Cspan two. Politics at russian and the influence of russian president Vladimir Putin. Speakers include a russian journalist, a former u. S. Ambassador to russia and nato and the first Russian Foreign minister who served under Boris Yeltsin. This is just over an hour and a half. John good morning. My name is john herbst. I run the Eurasian Center here at the atlantic council. Thank you all for coming. We have a Wonderful Program for you this morning. And i should mention that this is part of our series on internal developments in russia. We began with a session in october on demography in russia. And this of course is on politics. Next month, we are doing a session on the russian economy, followed by a session a session probably in april on Energy Sector in russia. We have a real treat for you this morning. We have a wonderful lineup of speakers. I will not describe them except to say yevgenia albats, a topnotch journalist from moscow, who has written a very provocative and a fascinating paper on russia politically. Foreign minister kozyrev will comment on that, as will eugene rumer from carnegie. And ambassador and former deputy secretary nato, Sandy Vershbow will bat cleanup for us this morning. And with that i will turn it over to dr. Albats. Yevgenia thank you very much. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the ambassador, who invited me and asked me to write a paper to the council and the center. And thank you very much all for coming for this event. Institutional persistence, thats the main topic of the paper that i wrote, and then in this paper i argue that we have been witnessing the transformation of the regime in russia. Which is now just known in ,istory with italy, Mussolini Franco in spain and portugal. To be sure there is no conspiracy in the story i am outlining, i just argue that when putin has become the president of the russian broughton in 2000, he people from his old job, the kgb and over the years, they staffed all the way from the russian ernment to the upper edge apparatus and the government, the president ial administration. Percent of all jobs in the upper levels of the government were occupied by kgb, Army Officers and some from the intelligence group. Became viewed in the public sphere that the country is pretty much run by the people or byew up inside the their sons and daughters. We have been witnessing the formation of the clan of people who are united by the common , byground, common education their understanding of what is right and by the conflicts they develop after the soviet union collapsed and the new russia came in. It sult, to put , Boris Yeltsin announced Prime Minister putin as a successor. Percent were oppositions were out to buy by those who we usually call. The kgb grew. 10 years later, the number rose to 66. 7 . More than the numbers of positions from people from the kgb had in 1989 when gorbachev was the leader of the country. When you have this overrepresentation of people in alle institution layers of the government, they bring with the institute with them the institutional culture. They bring their understanding inwhat is right and wrong internal and external politics. Instruments they used and were useful back at the time when they were young and and everythingg was pretty much good for besides the numbers, there is also a clearcut line in the success of the kgb the, their capacity to influence the politics by using oppression and repression. There was nothing special about russia in that respect. Russia sees it self is a special entity, with a special mission in the world, and therefore theres Something Special about russia from the political side, there is nothing special about russia. In fact, from a political point of view, this kind of regime is very well known in south america, and it was the argentinian political scientist who first coined the term bureaucratic authoritarianism. It is the path of the regime built on the coalition of, in the case of latin america and south america military. In russia, it is people from the kgb and technocrats and bureaucrats who run the every day operations. In that respect, nothing special, nothing new. We saw the rise of fsb activities in terms of violence. That was a feature of that type of regime, where the notion of it made the military part of the coalition to use violence over the rule of law. It was a very distinguishable feature of that regime and it is exactly what you see in russia. Ever since 2012, there has been an eightfold rise of terror cases, which are investigated and prosecuted by the fsb in russia a threefold rise of cases of extremism. I am citing the paper, done by Nikolai Petrov formally with , andrmerly with carnegie also a wellknown columnist and writer in russia. They wrote a paper for the university of economics, and it was never published there as they were unable to publish it there. They were unable to publish it anywhere but in my magazine the new times. Most vividly, the rise of the fsb activities as a vehicle of violence is seen in all of the nomenklatura. As a result, the overall number, 26 deputy governors are under criminal investigation. Four governors are in jail awaiting trial. Mayors and deputy mayors are also under investigation from this side of the fsb. Inside the department of fsb,nal security of the they have created what is coined in the russian media, [indiscernible] the head, when he was the last Prime Minister, he helped to finance and create this special department inside the fsb, to conduct investigations against russian nomenklatura. There is immense corruption in the russian federation, and probably many of those under investigation have been involved in all kinds of illegal activities. The question is not the fact that they are being investigated, the question is, how those who are investigated were chosen. Because, there was not just a random choice, all those who were appointed by the onetime substitute of putin, dmitry medvedev, all of them are under criminal investigation right now. The former government of the poorest area of the russian federation, who went to