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is because of the much greater opportunity that i have had to listen to and test the evidence. planning and preparation. while this part of my report is largely a narrative of events, it is nevertheless important. it is important that what was done by salman abedi and hashem abedi in preparation for the attack is done so in detailand preparation for the attack is done so in detail and only by doing that is it possible to understand where the weaknesses are in the provisions that try to prevent people acquiring the necessary ingredients for a bomb and information about how to construct it. it is important that the opportunities for obtaining precursor chemicals are... without effect to members of the public conducting their life without undue difficulty. i'm very grateful to the
would have engaged in the programme because their elder brother refused to engage with counterterrorism policing officers when they went to speak with him in 2015. i have concluded that there was at least a period during salman abedi'sjourney to violent extremism when he should have been referred to the programme. it is very hard to say what then might have happened. i have looked at whether the various educational establishments and mosques that salman abedi attended should have appreciated that he was moving towards violent extremism and notify the relevant authorities. i consider that it would have been very difficult for any of the educational establishments to become aware of his developing extremism. 0ne establishments to become aware of his developing extremism. one of the problem is that i have identified is that while over the period of his education at different
radicalisation nor of their time in libya because other members of their family, namely their parents and brother, were not willing to give evidence to the inquiry. the parents are salman abedi and hashem abedi were invited to provide statements but declined to do so. as they are currently out of the jurisdiction, there were no further steps that i could take. ismail abedi who was in the united kingdom at the time was able to leave so he did not have to give a statement. i have some suggestions which i hope will make this more difficult for important witnesses in the future. whether if i had succeeded in getting ismail abedi into the witness box, he would have assisted the inquiry, is very
doubtful. what i was not prepared to doubtful. what i was not prepared to do in the circumstances of this case was to invite the attorney general to grant him immunity from prosecution in relation to any evidence he gave to me. in order to encourage him to speak. if he was involved in the plot, it would be quite wrong for him to have any protection from prosecution and punishment. there were other extremists, most of whom came from the same area of manchester as salman abedi and probably played a part in salman abedi's radicalisation and or confirming him in his views once he had committed to violent extremism. 0ne
and the messages had been sent to the security service, it would not have affected their view of salman abedi. i have not criticised that view taken by the security service but there is a learning point which could usefully be pursued which is that the attitude of the security service to those sort of messages might be informed by the considerations which doctor wilkinson applied. we know that salman abedi visited abdal raouf abdallah in prison and also that they communicated by phone, including an illegal phone which abdal raouf abdallah had in prison. it was apparent by the evidence that while they were known to the way of prisoners radicalising other prisoners, they paid little if any attention to the risk that such
position did not reflect what the relevant officers did, thought or would have done at the time but rather the corporate position was more of a retrospective justification for the actions taken or not taken. we heard from him saying there that there were two pieces of information that mi5 officers were in possession of that perhaps if they had taken a slightly different plan of action, things would have been different. they had some information which we don't know what it is because that is a secret but they had two pieces of information that they failed to act upon effectively. and what sirjohn saunders has said today is if salman abedi had been questioned on arrival backin abedi had been questioned on arrival back in manchester shortly before the attack when he returned from libya it is believed he received bomb—making instructions, if he had been questioned then following to the vehicle where he was stirringly explode break explosive in, officers would have seen how he reacted around the vehicle and that may have led to them taking further action
are sort of notjust etched on everybody�*s mind that was there but everyone who subsequently had to report on it. it was an ariana grande concept. it had just finished, people were leaving and salman abedi walked into the foyer area and as people were pouring out, he detonated the bomb in his rucksack in a suicide attack. it killed 22 people and injured many, many more and affected thousands of people's lives with the all awful knock—on effect of being left with the psychological effects are being met night or losing a loved one or being injured. there was a huge report on how the emergency responders responded. there was some criticism they didn't get in there quick enough because there were fears of a secondary attack and other restrictions. so a lot of people were simply treated by other concertgoers for some time after the bomb went off before sufficient medical aid got in there and there
saunders has said in his report todayis saunders has said in his report today is perhaps if salman abedi had been stopped and questioned at the airport, it may have deterred him from going any further and alerted him to the fact security services were marking his card, he was being watched again and perhaps if they had watched him and followed him, and saw how he behaved around the vehicle in which he was storing the explosives here in manchester, then again they would have thought, had their suspicions raised and carried out some further action and investigation which again could have stopped him but we do not know for sure. what we do know is the pieces of information that mi5 had, sir john saunders believes they should have perhaps done something different with them and what they did but because of the official secrets act, we don't exactly know what those two pieces of information are, neither do the families and as you have heard in the last half hour here, they are still asking questions though some have been answered, they are grateful they
establishments, salman abedi showed worrying signs which could have been related to extremist views, there is no record which goes with the student which would have allowed anybody to consider all of those signs together. having a record which passes from school with student to college or university may well be contentious and deciding what material to include would also be difficult, nevertheless i do consider that it is something we should —— which should be looked at to see if a solution could be found. another very contentious part of the evidence concerned the manchester islamic centre, also known as the didsbury mosque, which salman abedi attended on some occasions. i consider it unlikely having considered all the evidence, that salman abedi was radicalised at the didsbury mosque, but some of the evidence given in behalf of the mosque about the association of the
wanted but it is now very clear that there was a failure to properly assess key intelligence about salman abedi. a failure to put it into proper context and, most catastrophic of all, a delay in acting on it. as a result of these failures, at the very least, a real possibility of preventing this attack was lost. this is a devastating conclusion for us. the failures exposed in this report are unacceptable. the public are entitled to expect information of national security in intelligence will be acted on speedily and crucially that the system will ensure this happens. it must do so in the future. we know that sirjohn will be making recommendations and his close report. we trust these recommendations will be acted on and