the reason for this missed opportunity include a failure by the security service in my view to act swiftly enough. as that potential missed opportunity we prepare to be hearing a response from from mi5 a bit later and that missed opportunity again referenced by many of the families afterwards. sirjohn also highlighted that salman abedi's background was a significant contributing factor to his radicalisation. i have concluded that there were a number of contributing factors to salman abedi's radicalisation. his family background, and his parents' extremist views, along with their participation in the struggle in libya, played a significant part. that struggle involved people who were radical violent extremists. salman abedi and hashem abedi's time
must put in place. i hope they will read my report and consider whether anything more needs to be done. for reasons that i have already given, i have not commented on the effectiveness of prevent as a programme. it should be noted that the inquiry however, several police officers spoke highly of it as a programme and how successful it can be in some cases. william shawcross did speak of the radicalisation of salman abedi in his report. he did not have the benefit, as i did, of an intensive investigation into salman abedi's case i know that he have the benefit of hearing from witnesses in closed session in order to resolve contentious issues. insofar as william shawcross's short passage in his report, dealing with salman abedi does not agree entirely with the conclusions that i have reached. i would suggest that this
review and are as stringent as possible. and need to be reported promptly. much like the —— none of the purchase chemicals were reported to authorities which is a situation which reduction not —— should not have arisen. had they been reported, it might have been possible that salman abedi could have been stopped. i've considered the parts played by others in the obtaining of those precursor chemicals and other acts which assisted the brothers and their preparation. all of this was carefully investigated by the police as part of the operation on the evidence was reviewed by the crown prosecution service to consider whether prosecution could be brought. some of the people are still under police investigation but
abedi family with the mosque was unsatisfactory and it looks as if the didsbury mosque is trying to distance itself from the abedi family in a way which i did not accept was accurate. the reality in my view was that the didsbury mosque did have a significant number of attendees who were connected to libya but were attached to opposite sides in the conflict. didsbury mosque tried and largely succeeded in providing a broad church where both sides of the conflict could worship together. although conflicts were generally avoided, listed on occasion lead to tensions between the two sides. the evidence given on behalf of the didsbury mosque could have been more helpful in enabling me to get to the truth. the charity commission has already prescribed a programme that the didsbury mosque
rutherford, —— caroline curry. those were the parents of a young couple, liam curry and chloe rutherford, and they sat through the testimony of they sat through the testimony of the brother of salman abedi but that what they were not allowed to sit through a none of them were was the evidence from the security services which was heard here in secret, if you like. but they have drawn their conclusions from what has been said today by sirjohn saunders saying m15 today by sirjohn saunders saying mis did today by sirjohn saunders saying mi5 did have information that may have led to the attack being averted had they acted upon the information received, so of course there is anger and emotion from the family. you heard from the families of liam and chloe, a gentleman there representing 11 of the other families and then you
that could be reflected on and thought that salman abedi could have been stopped from carrying out this atrocity. i think what comes out from this afternoon is there was no golden nugget of information that somebody missed that was so obvious, which was inexcusable. that is not what sirjohn saunders has concluded in his report. what he has concluded as there were two pieces of information about salman abedi which, if they had been acted upon and looked at differently, and followed up more, may have led to the atrocity being avoided. should he have been apprehended, perhaps, as he came back in from libya because he had been on the mis watchlist before and then had been effectively relegated down the league table as they form a person subject of interest but he had been in libya in the days before the attack happened and he has come back into the country and what sirjohn
parliament will be vigilant in monitoring their implementation. we welcome the other conclusions and recommendations in this report. it is clear that salman abedi should have been referred to prevent. it is clear that the education system needs to be more vigilant in picking up needs to be more vigilant in picking up signs of radicalisation. it is clear that didsbury mask turned a blind eye to extremism in its midst. sirjohn's report today contains many lessons. we must heed every one of them and make the necessary changes urgently. on the 22nd and 20 17,000 of people left homes to attend a concert at manchester arena. 22 of those would never return home. those killed and injured in this murderous attack had every right to feel safe and protected but as this inquiry has demonstrated, they were failed at
evidence was important. his perspective of the behaviours exhibited was on occasions different from that of the security service and counterterrorism policing. i would hope that his evidence will be considered with care by the relative authorities to see what knowledge can be gained to assist in the correct identification of individuals who are at risk of being radicalised. i have concluded that there were a number of contributing factors to salman abedi's radicalisation. his family background and his parents' extremist views along with their participation in the struggle in libya paid a significant part. that struggle involved people who were radical violent extremists. during the time salman abedi and hashem abedi spent in libya, during which
just been published in the government has responded to it. because of that report, i did not carry out an assessment of the effectiveness of the prevent programme during my inquiry because it would have been beyond my terms of reference to do so. the shawcross report does deal with the issues of the abedis and confirms neither were looked at by prevent. i have looked at the various situations where salman abedi could have been referred to prevent and i have concluded he should have been. i heard evidence that his referral was considered at one stage but he was not considerable... considered suitable. there can be no guarantees that salman abedi or hashem abedi
of those abdal raouf abdallah with whom there were a number of messages sent between the two which was recovered as a counterterrorism policing investigation which resulted in the prosecution and conviction of the abdal raouf abdallah for terrorist offences. those messages talk of martyrdom. they were highly significant view of doctor wilkinson for demonstrating the influence over salman abedi and the influence over salman abedi and the development of his violent extremist mindset. salman abedi was not identified as one of the participants in this exchange of messages until after the attack and i have concluded on the balance of probabilities the messages were not passed to the security services by counterterrorism policing as they should have been. my investigation however have demonstrated that even if salman abedi had been identified