standpoint, but then from the organization as well. >> take your argument, a couple of minutes ago you made this point as relates to the responsibility of th a foreign service officer. that they have a responsibility to be mindful of their own security. that was in response to ms. sanchez. every foreign service officer must understand they had a role in their own security. i agree with that wholeheartedly. and yet when ambassador stevens played a role in his own security on cable number one, cable number two, and cable number three, that responsibility was not absorbed or reflected in the state department. and you're not offering anything as relates to fundamental change because a somewhat the rules are right now, mr. secretary, you have the authority, you have the capacity and you have the flexibility to do the benghazi structure again. am i wrong? >> the rules have been changed. who is responsible is clearly defined. >> who is responsible is fourth down on the food chain, and by your own -- >> i would disagree with that. i am responsible. >> but i'm telling you -- >> the latest example, when we are trying to open a facility in southern turkey, we had a request to put personnel in on the ground for start operations, for humanitarian operations. they are in their tty. we need a facility. we are in the process of leasing a facility. we know where it's going to be. a request came to me from the people on the ground saying, can we use it in advance of the security upgrades being done, been accomplished. by answer, no. >> okay, that's beautiful. and in light of mr. cummings response and his admonition to us that we're here for a season, you are going to be there for season. and then another season someone will succeed you. and in the new season when someone with your judgment and your deference doesn't have that level of capacity and they don't have your kind of stick and your background, they will be under tremendous pressure and they're going to say yes. i yield back. >> the chair thanks the gentleman from illinois and recognizes himself. it strikes me that there are at least two issues at play, two major issues. no one is the efficacy of the arb process itself. whether or not it is in our best interest to allow any entity to essentially grade its own papers. we don't do that in any other category of life. we'll get to send ourselves we were in court. we don't get to grade our own papers in the classroom. the other aspect, the efficacy of the arb is to be interviewed and who they didn't interview, whether or not they have to accept recommendations are don't have to accept recommendations. that's a separate issue to me as whether not the arb process works, whether or not it is shortcomings. the second issue is let's assume our innuendo that the arb works. let's make that assumption for the sake of argument. is anyone following the recommendations of arb? mr. secretary, i want to read something to you. we are disturbed at the inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks. we are disturbed at the relative low priority accorded security concerns, and we praise the ambassador for seeking security enhancements long before the attack. do you know what that comes from, mr. secretary, what i just read? >> i believe it's part of the accountability review board report. >> from 1999. that was -- >> nairobi, correct? >> that was the arb from 1999, and you can lay it almost perfectly over what happened in benghazi. and one of the point, the 1999 arb made it really clear. they went out of their way to make it clear. they were disappointed that the recommendations that came after the bombings in beirut were not being implemented. something called the inman commission. so the 99 arb criticizes existing state department employees for not following the inman commission from 14 years -- that is a quarter century's worth of recommendations. and yet here we sit. so what i want to do because honestly, i commend mr. schiff. this was a wonderful idea and i think each of you for coming. but giving the inescapable interconnectivity between recommendations made after beirut after eastern africa and now after benghazi, we are going to look at some of those past arb recommendations. and i'll give you one, mr. secretary. for diplomatic buildings abroad not meeting in the dashing in mending again a root bombing -- not meeting him understands, physical upgrade should be made immediately. that was the recommendation of the 1999 arb. mr. secretary, i will read you another one. this goes to mr. cummings but which i thought was a wonderful point. a dramatic addition should be made to all governments with whom we have relations to remind them of their obligation to provide security for our embassy. who in libya were we to call? who? mr. cummings point is a wonderful point but it was so good, the 1999 arb's recommendation made the point. who did we call in libya? >> question, sir speak with when i pause, that's an indication of waiting for you to answer but i will make it more clear in the future. >> i think this is the heart of the question. there are times when, for the national interest of the united states, we are going to have to have limits, commission programs, rule of law programs and other things in places where the host country is -- >> mr. secretary? >> does not have a government. in those cases we must take lessons from the arb -- >> was a -- with the government in libya for us to contact? >> not at that time. >> so we were not able to do. let's move to one perhaps we were able to do. this is also from the 1999 arb. and begin the arb is present to us as a panacea. that's the evolution of what happens is there's an attack, a blue-ribbon panel, going to study, make recommendations and this is never going to happen again. back to 1999. the secretary of state should personally review the security situation of diplomatic facilities closing those which are highly vulnerable and threatened. why did you think the 1999 arb went out of its way to use the word personally? >> no comment, sir. >> is the answer privileged? i mean, that's a recommendation from the 99 arb. the secretary of state -- in 1999 arb. the second issue should personal review. we were not going to get to the word review. we got to get past the word that modifies review, personally. why did they think was important the secretary of state himself or herself personally review? >> i think ultimately the secretary, who bears the responsibility for the security, has to be brought the information that is necessary for him to make decisions. that is my job. >> okay. >> i have gone to the secretary of state on different occasions, and we talk specifically about the security of different places. tripoli was one of them in particular since i have been back. we've also looked at some the. we talked about -- sana, other locations as well. riot concerns about the safety and security of our personnel and if i believe are not doing the things that we need to do, then it is my responsibility to bring it to the secretary's -- >> i appreciate that. wasn't done on september 10 of 2012? was done prior to benghazi? this recommendation has existed for more than 10 years. >> i was not there at that time. i'm sorry, i cannot tell you. >> well, your answer is, mayors -- mirrors what the 1999 arb further said, which is first and foremost the secretary of state should take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of u.s. diplomatic personnel. is that being done now? and was being done prior to your tenure? >> in the time that i was here, and i served under multiple secretaries of state, i have heard every secretary talk about the importance of security. i have heard every second a state to personnel departments that security is their personal security has to be their function. that goes for madeleine albright, that goes through secretary clinton, secretary rice, and with secretary kerry who i was also made the statemes and has made statements that the safety and security of our personnel is absolutely one of our highest priorities. >> i appreciate that but again i think words have consequences and the meaning and most people use words intentionally. in 1999 arb intentionally used the word personally and active. that to me does not mean talking about something. a personal review is not simply talking about it. is the personal review ongoing? is that arb recommendations still excepted, i guess, is my question? does the state department still accept these recommendations from the 1999 arb? and is it being done to? >> yes. i think the best and clearest example that i can give you today is in the process of the we put into place. the vp due process, but vital presence validation process, where we, again, look at what are our vital national interest, why should we be in these high threat high locations. we put this process up and goes all the way to the secretary. >> that is a great point which leads very nice into next point i was going to make her ask you about. what is it about that recommendation that is so passionate could have been made prior to the attack in benghazi? >> i think the department of state has practiced risk management from the day's -- >> but the risk management being we, we will weigh the risk of being somewhere. we know the risk. can you tell us what our policy was in libya that overcame those risks? in other words, why were we there? >> these questions i think have been fundamental to the department for over 30 years. it is the reason why in many places we have evacuated or we have shut down operations or we've taken our families out. or we've gone down to essential personnel only, or we've asked former rains to come in and support as while we are there. >> and my point being none of that was done in benghazi. we know the risk in benghazi. my colleagues and you and others have done a wonderful job of highlighting some of the tripwires i think is a diplomatic term. what policy where we% in libya that was a great that it overcame all of the tripwires and all of the risks? >> not being here at the time, sir, i cannot answer that question for you. i do believe personally from my time at united nations that many of us understood that if we lost the eastern half of libya, that if we lost the confidence of the people after the revolution in libya, that we're going to pay a terrible price. and i don't want to put words into chris stevens' mouth. i think he was, and immensely talented diplomat and i was not here at that time. but i think it was clear in chris's mind what he needed to go to benghazi and what he was trying to accomplish. i think today we have more formalized processes to make sure that those decisions are documented, the vp2 process makes us go through a process by don't think was there prior to benghazi. i think the results of the accountability review board, the best practices panel and the recommendations that we've excepted ensure that as we go forward we've got a more clear, more precise, more mandated process for risk management. but i would tell you, sir, that every single day for the years that i was with the department of state we were weighing the safety and security of our personnel versus what our national security priorities were. i think that's a fundamental tenet that you will find everybody within the department agrees with. >> i appreciate you bringing a hearing towards its conclusion back to chris stevens and back to the other four who lost their lives. but mr. stevens was equally clear that he needed help. he was equally clear that the situation was getting worse in benghazi. he was equally clear in asking the people who sent him there to represent us, to provide adequate security, and none was forthcoming. with that i would recognize the ranking member for his closing remarks. >> i want to thank you all for being here today. i thank all of you. one thing i want to remind all of us is that we are americans. everybody trying to do the best they can to protect our people. when we look at what happened in benghazi, there are a lot of lessons to be learned. the question is, not only have we learned them, but then how do we address them? and, you know, quarterbacking -- what do they call it, monday morning order backing, i think when you look back on things a lot of time you realize the things you could have done differently here that probably would've made things better, but, you know, we cannot bring back the past. but i think we can make a difference right now. it's clear that our diplomats are in some very dangerous situations. i think we all agree on that. and so now we've got to figure out how we go about protecting them even better than we have in the past. and so that's why, secretary starr, i ask you about coming back to us and letting us know exactly, you know, what you are working on those things that you still have to do, and reporting back. it is so important, because after, when all the dust settles, the question is, is what do we accomplish? you know, i've been here 17 years and i've seen a lot of arguments back and forth, but i think we must concentrate on being effective and efficient in getting something done. the arguments that have been made, and the frustration you hear from both sides, trying to figure out what happened. i believe everybody is acting in an honorable way with great intentions, but i want you all to understand we are just try to figure out what happened so that we make sure if there were things that went wrong or could have done better, that it doesn't happen again. that's what it's all about. so, mr. chairman, again i want to thank you for this hearing, and i want to ask you to do something for me. i want to bring mr. starr back in either december or january. he's already told us that in 45 days or less he can tell us about what he's working on and give us some kind of timetable. but i want him to come back and tell us what has been achieved. and that's very, very important for me. and i'm sure for the whole committee. and, mr. chairman, if you will, that's your call, but i think it would be unfortunate if when all of this, this committee ends, that we have not addressed these recommendations and addressed them in a way that would please the families of the deceased. and that brings me back to them. for great americans -- 4 great americans who lost their lives, and i think we all made a commitment in one way or another to them, that we would do everything in our power to find out what happened. and at the same time, to make sure we did the best we could to protect our folks overseas, to tighten up security if it's appropriate, and we've got to do that. and so with that, mr. chairman, i want to thank you. >> i want to thank the gentleman from maryland for all of his help and, frankly, getting ready for this hearing, and the cooperative nature with which he has always worked with me. and i think it's an excellent idea. we will work with the secretary i don't want to pick a date that is inconvenient with his schedule. december suits me better than january. i would rather do it sooner rather than later we will work with the secretary and i will work with you on the nature of whether or not that we'll be hearing with all of our colleagues, whether or not that will be with just you and me. we work all that out but i will pledge to you it will be done and it will be done in december if it suits his schedule. and also i just want to say this. we were given to different tasks. and i say we. the house voted for us to be in existence. find out everything that happened before, during, and after the attack in benghazi, and then do everything to the speaker has been very clear in my conversations with him about this. do everything you can to make sure that it never happens again. and part of that is taking recommendations that have been made in the past and asking whether or not they have been implemented. the other part of that, frankly, frankly, is anticipating things that might possibly happen. we do not have to wait on a tragedy to make recommendations. i noted, mr. cummings, during the secretary's opening statement, i'm not minimizing this at all. if it comes across as mean minimizing it, i am not. he mentioned there partnering with the new york fire department. that's a great idea but it does necessarily lead some of us to conclude, why could that not have been done previously? fire has been around a long time. it's been a weapon for a long time. why now? and it's not fair for me to ask him, which is why i didn't ask him, but the notion that we have to wait on something bad to happen before we can act to do something that all 12 of us agree to be done. so again, i think all of my colleagues. i want to thank mr. schiff again for giving me this idea. i hope he'll sure some others with me. and again as we adjourned i want to adjourn in memory of chris stevens, sean smith, ty woods and glen doherty, and pledge a process that is worthy of their memory and one that our fellow citizens can respect, regardless of their political ideations. and with that we are adjourned. [inaudible conversations] the senate convenes in a few moments come than they were recessed shortly to attend a joint meeting of congress as lawmakers hear from the president of ukraine. when members reconvened they will start over four hours of debate on the resolution to fund the government until december 11 to attach to that measure as a house amendment authorizing an a to point to equip and train syrian opposition forces. the house passed that amendment yesterday 273-156. live coverage of the senate on c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the chaplain, dr. barry black, will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. eternal god, who restores peace in human hearts, thank you for your many blessings. guide our lawmakers so that they will discern your purposes and become instruments of your providence. today, help them to speak words that will leave them without regret. may they play their part in this moment awes times so that their labors will withstand the scrutiny of history and the judgment of posterity. may your spirit rule in our lives, teaching us to sacrifice our comforts for the good of others. use us today as ambassadors of your will. we pray in your majestic name amen. the president pro tempore: please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. mr. reid: mr. president? the president pro tempore: the majority leader. mr. reid: sorry that i got a little ahead of myself and everybody else. i now move to proceed to calendar number 409 s. 2432. the president pro tempore: the clerk will report. the clerk: motion to proceed to calendar number 409, s. 2432, a bill to amend the higher education act of 1965, and so forth and for other purposes. mr. reid: mr. president, following my remarks the senate will be in recess subject to the call of the chair for the joint meeting with the president of ukraine. when the senate reconvenes it will be in a period of morning business until 1:00 p.m. with the time equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees. the republicans will control the first half, the majority the final half. at 1:00 p.m. the senate will proceed to consideration of h.j. res. 124, the continuing resolution. there will be up to four and a half hours of debate prior to a series of roll call votes followed by several voice votes on executive nominations. the senate should expect votes to begin around 5:00 p.m. mr. president, in ancient greece the keeping of history was considered so important that cleo, the daughter of zeus was believed for recording all that occurred in everything. in the united states senate, we don't have greek gods. could we have order, mr. president? in the united states senate we don't have greek gods in charge of keeping the record but we rely on super human efforts of a group of official reporters who tribe every word that -- who transcribe every word we have wee say. it is a hard, hard job. the reporters have to accustom their ears to all kinds of accents, find ways to spell newly invented words, try to listen to what i don't say very loudly and all the other issues that they have to deal with. they have to suffer there talking filibusters. in fact, they may be the only people to dislike filibusters more than i do. today i recognize just one of those hardworking official reporters. chief reporter of the united states senate debates jerry linnell is retiring at the end of this month. for 32ies jerry has been a staple here in the senate ensuring the words of past and present are recorded for the american people. while here he witnessed many different things. five different presidents he has seen occupy the white house, worked with eight different majority leaders, transcribed speeches from everything on the berlin wall to senator byrd's history of the senate. i wish him well in his retirement. i have no doubt he and his wife will keep busy spending time with their children and grandchildren. of course jerry will have his washington nationals to follow. it has been a pleasant respite for me, mr. president, to spend time with jerry talking baseball. he takes trips around the country that i'm so envious watching different teams in different stadiums. i think he's watched a baseball game at every major league baseball game in america. the senate is a better place because of jerry's 32 years here. i along with every other member of this body thank jerry for his many years of service. mr. president, yesterday the house of representatives passed a continuing resolution to keep our government from shutting down for the next three months. in addition to keeping the government operating, this measure includes provisions important to our national security such as funding for the combat isis, this evil organization, by training and equipping vetted syrian opposition forces and aid to fight the spread of ebola. it is not perfect, that's for sure, but no legislation is. but in this era of radical ideologies and endless obstruction the funding resolution before us is infinitely better than the alternatives: another shutdown of our government. mr. president, i think it speaks volumes. speaker boehner, leader pelosi, the republican leader and i are supporting this legislation. that should say a lot to the american people. as every senator knows the funding bill we approve must first pass the house of representatives, and it did that, breaking up the legislation that the house sent us is not an alternative. we need to pleat our work -- complete our work on the resolution as soon as possible. p mr. president, with the cooperation of senators we can vote even earlier than 5:30 this evening. one final unanimous consent request. i ask unanimous consent that the president of the senate be authorized to appoint a committee on the part of the senate to join with the like committee on the part of the house of representatives to escort his excellency petro poroshenko into the house for a joint committee today. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. mcconnell: mr. president,. the presiding officer: the republican leader. mr. mcconnell: it frequently happens as we head into recess we have to say a reluctant farewell to some member of the senate family. i would like to say thanks to jerry linnell who has been a fixture here for more than three decades as a chief reporter of debates and as a somewhat hidden fixture as chief reporter. it is a tough job having to listen to the rest of us drone on every day and as chief reporter, jerry has the unenviable task of reviewing every single word we say. in his trademark suspenders, jerry is a friendly and unmistakable presence up on the fourth floor guiding his team through their diely rounds and maintaining a -- daily rounds and maintaining a level of integrity that has always been a key characteristic of the office. it is a proud group. in the 1930's senator huey long is said to have donated his personal bible to the office so they would have a handy reference when he quoted for it. it quickly became a tradition for new reporters to sign it when they got hired and then once they leave. in a sign of how dedicated these reporters are, only 35 names have been entered in the bible over the past 80 years. so it's a very venerable fraternity, one that has its roots in article 1 of the constitution, and we thank jerry for his many, many years of dedicated honorable service. i know jerry looks forward to spending more time with jane, their four children and their many grandchildren. after listening to us for all those years, i think he deserves it. you've done your time. you've done it well. the entire senate family thanks you. jerry, all the best. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: under the previous order leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, the senate stands in recess subject senate stands in recess subject >> the senate is in recess now to join house in a joint meeting today from the president of ukraine. when members return they will start over four hours of debate on a resolution to fund the government until december 11. attached to the measure as an amended authorizing a military plan to equip and train syrian opposition forces. the house passed that yesterday 273-156. the hill has posted this article about today's debate. majority whip dick durbin, second ranking member democratic leader said tuesday that house legislation authorizing president obama to train and equip syrian rebels is too vague. durbin was the chairman of the senate defense appropriations subcommittee said he would like to make changes to the measure drafted by the house armed services committee chairman buck mckeon. durbin says quote i'd like to suggest a few changes to that. it's not written as clearly as it should be. we are talking about going to see at this point which is a dog's breakfast of violence and terrorism. on tuesday defense secretary chuck hagel and joint chiefs chair martin dempsey went before the senate armed services committee to talk about presidents i suspect you here's a portion of the hearing and we begin with secretary kerry -- secretary hagel outline the military plan. >> describe how we're implement in this whole of government approach. first, in closed coordination with a new iraqi government we are broadening our air campaign to conduct systematic airstrikes against isil targets. protect americans threatened by isil's advances and to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. u.s. military has already conducted more than 160 successful air strikes which have killed isil find, destroy weapons and equipment and enabled iraqi and kurdish forces to get back on the offensive and security territory and critical infrastructure. including -- these actions have disrupted isil tactically and that helped to buy time for the iraqi government to begin forming an inclusive and broad-based governing coalition led by the new prime minister. that was one of president obama's essential preconditions for taking further action against isil. because the iraqi people, iraqi people must be united in their opposition against isil in order to defeat, this will require a united an inclusive government. this is ultimately their fight. the new broader air campaign will include strikes against all isil targets and enable the iraqi secret forces, including kurdish forces, to continue to stay on the offensive and recapture territory from isil and hold. because isil operates freely across the iraqi syrian border, it maintains a safe haven in syria. our actions will not be restrained by a border. in name only. as the president said last week, you threaten america, you'll find no safe haven. the president of the united states has the constitutional and statutory authority to use military force against isil in syria as well as in iraq. centcom is finalizing those plans which general austin will brief the president tomorrow in tampa. this plan includes targeted actions against isil's safe havens in syria, including its command and control of logistics capabilities and infrastructure. general dempsey and i both reviewed and approved cent, plans. the second element of the strategy is to increase our support for forces fighting isil on the ground. the iraqi incursion forces and the moderate syrian opposition. to support iraqi and kurdish forces, the president announced he would appoint an additional 475 american troops to arrive. part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors and support personnel to supplement forces already in iraq, conducting assessments of iraqi security forces. this assessment is now transitioning to an advise and assist mission with more than 15 games and betting with iraqi security forces at the headquarters level to provide strategic and operational advice and assistance. the rest of the additional 475 troops include one and 25 personnel to support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions out of a irbil. 200 personnel to increase headquarters elements in both baghdad and verbal. helping us better coordinate military activities across iraq. for the time all these forces arrived will be approximately 1600 u.s. personnel in iraq responding to the isil threat. but as the president said last week, american forces will not have a combat mission. instead uses visors are supporting iraqi and kurdish forces and supporting the government's plan to stand up iraqi national guard units to help sunni communities defeat a isil. the best counterweight to isil our local forces and the people of the area. and as you know in june the president asked congress the necessary authority for dod to train and equip modern syrian opposition forces, and $500 million to fund this program. we've now secured support from saudi arabia to host the training programs for this mission. and saudi arabia has offered financial and other support as well. 500 million requests the president made in june for his train and equip program reflects the centcom's estimate of the cost to train, equip and resupply more than 5000 opposition forces over one year. the package of assistance we initially provide would consist of small arms, vehicles and basic equipment like communications, as well as tactical and strategic training. as these forces prove their effectiveness on the battlefield, we'll be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to the most trusted commanders and capable forces. because dod does not only have the authority to conduct a train and equip mission, the administration has asked congress to provide the authority in the continuing resolution he is currently now considering. a rigorous vetting process will be critical to the success of this program. dod will work closely with the state department, the intelligence community and our partners in the region to screen and that forces we train and equip. we will monitor them closely to ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of radical elements of the opposition. isil, pursuing regime, or other extremist groups. there will always be risks, there will always be risks in a program like this, but we believe that risk is justified by the imperatives of destroying isil. the necessity of having capable partners on the ground in syria. as we pursue this program the united states will continue to press for a political resolution to the syrian conflict, resulting in the end of the assad regime. assad has lost all legitimacy to govern. and has created the conditions that allow the isil and other terrorist groups to gain ground and terrorize and slaughter the syrian population. the united states will not coordinate or cooperate with the assad regime. we will also continue to counter assad through diplomatic and economic measures. the third element of the president's strategy is an all-inclusive approach to prevent attacks from isil against the homeland of the united states and our allies. in concert with international partners, the united states will draw on intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic and economic tools to cut off the isil's funding, improve our intelligence, strengthen homeland defense, and stem the flow of foreign fighters in and out of the region. the department of justice and the department of homeland security have launched an initiative to partner with local communities to counter extremist recruiting, and the department of treasury's office of terrorism and financial intelligence is working to disrupt isil's financing and exposed their activities. the final element of the president strategies to continue providing humanitarian assistance through innocent civilians displaced or threatened by isil. alongside the government of iraq, the united kingdom, canada, australia and france, u.s. troops have already delivered life-saving aid to thousands of threatened iraqi civilians on mount sinjar and then the iraqi town. and total views military inducted 3 32 air drops of food and supplies, providing over eight -- 18,000 pounds of aid including nearly 80,000 gallons of water and nearly 120,000 meals ready to eat in these operations. in addition to this assistance last week the state department announced an additional 48 million in aid for civilian organizations to meet the urgent needs of iraqis displaced by isil. are totally managing assistance to displaced iraqis is now more than $186 million. for fiscal year 2014. the united states is also the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the millions of syrians affected by the civil war. last week secretary announced an additional 519 humanitarian assistance. since the start of the syrian conflict the united states has not committed almost $3 billion in humanitarian assistance to those affected by the civil war. all four elements of this strategy require a significant commitment of resources on the part of united states and our coalition partners. mr. chairman, i think everyone on this committee understand fully this will not be an easy or a brief effort. it is complicated. we are at war with isil as we are with al-qaeda. but destroying isil will require more than military effort a little but it will require political progress in the region and effective partners on the ground in iraq and syria. as the congress and the administration work together, we know this effort will take time. the president has outlined it clear that comprehensive and workable strategy to achieve our goals and protect our interests. mr. chairman, senator in a, thank you for your continued support and that of this committee and your partnership. thank you. >> thank you very much, secretary hagel. [shouting] >> thank you. would you please leave? would you please leave the room now? we're asking you nicely. we are asking you nicely to leave the room. [shouting] >> we are asking nicely, would you please leave the rim? thank you. we'll ask you the last time. thank you very much. [shouting] >> thank you for leaving. thank you. now -- general dempsey come as soon as the noise -- we would ask all of you to avoid these kind of outburst. they are not doing anybody any good, including hearing what this testimony is and they are not doing you and whatever your cause is any good either. thank you very much. would you please -- [shouting] and i'm asking you nicely to please leave the room. we are asking you again. would you please remove this gentleman. thank you very much. goodbye, thank you. [shouting] >> general dempsey. [shouting] >> general -- general dempsey -- [shouting] spent thank you, chairman and ranking member inhofe, members of the committee. i do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning. secretary hagel as described in detail the element of our strategy against isil, the role of the united states military is in my judgment appropriate. this is iraq's first strategy but not an iraq only. job one is empowering the iraqi ground forces to go on the offensive which they are already beginning to demonstrate. this requires a partnership with a credible iraqi government which is also showing positive signs of becoming inclusive of all of its population. within his partnership our advisors are intended to help the iraqis develop a mindset for the the offensive and to take actions consistent with offenses. our military adviser to help the iraqis conduct campaign planning, range for a neighbor and logistic support and coordinate our coalition activities. if we reach a point where i believe our advisors should accompany iraqi troops on attacks against specific isil targets, i wil would recommend t to the president. as long as isil enjoys a safe haven in syria it will remain a formidable force and the threat. so while this work in iraq is taking place we will simultaneously pressure isil in syria with coalition partners and contributions we will begin building a force of trained moderate sunnis to take on isil industry. we will work to ensure that they have a string chain of command and report to a moderate political authority. this fourth work initially at the local and committee love unhelpful together city and the most felt the harsh hand of the isil. in conjunction with a long-term effort will be prepared to strike isil targets in syria that degrade their capabilities. this will not look like a shock and awe campaign because that isn't enough how isil is organized, but it will be a persistent and sustainable campaign. i want to emphasize that military actions must be part of the whole of government effort that works to disrupt isil financing, interdict the movement of foreign fighters across borders, and undermined the isil message. given a coalition of capable willing and international partners i believe we can destroy the isil in iraq, destroyed the iran, correction the iraq syria border and disrupt isil ensure you. this will will be defeated when the cloak of religious legitimacy is stripped away in the population on which they have imposed themselves reject them to our actions are intended to move in that direction. this will require a sustained effort over an extended period of time. it's a generational problem and we should expect better enemies will adapt their tactics as we adjust our approach. as the situation in the middle east evolves and continues to demand our attention we're bouncing of the challenges in other regions. ebola been the most recent. along with reassuring our european allies against russian aggression continue our mission in afghanistan. but our young men and women in uniform are doing so much more. they conduct hundreds of exercises, activities and engagements every day. actions that deter conflict. they are performing magnificently. but i am growing increase the uncomfortable that the will to fight it means does not match the will to pursue end. the sector and i are doing will begin inside the department to bridge that gap but we will need your help. if we do not depart from our present path, over time i will have fewer military options to offer to the secretary and to the president, and that's not a position in which i want to find myself. thank you. >> thank you very much, general dempsey. we'll have a six minute first round. of a lot of sure we all want to have an opportunity and then if we go around once and have reasonable and our facing us will try to have a very short second round but we just won't know that until we get to it. general dempsey, let me start by asking you for your professional military opinion of the military strategy which was announced by the president last week. you personally support a strategy? >> i do, chairman. >> tell us why. >> because the nature of the threat is such that, as i mentioned, it will only be defeated when moderate arab and muslim population in the region reject it. and, therefore, the way forward seems to me to run clearly through a coalition of arab and muslim partners, and not through the ownership of the united states in this issue. and so the strategy does that. it seeks to build a coalition, encourage an inclusive government to address the grievances that of causes in the first place. it applies u.s. military power where we have unique capability to do so. and over time it allows those populations to reject isil. >> and in terms of utilizing on the ground the forces that are suited in iraq rather than western forces, is that part of the thinking at this time as well to avoid a western ground force in an arab or muslim country, the same reason you just gave? >> well, i do think that the approach to build the coalition and enable -- and to enable it leads me to leverage our unique capabilities which tend to be as i mentioned, the ability to train and plan and provide intelligence and provide air power. as i said in my statement, however, might you at this point is that this coalition is the appropriate way forward. i believe that will prove true. but if it fails to be true and if there are threats to the united states, and i of course would go back to the president and make a recommendation that may include the use of u.s. motor ground forces. >> secretary hagel, how important is it, you made reference to this, i'd like you to elaborate, that the coalition have very strong, visible participation by arab and muslim states? >> mr. chairman, as you just reflected in your question to general dempsey on the point, and i would pick up where general dempsey left off. this is not a west versus east issue. this is not a u.s.-european coalition against muslim countries, or a muslim region. it's important that the world see, especially the people in the middle east see, that the threat that is confronting them first, and all of us, needs to be addressed by the people of the region as well as all nations and all people in the world. to have arab muslim nations be present and public about their efforts in this coalition helps that, and it's critically important to the ultimate success of winning against all extremist factors and factions in the middle east, specifically isil. >> in that same approach of having the force, the people of these countries basically purge the strand of islam that is so poisonous that is trying to take over in their countries leads, i gather, to one argument for using indigenous national forces on the ground rather than outside and particularly western forces. >> yes. i said in my statement, mr. chairman, matt the most significant powerful force against extremism in the middle east are the people themselves who will not accept this kind of barbarity and brutality. the muslims of the world know that what isil represents in no way is what their religion, what their ethnicity, but that background represents. ..

