Transcripts For CSPAN H.R. McMaster On National Security 201

Everyone with us. Always when we do public events, we have a little safety and and. I am responsible for your safety tonight, so if i ask you to follow the instructions, please do that. The exits are right behind us and i will take care of h. R. Mcmaster first. He does have other people here to help him. [laughter] i will come back for everybody. The stairs will take us down and the we will make to left and get to the street and across national geographic, i have ordered ice cream and we will thing a song of praise. [laughter] will happen, but i used be ready in case i ask you to do something. This is an extraordinary evening, and i want to say thank you to general mcmaster who gave us the opportunity to celebrate this 70th anniversary, a remarkable institution, the National Security council. You have before you for gentlemen that have been National Security advisers. I have about three or four more in the audience, i could not get everybody on the table, but we have remarkable talent. My goal tonight is to help all of you understand how the institution works and im of the Big Questions are in a way. I will just be the moderator and try to stay out of the way with my questions. The first thing i would like to ask you, is, the National Security council really sits at the fault line of american constitutional governance. That is no question congress has a right to oversee , stateions of department department, Defense Department and there is no question that the president has a right of privacy in his decisionmaking. We call that executive privilege. In the National Security council, it sits right on top of that. You are there for the president to health will the government together but you are also coordinating the activities of agencies that have accountability to congress. I would like to ask each of you to reflect on that from your own he has aerience, trump card so he can interrupt you whatever you want. I will start with you, h. R. Thank you. It is important for the president and for all of us that we ensure congress fulfills its role which is vital to our democracy because the congress represents the american people, but is also the role Critical Role for congress. And for the administration to be able to access the great work about their staff does. It is a responsibility [indiscernible] attempted to do, as a National Security council is have conversations with senators and congressmen and staffers about key policy initiatives and early on in the development of what we call in the best integrated strategies. We found that helpful, because a lot of the problems are facing require legislative remedies. And all of them require resources. Has been oneffort early consultation from the National Security council. Obviously, continued coordination between the department the relevant departments, and the fill and the relevant committees. Havech of you, administrations that had somewhat contentious relations with congress. Therethis issue would obviously want to know what you are saying and thinking, but you have an obligation to the president to be his advisor. Jim, how about you . I think the most important thing is that the National Security adviser and the nsc is of National Security, to project an image of bipartisanship. In my relationship with president obama, i asked him for , to resist putting a political spin on big issues until such time that they had been developed. Obviously, it was a political decision. During my time, which followed , we decide to come by National Security and homeland staff andnto one that was a big difference in terms of the value volume of the staff. I think it is extremely important. In my military career, i had the good fortune of spending a few years on capitol hill as a marine liaison officer. Do foro was always to the majority what you do for the minority, and vice versa. Then i found out, when i became National Security adviser that all of a sudden, i was a democrat, and i did not know that i was. [laughter] you have to get through that, and even only get through that are working at it and by making sure that you reach out to both sides. I think that was extraordinarily important especially on security issues. Of course, the National Security adviser is not confirmed by the senate, he does not testify on the record before congress. My i am sure that all of president s have spent a lot of time consulting informally up , explaining policies and all of the rest, it is an important part of the job. I learned everything that i know about being a National Security adviser from the man who is in the front row here, brent scowcroft. Learned fromings i him, when we researched on the tower commission, which was established by president reagan in 1986 in the wake of the enron arms sales that iran arms sales was to stave off the action by congress to basically take over the National Security structure. It required the National Security adviser to be confirmed, that the organizational structure. Brent led the charge to frustrate the, because it was not just an issue of privacy, it was an issue of separation of balance. If the president cannot gather inund him or her a staff which he can have great confidence, he will not be able to carry out the constitutionallyprescribed roles that the president is prescribed in policy in Foreign Policy. A fundamental constitutional principle that needs to be preserved and it needs to always be preserved because in terms of war, president s get more power and sometimes the president seems to get in trouble and the Congress Takes it back. But it is very important to the is edition of the presidency to preserve that group that enables for the president to