argument, which i think the evidence supports that we should win, if we don t, then you have to look at whether or not this case should still move forward on a second-degree murder charge as to the issue of ill will and hatred. so let s talk for a moment about what ill will and hatred is and what it s not. in light versus state, a second dca case, there was a mosh pit case. mr. light didn t like the fact that the eventual victim fell back into him and hit him in a sensitive area of his body. so mr. light decided to pick him up in a wrestler move and smashing him to the ground, crushing the left side of his head, i think it was, on the cement. got up, made it outside, and died. the court ruled that that
emanuel burgess, who was this one-person crime spree through retreat view circle who got five years in prison for his bevy of burglaries in that area. you were the sentencing judge in that case when he came before you about a year and a half ago. so, yeah, an unfortunate circumstance. that doesn t allow the outrageously over response by mr. martin. sticking to the ill will and hatred argument, basically in the light case, it was just not ill will because the courts looked to two other cases for the instruction on ill will, spite, and hatred, that being williams versus state. mcdaniel versus state, a fourth dca case, to begin the analysis that even extremely reckless
behavior, though extremely reckless behavior to simply get upset at somebody, pick him up over your head, and smash him on to cement, is not ill will or hatred and would not sustain a second-degree murder conviction. because you can t infer any malice. i don t exactly know how you can infer malice from picking somebody up over their head and smacking them on cement. if we compare that law, which is now the law in florida, to this case, i would suggest that there is absolutely no evidence to support the contention that mr. zimmerman acted in ill will, spite, or hatred. if you can get past the exp expletives and the fact he seemed to be particularly interested in his community and that may have been why he focused on mr. martin as a suspicious person looking unfortunately similar to what we now know we have in evidence of
thompson 5527224. that s an aggravated battery case where he tried to stop a fight, was attacked. defendant backed up, brandished a gun. aggressor continued to approach. defendant shot him. and that was where the court reversed the conviction on that, suggesting that the judgment of acquittal should have been grant ed. the hernandez/ramos case, again cited in jenkins, gives some good insight into a similar fact scenario. in that case, evidence was there that the defendant took some effort to ward off the attack or end it without violence. the state s witnesses in that case uniformly identified the victim as the aggressor.
that s state versus ellison. 19. and i m sorry, your honor. that s sigler, 805 second 32. i mention those cases because they were the high-speed cases, factually different from this case but interesting because in both of those cases the defendant, one, had just escaped from prison. another had stolen a car, i believe, were high-speed chases, 80, 90 miles an hour, running through intersections, running over curbs, running through toll booths and just acting about as outrageously as you can act in a vehicle and in both of those cases the court said that even