Transcripts For CSPAN3 Implementation Of The Accountability Review Board Recommendations 20140917

this house committee on the benghazi attack hearing about to get under way. while we have a second we're going to take a chance and give you some background on today's hearing from a capitol hill reporter. >> welcome for purposes of taking testimony pursuant to house rules. chair will recognize himself and ranking member for purposes of making opening statement. without objection the opening statement of any other member of the committee who wishes to provide one will be included in the record. a little over two years ago, four americans serving our country in benghazi, libya, were killed. two of them were killed when a facility emblematic of our country was set on fire. and two of them were killed when they dared to fight back and defend themselves. and others. sean smith, chris stevens, ty woods and glen doherty represented us. they represented our country, and our values. we ask them to go. we sent them, and they were killed because some people hold a deep-seated animus toward us simply because we are us. so to the family and the friends, and the loved ones of those killed, we can never adequately express our condolences and our gratitude. as you have to the families you have helped each of us understand these four were not just pictures on a television screen. they were sons and husbands, and fathers and brothers and friends. and fellow americans. i remain hopeful that there are some things left in our country that can rise above politics. and i remain convinced there are fellow citizens entitled to all of the facts about what happened before, during and after the attacks in benghazi. and they deserve an investigative process that is worthy of the memory of the four who were killed, and worthy of the respect of our fellow americans. some question the need for this committee, and i respect their right to dissent. but the mark of a professional, indeed the mark of character, is to do a good job with a task, even if you don't think the task should have been assigned in the first place. and given the gravity of the issues at hand, i would rather run the risk of answering a question stwies than run the risk of not answering it once. i am willing to reconsider previously held beliefs in light of new facts and evidence, and i would encourage my colleagues and others to do the same, because we know that all the documents have not yet been produced, and we know that there are still witnesses left to be examined. and we also know that there are witnesses who have been examined in the past, but for whom additional questions may be wanting. so i would ask each of my colleagues, given their vast and varied and exceptional backgrounds, to put those talents to good use on behalf of our fellow citizens. the house of representatives constituted this committee. and they did so for us to find all of the facts. and i intend to do that and i intend to do it in a manner worthy of the respect of our fellow citizens. our fellow citizens have certain legitimate expectations. they expect us to protect and defend those that we send to represent us. they expect us to move heaven and earth when those who are representing us come under attack. they expect government to tell us the truth in the aftermath of a tragedy always, and they expect that we will not continue to make the same mistakes over and over and over again. which brings us to this hearing. benghazi was not the first time one of our facilities or our people have been attacked. beirut, kenya, tanzania, are three that come to mind among others. and after these attacks, groups come together, and make recommendations on how to prevent future attacks. that seems to be the process that is followed. a tragedy or an attack comes, we commission a panel, a board, a blue ribbon commission to study the attack and make sure that we make recommendations to ensure that it never happens again. but yet it does happen again. and so to hose who believe it is time to move on, to those who believe that there is nothing left to discover, that all the questions have been asked and answered and that we've learned all the lessons that there are to be learned, we have heard all of that before. and it was wrong then. it is stunning to see the similarities between the recommendations made decades ago, and the recommendations made by the benghazi arb. if you doubt that, i want you to compare the recommendations of those made 25, a quarter of a century ago, 25 years ago, with the recommendations made by the benghazi arb. we do not suffer from a lack of recommendations. we do suffer from a lack of implementing and enacting those recommendations. that has to end. and so it is appropriate to review the recommendations in the most recent arb and i commend our colleague in california, mr. schiff, for suggesting that we do so. and it is also fair to ask why we have not done a better job of implementing recommendations made in some instances decades ago. . in other words why does it take an attack on our people or our facilities for us to make a recommendation? why not evaluate the threat before the attack? why not anticipate, rather than react? in conclusion the people that we work for yearn to see the right thing done for the right reasons, and in the right way. and they want to know that something can rise above the din of partisan politics. they want to trust the institution's of government. so to fulfill the duties owed to those we serve and in honor of those who were killed, maybe, just maybe, we can be what those four brave men were, neither republican nor democrat. just americans. and pursue the facts. and justice. no matter where that journey takes us. with that i would recognize the ranking member from maryland. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. and i thank you for holding this hearing today. i know every member of this panel is dedicated to ensuring that our work honors the memories of the four americans who were killed in benghazi. their names must be etched in our memory banks. ambassador chris stevens. sean smith. tyrone woods. and glen doherty. i want to thank our colleague representative schiff for proposing the topic for today's hearing, and mr. chairman, i want to thank you for accepting that topic, and so that we can see what has become of the arb recommendations. too often over the past two years, the congressional investigation into what happened in benghazi has evolved into unseemly partisanship. we're better than that. today we have an opportunity to focus on reform. how can we learn from the past to make things better in the future? mr. chairman, i agree with you, that over the years, recommendation after recommendations have been made. the question is, as you said, what became of them? i do believe that in life there are transformational moments. that is, something happens, it causes you to stop and pause, and try to figure out how to remedy the situation and make it better. and the problem is is when those moments come, and they come to all of us. the question is, is whether we pause make things better, because usually if we don't, we repeat the the errors and usually things get worse. and this is one such transformational moment. the kind of oversight that can be product iive, it can be critical. it can sometimes even be tedious. but it can also save lives. that's what we're talking about. and that's why i want to thank every member of this panel for agreeing to do this. for we are about the business of trying to save lives. that's a very serious mission. i sincerely hope the select committee will stay on course of constructive reform and keep this goal as our north star. it would be a disservice to everyone involved to be lured off this path by partisan politics. today we will review the recommendations of the accountability review board. which was chaired by ambassador thomas pickering and admiral michael mullen, the former chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff. during our previous investigation house oversight committee and chairman gaudy and i heard directly from both men about how seriously they took their roles. ambassador pickering called it, and i quote, a debt of honor. their report was independent, it was adopted unanimously by all board members, and it was a blistering examination of what went wrong at the state department. they made 29 recommendations and secretary clinton accepted all of them. after they issued their report, the state department inspector general issued his own report finding that, and i quote, the department wasted no time addressing the recommendations, end of quote. the department has been working on implementing those recommendations for the past year and a half. and congress should ensure that it finishes the job. today, i would like our witnesses to provide an update on the status of several of the board's recommendations. first, the board found that the department's response to the deteriorating security situation in benghazi was, i quote, inadequate, and it was inadequate at the point in benghazi, at the embassy in tripoli, and here in washington. ambassador pickering explained that the post did not take action despite crossing several trip wires that should have caused officials to review security more closely and develop a stronger response. the board recommended that the department change its procedures to make sure that security breaches are reviewed immediately. today the department reports that it has created a new process that requires posts to report trip wires as soon as they are crossed, so security officials can review them immediately and take action if necessary. i want to know if this process is now fully operational. and if so, how it has been working so far. the board also found that we should not have relied so heavily on local militia groups like february 17th militia. to protect our post. or call this reliance, and i quote, misplaced, end of quote. and they found that the security forces were, quote, poorly skilled, end of quote. the board recommended the department strengthen security and i quote, beyond the traditional reliance on host government security, supporting high risk, high threat posts, end of quote. today the department reports that it has 17 new marine security guard detachments, and another new marine unit to enhance security in changing threat environments. in addition, the skate department is now using new funding from congress to hire 151 new personnel in the bureau of diplomatic security or d.s. i want to hear from our witnesses about whether these actions are sufficient or whether we need to do more. the board also found fault with a deputy assistant secretary with d.s. who denied repeated requests for additional security in benghazi. at the time this official oversaw the security of all 275 diplomatic posts around the world. to address this problem the department created a new position to focus exclusively on the security needs of roughly 30 posts experiencing highest threats. the board praised this action, stating that it could be, and i quote, a positive first step integrated into a sound strategy for d.s. reorganization. today i want to hear from the state department specifically about how this new position is working, and whether they believe we should make additional changes. everyone understands that diplomacy by its nature sometimes requires to be a very dangerous places. how diplomats work in high threat environments, and although we cannot eliminate every risk, we must do everything that we can to keep americans as safe as possible when they are serving overseas. with that i want to conclude by recognizing the tremendous sacrifices that are made every single day. around the world our diplomatic core, the intelligence community and our military service members on behalf of the american people. and i remind my colleagues that this is our watch. i said to the chairman before we started, this is bigger than us. the things that we do today, and over the next few months, will have lasting effects, even when we're gone on to heaven. and that's how we have to look at this. so we prepare not only for the present, but we prepare for the future and generations unborn. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you gentleman from maryland. the committee will now recognize and receive testimony from today's witness panel. the first witness will be the honorable greg starr the assistant secretary for diplomatic security at the department of state. second witness will be todd kyle a member of the independent panel of best practices and third witness will be mark sullivan the chair of the independent panel on best practices. welcome to each of you. we will recognize each of you for your five minute opening statements. there are a series of lights which mean what they traditional mean in life, and i am sure that you are familiar with the lighting system, because this is an investigative hearing, i will need to administer the oath to the witnesses before taking their testimony. so if the witnesses would please rise, and lift their right hands. do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. may the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. secretary starr you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement. >> chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and distinguished committee members, good morning. and i thank you for your invitation to appear today to discuss the department of state's implementation of the 29 recommendations made by the independent benghazi accountability review board, also known as the arb. >> mr. secretary, i don't want to interrupt you. would you pull the mic just a little. some of us have had a couple birthdays recently and we're heard of hearing. >> i, too, sir. i along with my colleagues at the state department look forward to working with you as you examine the issues relating to the 2012 terrorist attack in benghazi. the attacks in benghazi were tragic. today we honor those we lost by internalizing the lessons from that night to protect our people in the field as they carry out our country's foreign policy work every single day. over the past two years, with secretary kerry's leadership, that commitment is being honored. like you, we want to keep our people safe. the heart of the accountability review board's recommendations was to enhance the department's approach to risk management. ensuring that when our national interests require us to operate in dangerous places, that we identify the risks and take the proper steps to mitigate them. the department has made important strides in that regard. i'd like to highlight just a few examples of how we're implementing the arb's recommendations, including how we are giving high threat post the attention and resources that they need. however, even with this progress it is essential for us to acknowledge that while we can do everything we can to reduce the risk, we can never eliminate it fully. high threat, high risk posts require special attention to confirm our national interests require us to operate there, and to provide the right resources to do that. we have instituted a new process called the vital presence validation process, shortland vp-2 as we call it, to do just hat. one example of it in action is our recent return to bangi central african republic. the department suspended operations there in december of 2012. process and a support cell process, that plans for how we go in to these operations, the analysis that determined that we should and could go back. we worked with our colleagues at the department of defense to assess the security situation on the ground, and develop a comprehensive plan for our return. i'm proud to report that we deployed dod and state department personnel just last we week. the embassy is now open. while we must closely monitor conditions on the ground our return to bengi demonstrates our procedures are working. another example of our enhanced posture since benghazi is how we've improved at training. chief of personnel drgs chief admission personnel including both security professionals and all foreign service personnel are now better prepared for operating if high threat environments. we've increased the expanded training for our ds special agents, who receive high threat training specifically and then we've also expanded what we call our foreign affairs counterthreat course for foreign service colleagues that are going to all of our high threat posts. and we're working towards making this foreign affairs counter threat training universal for foreign service personnel and employees for all of our posts overseas. further, to combat fire as a weapon we partnered with the city of new york fire department and the army's asymmetric warfare group to enhance our training curriculum and implement countermeasures in response to fire and smoke as a terrorist weapon. finally, with your help, we have added to our security resources. the arb recommended that we expand the number of diplomatic security personnel, and we have done just that. we are well on our way to just finishing that off and hitting all of our targets. it also recommended that we augment the marine security -- marine security guard program which we have done, as well. while these are just a few examples of the department's efforts post-benghazi i believe they highlight some of the key progress we have made. i will not outline all of the things we've done in the interest of time but i'm pleased to report that we have made what i consider to be tremendous progress on the 29 benghazi arb recommendations. to date we've closed 22 recommendations, and 7 are in progress or nearing completion. today we're better prepared, better protected and informed to manage the risk. we look forward to working with congress, and you, on ensuring that foreign affairs, our foreign affairs community has safe platforms for carrying out our national interests. i want to thank congress for the additional resources that you provided over the past two years to improve and sustain this diplomatic platform. and i'll be glad to answer any questions that you have. thank you. >> thank you. mr. kyle? >> thank you, chairman gaudy, ranking member cummings and distinguished members of the select mitty for inviting me to testify about our independent panel report on best practices. in the aftermath of the tragic attack on the u.s. mission in benghazi, libya, and to provide our insight regarding the (urjjp'd related issues relevant to our report. our panel was committed to identifying best practices from the u.s. government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and international partners which can finally establish an effective risk management process in the department of state. improve the security of u.s. diplomatic facilities abroad, and enhance the safety