Page 2 - Martin Hellwig News Today

In a recent analysis, professors Anat Admati, Martin Hellwig, and Richard Portes present a scathing critique of the ...

It has long been understood that deposit guarantees and too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policies create a moral-hazard problem—they incentivize banks to take on too much risk by shielding depositors and shareholders from losses in excess of equity (“left-tail” outcomes)—in American banking.1 Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991 to mitigate the moral-hazard problem by restricting forbearance and implicit subsidies for undercapitalized banks.

Seven books, and two films, for people curious about financial catastrophe | The Economist reads

Peter Bofinger questions last week’s award of a prestigious economics prize to an orthodox school which could not anticipate the 2008 crash.

We need to help banks stay out of trouble, not just help them during a crisis.

How to convince the Supreme Court that the plan is constitutional?

Analysis: Because it’s not making news anymore, people think the problem of under-capitalization of big banks in the West has been taken care of. Not so. Indeed, big banks continue to behave like companies who cause environmental damage. We all must cover

Trans-Border Global Freight Systems in Round Lake is using every contact it has to...

We are all victims of “the pervasive use of state support of special groups” and of governance failures everywhere.

unfortunately. >> you open the book with the emperors new clothes story. why? >> because it has a mystique to them. when people are dressed nicely and here they know what they are talking about, people think they might be missing something or they might not understand or its just not good business to say something. its more convenient not to challenge what they say but we try to back to the deutsch the opposite and expose the arguments, so "the bankers new clothes" refers to arguments ...