Decision in this case is the first time i a court in our nations hisry has held that congress violated the appropriationslause by enacting a statute providing funding. This court should uphold the cfpbs funding statute becau it is firmly grounded in constitutional text and in historical practice dating back to the founding. The text of the constitution shows that when the framers one to limit congress apopriations authority they did so expressly. While the framers restricted apopriations for the army to two years, they applied no similar limits on appropriations for any other agency. Hiory confirms that. Since the Founding Congress has consistely funded agencies through standing appropriations that are n timlimited and that provide significant discretion over how much to spend. The First Congress didxactly this at the very first agency it created the Customs Service, and the same i true for of the founding era agencies including the post office, the national mint, the Patent Office, renue officers and the national bank. And congress is use this kind of appropriation as the default when funding financial regulators including the fedal reserve board, the office of the comptroller o the currency, the deral deposit insurance corporation, the National Credit unio administration, the farm credit administratnd the federal Housing Finance agency. The cfpbs appropriations that squarely in this unbroken line of the historical practice. In fact, congress exercise significantly more discretion d control over the bureaus funding by capping its annual appropriation in anunt that is far lower than many other agencies budgets. Respondent argued t combination of features in the cfpbs statute violate some previously unrecognized tutional line. At the bureaus appropriation is materiallyical to the numerous funding statute i just listed, and respondentsde the statutes are constitutiona this court to reject respondents attemp gerrymandered able to fit the cfpb aloneut providing a coherent theory about to interpret and apply the appropriations clause. I welcome the courts questions. General, other than passing and appropriations law, are there any limits on what congress can do . So ihink at the outset as your question touches on, Justice Thomas come the term appropriation itself contain some essential requirements. So that term is defined to mean about the provides for funding and the specifies both the source and the purpose of the funding. Thats how it appropriation was dened at the founding. Its how its always been understood and that still so it is defined today in sources lik the junior redbook which is congresses own appropriations treaty. We think at theutset is not just any old ball b a lot of the contains beseeches the constitutes an appropriation. I think the question becomes are the other limits out there on how congress can structure funding for particular typ o activities or governmen functions we know from the army propriations clause the answer is yes with respect t that particular government function. Theres a durational limit and its based on the nature of activity because the framers were specifically concerned about having a Standing Army. The army appropriaon clause itself demonstrates there are not otherwise constraint in the appropriations clause that would limit congress at how itides to structure the funding. So beyon the initial almost skeletal requirementsuration and purpose, there is an, if i other condition . T, there is no we donthink the appropriations clause p of limits on congresstself when it enacts the funditute. But i do want to emphasize that our argument also relies heavily on history if you have in mind some kind of funding statute or arrangement that is never been done at all of this nations history i think the court could te that into account in a future case. Herehat we have a specific type of appropriatis, a capped lumpsum appropriation that is standing for a Single Agency. Our historical argument is that this is nothing new or unprecedented recall of the agencies i listed had simil appropriations. S there anyole in appropriatio, that propriations plays in separation of powers . It seems that at least wn i did, was an execuve branch, that congress exercise appropriation to check the executive branch to some extent. If there is in this case, what would be in the case of cfpb, how would that play out . I do agree and think a course of the critica albert of the separation of powers that congress has conol over the purse. Our argument is tha congress has exercised that power. This court is looking at a statute that congres itself enacted that set up this funding chanism for the cfpb which is similar in kind to the way that congress has funded of the financial eviscerate the kind of exacting control that congress usually exercises inhe appropriations process . I dont. To the extent this queion is present on the annual propriations as a counterpart, i think the qstion becomes doeshe constitution limit congress with respect t the duration of appropriations . Is there expcit limit and the text the court can defe that Means Congress in contrast to other laws which of course can remain in effect until the future congress acts, is congress limited in how long to leave appropriations in effect . There i think the Army Appropriations clause does a lot of work becau its not like the framers were not aware o this dynamic. They thought specifi about the fact appropriations like all other laws might be continuing indefini until the future congress acts, and the were concerned about that with respect to a Standing Army but they didnt otherwise o limit congress authority. General, one of the things that strike ms of reading it, you have a very aggressive vie of congress authority under t appropriations clause. Im not saying remotely that thats not correct but it struck me, you represent the executive branch as well. And its a very strong power given to congress. And it struck me that the reason you would want to defend that is because it gives them more power to give away. Legend has it thereav been times when the same party coed both