of department of state and foreign affairs agencies, personnel, not only in high risk areas, but globally. we identified 40 crucial recommendations to achieve this goal. we continue to stand behind our report in the strongest possible terms. and believe that the 40 recommendations and the supporting narratives which were derived from well-known and established best practices provide a clear road map for an absolutely necessary organizational paradigm change throughout the department of state to support the current direction of expeditionary diplomacy and the application of proven enterprise risk management enhancements. mr. chairman, and distinguished members, i spent a career of almost 23 years as a special agent with the bureau of diplomatic security and the department of state. as a result of my years of service, i am uniquely familiar with the history and most importantly the operating culture both within the bureau of diplomatic security and the department of state. as our panel interviewed hundreds of people in the u.s. and abroad and gained valuable ground truth from our travel to ten countries during our work, including numerous high threat locations, i couldn't have been more personally and professionally proud and heartened, along with my fellow panel members, by hearing and witnessing the dedicated and admirable work of the men and women of the diplomatic security service. each day around the world the ds team faces extreme challenges and unpredictable risks to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of u.s. foreign policy, and they do so with distinction. the men and women of the bureau of diplomatic security are truly dedicated public servants, and are owed the gratitude of the american people for their service to this great nation. as we stated repeatedly throughout our report, best practices will not save lives. unless they are resourced, implemented and followed. almost 14 now, actually almost 15 years ago as was mentioned in the chairman's opening statement, a number of very similar recommendations were made after the east african embassy bombings and little has been accomplished by the department of state since then to improve its approach to risk management. while we're pleased our report has been finally officially released by the state department, along with the implementation fact sheet, we are disappointed with the decision not to implement recommendations, number one. the most important one. and recommendation number 13. in a meeting earlier this year with deputy secretary higenbottom and assistant secretary starr we were encouraged by their candor and support for our report, and their intent to adhere to the recommendations in our report. in light of the long history of such report, and recommendations to the department of state, and with a continuing sense of responsibility, we voiced our concerns in a recent letter to deputy secretary higen bottom both for those recommendations not implemented, and those that are apparently relying on pre-benghazi processes and procedures to demonstrate or achieve implementation. now is the time clear the smoke. remove the mirrors, now is the time for the department of state to finally institutionalize some real, meaningful and progressive change. and as the ranking member said this is a transformational moment. they can't lose this moment. words and cursory actions by the department of state ring hollow absent transparency, and verifiable and sustainable actions to fully put into practice the letter and the intent of our recommendations. which will facilitate diplomacy and safeguard the selfless americans who carry out our national security priorities around the world. the department of state owes it to those people who have given their lives in service to our country and to those employees who continue to serve our country in some very dangerous locations around the world, to continue to identify and implement risk management best practices. additionally, we urge the department to institutionalize the process of outside and independent counsel and guidance on risk management best practices, sooner than 2016. the accountability review board recommended that this be an annual process and we concur that this remains a critical need for the department and should begin as soon as possible. in our view, this is a decisively important step the department must take to demonstrate transparency, and ensure a continuing dialogue on security best practices, with and input from outside independent experts regarding operations in high threat and challenging international locations. finally, mr. chairman, i'd like to take just a quick moment to introduce another member of our panel sitting in the audience, mr. ray vislack. his multiple careers in public service include more than 25 years as an fbi agent, five years as director of security at the cia. ray exemplifies the definition of a great american. thank you, mr. cheryl. >> thank you mr. keil and welcome to your guest. mr. sullivan you're recognized for five minutes. >> good morning, chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for asking todd keil and i to appear before you today. mr. chairman, i consider it an honor to have served on the best practice panel with outstanding and dedicated individuals. our team of todd keil, richard manlove, raymond mislock jr. timothy murphy and staff, erica lickleiter and stephanie murdoch have a combined experience of 175 years of experience in law enforcement expertise. during our careers, each panel member has gained an appreciation in understanding of the importance of having clear lines of leadership and organizational structure concerning security matters. we as a panel also understand that things don't always go as planned. and when they don't, it is vital to implement lessons learned in an effort to prevent them from happening again. the panel report reflects the independent views of the panel based upon our best professional judgment. experience, and analysis of the best practices. informed by interviews, travel, and extensive research. it was a pleasure to serve with this dedicated group, and i appreciate their professionalism, and hard work. i would also like to acknowledge and thank all of those interviewed in the course of drafting this report from the u.s. government, private sector, international organizations, and foreign governments. the best practice panel was the result of the accountability review board for benghazi. which recommended that the department of state establish a panel of outside independent experts with experience in high risk, high threat areas, to support the bureau of diplomatic security. identify best practices, and recommendations from other agencies and countries. and evaluate united states security platforms in high risk, high threat posts. our report provided 40 recommendations, in 12 different areas. those 12 areas are organization and management, accountability, risk management, program acceptable risk, planning and logistics, lessons learned, training and human resources, intelligence, threat analysis and security assessment, program resource and technology, host nations and guard force capability enhancement, regular evaluation and change management, leadership, and communication and training. it was the opinion of the panel, all 40 recommendations, with further strengthen the department's ability to protect its personnel and work more safely on a global platform to achieve american foreign policy goals and objectives. the panel's view was that its recommendations were realistic, achievable, and measurable. on august 29th, 2013, the panel delivered its final report to the department of state. of the 40 recommendations we offered, the department accepted 38. of the 38 accepted recommendations, the department of state has reported that 30 have been implemented, and in addition, the implementation process for the remaining eight is ongoing. the two recommendations not accepted are the department should, as a matter of urgency, establish an undersecretary for diplomatic security, and number 13, waivers to establish security standards should only be provided subsequent to the implementation of mitigating measures as agreed by regional bureau or other program managers. advised by department of state, and as informed by the department risk management model. the best practice panel looked across a wide spectrum of private and nongovernmental organizations to identify effective measures to enhance the department's ability to ensure a safe and secure environment for employees and programs. not surprisingly, the panel found that many institutions, including governments, referred to the department of state, bureau of diplomatic security, as the gold standard for security and seek to model their service after the bureau of diplomatic security. nevertheless, any organization must continuously evolve and improve to adjust with a fluid and dynamic environment. the panel continues to advocate that the way forward should be characterized by cooperative efforts that will provide a framework which will enhance the department's ability to protect americans. in order to be effective, we must be innovative so that we ensure institutions adapt and evolve to meet the ever-changing security requirements needs. many environments of uncertainty permeates one certainty we share is the necessary collaborative effort that is needed in our country to ensure the safety and security of all american lives. it is also a necessary certainty that we honor and protect the memories of those citizens who have been lost as a result of violent attacks with dignity and respect. i would like to take this opportunity to thank the department of state, the overseas post that hosted our panel's visit, and the bureau of diplomatic security for the outstanding support they provided to our panel during our endeavor. i would also like to chang chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and members of the select committee for inviting us here today and your continued efforts to make america safe. i look forward to any questions you may have. thank you. thank you. >> thank you, mr. sullivaqrpl?"2 t18xtñ 2013, there were actually 336 -- facilities. these include things like rocket attacks. firebomb i firebombing, attempted murder, arson, takeovers, vandalism. it wasn't until 1987 that the state department started what are called accountability review boards. and there have been 19 arbs since that time. they've reviewed only -- and as i understand, it's the mission of the arbs to review only the most significant attacks against our diplomatic personnel, and to review specifically security, and intelligence, and whether or not government employees reach -- as the chairman and ranking member have brought up, in the 1998 east african bombings, 300 lives were lost. 12 americans, the rest were africans, and an arb was convened then, and as we've already heard they made several findings and recommendations then. this follows what was called the inman panel which was 14 years before the east african arb. and again many of those findings and recommendations were found in east africa, in their arb. at the time the then-secretary of state accepted all of the recommendations in the east africa arb. and now here we are, 14 years later and some of those same recommendations have been repeated by the benghazi arb. and so we seem to have a state department that has a long history of repeat recommendations. but i think there's a significant difference between recommendations, and implementation. and i'd like to talk about how that happens. and how that has happened. in fact, the board in east africa urged the secretary of state to, quote, take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of u.s. diplomatic personnel abroad. and it was essential to convey to the entire department that security is one of its highest priorities. assistant secretary starr, are you familiar with the east africa recommendations? >> not every specific recommendations, but with the report, yes, ma'am. >> and do you agree with the report? >> yes. >> are you aware that after the benghazi arb, then-secretary gave her personal assurances, as well, that she put overall responsibility for implementing all of the arb recommendations in the hands of the deputy secretary. are you familiar with that? >> yes, i am. >> and that was, in fact, in her letter to -- in december of '12 to at the time the honorable john kerry, chairman of foreign relations. she indicated that the deputy secretary would be overseeing the implementation of the arb. are you familiar with her letter? and then are you familiar with the fact that when secretary kerry became the secretary of state, he initially kept it at the deputy secretary level, is that correct? and could you please speak into the mic, thank you. >> yes, ma'am. >> today, however, overall responsibility for oversight and implementation of all of the recommendations is with an office known as management policy right-sizing innovation. is that correct? one of eleven separate offices that reports to the undersecretary of management. >> mpri is tracking. they are not necessarily responsible for implementing, but they are doing the job of tracking the implementation, yes. >> and it is their job. and so i'd like to just point out, for those who might not be familiar, and you, too, are an assistant secretary reporting to the undersecretary of management, is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> and so, with respect -- and you say that they are tracking the implementation. however, that is the office that is day in and day out going in and trying to ensure that all of those recommendations are being followed. is that correct? >> one office, yes. >> and so at this point, the arb recommendations, it's really not at the secretary of state level, it's not at the deputy secretary of state level, the second level, it's not with an undersecretary, but the tracking is happening at the fourth tier. is that correct? the tracking and making sure that day in and day out is at the fourth tier. >> the tracking is going on at mpri. but i can also give you further information about how it is, in fact, being closely looked at by the deputy secretary herself. >> and the deputy secretary, are you familiar with the inspector general's report, sir? >> yes, i am. >> and the inspector general, who issued the report in 2014, also believed that at the highest levels in the department, those are the individuals that must be personally responsible for overseeing those recommendations. isn't that correct? >> yes, it is. >> and, in fact, indicated in the i.g. report that that's how lasting change and cultural change would happen. is if implementation were at the highest levels of the department. >> yes. that is true. >> i'd like to ask mr. keil, if you might, your best practices panel indicated that where a security function is placed in a department is a statement of how that organization values security in its personnel. do you recall that finding? >> yes, ma'am, very well. >> and can you please explain with respect to recommendation number one, which has not been implemented by the department, can you please talk about the importance of that recommendation of elevating the importance, actually, of mr. starr's position, to a higher level? can you please talk about the importance of that recommendation, and what you understand as to why the department is not elevating the importance of security within the organization at the current time? >> as we looked at other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, it became very clear that the placement of the chief security officer with responsibility for the safety of the programs, and the people, clearly depends on where it's placed within the organization. especially at the department of state where visuals, because of the culture of the department of state are so crucially important. the placement of that position, it was crucially important. mr. starr previously served up at the united nations in charge of their department of safety and security. in that organization, he was an undersecretary. that position was an undersecretary. the united nations recognized that important and that diplomatic world where you see things really matters. and, ma'am, if you'd actually look at our recommendation number 40, we recommended that the secretary should establish a comprehensive change management strategy throughout the department that is led by the deputy secretary for management resources. so those two things clearly come together and are crucially important. >> and in your view, the best practices panel, when they looked at the organization of the department, it was clearly your view that overall responsibility for security from a visual standpoint, which is important in large organizations, was too low on your chart? >> from a visual standpoint and also from an operational standpoint. i remember on the first day when we brought out the chart as part of our panel mr. sullivan was trying to find the bureau of diplomatic security and i had to keep pointing him further and further down the chart until he identified it. >> and while it might not just be where it's placed on the chart visually, it has to do with command and control, does it not? >> exact. command and control and informed decision making. >> and, in fact, when you are a lower level on an organization chart that requires you to then move up within the organization to get approval for things that you'd like to do, is that correct? >> yes, of course. >> i'd like to just briefly wrap up with mr. sullivan. and with respect to -- you've led a large federal agency, the secret service. is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> and you understand the span of control, and so with respect to the need to lead lasting cultural change in an organization, which is what i believe this panel is going to try to lead and to do, where does that need to start? >> i think it needs to start at the top. >> and when you start at the top, which would be the secretary of state, if you want to emphasize within your entire organization the importance, and in this place of security, the deputy secretary or the undersecretary, which are considered principles in a department, is that correct? and that's the highest levels? >> yes, ma'am. >> and with respect, do you have any other comments you'd like to make with respect to mr. keil's assessment? >> when we look at management, that is a very large and very complex directorate. it has important functions going on there but its personnel, budget procurement i believe there may be about 20 or 21 assist avt secretaries or deputy assistant secretaries reporting up to that undersecretary. and for us, quite frankly, this was not about an upgrade in title. quite frankly, from my perspective, i don't really care what the title is. i just think there needs to be a direct report up to the, you know, in my former position, and i may be biased, you know, i reported directly to the secretary. we had the deputy secretary of the fbi was on our panel, and the fbi directory put it to the attorney general. we just believe that it's a -- that that's the way that this should be structured. we think internally and externally, it tells people, you know, where security is thought to be, and the importance of security. but again this was not about an upgrade in title. this was just about clarity of who's in charge of security. >> thank you. and i yield back. >> the gentle lady from indiana yields back. the chair will recognize the gentleman from washington mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. talked a lot about process. who is in charge. how can we -- i always think one of the first recommendations when everything goes wrong, going to go back and review who was in charge, how we can change the process, how can we sort of move around, who was -- who was and who should be responsible? but what i really want to focus on is what should be done. regardless of who it is, who is in charge of it, the challenge i see, and i've, you know, as i've traveled around the world to various different posts, i'm just, you know, awed and amazed at the risks that people who serve in the state department take every day. i went to a consulate we have in peshawar in pakistan, and just listened in to the personnel there talk about going back and forth to work every day, all the security that's involved. we are in a lot of