perform his role. No one had a boss that had a more difficult relationship ultimately than richard nixon. Yourid you balance obligations to be his advisor but also your accountability to the congress . The question of one, how they congress can control the maintenance of privacy mean lines of privacy. Measures that had to be in an essentially secret negotiations to the exploration of new avenues. That was the basic premise. The administration that i served, it was in the vietnam war, and you cannot say that tight nship was at a [laughter] some of the people who had started us on that road that led to the peace movement, passions were great. President nixon had a combat of ride. Side had a combat of a combative side what we did was to things. Principle thatof president nixon did not commit that his Staff Members could not testify before congressional committees, or could be subpoenaed by congressional committees. We agreed with senator with the senator that we would have private meetings, that he would invite me, active members of the Foreign Relations committee to come to his house, and i would come periodically, and briefed him so that no formal record was kept of these briefings, and it was not a subpoenaed order. We invariably briefed the leading members of the various. Enatorial committees the problem was, there was a philosophical difference and the country was so deeply divided at that moment that it was very a basis for find bipartisanship. How do you end a war that one party has started, the other they has inherited and party that got involved had the shift inside the party so that they shifted principle to the policy that they themselves had advocated . I do not say that as a criticism, it goes to affect. This it goes to fact. Timeframe, wexon made strenuous efforts to and ourthe congress decisionmaking. But the key issue really comes debate toe continuing what degree the operations of pervasive,ome so that they really act like a department . There is a category of decisions which i think most would believe have to be done to some extent, secretly. O permit exploration but when it becomes a daytoday occurrence, that is one you arrive at congressional control. I think most of the time, the nsc has stayed on right side of the line. That if thed argue nsc is an institution if it conduct a continuing negotiation that goes on over several years, taking steps that ordinarily are under departmental and congressional control. You have anticipated the next question that i was going to ask, because there is a critique in washington these days, that the National Security council has become operational, that it is taking on the activities of the departments, rather than ng a coordinating advisory each one of you probably dealt with that criticism. Henry has given us his thoughts about it, steve, let us start with you. How do you think about that . Is thatf the things part of the bargain about that National Security adviser and nscand this the and the is that it needs to be role,tful to confine its so that it does not preempt the roles of the departments and agencies or cabinet secretaries who are the ones that are confirmed by the senate and to whom money is appropriated to carry out Foreign Policy. So it requires a National Security adviser to import do on the staff and be selflimiting, legitimately not get to public in terms of what they are doing. Toond particularly not get public in terms of what theyre doing. Nscdangers of having an that runs operations is Something Like what happened with irancontra. The nsc has spent a lot of time developing ways to deliver policy options to the president. I think there is a world for the and this he not in running operations, but to make sure that once the president makes a decision, and sets a policy, that the agencies are implementing the policy effectively. It is not to assess the chief for the departmental agencies, but it is to make sure that they are implementing the president . Decisions and hold them accountable. I think that is a new frontier for the nsc and something that i think we need, because the greatest policy as it no good, if it is not implementing and causing effects on the ground. Jim . I think the biggest cancer in any nsc is when it crosses over from being strategic to operational. We have to guide against that. It is not easy. Technology is a doubleedged , technologys case allows someone on the nsc, if he or she which is to best he or she wishes to to pick up a phone and call it commander on the field and question them. In any a problem administration, not just one administration. As a marine officer who was on the receiving end of direction from direct from the white house as a captain. When i was in an operation off cambodia, someone decided he wanted to talk to captain johns and he could do that. Problem, and it is one of the jobs that i think a National Security adviser is under most under nonces will circumstances should they do that, because when you open the door you start getting into micromanaging and running operations. Which is something that the nsc should guard against absolutely. Hr . It is been a great gift to be able to study the nsc from a Historical Perspective and to learn from those who are here especially generals no cross who has been general snow croft who has been such a role model to me. Some of his work is very relevant to this question, emphasizing the role of the National Security council in coordinating and integrating across all of the departments and agents these, to provide options to the president. Once the president makes decisions, as stephen when it out, to assist with the implementation and execution of those decisions. In recent years, for whatever reasons, more and more authorities