grovel to the local fsb, and is now awaiting a 10 year sends to jail. A tenyear sentence. The future of russia, it is a long talk. I just want to point out to you, that there is good and bad news. The good news is that tend tolistic regimes be more unpredictable and more prone to all types of war, revenge with the neighbors, like in the case of the annexation of crimea, or the war in eastern ukraine. Corporative types of regimes are more stable, more persistent, and unfortunately more consolidated. Therefore, it is much difficult to expect positive change in russia. I would be happy to answer your questions with respect to this issue. Here, let me just say that there is one very interesting feature that we observe now among the new russian nomenklatura. Kgbously, those who were in offices in soviet times, there already in the mid 60s and some of them older than that, and they have their children, who have already joined the ranks of the russian nomenklatura. We call them hereditary captives, the children of the kgb they work in banks, stateowned banks. Over half of the stateowned banks are led by the greatest of the kgb. 25 heads of governmental agencies, are led by the greatest of the kgb. When talking about the children, what is interesting about that is that many of them went to boarding schools in the west, and some of them went through the universities in the west. I do not want to imply they absorbed the values of western democracy, they were aware that [indiscernible] however, what is important is that my hypothesis is that, these children who got their education in the west, they were they would not want to live in the closedcell named russia. I think they would like their children to be educated in the west because it is pretty much where they got the best level of education. The level of education in russia is unfortunately not good. They would like to have their children to go to boarding schools in switzerland and the united kingdom. They would like they acknowledge that they are making money inside russia but they prefer to live outside russia. The key to the soviet union the children of the nomenklatura i believe it can be a vehicle in bringing change and Democratic Development in russia. Again, i will stop here. I would just like to briefly there is a book that i love very much, and i think that political scientist at large overlooked alexis deby tocqueville. It is called the old regime and the french revolution. It talks about the problem of institutional persistence in other countries. I believe that tocquevilles study of the failure of the french revolution is applicable to the situation with the failure of the democratic revolution in russia. I am convinced that although they had no inkling of this, they took over from the old regime, not only most of its customs, conventions, but even those ideas which prompted our revolutionaries to destroy it. That in fact, although nothing was further from their intentions, they used of the debris from the old order to build up the new one. That is exactly what happened in russia in the 1990s. They used the debris of the old order, to build up the new one. Now, we are dealing with the consequences. Thank you. Host there was your vehicle. We will talk about that later. Mr. Minister, your comments please . Thank you. I was known for being softspoken and criticized by the opposition for that. If you expect arguments and fights here, you will probably be disappointed because when i entered the room this morning, i said, i like your research to her. Then, everyone who joined us gave the same opening quote i like your research. So, it will probably a mutual of herion Society Research and writings. Herrst started reading writings 30 years ago, she was almost a child. It was when we were working in the moscow news. From then on, for 30 years, i have agreed with everything that she writes and says. So that almost exhaust my comments. The only thing which i could add to that, is this notion of bureaucratic military and security forces. It occurs to me that it could be dated at least 30 years earlier, maybe 100 years earlier, or maybe hundreds of years earlier in russia. But that is probably to general of an observation. I think it was also the same in the soviet union. Stalin was supposed to be a single dictator, which he was, on one hand. But on the other hand, he created he was promoted by actuallyss, which was heir to the old ways and old bureaucracies, not necessarily the top level of the bureaucracy, but at least peasants brought to capitals, st. Petersburg and moscow, to work. In moscow, a lot of their ways and habits affected the soviet union. My impression is that this kind of structure, is coming in a vicious circle. Why is it so repetitious, even after major upheavals and revolutionary events, which look on the surface at least, as a major revolutionary event, such as in 1917, or 1918 that is a little bit of mystery of history. It is not political, it just so happens that history anyway, that is what i can offer as the debris of both debris of both soviet and he failed democratic regime in russia. Thank you. Host let me ask a specific question, perhaps i should have foreshadowed this before, what do you think of the corporatist thesis in the paper, and what is the meaning of that for developments Going Forward in russia . Your take them up these . First of all, am very glad to be here. Thank you for the lead. It is hard to argue with eminent personalities and people who really know firsthand the development of the russian system. I think there is a certain amount of tensions in the thesis, in that corporate systems to my mind imply a degree of competition, among orporatist entities. It is not an authoritarian regime. I think you described them both in the paper and in your presentation it is really one corporation, or one clan that is in charge. As i was reading the paper, and thinking about my own very brief remarks, i could not help but think that one record of analysis and predictions is pretty poor in the last 30 years. We have been there multiple times to predict