dangerous places throughout the world. and most of the people in state department that i talk to, you know, take a certain amount of pride in that. it's their job, they're going to tough places to make sure that american interests are respected and watched over. but the question becomes, how do you protect them? so, you know, we've got the recommendations, these recommendations, what have we learned about what you can specifically do forgetting for the moment of who is in charge of doing it to enhance security at high risk posts. security atk posts? i guess it will be two piece. how do you identify the high-risk posts, first of all? and second of all, once you identify one, what do you do? how do you then try to enhance security and make sure that people are protected? and if you can tyie that back into what played out in benghazi, what should have happened as a result of that identification that didn't. and then the broader question about high-risk posts and how you approach them now and befor before. >> thank you. we have always rank ordered our posts according to threat. we look at the threat of terrorism. we look at the threat of civil disorder. this is done in a process every single year with a tremendous amount of input from the post itself, from the emergency action committee on the post, which has members from all the different agencies that are represented. we rank order these posts and give them ratings for terrorism, for civil disorder. for things like crime, counterintelligence, human intelligence, technical intelligence. >> and then the question, the real key question there is then what? once you identify them, how do you try to better protect them? >> we look at these posts and for years we have worked through the overseas security policy board to craft security policies and standards. physical security standards. technical security standards. procedural security standards on what we can do at these posts, at these different threat levels. once we decide and we see that a post is in our highest threat. so let's say a critical threat category, we're going to devote more rsos. we're going to look at what is the size of the marine detachment? does it need to be larger? in terms of the posts, that plays a huge role in when we decide which posts we want to rebuild after the capital skurlt cost sharing program. and we prioritize, replacing the most vulnerable posts with more, with newer, much more robust, much safer facilities that we build with funding from congress and offiverseas office and buildings. we look at threat and make determinations now in the aftermath of benghazi. w our highest risk 30 posts. we sent out teams specifically to those posts, and in addition to making sure that they meet the security standards, are there things that we need to do in addition to the security standards that make sense? these were multiagency teams that we sent out. we continued to look at the threat information from every post around the world that we get every single morning. we start at 8:00 a.m. every morning looking at the threat information that we get. but one of the critical lessons we learned from benghazi is there are many times, andny we know this from times past, that we don't get specific threat information before an attack. if we did, we would thwart the attack. and congresswoman brooks talked about how many attacks we have suffered over the years. that's our document that we put out to ensure that people know what the environment is. or we may evacuate the post. there are times we go to the the u.s. military and ask the department of defense to augment our protection on the ground. in tripoli we had nearly 100 marines with us, so on a daily basis we look at exactly what's happening on our post overseas. try to make sure we're aware of whatever intelligence is out there. try to make sure we're fully aware of the larger instability question and what does that mean to us and put the right resources in the right place and take the proper steps. >> so as a result of the arrb on this specific instance, what do you think you learned specifically about benghazi? what should have been done there that wasn't? and actually let me ask mr. sullivan that question. >> our focus was not to evaluate what happened in benghazi. our focus was to come up with best practices. during the course of that, we did become aware of certain things that did happen in ben gau benghazi. when we met with tp assistant secretary, and we met as a panel, we quickly determined that we were going to take our approach from a tactical approach to more strategic approach. we recognized that, you know, they didn't need us to tell them what type of weapons to get, what type of fire equipment to get. that we needed to approach this from a strategic perspective. i think one of the things you see in any type of situation where things go bad is communication. i think this comes down to communication. and you know, we made recommendations under planning and logistics. we made four different recommendations there. and i believe for any type of a trip, whether it be to benghazi or wherever you go, there has to be a cohesive plan. there has to be logistics. you have to do a very good job of risk management. obviously, there was a communication breakdown for that visit to benghazi. i think it was mentioned earlier that there were numerous trip wires. i think in that spring, starting in march of 2012 and going up until july or august of 2012, there are numerous incidents that were occurring in benghazi. i think one embassy moved out, the british moved out of benghazi. that needed to be communicated. that needed to be discussed. they needed to talk about what were the mitigating measures they were going to take to protect our people at that mission? and again, i think that unfortunately, four people paid the price. because that communication didn't occur and that planning and logistics quite frankly didn't happen the way we were recommending it should occur. and which i have ever confidence that assistant secretary starr and his staff are working on right now. >> do you want to add something on that? >> i think, congressman, the first question is it's not about how many people you send, how many walls you build. and the first question has to be, and that's where we change from a tactical approach to a strategic approach. the first question has to be, do we need to be there? do we need to be in benghazi? and the department lacks a risk management process to make those informed decisions. do we need to be in those places? do the risks -- are the risks less than the national security priorities or the policy gains? the department does not have the process to determine do we need to be there and do we need to stay? that's the center and the heart of our report. the department needs that process. not just give them more people. not just give them more guns. if the national security priorities outweigh the risks, fine. then go. there's nothing wrong with that. we're not saying don't go. but you need a risk management process, which the department lacks to make those determinations. >> congressman, my good friend todd kyle here. could i just say, perhaps it should be past tense. lacked as opposed to lacks. this is one of the things that we've concentrated on most over the past two years. it is the heart of the vital presence validation process. >> and talk about that. the chairman talked at the outset of the necessity of this panel. but we've done that with a number of different reports. and as you point out, we made this change now. so what is different about that communications level as a result of the arb and some of the other studies that we've done? >> sir, the biggest single change that i would really like to point out is the department's acceptance. not just acceptance, but embracing this concept that first and foremost, as todd just alluded to, we need to ask the question, why are we in the most dangerous places? and the 30 places that we identified as the highest risks, that's exactly what we're doing. going through every single one of those 30 and doing this vital presence validation process. the first step is, what is our national interest for being there? why should we run these high risks that we've already identified as a high threat, high risk post. and if the answer comes out that the risks don't outweigh why we should be there, the national interests, then we're going to make decisions that either we have to put additional security in, or we're going to have to wait. >> and we've actually in the last year pulled out of posts in the result of that process, correct? >> not as a result of that process. that's the longer strategic process. the risk management process and the principles of it, yes, exactly so. we have pulled or closed post because of that thing. >> thank you, gentleman. >> the chair would now recognize the gentleman from kansas. >> you said in you recent testimony there was no immediate tactical warning. that's the saying arb had found before, is that correct? >> that's my understanding, yes. >> and it is also the case that in your experience that it's often not the case that there's an immediate tactical warning. >> that is very true, sir. >> and so i want to talk about that intelligence. you in your opening statement didn't mention anything related to findings 21 and 22. in fact, in unof these matters. if you don't have the threat analysis right, all the various things you talked about is meaningless if you don't have the threat analysis correct. if you don't have the right intelligence and have it in the right place. would you agree with that? >> yes, sir. but i would just add it's not just the intelligence. you also have to look at the entire situation in the country. it's analysis and intelligence. >> i would agree with that as well. there were some 20 incidents referred to in and around from march 2012 up until the death of the four americans where there was an incredibly deteriorating situation in and around benghazi. would you agree with that as well? >> the situation was deteriorating. >> and in fact, number 21 said careful attention should be paid to that kind of thing. and your only response to that particular finding was the department has addressed this recommendation. can yo u the u tell me what tha? what it is you've done to address that recommendation? >> i can discuss part of it in open session, sir. literally we start every morning at 8:00 a.m., looking at every bit of threat intelligence and threats that come in from a wide variety of sources, not just the intelligence community, be u from our posts in the reporting. beyond that, we bring in personnel from the regional bureaus, the political officers and others that are with us that we're not just just looking at the threat intelligence. as you pointed out and we well know, in many cases we don't pick up the threat. >> is this different from pre-benghazi to post-benghazi. >> this is different, sir. we are incorporating the regional bureaus with us. we are looking at the political reporting in addition to the intelligence reporting. we are looking at the sources that we get from private companies, from ngos in the area, the entire question of instability. what is the overall threat profile, and, i would say that a much better job of looking at the entirety of the threat situation as opposed to just whether or not we know -- whether there's a specific threat against us. >> and after all the the incidents in the previous years that were accounted so elegantly this morning. you weren't doing that before the incidents of september 11th, 2012 or before the arb's findings. is that right? the state department wasn't do that, is that what i understand from your testimony? >> i think we're doing it better than we were before. >> and can you tell me if any of the changes would have made an impact on the lives of those four americans in benghazi? had we been doing those before that date? >> hard for me to say, sir. i was at the united nations at that time. i can tell you that at the u.n. when i was the undersecretary general, we were aware of the deteriorating security situation in benghazi. on the date of the attack, september 11th, 2012, i still had u.s. personnel in benghazi as well. >> let me change topics a little bit. one of the findings of the best practices panel that now dates over a year ago was the state department had not interviewed the ds agents who survived the attack at benghazi special mission, as of that date. is that still the case? >> the agents were interviewed by the fbi. the agents were interviewed by diplomatic security. >> so the state department now -- was the the panel incorrect, or did you conduct the interviews after the panel's report, the independent panel's report? >> they were done prior to the best practices panel. we had discussed tactics tw the agents, but we had not fully debriefed them on the incident because we had the fbi 302s. >> it would be pont to know what the folks on the ground saw, right? it would be very important to know what those people saw. >> yes, sir. >> the same for the folks there that night. but there previously as the department of state interviewed all of those persons at this point? >> i hesitate to say all. we have interviewed a number of them. >> were they conducted vinlly or in groups? when the interviews were conducted by the department of state, were they conducted individually, or were they group interviews? >> individually. >> i ask that question because you know the arb conducted group interviews. i've seen that dynamic. i was in business 16 years before this when the boss is sitting around, the underling isn't quite as candid as they would be. if you look at the findings and evaluate they're sufficient for you to do what you need to do, that's important to know the the basis for what the arb did as well sochlt the interviews were conducted by the department of state individually? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. mr. kyle, mr. cummings' reference to state department general's inspector report, it indicated at least two secretaries of state have asked the question about whether the arb was a sufficient process. that is is it capable of handling investigations of the complexity that we see here. do you think that the arb itself is sufficient to make the transition from facts known about incident to conducting good security policy moving forward? >> i think there are limitations. they have significant limitations in what they can and can't do. it clearlymd impacts their effectiveness. >> and back to you. finding 23 goes to some of those limitations. it goes to the authority to recommend disciplinary action on the basis of unsatisfactory resources. are you prepared to testify today you'll help us continue to make sure that the arb does, in make surhe ability to make , in sure that the leaders of organizations are held accountable for any errors that they may have made. >> yes, sir. and it's my understanding that we have been looking at this and working with congress since december of -- sorry. january of 2013 on this. may i also just say that one of the points that i think is important to make is while the arb in several cases may not have the expertise to look at everything, the fact that the arb recommended that we consider putting together a best practices panel that could then delve further into the specifics, i think proves that the arb can make recommendations that can go beyond what they can do and look even further. i think that's a very good example of the fact that while the arb might not have the exact expertise that you're talking about, recommendations can be made to bring in other experts to do these things. >> i appreciate that. so you think it's important that the arb have the capacity -- at least recommend some type of disciplinary action against senior leaders. >> the arb already has the ability to recommend disciplinary action if they find a breach of duty. think think we're looking at whether they find a lack of leadership. i would support that as well. >> that's exactly what i was asking. mr. starr, i know you weren't on that. none of you were. i want to make sure we understand precisely what is there. abdullah? >> we are aware of the debriefings. we're looking at some of the debriefing material that is relative to us. and we are taking proper steps based on what we find. great, thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you very much. mr. star, i want to pick up where miss brooks left off. how is the department tracking compliance with the benghazi arb recommendations? can you tell me briefly? >> it's correct that the npri office is the one actually doing the tracking as we go through these. but i can tell you that i've had many meetings with the deputy secretary, myself, anyone that has anything to do with a response of a particular arb answer or best practices panel answer or the management panel answer where we have sat with a deputy secretary and literally gone through every single one of the recommendations. where are we? how have we answered it? what is the response? how far along in implementation are we? we have these meetings about every other month. she's out at the the moment. but literally she has been on top of this and tracking it since the beginning. >> and so, you said that there were seven arb recommendations that have not been completed. is that right? is that what you're saying? >> we are still in progress or nearing completion on seven of them. but they're not totally fulfilled. >> and do you have a time line on those? >> some of those, sir, are what i would refer to as evergreen recommendations. and i'll give you an example. one of the recommendations was for better language if r the security agents. since that time, we worked with fsi and specifically put together some courses in arabic and french. we call them alert courses. they're much shorter. they're specific to training d.s. agents and the types of language capabilities that they need in a short period of time. we have the courses in place. but the reality is it's going to take me a long time, you know, as agents get ready to rotate overseas and put them into the training and then get them trained. so that's the type of recommendation that's going to be actually open for a long too many. >> so but all of mine aren't like that, are they? some of them will be closed in 2015. >> let me show you where i'm going with this. they will come in, say they're going to do things. and then they wait. there's no checking up on this em. a new congress comes in and the next thing you know it hasn't been done. we want to be effective and efficient. this is a moment we have to take advantage of. so can you of those seven, the things that you know can be done in a definite amount of time, can you give us a timetable on those so that we can at least while we are a committee can hold the department accountable. is that a reasonable request? >> i think it's a reasonable request. we can supply you with the information where we are on those recommendations in panel. i would say, sir, that there is no doubt in my mind that we are going to implement every one of these recommendations. # i think one of your questions is whether or not we have been implementing arb recommendations. one of the exercises we went through last year was to review every single arb recommendation that has been made sinceggx 198. the office of npri. that aus that is tracking these. we sat down with them and went through every recommendation in the past to make sure we were doing our best to fulfill those and that office is going to track these in the future as well. i think -- i can understand some hesitancy about if we drag these out they're not going to get done. >> i can assure you, sir, while i am there, while secretary kerry is there, we are going to make sure every single one of these recommendations is fulfilled. >> as i get older, i realize that we're not going to be here for so long. we are in the places that we're in for a season. and it may come to an end in any and all kinds of ways. that's why i want you to, as i said in the opening under my watch. i want some definite timetables. so that we can hold somebody accountable. other than that, he said it best. we'll be going through this over and over and over again. can you understand what i'm saying? but you just gave me more information that i would like to add onto your list. if there are crucial things that we've been looking