have been centralized or were centralized within the National Security council and it did cross, i think, a line between ordinary and integrating of organization into and executing arm of the government. So under president trumps guidance we have devolved the responsibilities and authorities back to the departments where it belongs and exercised that coordination and integration role. One of the ways we did that is the time we have saved by not calling up captain jones or his equivalent, what weve done is applied that time to reestablishing our strategic confidence. Longerterm, and to involve the heads of the departments and agencies, the state department in particular to play a foundational role in explaining problems, viewing situations around the world that affect our National Security through the lens of vital interest, and they stunned that framing, to establish longterm goals and more specific objectives associated with them. Then what happens is, the principles issue guidance to the departments and agencies which then allows them to get to work and to actually start doing things, if it is already within their authority to meet whatever the principals guidance is. Then we bring those decisions to the president. ,he approval of that framing and ultimately, we deliver to the president and integrated strategy, much as we did, as many of you watched us do it on the cuban policy, which is probably the most public one. Or the policies on iran for example, which will hear more about this week, i could go on and on. I think what is helped us this which is helped us address this potential of centralizing too much control in the and is the, making the nsc to operational is to focus on the development of these integrated strategies. Henry, i think that when you were National Security adviser, you had a staff that was 40 or 50. I am not exactly sure the precise number but it was about 42 or 45, Something Like that. Staffs in theig nsc, in recent years. Question, moree people are looking for things to do, they take on the command responsibility. I know hr, you started with the can all of you talk about how big a staff is and how influential it is to the job . Please, hr . You can probably get away with 40 or 50, if you are kissinger. Me, i need a little bit more help. [laughter] into g to institutionalized the genius of napoleon, let us that you will probably need more staffers if you are not henry kissinger. We try to reduce the staff and make sure that we devolve responsibility to departments and agencies. As we get out of management of tactical issues, we are able to reduce. We have reduced significantly the numbers of policy people and overall staff. It was over 400 or so, at its peak and we are down to about 360 something now, which rounds like a lot. Of those 360 it is probably about 170 policy people. The rest is the white house worksion room, which multiple shifts and information technology, those who manage the president s travel and visits with foreign leaders. There is a large administrative component, not as big as im of the numbers you hear talked about. What is contributing to the growth over time from 50 or so on157 is the emphasis homeland security, especially after the mass murder attacks on our country of september 11. So the National Security now has a blended staff which includes the home and security council. Does that mean we cannot get smaller . No, the emphasis is obviously to have the right people with the right expertise and because of the coordination and integration efforts, the right personality a lot of the times. Trying to lead by charm and bring people together around these important issues. So i think we are in a good place right now, a good size and effectiveness, especially with the extreme talent and dedication of the people on the National Security council, it is astounding. It makes you proud every day when you interact with your teams out there. It did grow for a number of reasons, it is gearing smaller again, but the numbers can be deceiving in terms of policy. We did not start with a fixed idea of the number of people that should be on the staff. Is,ink one of the problems what do you define as National Security . When we started, in the Nixon Administration we concentrated on a number of key issues like china, fouring to or five key issues, and we left most of the others up to the departments. Gradually over time, the lines between strategy and daytoday until there eroded was felt to be a greater need for white house supervision. There is a reason for this. World the people who which are due to return has improved. Overruled haset to think it was misunderstood is a need toe carry out the limitation that is as youo the original could find so there is a the department to into the preference of their members. Tos is of course maddening the president can then it gradually fluctuates. Function to add to policy formulations, the need for supervising and limitation because very often the difference between success and 50s screw that up, even a great policy decision can fail. A [indiscernible] never better then when i had both jobs. Then when i had both jobs your product this question changing technology is. Secretary kissinger the notes thoughdelivered type on paper that had no watermarks on it and it came back the same way. Each was a minimum of three the realtime was two to three months between these exchanges. And battlefield commander can get a phone call from the president. How did you deal with it . If i could just make a comment on the side because i feel pretty strongly about this. Of the National Security is not important, it is what the National Security council does. If you look at the range of issues that the president has to do