Of a major new fdd report. Maximum pressure 2. 0 a plan for north korea. The report offers an actionable and multifaceted plan focused on the denuclearization of north korea. Today in north korea, we have a young mercurial, brutal, and ruthless despot, kim jongun, armed with Nuclear Weapons, and Ballistic Missiles, using both to threaten america and americas allies. You may have seen reports earlier in the week in the Washington Times that a highlevel defector from north korea sent a letter to President Trump. The defector warned the administration that kim jongun is unlikely to give up his Nuclear Weapons absent significant pressure. Consistent with the recommendations and fdds new report, which will be discussed today, the defector urges allout sanctions, what our authors Call Information and influence operations. While we understand people of good faith may disagree in the path forward, it is clear that u. S. Policy, over decades, by republican and democratic administrations alike, has failed to achieve significant progress toward the denuclearization of this threatening regime and this threatening dynasty. Fdd, you may know, has launched three centers that seek to integrate elements of American Power in order to achieve better results for Americas National security. Our new report benefits from the work of all three centers. It provides detailed, actionable recommendations for american policy makers. We will here today from experts hear here today from experts with experience and intelligence, cyber warfare, defense, and sanctions to help build a holistic picture of what a maximum pressure 2. 0 policy against north korea needs to look like. I want to note that todays program is one of many we host throughout the year. For more information on all of our work and our areas of focus, we encourage you to visit our website, its just fdd. Org. We are glad to be joined today by a distinguished audience of diplomats, representatives from congress, the department of state, the pentagon, activeduty military personnel, many experts from the policy community and the media. Most of this audience knows that fdd is a nonpartisan policy institute. We take no for an Foreign Government money, no foreign corporate funding. I will also note that todays event is on the record and will be livestreamed, recorded, and will be broadcast on cspan. I ask you to kindly silencer silence your cellphones. I encourage you to join in on todays conversation by using twitter, fdd. Just fdd. With that, i am pleased to introduce our first speaker, the honorable juan c. Zarate. A wickedly brilliant and always charming, juan is the cochairman and founder of fdds center on economic and financial power. He also serves as chairman and cofounder of the financial integrity network. Prior to that, he was National Security advisor to president george w. Bush. Please join me in welcoming juan zarate. [applause] hon. Zarate thank you, clifton, for the incredibly kind introduction. It is really an honor to be here. I was joking a bit with allie, who has helped organize the event. Allie always does a great job. I was coming to learn and sit in the back and have a nice lunch, and i was asked to present. I am honored to present, especially before such undistinguished such a distant west panel. I have learned in the publishing world, you have to show the product. It is actually a great report. We will get into that in just a moment. I want to talk a little bit about what the centers are doing and my experience with north korea, and that will lead into the great work that brad and david have done with the report and the panel. Just a few weeks ago, i was honored to be on stage with dr. Samantha ravitch and h. R. Mcmaster, general mcmaster, to talk about the work of the three centers here at fdd. The center on military political military and political power led by h. R. Mcmaster and brad bowman, the center for cyber and Technology Innovation led by samantha ravitch, aided by any by annie fixler, and of course, our center on economic and financial power that i chair and is led by eric warber. That day, we talked about a number of threats, number of issues, including north korea. And largely, the ambition of the centers in the work we are doing at fdd would result in innovative, impactful, strategic work on things that matter to fundamental american National Security. And that is exactly why we are here today and exactly what this report represents. It represents the best thinking of those three centers and the great work of brad bowman and dave maxwell and the authors. Todays event and the report could not come at a better time, as those of you know, those who followed north korea closely, north korea and its leadership is returning to the well rehearsed playbook of bluster and brinksmanship. Timed neatly to our holidays. Those of us who worked in the white house often suffered holidays dealing with north koreas recalcitrance and brinkmanship in hopes of achieving premature lifting of sanctions and international brixon ship. In hopes of achieving premature lifting of sanctions and international pressure, north korea has reportedly conducted a very significant test at a satellite launch site, and there are indications that we may see more provocation soon from kim jongun. As the report notes, north Koreas Nuclear biological and chemical weapons programs as well as its Ballistic Missile program and developments represent a grave threat to the u. S. And our allies. North korea also represents a threat to the Financial System and international norms. North korea is a rogue force for instability. Now, the Trump Administration deserves credit for focusing on this issue, giving it