at, recommendations from 1988 that you are working on, would you add those -- the significant ones, going back to miss brooks now, that you haven't been able to complete that you're working on so we can have a timetable in that? i think the most important thing that we can do coming out of this, and i promise the father of tyron wood, and i looked him in the eye and he asked us one question. every family said the same thing. make it safer for somebody in the future. so are you with me? i just want to make sure you're with me. >> yes, sir, i am. >> all right. so will you come back to us, how much time you need? give us what i just asked for. >> let me take this back to the department. let me work through this. i will try to get you these answers as fast as possible. >> 45 days? >> absolutely. >> very well. mr. chairman, we can talk about this. it may be appropriate later on for us to have a hearing just on the progress that has been made. and i would -- i know that's the chairman's decision. but i think we need to mike sure that we stay on top of this. the independent arb found that the trip wise, security incidents that are supposed to trigger reviews and responses were, and i quote, too often treated as indicators of threat rather than essential trigger mechanisms for serious risk management decisions and actions. the senate select committee on intelligence came to a similar conclusion in the bipartisan report. it said, and i quote, there were trip wires designed to prompt a reduction in personnel or the suspension of operations at the mission in benghazi. and although there is evidence that some of them have been -- operations continue with minimal change. as a result the arb recommended that the state department revised the guidance to post and require key offices to perform in depth trip wires. is that right? >> yes, sir. >> and in response to this recommendation, the state department set up a committee in washington. as i understand it, the purpose of this is to review trip wires when they were triggered to help ensure that relevant and regional bureaus respond quickly to deteriorating environments. miss star, who is on that community? >> regional bureaus. representatives from regional bureaus. thest chaired out of the crisis management group. i think the biggest single change, sir is that in past years the trip wires were usually something that the post itself would look at. it's part of their emergency action plan. if they crossed a trip wire, they would determine what action needed to be made and report to us what decisions they were going to have. at this point the major change is any time a post crosses a trip wire it has to be reported to washington. at that point cms gathers a group that reviews what trip wire was cost. they look at the implications and we make decisions based on what should happen in. now in many cases the post may have always made the recommendation. but this is a much greater degree of oversight and much greater emphasis on action if a trip wire is crossed. >> can you give us an example of what happened with regard to that? >> i would say that trip wires are not just security concerns, but i'll try to concentrate on security concerns. the activities the kiev and ukraine recently. at the beginning of those activities. when it was clearly unsure what was happening and we had civil disorder in the city, the post reported quite a few trip wires were crossed for inspablt and security. decisions were made at that point. we made the decision to move them out of kiev. we moved them out until the situation had ceased and rectified itself. we looked at reverse trip wires. was the situation really changed and what had changed? then we made the dogs to return the families after the situation ended in the middle of town was resolved. >> i look forward to sreceiving the information that we requested. >> thank you, mr. starr? the arb found that systematic failure in the security of posture in benghazi. and it was inadequate for the special mission compound and just a little side note here. three days after the attack we had been calling the embassy. we were told it was a temporary mission facility. and now it's being called a special mission compound. was there any reason for the terminology continuing to evolve into something? >> i think, sir, as it was neither an embassy or consulate or agency, there was just some -- >> do you call it a temporary mission facilfacility? >> i think that's probably the right definition. >> all right. so, all right. anyway. they had hired the blue mountain, i believe. is that correct? to do the screening of any visitors in the protection? >> my understanding from the arb and oh reports is it was a contract with a blue mountain security company for libyan individuals and agreements with, i think it was the 17th militia. >> it was the host country security? was the 17th brigade. >> well in the absence of a practical and real host country security, i think that was the be they could do. >> but the blue mountain was unarmed. is that correct? >> correct. >> who is responsible for vetting these contractors, like blue mountain, who will be used at some of these facilities? >> in terms of vetting and in terms of contract performance and those types of things? >> yeah. >> normally, sir, it's -- we have an open competition process. it's open competition. and whoever can bid on it and meet the requirements does it. i think in contingency like situations like we were finding in benghazi that probably very little competition. >> so are -- was the lowest price? >> tags right. are you aware the two contracts were counciled and that the rso at the facile -- at the temporary mission facility had recommended they not be used? >> i read reports of that, sir. >> okay. you were once an rso, correct? >> yes, sir. >> in your distinguished career, do you ever remember recommending that a service not be used? that you were familiar with anywhere, and then them being hired over your protest or your recommendation? >> not in my expeeps, sir. >> okay. >> but you would have at some point recommended somebody or maybe not recommended anybody. was it your job to look at the performance of these people? >> if we fine that our contractor is not performing we have a variety of ways. we can qynéér> all right. you had mentioned february 17th the martyr's brigade, i believe is what it was called. we were told that was basically the host company security. is that true or not? >> i would hesitate to call that host country. i think at best it probably had control in the area of the city. this is based on what i read. >> is there an individual at the post that would be responsible for ensuring that the 17th brigade was responsible and dependable? >> sir, i wasn't there at the time. as a former rso i can probably tell you there were likely limited choices and one of the things that an rso would do at that point if faced with limited choices is try to train them the best he could. >> he would have to train the february brigade? >> if he found they were not up to the levels that he wanted, he would engage and assist in the training in making sure they understood the guard orders and making sure they had the capabilities necessary. >> and they were hired in case there was an attack inside the compound to respond, who would have had the contact information, and who would have been responsible on the post for contacting this protected brigade of martyrs? >> there were, as i read the reports, sir, again, i was not here at the time. there were personnel on the compound. they had telephone conversations with their own groups. >> with their own groups? >> with other personnel in the groups? and there was a communication in the operation center making phone calls. and there were phone calls being made from the anex. >> okay. let's go the trip wires that mr. cummings was talking about. the foreign affairs handbook describes it as events that activate, initiate or set in most post plans to prevent harm to the post. the u.s. citizen community or other u.s. national interest. the handbook also notes when a trip wire then occurs, it requires that an action be taken. are you familiar with that? >> yes, sir. it's my understanding that the trip wires are preplanneded, preapproved measures that should be taken in light of a security related incident or threat. is that true? >> that is true, sir. >> as the state department emphasized the purpose of having trip wires? >> has the state department? >> having trip wires? >> yes. when a trip wire is breached, that breech is enough to take action? is it not? >> at a minimum, it's a warning that the post must review what has occurred and then determine whether action needs to be taken. at a minimum. >> take action rather than just requi requiring they sit around and reevaluate the situation? >> well, sir, trip wires are written in advance of activities. we try to cover a wide variety of situations that could occur. predicting the future and exactly what your actions are going to be is very difficult. i think the purpose of trip wires is to indicate that wait, something has just happened. this could be significant. we need to consider whether or not we need to take action in this case. >> okay. it was normally a post activity. now once wire is tripped it is watched. >> would you consider a hole being blown in the perimeter wall of the temporary committee, would you say that? >> i would say that's a good indicator. >> and that event would have probably -- should have caused some action or discussion, correct? >> yes. >> would an attack on another diplomat coming into benghazi that caused the country to pull o out. >> i'm assuming you're referring to the attack on the british ambassador. >> i am. >> i certainly thing think it's indication of instability. >> so those are two trip wires that you would consider insignificant, would you not? >> yes, sir. >> and what was done with the security after those two trip wires were tripped? >> sir, as i said, i was not here at that time. >> well, you've read reports. >> i'm aware that the rsos were increasing physical security. they were engaged with training in the facility. they had run drills with the annex. i think from what i read they were doing the types of things an rso would do when he sees the situation beginning to deteriorate. >> well, thank you for your testimony. thank you all for being here. and let's hope we can get some results out of this tragic event. >> the chairman now recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. shift. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank you for conducting the hearing today and for the way you have worked with us to bring together wnszs and follow up on arb recommendations. i greatly appreciate it. i want to ask you gentlemen something in a bit of a different direction than the question you've had so far. i think serve on the appropriations sub committee. and i have the opportunity to meet with a lot of foreign service officers, both here and washington and around the world. many have described to me what they consider the benghazi effect. on their jobs. and by that, they refer to such a heightened concern about security that many of them feel they cannot fulfill their mission anymore. that they are confined to pa bunker or not allowed to undertake things they think are necessary to job responsibilities, and i think this sentiment was best expressed in june by vice president of the american foreign services association who wrote, does our collective response to benghazi threaten to make the foreign service less knowledgeable about the world and less influential with a host country and the u.s. government itself? that's a question that ambassador stevens might have asked. and i wonder if you can share your thoughts on it, as we implement the recommendations of the arb and of your panel. how do we make sure we're not preventing people from doing their job? we all acknowledge this is a dangerous thing. as many i colleague pointed out, our facilities have been attacked literally hundredses of times over the last couple of decades. it's happened in the past. it's going to happen again. we want to protect our people as best we can. but we want them to be effective. that's why they're there. if you could each share briefly your thoughts on are we striking the right balance, or has the benghazi effect meant we are undermining the able of our people to do their work? >> congressman, you are going to the heart of the question of risk management and how do we implement risk management? over many years we've made great strides in building safer and secured facilities so that an attack on a facility that could hurt everybody in one attack, we've done great things in terms of protecting that. and i think if you look at the number of attacks against our facilities and how few have been successful, most have been driven off with casualties by our security personnel or others only. we made great strides in. we can't lock people inside embassies. the whole point of diplomacy is to get out. and in many cases it will be the most restrictive for the foreign service personnel. but we have to get them outside of the wall as well. and that means protective security details and armored vehicles and working the host country security services. every single day we run motorcades outside of our embassy in kabul or iraq or tripoli, we were taking risks. but every single day we were judging what that risk was versus the need to get out and making sure that we could balance those risks and we were not getting our people out for not very good reasons. they had to be very important reasons. in lower threat level posts we're operating almost normally around the world. we have physical security around the post, but our people get out every single day. that's the work of diplomacy. talking to people, understanding the country, representing the united states, and bringing information back, and you don't do that without talking to people. so i think all the efforts we've made in terms of recognizing what are the highest threat, highest risk posts, doing risk management and making sure we're getting the people out when we can, but understanding if too many people get injured or it's too dangerous, we can't operate. and if we're not taking the threat seriously enough, we won't be there either if we get too many people killed or injured or the threat is too high, those are the types of things we need to weigh every single day. and we do. i can understand the] of foreign service officers. no, sir, they cannot live out in the open economy. they cannot just go to a coffee shop. but we are still getting them to the meetings they need to get to. >> i don't think that's the issue for them. as much as they would like to be accompanied by spouses and go to a local coffee shop, what they've expressed to me is not that which they understand, but they can't undertake the meetings they want and the places they need to go to have the meetings and the contacts they need to gather information for the government, to convey the u.s. position to people, they condition do their job because they're confined by a hyper conservative point of view perspective back in washington. and you get that feedback, and are there any situations where you feel the pressure has been such top be so risk avoidant that we're not allowing people to do the job. >> i think in the immediate aftermath after benghazi. i think there's a deep appreciation of that attack. an the pendulum may have swung the other way for a while. i think today with the systems we have put in place. with the risk management we're doing every day. the additional resources that you're giving us, i would not agree with that same, sir. i think we need to take precautions, and we do. i talked with ambassador deb jones when we were in tripoli. i talked with the ambassador about whether or not we're getting out enough and doing the things we're doing and they say yes, we are. and let me ask you another question because i have limited time. one of the problems with benghazi is the overreliance on the loyalty of the local militias to provide security. are there any places around the world today where you feel were continuing to place an overreliance on local militias for security of our facilities? >> that was something we talked a lot about. when you go into a situation like that, and no matter where you go in the world you're going to have to come up with that evaluation. if you don't have that capability, no amount of money you're going to pay in the contract is going to rock that. it goes back to risk management. if you don't have the capabilities locally, you have to go and bring them in yourself. i can't speak to who has them and who doesn't. but i really think when you look at the reaction of that guard force, leading up to that, those trip wires that were spotted there, i mean, that was a real concern. and again, i just go back to there might have been the will, but there was just not the capability. >> on either question? >> i think first of all, sir, one of our recommendations, i'll start with as mr. sullivan pointed out in his opening statement, when we first started with our panel we thought we would look at these tactical issuesover building bunkers and higher walls. we quickly realized that wasn't the answer because that doesn't facilitate diplomacy and we moved to thexpda=ímqiq% and looked at the department and overseas post and risk management. we asked ambassadors, deputy chiefs and foreign services officers as we traveled overseas, tell us about the state department's risk management process. without exception, each one said there is none. and they make it up. and sadly to this day, while they may be making(syprogress, that is still a significant concern. risk management process, as you indicated, sir. the foreign service is a dangerous business. we have to be out there. we have to do these things that are national security priorities. but we have to do it under a risk management process that's effective and sustainable andzú transparent. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >>en thank you, the chair will now recognize the gentleman in ohio. >> mr. kyle, how many years experience do you have in the security field? >> approximately 30, sir. >> and how many years did you serve the state department in the the area sf. >> almost 23. >> did you get good evaluations in high reviews, strong reviews? >> yes, sir. >> so good that you were put on the security detail to protect the secretary of state. is that accurate? >> yes, sir. sectarian warren christopher and madeline albright. >> and the most recent service in the public sector was assistant secretary of homeland security. is that right? >> yes, sir. >> and that's from the obama administration? >> yes, sir. >> you trust the agents in the field, mr. kyle? >> i trust them. they know the ground truth. they know what's going on. they're the guys on the ground putting their lives on the line just like you did. when they make a recommendation to the state department, you take that seriously? >> yes, i would. >> are you aware the guys on the ground in benghazi repeatedly asked for additional security and were repeatedly denied? >> yes, sir. from what we saw. they said this thing is out of control. we need more good guys here. and it was worse than that, wasn't it, mr. kyle? >> probably, yes, sir. >> because they said not only we need more. but what they had was reduced. is that accurate? >> yes. we heard testimony he was on the ground in benghazi. he said we couldn't keep what we had. we're the united states of america. we have facilities all over the globe. my guess is the security people will say we can use a few more folks. but wasn't the situation in libya and benghazi unique? >> when you look at the intelligence and the numerous incidents, yeah, i would prioritize benghazi. >> we had assassination attacks on the british ambassador. this is as bad as it gets. the state department says you're not going to get that. if you were an agent on the ground, would you be boblying for more help? >> i would be extremely frustrated and try to push every button i could possibly push. >> you get the request from these guys on the grounds for more help. would you have fought to make that request happen? >> my last position, i was a regional director for the bureau vetting those requests from the field. i would have put a significant amount of priority on benghazi. >> so you had that job? >> yes. >> before benghazi you had the job? >> yes. >> and you would have went to bat for them? >> i would have. >> what's the overseas security policy board? >> it's an inner agency board that is a genesis from the beirut embassy bombings. the kbhigs that maded the security services. the standards. it's an inner agency board that creates physical security, technical security. procedural security. >> so these were standards developed interagency. so state department standards, is that correct? >> state department leads. >> and the resulted from the embassy bombing in beirut where 64 people were killed. 