houses of congress and the white house, and it situation you can e congress empowering the present in aay that might seem unusual to the framers. So keeping in mind that, that balance, in other words, its kind of paradoxical, the mor power you give congress i think, think this is your friends argument on the other side, theres more that can give away andce the authority the executive. Is that a, and unpersuasive concern . Certainly i dont think it is unpersuasive concern but built into your queion as undersod, mr. Chief justice, was the idea thataybe congress could do something that would be surprising or anomalous to the framers. I guess what i would say is if you look at it through that lens then history should play a powerful role in trying to understand the limits or scope of homage cgress can give away when it becomes too much. Here the court does need to articulate any outer limits because weave a specific type of approprtion that is far more cstrained and many that conversation enacted throughout history becauseongress provided funding for Single Agency and capped that about the fun in an amount not to exceed the cap set by congress for its pretty unusual to have that agency drawing, been able to request how mh ever wants subject to limit that it only has a got very close to over the years from an entity that is also drawing in money from the private sector. Didnt see any particularly compelling historical analogues to that. Well let me speeded to the extent that takes awa from the appropriations power, its equivocally enhances the power of the executive. So i disagree that theres anything unprecedented about this funding arrangement when you look at t relevant constitutional value of protecting cgresses prerogative. I know there are a lot of different moving parts and pieces to the auments respondents have made it as understand it they are attacking four features of the funded facts statu or the standing at standing appropriations, rains a place and is notnlimited. That against the director of the cfpb some discretion to act within the statutory cap and requesting the funding. Third, that the cfpbas enforcement and regulatory functions and forth ce as your question touched on, that the cfpbs funding comes in the source that is not in the words constrained by Market Forces. But we haveumerous examples of agencies that have all four of those relevant characteristics. I fear at the outset we dont for the functions of the Market Forces constraint are relevant but even taking the argument on its own terms i can give you founding era examples, customs or in the revenue officers were funded with the kind of mechanism. They have standing appropriations for the Custom Service it. It was uncapped. These were powerful regulatory entities. The Customs Service aboard ships and seize vessels at the spec records and conduct searches and level penalties and colle fines, and just a way to avoid that kind of regulatn. The market cstint theory that the users could justpt out our regulated parties could decide not to fund the operations doesnt app t those agencies. It still because of many ofhe financial regulators today tk the ones i would put on that list are the Federal Reserve board, the fdic, the ncua, the farm credit administration, and the fhfa. General, unsorted hermaphrodites want to understand follow up on the chief justices question. Dash im sorry to interrupt. Is essential feature to the constitution of this provision orou Congress Passed the same l wh no upper limit allowing the executive branch to determine however much it wished to take . Site dont think tha congress would have to prode statutory specified amount but it would of course have to specify the purpose of the funding. Budgets on the amount, your three doesnt turn on there being an upper limit . Are theory doesnt turn on it because take 1 trillion, if, if you wish to do so. No, because congress itself has specified the direct is limited to the amount the phrase when necessary to carry out federal if the president determines that w rently necessary to take 1 a trillion dollars, t would satisfy your concern. And on the appropriations clause itself has no upper limit constraint. I think that would violate the statute and the same theoretical possible exist with all of the other financial regulators ive been discussing but if you disagree, of course here we have sed is i just find understand your theory thats all you try to do. Are theory is written in history. Congress has appropriate in this way without a cap for time immemorial in 1789 on. How about on the lower end of e skill . What is the president o was the appropriate some . Im not going to take money. I dont like the cfpb, you know. I dont think it is necessary to take another dollar. Could the president do that . I think that would pilot the statute as well sp talking about appropriations clause. So think that congress itself has specified the purpose and so i think that if the president f the cfpb director didnt comply, tha wld be a violation and i would expect congress to step in and change th funding mechanism. All of these possibilities exist with respect to countless other appropriations. All of the other finanal regulars for example, likis i understand the practical realities and i appreciate them and it is to thetatutory arguments. Im just trying to understand. Is anything would prohibit the president ro the appropriations clause clg whether to take zero dollars which we for reestablishing a take 1 trillion . I dont think the appropriations clause would be a check, althoughfourse congress could exercise its authority and the spar ove the purse to chain to the discretion that is provided to require the president or the direct of the agency to take a particular amount. Can ask a question about the treasury . The professors of constitutional law and history say lte the appropriations clauset apply at all because these funds not being drawn from the treasury. You agree with that . Its not the argument you made. E are not making that argument. Weccepted the appropriation clause was the weakest of the trim and the