attention, and accelerating policy work, and also bringing the north korean regime to the negotiating table. But unfortunately, as the report notes and as we know, the Pressure Campaign has not achieved progress toward its objective, the denuclearization of north korea. And so, for these reasons, now more than ever, we need sober and clear thinking, we need good analysis, and we need specific recommendations to think about a next steps. That is what this report does. Washington sometimes struggles with the idea of broad, longterm strategies, or integration of all elements of National Power in pursuit of strategic objectives, but the intent of this report is to break those orthodoxies and those approaches and to think collectively and constructively about what that means. I was very fortunate in government to work at the Treasury Department and the white house on these issues, as some of you may know. When i served in the administration, one of the things we tried to do was to pierce through some of these paradigms and orthodoxies that north korea cant be sanctioned or pressured anymore. The idea that we had thought through all of the potential vulnerabilities and elements of pressure that were possible. In fact, when we looked at the map of the world and north koreas economies and dependencies, there was recognition that there was more to be done, much more to be done in terms of what those dependencies and decisionmaking looked like in pyongyang, and what we could do to affect the decisionmaking. Precisely that led to the interagency efforts to look at the range of north korean vulnerabilities, in particular, in the illicit finance contacts, finance context, what led to the section 311 action against asia in september of 2005, and what led to the most significant pressure put on north korea, at least in that period, and the diplomacy that then followed. And to the diplomacy that then followed. To those of you who remember that episode, for two years thereabouts, north korea began and ended every Nuclear Negotiation with we want our money back. We want the pressure relieved from those actions. And so, the ability to bring all elements of National Power together for sustained Pressure Campaign, to do so when a way do so in desha do so in a way do so when away that breaks through some of these orthodoxies, is really important. Especially as north korea returns to its classic playbook of requiring concessions without conceding or honoring its own commitments, something this report talks a little bit about. So this maximum pressure 2. 0 report delineates the right next steps. The report has chapters on diplomatic, military, cyber, sanctions, and Information Tools of power, and it has at its core the principle that American Power is ultimately what deters north korean aggression. Each chapter includes specific recommendations in each of these categories, and the goal ultimately is to constrain north korea, reduce various threats it poses, affect decisionmaking, and ultimately avoid war. When considered together, these recommendations do provide a plan b that this administration and perhaps others to follow should and can implement without delay. Once again, i am very proud to be a part of fdd, proud of the centers we have built, proud of the concept of bringing innovative thinking together for realworld solutions for the American People and our allies. I look forward to hearing from David Maxwell, his summary of the report in more detail, and then hearing the Panel Discussion to be moderated and led by brad bowman, who is also the coeditor and author of the report. With that, allow me to handed over to dave maxwell, senior fellow here at fdd, coeditor and author of the report, army veteran, patriot, and one of washingtons leading experts on north korea. David . [applause] mr. Maxwell good afternoon. Thank you to juan for those excellent remarks. They really set the stage for the discussion of our report. Before i provide an overview, let me say i am here representing a great team that collaborated on this report. First as noted, the senior director for the center of military and political power, brad bowman, will moderate the panel. He used to lead on this project and really drove the process and is responsible for the excellent collaboration and coordination and putting this together. He coauthored the introduction chapters. I would like to recognize the expert who coauthored the military, cyber, and influence activity chapters. Ixler is the Deputy Director of cyber and cowrote the cyber chapter. David usher has probably done more than anyone i know to exert pressure in north korea. I hope the u. S. Government will call on his expertise for some of the great work that can be reprised so that we can execute a maximum pressure 2. 0 strategy. Leslie, the editing team that all the behind the scenes work to bring this together and Danny Ackerman is a person who designed the excellent graphics and turn this into what a think is a visually stunning report. We began to conceive this report following kim jonguns failure at the hanoi summit. Is his failure because he has been unable to get premature sanctions relieved from the u. S. From south korea and the International Community. In april, he put an expiration mance withe bro President Trump. Were coming near the end of the deadline with the rhetoric. We are seeing kim practicing the seven decades old blackmail diplomacy facebook, using tensions and provocations to get political and economic concessions. 