with every single day, just the 70s sent ive been gone, i know they deal with twice as many issues. Means you organize yourself. You have to have that kind of knowledge. You have combined the National Security council under was severely underfunded. The only way to fight it was to. Et detail ease stephen and i talked about this. On my watch, the National Security<\/a> council. You have before you for gentlemen that have been National Security<\/a> advisers. I have about three or four more in the audience, i could not get everybody on the table, but we have remarkable talent. My goal tonight is to help all of you understand how the institution works and im of the Big Questions<\/a> are in a way. I will just be the moderator and try to stay out of the way with my questions. The first thing i would like to ask you, is, the National Security<\/a> council really sits at the fault line of american constitutional governance. That is no question congress has a right to oversee , stateions of department department, Defense Department<\/a> and there is no question that the president has a right of privacy in his decisionmaking. We call that executive privilege. In the National Security<\/a> council, it sits right on top of that. You are there for the president to health will the government together but you are also coordinating the activities of agencies that have accountability to congress. I would like to ask each of you to reflect on that from your own he has aerience, trump card so he can interrupt you whatever you want. I will start with you, h. R. Thank you. It is important for the president and for all of us that we ensure congress fulfills its role which is vital to our democracy because the congress represents the american people, but is also the role Critical Role<\/a> for congress. And for the administration to be able to access the great work about their staff does. It is a responsibility [indiscernible] attempted to do, as a National Security<\/a> council is have conversations with senators and congressmen and staffers about key policy initiatives and early on in the development of what we call in the best integrated strategies. We found that helpful, because a lot of the problems are facing require legislative remedies. And all of them require resources. Has been oneffort early consultation from the National Security<\/a> council. Obviously, continued coordination between the department the relevant departments, and the fill and the relevant committees. Havech of you, administrations that had somewhat contentious relations with congress. Therethis issue would obviously want to know what you are saying and thinking, but you have an obligation to the president to be his advisor. Jim, how about you . I think the most important thing is that the National Security<\/a> adviser and the nsc is of National Security<\/a>, to project an image of bipartisanship. In my relationship with president obama, i asked him for , to resist putting a political spin on big issues until such time that they had been developed. Obviously, it was a political decision. During my time, which followed , we decide to come by National Security<\/a> and homeland staff andnto one that was a big difference in terms of the value volume of the staff. I think it is extremely important. In my military career, i had the good fortune of spending a few years on capitol hill as a marine liaison officer. Do foro was always to the majority what you do for the minority, and vice versa. Then i found out, when i became National Security<\/a> adviser that all of a sudden, i was a democrat, and i did not know that i was. [laughter] you have to get through that, and even only get through that are working at it and by making sure that you reach out to both sides. I think that was extraordinarily important especially on security issues. Of course, the National Security<\/a> adviser is not confirmed by the senate, he does not testify on the record before congress. My i am sure that all of president s have spent a lot of time consulting informally up , explaining policies and all of the rest, it is an important part of the job. I learned everything that i know about being a National Security<\/a> adviser from the man who is in the front row here, brent scowcroft. Learned fromings i him, when we researched on the tower commission, which was established by president reagan in 1986 in the wake of the enron arms sales that iran arms sales was to stave off the action by congress to basically take over the National Security<\/a> structure. It required the National Security<\/a> adviser to be confirmed, that the organizational structure. Brent led the charge to frustrate the, because it was not just an issue of privacy, it was an issue of separation of balance. If the president cannot gather inund him or her a staff which he can have great confidence, he will not be able to carry out the constitutionallyprescribed roles that the president is prescribed in policy in Foreign Policy<\/a>. A fundamental constitutional principle that needs to be preserved and it needs to always be preserved because in terms of war, president s get more power and sometimes the president seems to get in trouble and the Congress Takes<\/a> it back. But it is very important to the is edition of the presidency to preserve that group that enables for the president to perform his role. No one had a boss that had a more difficult relationship ultimately than richard nixon. Yourid you balance obligations to be his advisor but also your accountability to the congress . The question of one, how they congress can control the maintenance of privacy mean lines of privacy. Measures that had to be in an essentially secret negotiations to the exploration of new avenues. That