Monitoring provisions will be the main determinant of the agreement success and established the essential foundation for all the other provisions. Effect of monitoring needs to be able to detect a rapid breakout from some facilities known to us in a slow sneak out from covert facilities. In agreement with iran should hence provide one a full explanation of past Iranian Nuclear activities with possible military preventions and to irans Atomic Energy agency about such such activities explains who is involved, what actions were taken and where they took place. There can be no International Confidence that the development of Nuclear Weapons capabilities has ceased. Second a complete data declaration and robust inspection of irans Nuclear Activities and material and equipment. Critical parts of Irans Nuclear programs are still not well understood by the International Community. A final agreement must allow access to sites persons and records sufficient to make Irans Nuclear program transpar
With zero tolerance for cheating. An immediate test of irans willingness to cooperate rests with the iaeas attempts to clarify evidence the International Observer group has on the potential military dimensions of irans programs. For several years, iran has refused to provide information or explanation to the iaea on past bomb efforts. This includes the Parchin Military base where iran has gone to Great Lengths to eliminate all traces of any clandestine activity, including demolishing buildings and including removing large areas of soil from the site. Irans willingness to come clean on its past Weapons Programs should be an acid test for western negotiators. We must ask, what good is striking an agreement and removing sanctions, our only leverage, if iran keeps a capacity to secretly build nuclear bombs. Unfortunately, u. S. Negotiators have already made a key concession that will complicate the task of verifying Irans Nuclear commitments. The interim agreement of last year would allow
Verification over several decades and the views i will be presenting are my own and not intended to represent views of those ive been associated with such as the department of defense and the Nuclear Treaty monitoring and verification. My statement draws in part on those experiences and on the Defense Science Board Task force report as well as the work of a nongovernmental task force on verification requirements for Nuclear Agreement with iran. Neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to whether compliance with any particular Nuclear Agreement is ver fibl. Indeed, we do not yet know the details of the monitoring provisions that will emerge in the iranian agreement now under association or in such an agreement will be concluded. The Defense Science Board Task force report underscores that monitoring Nuclear Programs is very challenging. And that the technical capabilities to do so are limited. But the report suggests a number of steps that can be taken to make monitoring more
Help us close the achievement gap. I can tell you from being in the trenches and talking and seeing enough data so far to tell you, i guarantee you that will be the sixth one. About to beand its proven. I will give you an example. Project done in North Carolina in the 1970s. They did quality early child education. Aen done well, it inoculates child for three years. In this one, they went into the home every two weeks and taught the parents how to do homework with the kids. Those kids when tracked all the way through high school were graduating at much higher rates, going to college at much higher rates. Much less dropout rates. The home environment had changed. It had been changed. They were inoculated for the rest of their lives. Data . Ave those pieces of i just dont have enough. I know there will be enough data. Only good can come from involving them. Can i mandated for the schools . No. This goes under the premise of if the home environment does not change, can you close the achiev
Detected subject to zero the protocol five bombs in the five years after this agreement is eclipsed . Go back to testimony director clapper gave before the hill where he said the fundamental constraining element or the fundamental point is what decision and iran will make stannic the decision would be to develop a Nuclear Capacity and dont get caught. Work hard does anybody have an answer choose the question . In the timeframe . Yes. Five bombs in five years . Yes. I just take that number to a better estimate of what they could do subject to Additional Protocol assuming they dont want to be caught . But with the strengths and the weaknesses with the Nuclear Facilities something that is and declared so it needs the federal analysis how it is set up. That is why with the Additional Protocol. You dont agree . With the Additional Protocol it is the possibility because you still made unfettered access i agree but i have a slightly different concern. Not how a quickly or effectively to break