2017 was the year of fire and fury. 2000 and team through the june through june 2018 of 2019 was diplomacy. He met with all major leaders in , Prime Minister of a of japan. We are at an election point. What will kim say in his new years address and what will be his next provocation . We offer this report to the white house and the policymakers and specifically to the u. S. Strategy group established less thereby u. S. And Korean Special representatives. The combined Strategy Group is that you can want sure that we move forward in a synchronized way that serves iraq and u. S. Alliance interests. This report is based on new assumptions to two assumptions. One cap believes concessions woolly to denuclearization. Another believes coercive external pressure will lead to denuclearization. The third camp argues for the right combination of both. However, it is very possible and very likely that kim has no intention of denuclearizing. Our strategy must reflect that fact. A report of some snow outside pressure alone will cause kim to make the right Strategic Decisions in return for a brighter future. We assume it is only when kim faces a significant internal threat that will cause him to recalibrate. He must realize from that internal threat that the threat of possessing a clear weapons is greater than giving them up. And until he feels that internal pressure, he is unlikely to ever change. The external pressure can and contributed this condition, but as it now stands, in kim kims calculus, he needs Nuclear Weapons for survival and to support his blackmail democracy and ultimate objective, which is of course unification of the Korean Peninsula under the domination of what i like to call the guerrilla dynasty. That is of course in order to ensure regime survival. Someleads to the second of sugared we see no evidence kim has abandoned the seven decades use tension and coercion and the use of force to achieve unification. We assume he will not give this up in response to the current or any policy. Kim believes the conditions will be right when the u. S. Alliance is ended and u. S. Forces are removed from the Korean Peninsula and extended to terms in the Nuclear Umbrella over south korea and japan are eliminated. This is also the description of both the security guarantee that as aemands and as all definition of u. S. Hostile policy. Must beu. S. Alliance viewed through the regime through the lens of the regime strategy. On the one hand, the shared values of the iraqu. S. Alliance. Freedom and liberty, free market economy, and human rights. On the opposite end are the kim family regime values, which of jongunism,im canada and ill of human rights ticket kim jongun empower. Human rights to keep kim jongun in power. Paul smith describes warfare vest. The use of political means to propel an opponent to do ones will. Based on hostile intent. This very much describes what we might call kim jonguns unique Political Warfare. What weso a form of talked about in the paper, in which kim jongun is trying to play both President Trump and the International Community just as his father manipulated the Six Party Talks and his grandfather manipulated in 1950. This is in the dna of the kim family regime. From northn escapee korea wrote to provide advice on how to address this. We hope to complement that advice. Bottom line, the challenge now is for the iraq and u. S. Alliance to figure out an acceptable and durable political arrangement that will advance u. S. And iraq u. S. Alliance interests on the peninsula and in northeast asia. The alliance has to determine the ways and means to achieve that goal. These must include new International Diplomatic efforts, military enhancements, supporting cyber activities in defense and offense, and sanctions enforcement and robust information and influence activities campaign, including a strong focus on human rights. The working group must carefully develop a new strategy, a plan b, or maximum pressure 2. 0 based on the recognition that kim jongun may never agree to denuclearize and will always seek to dominate the peninsula. I would like to highlight some of the key concepts described in a report. Well we are recommending a maximum pressure 2. 0 strategy, we want to give every chance for diplomacy to work. This must be done through working level negotiations without prematurely lifting negotiateuntil they in good faith and take steps toward denuclearization. Untilmust be no summits working level negotiations produce an agreement. At the same time, the u. S. Must continue to take the lead in the effort to crack down on the regimes global illicit activities in human rights abuses, such as overseas slave labor. Comply, wes do not recommend u. N. And other action. We must make sure cam understands all military options are always on the table. When he to strengthen cooperation and implement an effective diplomacy campaign and make human rights a priority. We must also target chinese and russian obstruction in support of the north. There could be no degradation of the military commitment to the alliance to Deter North Korea from attacking the south. The alliance must maintain the capability to rapidly defeat the north Korean Peoples army. Should kim jongun order an attack. We have seen no reciprocal action from the north. South korea negotiated the conference of military agreement to reduce tensions, and while there was initial compliance such as removing guard posts, the militarizing joint security areas, there have been no confidence Building Measures in the north to correspond to the ones being implemented by the iraqu. S. Alliance. As we speak today, 1. 2 million personnel, military personnel are conducting the annual winter Training Cycle from december through march. This is a larger training combinedthan any iraqu. S. Of. We must strengthen the exercise program, address the onesided aspect of the com