was the basic premise. The administration that i served, it was in the vietnam war, and you cannot say that tight nship was at a [laughter] some of the people who had started us on that road that led to the peace movement, passions were great. President nixon had a combat of ride. Side had a combat of a combative side what we did was to things. Principle thatof president nixon did not commit that his Staff Members<\/a> could not testify before congressional committees, or could be subpoenaed by congressional committees. We agreed with senator with the senator that we would have private meetings, that he would invite me, active members of the Foreign Relations<\/a> committee to come to his house, and i would come periodically, and briefed him so that no formal record was kept of these briefings, and it was not a subpoenaed order. We invariably briefed the leading members of the various. Enatorial committees the problem was, there was a philosophical difference and the country was so deeply divided at that moment that it was very a basis for find bipartisanship. How do you end a war that one party has started, the other they has inherited and party that got involved had the shift inside the party so that they shifted principle to the policy that they themselves had advocated . I do not say that as a criticism, it goes to affect. This it goes to fact. Timeframe, wexon made strenuous efforts to and ourthe congress decisionmaking. But the key issue really comes debate toe continuing what degree the operations of pervasive,ome so that they really act like a department . There is a category of decisions which i think most would believe have to be done to some extent, secretly. O permit exploration but when it becomes a daytoday occurrence, that is one you arrive at congressional control. I think most of the time, the nsc has stayed on right side of the line. That if thed argue nsc is an institution if it conduct a continuing negotiation that goes on over several years, taking steps that ordinarily are under departmental and congressional control. You have anticipated the next question that i was going to ask, because there is a critique in washington these days, that the National Security<\/a> council has become operational, that it is taking on the activities of the departments, rather than ng a coordinating advisory each one of you probably dealt with that criticism. Henry has given us his thoughts about it, steve, let us start with you. How do you think about that . Is thatf the things part of the bargain about that National Security<\/a> adviser and nscand this the and the is that it needs to be role,tful to confine its so that it does not preempt the roles of the departments and agencies or cabinet secretaries who are the ones that are confirmed by the senate and to whom money is appropriated to carry out Foreign Policy<\/a>. So it requires a National Security<\/a> adviser to import do on the staff and be selflimiting, legitimately not get to public in terms of what they are doing. Toond particularly not get public in terms of what theyre doing. Nscdangers of having an that runs operations is Something Like<\/a> what happened with irancontra. The nsc has spent a lot of time developing ways to deliver policy options to the president. I think there is a world for the and this he not in running operations, but to make sure that once the president makes a decision, and sets a policy, that the agencies are implementing the policy effectively. It is not to assess the chief for the departmental agencies, but it is to make sure that they are implementing the president . Decisions and hold them accountable. I think that is a new frontier for the nsc and something that i think we need, because the greatest policy as it no good, if it is not implementing and causing effects on the ground. Jim . I think the biggest cancer in any nsc is when it crosses over from being strategic to operational. We have to guide against that. It is not easy. Technology is a doubleedged , technologys case allows someone on the nsc, if he or she which is to best he or she wishes to to pick up a phone and call it commander on the field and question them. In any a problem administration, not just one administration. As a marine officer who was on the receiving end of direction from direct from the white house as a captain. When i was in an operation off cambodia, someone decided he wanted to talk to captain johns and he could do that. Problem, and it is one of the jobs that i think a National Security<\/a> adviser is under most under nonces will circumstances should they do that, because when you open the door you start getting into micromanaging and running operations. Which is something that the nsc should guard against absolutely. Hr . It is been a great gift to be able to study the nsc from a Historical Perspective<\/a> and to learn from those who are here especially generals no cross who has been general snow croft who has been such a role model to me. Some of his work is very relevant to this question, emphasizing the role of the National Security<\/a> council in coordinating and integrating across all of the departments and agents these, to provide options to the president. Once the president makes decisions, as stephen when it out, to assist with the implementation and execution of those decisions. In recent years, for whatever reasons, more and more authorities have been centralized or were centralized within the National Security<\/a> council and it did cross, i think, a line between ordinary and integrating of organization into and executing arm of the government. So under president trumps guidance we have devolved the responsibilities and authorities back to the departments where it belongs and