17 americans. >> yes, sir. >> and were the standards followed at if benghazi facility? in talking with people and based on my experience, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the standards. >> so the standards weren't followeded? >> no. >> so my understanding is there's a waiver process you have to follow if you're going to deviate. was that followed? >> that was one of our recommendations, sir, and when you're not following the standards, you don't have to following the waiver process. >> so they didn't follow standards or the waiver? >> correct. >> what's your overaum impression of the arb report? >> mr. sullivan and i testified before the house and oversight government reform committee. the ambassador referred to the arb as being fiercely independent. in the same hearing, admiral u mullen admitted to oversight and government reform that he was reporting on arb proceedings through the senior staff of the safety department outside of the requirements of being a member of the arb, i don't think that fits anyone's definition of being fiercely independent. >> you don't think it was independent at all? frankly, i share your belief. when secretary clinton gets to a point, when sheryl mils calls them up and asks them to serve. when neither are interviewed. when they get a draft report before it goes public, in essence they get to edit it before the rest of the world sees it. when admiral mullen told the committee, told the committee, now think about this. he's been on the job a few days as the cochair of the supposedly independent arb. be on the job a few days. he discovers that she's going to two days later come in front of the oversight committee. he realizes she's not going to be a good witness. what does he do? just what you referenced, mr. kyle. he gets on the phone and calls the chief of staff to the secretary of state and says charlene lamb is not going to be a good witness. she's not going to reflect well on the state department. he gives a heads up to the very person he's supposed to investigate. of course this wasn't independent. we asked mr. mullen, why do you care if she's a good or bad witness? your job is to get to the truth of the american people. not to get to the heads of the >> it's recommendation number one. most of the others hinge on the implementation of that recommendation. >> yes, sir. it's designed to give accountability to one particular person at the state department, is that correct? >> to identify those who are -- >> yeah, something miss brooks talked about in her opening questions. >> yes, sir. >> designed to give accountability and responsibility to someone at the state department. and is this the first time this recommendation has been put forward, mr. kyle? >> no, sir, our panel was a bit surprised to uncover a memo from now 15 years ago that secretary of state madeline albright signed ordering the creation of an underdsecretary deputy of security. >> that wasn't followed. we have a recommendation from madeline albright, the lady you protected,that say wes need to create an undersecretary after americans were kill nld the east african embassy bombings. >> yes, sir. >> and that wasn't followed. has the state department said they're going to implement this at all? >> they said it's one of the recommendations they're not going to implement. >> they're not going to implement. my question is simple, mr. chairman. what is it going to take? what is it going to take for the state department to put in place the practices to save american lives? they didn't listen to the guys on the ground. the pros that know what they're doing. they didn't listen to the guys on the ground that put their lives on the line. they didn't follow their own standards that were developed in 1983 after the bay rue embassy bombing. they didn't follow the waiver process to deviate from the standards and now they're not following the panel ee's numbere recommendation. what's it going to take? the ranking member in the opening remarks said this is a transformational moment. somebody better tell the state department that. think of this track record. i hope it's right. i hope they get it. if they're not going to listen to two guys with the experience that mr. kyle and mr. sullivan have and say the one mange thing we need is person of accountability. the one ming thing that everything else hinges on. talk about the arrogance of the state department. hopefully one of the things this committee can do is convince them to follow these guys. at least convince them of that. thank you for your service. amazing work for your country. we appreciate your work as well. 42 seconds, i would yield. >> wli don't you answer the question of the state department? >> you can is ask him that question. the way this works -- >> reclaiming my time. that's -- you're welcome to do it, mr. chairman. i think you spent a lot of time on mr. starr. i chose to focus on mr. kyle who has 30 years of experience, appointed by the obama administration, 23 years in the state department, viewed so highly he was actually on the protective detail for secretary of state to warren christopher, secretary of state madeline albright. i chose to use my ten minutes on mr. kyle. minority can use their ten minutes on whatever witness they called. this is a hearing they called. >> thank the chairman from ohio. now recognize the gentle lady from california, miss sanchez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you to all the witnesses for joining us for what i hope will be a productive and forward looking hearing on what can be done and what is being currently done and what we have yet to do in terms of trying to prevent a tragedy from benghazi from happening again or at the very least minimizing the potential for something like that to happen again. i am going to begin my questions on the same realm of where the questioning left off. talking about the security accountability framework within the department of state. the best practices panel, led by mr. sullivan, determined, quote, clearly defined accountability and security at every level is fundamental for effective security management within an organization. and the panel recommended the development of an accountability framework. is that correct, mr. sullivan? >> yes, ma'am. >> in response to that recommendation the department created a security accountability framework that the department explained clearly defines key actors, their roles and responsibilities, and governing you. can you please describe the responsibilities at each of the various leadership levels? >> i think the first leadership level starts with the secretary of state. the secretary acknowledges that he is ultimately responsible for the security of our personnel overseas. beneath that in the accountability framework, the next person that has the direct responsibility for security is me. assistant secretary for diplomatic security. and i would have to say that we looked long and hard at the recommendation of whether it needed to an under-secretary position or assistant secretary position. it was a rental by the panel. the department looked at this very seriously. ultimately, weighed all the points behind it and made a decision what was probably more important is whether or not i, in my position, had the direct access to the secretary that was necessary. and under accountability framework and f.a.m., i'm directly responsible to security threat information and security threats against our people. i still do report to under-secretary for management. we think that's key because isolated and alone diplomatic security would not have some of the capabilities we have with buildings operations, imn and others. i want to put that back on the record. one of the things the accountability framework talks about is that all of us in department of state are responsible for security. specifically designs the roles of the department secretaries and what they do. it defines roles the under-secretary for political affairs and under-secretary for management has. the most important thing it does is define roles for other assistant secretaries, the people i work side by side with every single day, who run the regional bureaus, the wha, era bureau. and it assigns security responsibilities to them. in fact, their job descriptions have been changed to reflect the security responsibilities. >> let me -- let me -- >> all of this is contained in the accountability framework. one final thing, which i think is critical, we can't do the security we need to do unless every individual foreign service officer understands that they have a role in their own security as well. and it goes to defining that. >> so, those expectations have been communicated, then, on down the security framework, is that correct? >> yes. >> and state department employees have a clear understanding of what the chain of command, so to speak, is for security decisions and security decision making? >> overseas it was always clear. it ran from rso and chief of mission. it was always clear overseas. it was a little less clear within the department who had the responsibilities. this document goes a long way, taking information that was already in the f.a.m. and putting it together into a clearer framework, yes. >> if i can go back for just a second to the number one recommendation about creating a different position that would be in charge of security explain some of the thought-making process that went into the ultimate decision not to accept that recommendation and essentially make you responsible for security. >> well, first and foremost, i think it has to be acknowledged that i am responsible, whether i'm the assistant secretary or whether it be changed to deputy -- i'm sorry, an under-secretary position. the department looked at this and and had to weigh different things. under-secretary has different responsibilities rather than one focus on things. if you look at other under-secretaries and the range of things they do, it's -- one of the things the department made sure of is this position, my position, a, we are access to secretary and other leadership. second, that i wasn't being diverted from the just pure security role by other duties. under-secretary position would carry other duties. my predecessor was the assistant secretary for diplomatic security and the chief of overseas foreign missions. the office of overseas foreign missions. one of the things we did in the aftermath of benghazi was to separate those two functions. now there's an ambassador in charge of overseas missions. i'm not distracted by that role. i focus exclusively on security. >> i have two other questions i would like to ask. mr. sullivan, do you think the new framework that the department of state has clearly defines accountability and responsibility for security? >> congresswoman, we haven't been fully briefed on that. what i heard just now, i think that's a great start, but clearly there has to be accountability. people have to know who's in charge of security. also the point that was made earlier, how all the employees feel around the world. i think that that leadership is important to let them know they're valued, that they're supported and that those people making decisions are going to be made accountable -- every employee will be made accountable for those decisions they're making. >> thank you. i want to hit on the issue very quickly. i have very limited time about temporary staffing. several investigations into the attacks in benghazi found the temporary staffing of security officers was what contributed to poor security at the benghazi facility. the bipartisan senate homeland and governmental reform committee found, for example, dsa agents were remaining for relatively short periods, often no longer than a month. the independent accountability review board concluded that the utilization of temporarily assigned agents in benghazi was problematic. i'm quoting from their findings. the short-term transitory nature of benghazi staffing to be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in benghazi. staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering the post security posture, considering the high risk, high threat environment. the end result was a lack of institutional knowledge and mission capacity which could not >> it is critical. your first 30 days on the ground, you are just trying to figure out where you are, how things are operating, where the threats are. we absolutely concur with that recommendation of taking steps to ensure that the personnel we put on the ground are there for longer periods of time. >> and has the department been able to achieve those requirements in its practice? >> yes, it has. the fact is we don't actually have any temporary facilities at the moment. i request give you an example, though, when we just entered bengi, we have mobile security agents on the ground with u.s. marines that are there. those agents are going to stay for a much longer period of time. probably up to 90 days until we're sure we have the proper security that we can then start replacing them with permanent personnel we're going to have on the ground. the 30-day rotations as the arb pointed out were not conducive to the security operation. >> are there any other incentives that the department can provide or think to provide for personnel to undertake those longer assignments? >> i don't think it's a question of necessary or additional incentives. i think it's a question we needed to understand that constantly rotating like that was not in our best interest. i think my agents clearly understand that. and i think it really isn't about additional incentives. it's about knowing that's not the proper procedure and we needed to change it. >> built a great practice. thank you for your forthright answers and i yield back to the chairman. >> the chair would recognize the gentle lady from the state of california, mrs. robey. >> thank you, mr. chairman. returning to the questioning of mr. jordan about the waiver process briefly. mr. starr, oversea security policy sets the physical security standards that must be met. it's also my understanding that they're either temporary, interim or permanent, correct? >> yes. >> and overseas diplomatic facilities can be further classified as residential office or other categories as well? >> yes. >> okay. >> and how was benghazi classified in 2012? my understanding from the reports is that it was the temporary mission facility. >> and was that classification found in the ospb's standards? >> no. >> are there any ospb standards for a temporary office facility? there's not, right? >> our outlook on that is whether it's temporary or interim or permanent, that we should be applying the same security standards that the ospb has put in place. and that if we can't, then we need to look closely at what risks we run -- >> so that -- sorry to interrupt you. the office in the residential don't require a higher level of security if they're in that category? >> there are higher levels -- when we build offices, when we build facilities, they have higher level. >> the benghazi facility was used at both, correct? >> yeah, i'd say that's an accurate portrayal. >> in the dual case where it's being used as a residential and an office, what standards apply? the higher standards, correct? >> correct. and so those ospb standards should have applied to the benghazi facility? >> that is the way that i would apply them now. i wasn't here, but if we had a similar situation, we would be applying the higher standards. >> i just want to make sure this is very clear. your policy is that any time a facility is being used for any purpose, whatever type of facility has the higher -- the highest level of physical security standards, those standards should be applied? >> that is correct. >> but that didn't happen in benghazi? >> i would have to say i can't answer that question. >> looking ahead, when you talk about in this era of expa dishary diplomacy, is it possible for the facility to other a temporary facility? >> we don't have any at the moment. i can't imagine we would or that i would approve it. >>. >> okay. let's turn to marine security guard detachments. were marine security guard detachments ever deployed to the benghazi compound? >> no. >> the benghazi compound we already established by multiple questions here, it was a temporary facility. and marine security guard det h detachments are never deployed to temporary facilities, correct? >> not in my experience. >> the increase in marine security guard detachments as a result of the arb recommendation 11, therefore, would not have actually helped in benghazi, correct? >> i mean, if it's a temporary facility and they can't be deployed, then it can't help? >> i just want to make the point, i'm not saying that additional personnel on the ground would not have helped, but, yes, you're correct, we would not -- in my experience, we would not have put a marine security guard detachment into a temporary facility. >> we've also already established here today there's currently 30 posts that are considered high risk, high threat. how many have benefitted, of those 30, of the marine security guard personnel? >> i'd have to get back to you with the exact number. i think about 20. we have opened four marine detachments in benghazi at our high-risk posts. there are still some that don't have marine detachments. there's a variety of reasons why. >> is it your goal to get to marine security detachments at all the high risk, high threat posts? >> i would like to have marine security guard detachments at all of our high risk posts. some impediments cannot be overcome. >> at the ones that don't have the marine security detachment, how exactly does the -- without highly trained marine security guards? >> in some places we have made up by using diplomatic security agents. in some cases we have made risk managed decisions where we have taken personnel out and lowered our presence. some cases our families are not there. or we lowered the number of employees to minimum numbers. in many cases we make representation with the host governments and we analyze whether the host government has both the capability and the will to provide the necessary level of protections. and if we find that we don't have those types of protections or we think the risks are too high, then we won't be there. >> okay. if an ambassador at a high risk, high threat post picks up the phone and calls the seventh floor of the state department today, asking for additional security, physical or personnel, who ultimately makes the decision to grant or deny that request? mr. starr? >> the last person in the chain would be me. the request would probably not go to the seventh floor. it would probably go to me on the sixth floor or the rso to our personnel. i can tell you that today i have available mobile security teams to deploy. we work very closely -- >> ultimately i'm asking who makes that decision? >> it can be approved at lower levels. >> what's the lowest level it can be approved? >> i think the lowest level would be the regional director of the -- of diplomatic security. >> if an ambassador sends a cable, would it be the same, rather than picking up the phone, it would be the -- >> exactly the same. >> and would it -- would the decision-making process change if it were not a high risk, high threat post? >> no, it would not. >> okay. >> and was benghazi considered high risk, high threat or critical threat? >> pardon me. i actually don't know what the rating was of benghazi. we did not have the 30 identified high threat, high risk posts listed at that point. >> who denied the additional diplomatic security personnel requested in benghazi by those who were working and living there and in tripoli? who was the person that denied that? >> i have to refer you to the results of the arb. i came back five months after the attack. >> what i'm trying to get at, is that same person who was also responsible for ensuring the physical security in benghazi, is that the same person that's vested with that responsibility today? >> i think the board pointed out that there were lapses in judgment on the part of the director and several others, including the director for international programs. >> if a ds agent at the post writes back to headquarters requesting additional security upgrades or increased personnel performing security duties, who is responsible for making the decision to deny or grant that request from a ds agent? >> i think the first thing that would happen is the discussion would go on, is this an individual request from ds? has it been vetted through the emergency action committee at the post? is this a post request? >> okay. and is it affected by whether you categorized this as high risk, high threat? >> we pay more attention to our high risk, high threat bases on a daily basis, but i would tell you any additional request for additional security resources for any of our posts overseas is going to be met with immediate action. we would make decisions on how we can best fulfill those requirements. >> so, to get to the point, even if a post is not high-risk, high threat, we know in certain parts of the world things are very volatile and can unravel in a moment's time. despite threat assessment or not. what i'm getting at is, is the department now today, in light of what happened in benghazi, prepared to pay better attention when the folks on the ground are saying, we need help? which is not what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the attack in benghazi. >> my answer to you is unequivocally, yes. that's what i've been spending my time since february 1, 2013 on, making sure that we have the resources, the programs, the knowledge, the capabilities, to respond quickly and effectively to any cry for help. more ever not just respond to the cries for help, but to try to better place ourselves before those come in and make sure that we're ready for these things. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman woman from alabama. we recognize the gentle woman from alabama, mrs. duckworth. >> as member of the oversight and government reform committee and armed services committee, i've spent a great deal of time working on all of the -- working through the reports on the attacks in benghazi. and as the committee begins our work here today, i think the most appropriate way we can honor the brave americans who lost their lives in benghazi is to make sure we learn from those past mistakes and never make them again. i heard that from the family members again. let's never let their buddies down the way we let their family members down. and so i want to go back to t s this -- the discussion on the security and interagency cooperation. i was there the day admiral mullen testified. i have to disagree with you. you may question his professional integrity, but when admiral mullen, a man that served in vietnam, 43 years of military service, againing this great nation, comes before this committee and swears an oath of office and then testifies he was fiercely independent in the arb, i would tend to believe him inspect in fact, the arb was incredibly scathing of the state department in its report. and i want to go to that report. mr. starr, i want to follow up on what my gentle lady from alabama, her line of questioning about the marine security guard details. so, if you don't have -- if you have a post that does not have a detail because they're not at a temporary facility, for example, can you talk about other details that can be there? are there other military options that can be assigned to those temporary details? you talk about the mobile security teams, marine augmentation units. are there other options if there are -- if the marines can't actually be assigned there full time? >> yes, there are other options. we currently are trying to expand 35 more detachments. it should be noted that at the moment we have 270 -- more than 275 diplomatic facilities counting the embassies, consulates and consulate generals. we have only 173 marine security guard detachments. we have never had enough marines, nor we will to cover every single post. many of our posts around the world f we put a marine security ky2k1éñ have ent w more marines than foreign security officers. so we carefully look at where we need to use this scarce resource. we have had excellent cooperation from the marine corps in terms of augmenting different units and getting more detachments. as i say, we have opened 17 more detachments since benghazi on our way to opening 35 totally. we should be done by the end of next year. additionally marines have made marine augmentation units where we can send additional marines under the ruberick where we have different situations. but your question, what do we do where we don't have marines or don't have permission to send marines. we have different capabilities. we have diplomatic security agents that are high risk, high threat, highest trained, mobile security officers. we have the ability to request from the department of defense, and they have never let us down, for things like fast teams to come in and protect our embassies and consulates when we need that. >> we have a robust program where we have security contractors. many times they're americans, sometimes third country national contractors but we have used contractors for many years. there are some downsides to that and some countries won't allow them and we've learned some very painful lessons over the years about contractors, that we have to have incredible amounts of oversight and make sure we're using them properly. but it is still a tool. we have local guard forces and local elements we hire directly from the country we're in. and i would tell you some of these units in some places around the world have done amazing acts of heroism protecting our people. ultimately we have host country services which we evaluate whether they have the capability to protect us. additional funding congress has given us is the ability to start a program where we can train host country forces, whether it be police or national guard directly around the embassies and increase their capabilities. so, we have a number of different possibilities.)63j4pzi >>. >> you had said the state department. i have to say i was disappointed with the risk management process that was undertaken leading up to the benghazi attacks. assessment and mitigation process has become morrow bust. i want to speak specifically to enter agency cooperation, between d.o.d. and state. you said the d.o.d. has never let you down. on that night, the arb in various reports, including armed services committee has stated there was no way those f-16s, those u.s. military forces could have made it there in time to save our americans lives. what have we done to make sure in the future they can be present in time to save american lives? as these special dates come up, september 11th, these anniversaries or as you hear more chatter going on and you think there might be the potential for greater risk, what trip wires are in place? what processes are in place for you to call the d.o.d. and say, hey, maybe you need to help us and reposition some forces so that if we do have another benghazi, we can call -- and that those f-16s can be there in time in the future so we don't lose american lives? what process is happening between d.o.d. and the department of state at this point? >> the department of defense has put together a program they refer to as the new normal. we have looked closely at what capabilities d.o.d. can bring for defensive use of american embassies and consulates overseas. there has to be realization that we don't have bayh bases everywhere in the world. in many cases while we would like to say the department of defense could respond to any one of our embassies within four hours, physical distances, just the amount of distance between where our diplomatic stations are make it impossible. even if they could respond in a certain amount of time, this idea that we're magically going to get paratroopers out of the back of the plane and land on the embassy isn't realistic. we still have to go through airports, go through host countries to get personnel in, transport them from the airport to the embassy somehow. in the midst of a crisis, this isn't realistic about what's going to happen. what we've worked with d.o.d. on is making sure that we're better prepared to predict what's going to happen. looking at instability. as d.o.d. said, we would rather be on the ground in advance of something happening then trying to react after something happens. now, it doesn't mean in certain cases that they haven't been on a very close leash with us. i can give you the example of tripoli recently, where we had in many cases special forces and helicopters and marines on less than one hour notice to respond to the embassy. and a high, high threat, critical threat situations, those are the types of things we're working with d.o.d. on, to make sure they have very close at hand respond capabilities. i can tell you with 275 locations around the world, we can't do that ofsh. we can't do that every place. d.o.d. is seeking increased base options. i would highly recommend a discussion with d.o.d. on this about where they're going in terms of basing closer and more closely to u.s. embassies and facilities. they have excellent plans. working closely with the state department on this. ultimately, we've got to do a better job of making sure we have the right preparation on the ground in advance. in those situations that are absolutely critical, we'll have d.o.d. very close to us. they've worked tremendously with us in places like tripoli and sana and other places. i have to tell you i have the utmost respect for the way the department of defense, u.s. marine corps, army and air force -- and navy have responded to our needs. >> in the last minute i have left, can you talk about at what level at the state department does that request for d.o.d. have to take place? for example, in the case of tripoli recently where you said that they had them on a one-hour leash to respond. does that come from you or can it come from lower? if an ambassador determines that through his risk analysis assessment with his diplomatic security team that's there, that he needs this, how far does he have to go before you can have something like a fast team, that's ready to come in or something along those lines. how far up the state of bureaucracy does he have to go? >> the commander will call the nearest combatant command. they meet awe the time, talk with each other. in an emergency situation, he can pull the string immediately. in a less than emergency situation, in the way we're looking tat to pry to preposition ourselves, he would state something or make a request or we may make the request and say, we think you need this. we work through the office of executive secretaries. we send an exec sec back and forth. i can instigate it, assistant secretary of the regional bureau can instigate it. in the most extreme cases, the ambassador can go directly to the combatant commander closest to him and request support and then even notify us afterwards. >> thank you. yield back. >> . >> i would like to clarify two points miss duckworth said. you cannot discuss the proceedings outside of the arb. admiral mullen admitted he did that. it's fact. >> in law that's called exparte communications. >> sorry. i didn't go to law school. from our review under-secretary kennedy in authorizing that made up that term in order to avoid the ospb security standards. >> it's an interesting thing. yesterday in our office we did a ne nexus lexus search of special compound, not benghazi. there may be different ways to look, ways to look ought over the landscape. the result of looking for that term yielded nothing. throughout all those data files, all across the fruited plain, absolutely nothing. so what does it mean if simply is redefined? if they declare this as something other than that which is to be regulated. that means have you no regulations, right? >> correct, sir. >> mr. sullivan, you mentioned in your opening statement one of the regrets you have as a member of the panel that the department of state didn't adopt your recommendations as it relates to waivers. what is your recommendation as it relates to waivers? >> we think -- we believe waivers are needed. we want to see those waivers. because when you have a waiver, what that will do and set in motion standards and people recognize once have you those standards, have you to meet those standards. what we saw in this particular instance, since there was no standards, was no waiver, there were really no standards set, and i think somebody brought up the fact before that there were a lot of people coming in tdy, and some very dedicated people, some very hard working people, and some extremely well-intentioned people and dedicated people. however, these were people that were extremely inexperienced and they were coming in for 30-day periods. and they would come in for 30 days. they would identify vulnerabilities, take care of that vulnerability. the next person would come in and that process would continue. >> so, you're saying you need an orderly process by which things are waived, not declarations on the part of the department of state, that it's all waived, is that right? >> right. it goes back to what we talked about before, risk management. risk management is all about identifying the threat, identifying the vulnerability and then coming up with the mitigation for that threat. we did not see that formalized process ongoing. >> secretary starr, question, you said earlier in an answer to congressman smith, on benghazi they didn't get the threat information. now, i understand that threat information may be a term of art, but to mr. west moreland's testimony earlier, certainly a bomb blowing up on the side of a wall. the whole litany of events that took place beginning march 18, 2012 until the first time there was a communication from ambassador stevens, those -- isn't that enough information? you're not saying, nobody was aware of the nature of the threat. is the threat a term of art? >> congressman, thank you for the question. i think the distinction is -- that i was trying to make is that there was no specific threat information that had been developed by the intelligence community. >> in other words, these people are coming over the hill top at this moment in time? >>y correct. >> we don't normally get that. i think your point that there were a number of different thins going on. i think people were aware of the overall level of instability? >> here's my point. the senate intelligence committee report, they reported on june 6th of 2012 ambassador stevens recommended the creation of teams and so forth. the team was never created in benghazi despite the ambassador's recommendation. there were other events subsequent to that. then ambassador stevens reaches out again, sends a cable to the state department headquarters requesting a minimum of 13 temporary duty personnel and the state department never fulfilled his request and headquarters never responded to the request with a capable. then they follow up on august 16th of 2012, a month before these events 37 again, a cable to the state headquarters. stevens raised additional concerns, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. now, go to the arb. the arb says one thing two times about ambassador stevens. and it's worth noting. they said this about him. his status as the leading u.s. government advocate on libya policy and his expertise on benghazi in particular caused washington to give unusual deference to his judgments. they said that on page 6 of the report. they cut and pasted -- they liked it so much, they put it on page 34 of the report. and yet ignoring the ambassador, who by their own admission is the expert in the area, and ignoring his request for support, that's not giving unusual deference to his judgments, is it, mr. secretary? >> gill question, mr. congressman. >> no, it's very straightforward. >> no, i don't think it is. it's a difficult question. i think chris stevens was a tremendous ambassador with a tremendous -- >> look, there's no question that he was tremendous. there's no question that he was a hero. he made specific requests of the department. the department in the arb said this person is uniquely qualified, secretary, and he was ignored. >> and i think this is why the arb recommendations are what they are. >> well, this is why the arb recommendations and the panel say, you can't have this kind of waiver authority. when miss robey asked you the question, are there any plans for temporary facilities in the future, you were pretty clever in how you responded. you said, we don't have any plans for it, and i'm not likely -- i'm paraphrasing now -- i'm not likely to approve it. you know what that tells me? that tells me you can do it all again. that tells me you can take the special mission compound, you can call it something else, can facility. you can take two adjectives, put it in front of a noun and call it some other thing. and do it all again. so, here's the question. if madeleine albright signed off on certain recommendations, if the best practices panel makes certain recommendations, why is it that the state department is clinging to this legacy of power that has failed? why are you grasping on it so much? why not walk away from it? and nobody here is criticizing a very tough job. but the nature of the job, mr. secretary, means that this, to mr. cummins point, needs to be the transformational moment. why not be the transformational moment to say, we're not going to just choose to redefine things and we're going to visit how we do these waivers and we're going to do everything we can in cooperation with congress to honor chris stevens' legacy, to honor the legacy of those who suffered and you know, but why cling to this old thing that just isn't working? are you the only one that doesn't see it? >> congressman, i think i have a distinct view having served 29 years with the state department, four years with the united nations and i'm back again. i think that in accepting all of the recommendations of the accountability review board, i think in accepting 38 out of 40 recommendations made by the best practices panel, i think the department has made tremendous progress and efforts in the time that i have been back and -- >> but the opportunity -- you want to knock it out of the park right now. >> not every recommendation is gold. every recommendation needs to be looked at from the recommendation standpoint, but then from the organization as well. >> okay. take your argument, a couple of minutes ago you made this point as it relates to the responsibility of a foreign service officer. ha to be mindful of their own security. that was in response to miss sanchez. every foreign service officer must understand they have a role in their own security. i agree with that wholeheartedly. yet when ambassador stevens played a role in his own security on cable number one, cable number two, and cable number three, that responsibility was not absorbed or reflected in the state department. and you're not offering anything as it relates to fundamental change. based on what the rules are right now, mr. secretary, you have the authority,ç you have e capability and you've got the flexibility to do the benghazi structure again. am i wrong? >> the rules have been changed. who is responsible is clearly defined. >> who is responsible is fourth down on the food chain. by your own -- >> no, sir, i will disagree with that. i am responsible. >> yeah, but i'm telling you -- >> the latest example. when we're trying to open a facility, in southern turkey. we had a request to put personnel in on the ground for start operations, for humanitarian operations. they're in their tdy. we need a facility. we are in the process of leasing a facility. we know where it's going to be. a request came to me from the people on the ground saying, can we use it in advance of the security upgrades being done, being accomplished. my answer, no. >> okay. that's beautiful. and in light of mr. cummings' response, you're going to be there for a season. and in another season, someone is going to succeed you. and in that new season, when someone with your judgment and

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