constitution referred to the public treasury as a general matter, that specifical t the Treasury Department. At the timef the founding ratification the Treasury Department had not even been create a thats also how this court has described the scopef the appropriations clause i cases like opm versus richmond we rerred to public monies generally. Of course theontrary approach would expose the gaping loophole and congress authority bau would mean the executive it has funds thatre not helping the general treasury has been Even Without Congress appropriating in the first place. T authority are the money, the monien the cfpbs budget appropriated moneys . So for constitutional purposes just because congress estaisd the funding statute and it has both the source and funny. Within the meaning of the constitution this countssn appropriation. That a opm and executive branch, ngo and congress under since the source of the funding. What to mef the provision in doddfran a which has that the bureau fund, will, shall not be construed to be Government Funds appropriated moneys . Soha was congress try to control for the interaction tween this funding mechanism and of the background rules that apply to appropriations they go through the annualpppriation process. There a rules about things like procurement and whether you can use appropriate meys in essence the litigation expenses, miscellaneous state requires agency to deposit the revenues in the general treasur and some of his background rulesou actually interfere with the funding that conrsion tended for this agency. It was just try to control for the intaction there. Other agencies have that statement is incorrect. In the doddfrank act itself is incorrect. These are appropriated moneys . I dt think that statutory provision w taking a stance on th constitutional question of whether this fits t definition of an appropriation within the meaningfhe constitution. As i mentioned congress has used this formulation for other agencies as well like the occ and the fca and again its all intended to just allow congress to control for the interaction of various statutory provisions in ts c. Doesnt does it use itt office, for the mint and other agencies of that nature. Was justice sotomayor, im not familiar withheer this particular language apprs in the statutes governing the post office. The post office was ogilly creadnd founded in 1792 and so its not cle some of these of the background rules existed. Certainly we can point to an example today including the occ and the fca which had the same li wd and its meant to ensure again theres no disruption with the funny operatn way congress can i go back to Justice Thomas question . Ers appear to be, im sorry, a bit congested, there appears to be bound up in this question ofhe appropriations bill, the sepati of powers and nondelegation. Now, i kno the court below said nondelegation was forfeited. Not quite sure i understand it, maybe you could explain it to me w separation of power is different fromonelegation. Why wasnt the other . But do you see tse other provisions, separation of power, nlegation, as having a place in other constitutional provisions beses the appropriations clause . And if it has noce here, why not . Yes. I think obviously these concepts of separation of powers and the scope of the appropriations clause andonelegation principles have in many respects poteia overlapping functions this context. We interested respondents to be making an argument about the appropriations clause in particular and that fifth circuit found they had tt simply raise a nondelegation challenge. Guess what i would say as to the extent the crt is thinking about this fro t perspective of general separation of powers principles, the tngs the court generally consults and understandinghetructural provisions of the constitio are, first, the text and second, the history. Those indicatorsf intent are overwhelmingly on our side. The cou i thinking about some delegation principles there you would have to lookt history and as Justice Scalia emphasized inis concurring opinion, if you look aoss the course of history from 1789 on, it has it has beenn the appropriations contextard by very broad delegations of authority to the executive branch to spend within the bounds set by congress. In the very first appropriation ws were structured like this one and a sense ofroviding executive could spend up to a cap set by congress. Tnk the claims what you thin aut the argument response our present is under the appropriations clause but i mechanize as a course to get more broadly about these issues the other doctors could come into play. General, could i take you back to the light of qstning for your Justice Gorsuchs talking abt . In your reply brief on page 1 you discussed a standing appropriation of up to a quadrillion dollars f t president to find besides the my so just on this questio o where your outer limits are and what theory we might use to say there are some limits,ha do you want to say about thator of stute . Would that be a constitutional olation . If so, why so . And why is that different from this . Yes. So that statute as wenderstand it would be cpletely unprecedented. It would effectively take the whole ofoness appropriations authority and transfer it to the executive branch. Congress has never done that for the past 230 years and its hard for meo imagine congress and wou d that. But if they could the crt were confronted with the issue in n future case they could will recognize lit and the limits would come from history. The court in any number of paration of powers cases has said that the fact that a method of structuring government haso historical precedent can strongly counsel against recognizing it as a cotitional way to proceed. That w analysis set in Free Enterprise fund, a reped to have been seila law b that history works both ways. The court has likewise said a fact that away structuring government is well rooted in history and trace it back to the founding is powerful evidence that the contemporaneous understanding of original intent. Thats the box we are in her i guess i would the cour