exercised that coordination and integration role. One of the ways we did that is the time we have saved by not calling up captain jones or his equivalent, what weve done is applied that time to reestablishing our strategic confidence. Longerterm, and to involve the heads of the departments and agencies, the state department in particular to play a foundational role in explaining problems, viewing situations around the world that affect our National Security<\/a> through the lens of vital interest, and they stunned that framing, to establish longterm goals and more specific objectives associated with them. Then what happens is, the principles issue guidance to the departments and agencies which then allows them to get to work and to actually start doing things, if it is already within their authority to meet whatever the principals guidance is. Then we bring those decisions to the president. ,he approval of that framing and ultimately, we deliver to the president and integrated strategy, much as we did, as many of you watched us do it on the cuban policy, which is probably the most public one. Or the policies on iran for example, which will hear more about this week, i could go on and on. I think what is helped us this which is helped us address this potential of centralizing too much control in the and is the, making the nsc to operational is to focus on the development of these integrated strategies. Henry, i think that when you were National Security<\/a> adviser, you had a staff that was 40 or 50. I am not exactly sure the precise number but it was about 42 or 45, Something Like<\/a> that. Staffs in theig nsc, in recent years. Question, moree people are looking for things to do, they take on the command responsibility. I know hr, you started with the can all of you talk about how big a staff is and how influential it is to the job . Please, hr . You can probably get away with 40 or 50, if you are kissinger. Me, i need a little bit more help. [laughter] into g to institutionalized the genius of napoleon, let us that you will probably need more staffers if you are not henry kissinger. We try to reduce the staff and make sure that we devolve responsibility to departments and agencies. As we get out of management of tactical issues, we are able to reduce. We have reduced significantly the numbers of policy people and overall staff. It was over 400 or so, at its peak and we are down to about 360 something now, which rounds like a lot. Of those 360 it is probably about 170 policy people. The rest is the white house worksion room, which multiple shifts and information technology, those who manage the president s travel and visits with foreign leaders. There is a large administrative component, not as big as im of the numbers you hear talked about. What is contributing to the growth over time from 50 or so on157 is the emphasis homeland security, especially after the mass murder attacks on our country of september 11. So the National Security<\/a> now has a blended staff which includes the home and security council. Does that mean we cannot get smaller . No, the emphasis is obviously to have the right people with the right expertise and because of the coordination and integration efforts, the right personality a lot of the times. Trying to lead by charm and bring people together around these important issues. So i think we are in a good place right now, a good size and effectiveness, especially with the extreme talent and dedication of the people on the National Security<\/a> council, it is astounding. It makes you proud every day when you interact with your teams out there. It did grow for a number of reasons, it is gearing smaller again, but the numbers can be deceiving in terms of policy. We did not start with a fixed idea of the number of people that should be on the staff. Is,ink one of the problems what do you define as National Security<\/a> . When we started, in the Nixon Administration<\/a> we concentrated on a number of key issues like china, fouring to or five key issues, and we left most of the others up to the departments. Gradually over time, the lines between strategy and daytoday until there eroded was felt to be a greater need for white house supervision. There is a reason for this. World the people who which are due to return has improved. Overruled haset to think it was misunderstood is a need toe carry out the limitation that is as youo the original could find so there is a the department to into the preference of their members. Tos is of course maddening the president can then it gradually fluctuates. Function to add to policy formulations, the need for supervising and limitation because very often the difference between success and 50s screw that up, even a great policy decision can fail. A [indiscernible] never better then when i had both jobs. Then when i had both jobs your product this question changing technology is. Secretary kissinger the notes thoughdelivered type on paper that had no watermarks on it and it came back the same way. Each was a minimum of three the realtime was two to three months between these exchanges. And battlefield commander can get a phone call from the president. How did you deal with it . If i could just make a comment on the side because i feel pretty strongly about this. Of the National Security<\/a> is not important, it is what the National Security<\/a> council does. If you look at the range of issues that the president has to do with every single day, just the 70s sent ive been gone, i know they deal with twice as many issues. Means you organize yourself. You have to have that kind of knowledge. You have combined the National Security<\/a> council under was severely underfunded. The only way to fight it was to. Et detail