the nature of pivotal points in the revolution or revolutions in russian domestic politics. Looking forward to the next six years, because i think of movement in russian domestic politics in terms of president ial terms, and we are little more than a month away from the next president ial election. I have to say, i really do not see much of a possibility of change in the system, that to my mind came into being probably in 90s. Ddle to the early i think some have described it as the clan basis, and i think it will still survive by that time. Fundamentally, the distinctions are there, russian Traditional Society went away and what was left was the competition for power among various clans. In our Political Science, there is a greater degree of openness in the system. This system continues to the present day, facilitated to a large extent by the 1993 , which created the super presidency that in the , 1990s was very weekend and basically reduced to one clan, the family centered in the kremlin. A number of other clans rose to prominence and justified the name of being oligarchs. Since then, we have seen considerable change in the balance of power, between the kremlin and these clans. The kremlin perhaps as was pointed out, by dr. Albats, they gained the upper hand. In the time that Vladimir Putin has been in office, it has asserted itself much more than first among equals. The Competition Among various interest still survives. I do not think it has been completely eliminated, and at times, when the system feels uncertainty or weakness as was the case in 20072008, in the time of president putins second a second term and questions about the transition, i think we may be coming up on something similar in the years to come. This is not to say by any means, that we are approaching a major transition in domestic politics. All signs point to a pretty stable arrangement with very few internal or external challenges. But this uncertainty about what will happen post 2024, post Vladimir Putins next term, i i think opens up the conversation in a way that has not been opened up until now. For the next six years, i emphasize the system appears quite able to handle the uncertainty and any sources of domestic discontent. Certainly, we are seeing elements of domestic discontent now. Dr albats has been very prominent in describing the noncandidacy candidacy of alexei navolny. He is not a Major Political challenge to the system, but i think there is a degree of uncertainty there. A challenge domestic to the system that we ought to be thinking about in certain ways. I do not think he will be a really systemic change, but really an alignment. My question to both my colleagues who spoke before me, i would say, what do you make of this very strange president ial campaign . With alexei navolny being marginalized in terms of the process, but still playing a huge role as a voice voice for many in the young generation, and then there is the other candidate, who at first appeared to be handpicked by the kremlin and who is going to be in washington soon. It raises a very uncomfortable question i think, for the system, how to handle it. R sheerere thei presence and raising of questions in the public sphere, it seems to make the kremlin uncomfortable. The same goes for the communist Party Candidate who also seems to be pushing the boundaries of the conversation with up to now has been quite stilted. As a followup to our prepared remarks, we ought to consider the next six years, i think. I am tempted to say that in conclusion the title of this panel is the direction of russian domestic politics, i think of it going in circles, but maybe it is a movement along a spiral, and i will leave it at that. Sandy, any comment on the corporatist thesis, specifically on the Foreign Policy side of this, if any . Ok. Thank you very much, it is great to be on a panel with yevgeny. Back in the ambassador days, he taught me a lot about the system as it was beginning to emerge back then. I am quite convinced by the case in your paper that the regime has become more like a corporation than a personal dictatorship, although it obviously has elements of both. I think some of the statistics you marshaled have been quite impressive and also extremely the steadywith growth and dominance of all levels of the system, with the kgb veterans. I was intrigued by the notes there and i would encourage , everyone read the paper when it is issued, which highlights the role of key institutions best service for the protection of the council order, which are under different names under the soviet. And have been under the soviet period and were instrumental in protecting the strength of the regime. Some interesting anecdotes about how Vladimir Putins order seems to have been overridden, which creates more evidence behind this idea of a corporatist structure, rather than a single strongman calling all the shots. At one point though, you suggested that the corporation was dictating to him, all but i think that is too strong. They still need him as the dispenser of the illicit wealth. Of course, he is one of them, so it is not like they have a different agenda. But i think the rest of the corporation needs his popularity, some of which is genuine, in the sense of being an antiBoris Yeltsin, who in some ways, brought stability to russia. If he were to get run over by a bus tomorrow, likeminded people would be poised to take his place, at least in the short whether other short term. Whether other people of the corporation would maintain the cohesion among themselves, if they were to do so, that is an open question. If the young generation are going to be a force for liberalization, he might be in the short term, but that is something that we can hope pans out on the road. This is clearly something which is not new, todays kgb incorporated or whatever you want to call it, is the culmination of trends which began in Vladimir Putins first term. We saw that increasing intolerance of real opposition, the shift to a rubberstamp parliament, repression of the media, ngos engaged in human rights activitie