ease stephen and i talked about this. On my watch, the National Security<\/a> council was roughly two year, and after the first they went back to their agencies and you had to rebuild it. The National Security<\/a> council i franklyanized dont care about the size as long as it does what it needs to do. Big issues on the problems of multiple agency departments. It is no longer just the Defense Department<\/a>. It is treasury, commerce, it is everything. If you are going to run an that will be the ringmaster, you have to have adequate size. You have to have them on a permanent basis. Think we should have had two thirds. That is the National Security<\/a> advisor. The immediate knowledge of going on in the far corner of the world. Organizatione the to keep up on a 24 7 basis. We need to have staff other than a watch. So that when the shift comes, you are actually transitioning with knowledge. If that is the conundrum, you have no time to think strategically and you have a single director who think about what is coming over the horizon. Technology,ple of but it does multiply the task of what you tell the president dramatically every day. Quite the Dwight Eisenhower<\/a> had a military background. For3 is responsible. Aytoday operations eisenhower actually had to staff. Had he used to change it strategize between longterm planning and the daily fight . The same have over implementation. What we found is with the really strategies we need crystals to become involved to assess and recommend adjustments unless the situation changes. That causes us to review these strategies and to to thecommendations president. , the tendency to to respond without fully understanding. We have not separated execution or implementation, but coordinated from the planning effort. Cannot ask each of these, this is a huge problem and i solvedhink any staff has it. I think what hr is doing is definitely in the right direction. Youll you do is manage, all would do is get more crises because youre not putting in tragedy to avoid the crises. On the other hand, the number of issues is overwhelming. We had people would show up when you talk about it today problems. Is saturdayan do morning. That is the only time things quite a down. Glut of resources available. Take the have time to longer view. Didof the things that we 10 things that might go bump in the night. If you do a study on the longterm implications, i think i know people in the white house who would be interested in reading it. Think there is great value to asking the community to take issues. Of the strategic they are watching and thinking about. Ands a force multiplier something that should be used. A just do that on, i think it is important to have this focus, especially to organize properly as well. What im doing is repeating a lot of the if i. It is also helping the departments and agencies. Aintain that perspective it will be good to organize was create a National Security<\/a> adviser for tragedy which is our main bridge into policy and teamsng and bring we are ready to frame these problems. We sayalready been iran or russia discussed. We aremething ready for this. I thought i would like to bring us back to this and that is when he talked about the necessity of government doing things in secret. Would obviously the government has to have secret initiates are it homicide, that it has to be grounded in something that we talk to the American Public<\/a> about three henry open the door on this. Reaction. S your i had a practice that i had no secrets. There was not anything i was rice for thendi secretary of defense is not know. That is the way the president wanted it. I think that is an important piece. I also wanted them to know what i was thinking and get a sense device place to get to the president. In terms of the congress and the public, i think one of the things we have to distinguish between is the semantics and general direction of policy. Congresshe public and cannot want to start, have a desire to go all the way down and it is a mistake. I think what weve got to do is semantic. Distinction what is our basic principles of our tragedy and then let the professionals do the implementation and execution for some secrecy is required. I think that is a distinction we have lost. One of the things that technology does allow for is classified communications with friends and allies. These are things that i not only enjoyed, but i think our productive is engaging other National Security<\/a> advisers on a weekly basis. That had a very unifying effect talkg issues and you could to pretty high level of confidence. I dont recall anything that was discussed on those teleconferences ever being revealed in public. More countries decided to adopt the National Security<\/a> advisor in their government. More countries have since come on. Be careful have to to make sure when a National Security<\/a> adviser is using those that is a metric absolutely that is absolutely something you cannot tolerate. The more people you can bring income, the more expertise you can bring in. It gives you a different perspective. It has become a real challenge to National Security<\/a> so i think what is important is everyone understand the sacred trust placed in that and they realize that speaking to the media about government deliberations is treasonous when it involves National Security<\/a>. I think with that confidence established, the more transparency the better in terms of understanding across the rtments and in conventional wisdom secrecy is supposed to be bad goodhare knowledge really if you ask yourself how history if you turne it into a bureaucratic you turn it into a bureaucratic effort, he may wind up stagnating in being paralyzed. The essence of creative thecymaking is to go down road that is a lonely fashion. Roads are made by walking and an aspect of be policymaking in a form that one waycess [indiscernible] of course a president or heretary of state, when pursues secret avenues come up for have to testify in a measurable time and invited them ut when president bush after he had principles those within the discussed and become part of the political process. My opinion involves a thereation of making sure is a much needed level of transparency. Lso an element of creativity you have immediate problems and [indiscernible] has someery president are along the line felt it. Ecessary to employ emissaries find theces can we balance . If you are thinking about the National Security<\/a> council, this is the key element to reflect. Im going to ask think the hardest question. Im going to start with you. , a fractured society, we have some in a different traditions. It is hard for us to develop , somethingragedy that carries from administration we lose itration and in the politics. How do we develop. What are we one is the necessary preconditions . I think one of the biggest differences, maybe the biggest differences between the United States<\/a> and other great countries is we have never had the direct National Danger<\/a> to our survival except in civil war we could conduct Foreign Policy<\/a> [indiscernible] we had to think of foreign a series of problems chinesee you take the to the policies. But think you can fix the problem. It is one of the problems with our president. That danger, had but now we are living in a world of permanent danger because of. Ew technologies. That is in their experience if we dont have trained areel in that way very understandable. Via deaconn america sure if we tend to think if we can reshape domestic structure , ther countries [indiscernible] now we have to learn that we have to make progress and it is dangerous. It is amazing what we have achieved. Yes, i tend to criticize our now weic of the, but have to change it. Challenge and now it has to be without problems. I think it is a problem. Where have back say we come closest to doing what henry is talking about . I think it was managing the cold war. Im somewhat familiar with both of them. Think the cold war example where he had common policy across another a number of demonstrations. Withina lot of division the country, but i think the formula is the same. Times ando fit the then taking that strategy and having a national debate. With thee succeeded tactics, but the basic tragedy has a lot of support over five administrations. Debates11 we had huge about the balance between what in a needed to actually stay the society that we wanted to be. Had a lot of chocolate that in the courts. We are still struggling about the details. Its interesting there was a lot of continuity from the bush administration, Obama Administration<\/a> so in our own untidy way, it is difficult, but we had been able to do it. I think there has been a lot of continuity on china, but it is hard. Department the their own departments provideso support for the information on the it stops you from revealing too much on the classified side so i think that is a very good thing to do. In thes people focused short game. Time, but iking our still want to say just a minute or two for general master, he is currently the custodian of this remarkable to titian. No institution in america is more important on a daytoday basis than the National Security<\/a> council. We are now at the 70th anniversary. Your currently the steward. What does her vision and had a you look at the future for this . Dr. Kissinger mentioned, the stakes cannot be higher. There are dangers to National Security<\/a>. That the age of presecurity was over and what we see now is new threats emerging. Evolving forounds sophisticated campaign. Approach the challenges and opportunities from a perspective topragmatic realism prioritize the safety and security of the people to emphasize the connection between security and prosperity in new ways so that we integrate what to emphasize peace through strength and explore new forms of deterrence. Also to advanced american influence and recognition that it is americas partners and allies that give us our unique strengths across the world so these are ideas that underpin the development of our underpin National Security<\/a> strategies as well. Ofould like to say first all, thank you to john for this tremendous opportunity. I took on this job in a quite unexpected way so, thank you john. We have a bunch of people here who have worked on the staff of the National Security<\/a> council in various positions. Could i just have both of you raise your hand . Thank you. Youuld say thanks to all of. [applause] if you missed any of that program, you can catch it online at cspan. Org. Here is a look at pictures in the oval office. You very much. Henry kissinger has been a friend of mine. I liked him, i respected him but we have been friends for a long time. Long before my emergence in the world of politics which has not been too long. But we have been really in the new york scene and little bit but we got to know each other very well. He is a man i have great, Great Respect<\/a> for","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"archive.org","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","width":"800","height":"600","url":"\/\/ia600803.us.archive.org\/22\/items\/CSPAN_20171011_054900_H.R._McMaster_on_National_Security\/CSPAN_20171011_054900_H.R._McMaster_on_National_Security.thumbs\/CSPAN_20171011_054900_H.R._McMaster_on_National_Security_000001.jpg"}},"autauthor":{"@type":"Organization"},"author":{"sameAs":"archive.org","name":"archive.org"}}],"coverageEndTime":"20240629T12:35:10+00:00"}