Decision in this case is the first time in a court in our nations history has hel that congress violated the appropriations clause by enacting a statute providing funding. This court should uphold the cfpbs funding statute because it is firmly grounded in constitutional text and in historical practice dating back to the founding. The text of the constitution shows that when the framers one to limit Congress Appropriations authority they did so expressly. While the framers restricted appropriationsor the army to two years, they applied no similar limits on appropriations for any other agency. History confirms that. Since the Founding Congress has consistently fundedgencies through standing appropriations that are not timelimited and that provide significant discretion over how much t spend. The First Congress did exactly this at the very first agency it create t customserce, and the same isru for of the founding era agencsncluding the post office, the national mint, the patent office, revee officers and the national bank. And congress is use thisin of propriation as the dau when funding financial regulators including the Federal Reserve board, the office of the comptroller of the currency, the federalepit insurance corporation, the National Credit union administration, the Farm Credit Administration and the federal Housing Finance agency. The c appropriations that squarely in this unbroken line of the historical practice. In fact,gress exercise significantly more discretion and conver the bureaus funding by capping its annual appropriation in an amount is far lower than many other agencies budgets. Respondent argued the combination of features in the statute violate some previously unrecognized constitution line. At the bureaus appropriation is materially identical t numerous funding statute it listed, and respondents concede the statutes are constitutional. Court to reject respondents attempt to gerryed able to fit the cfpb alone without providing a coherent theory about to interpret and apply the appropriations clause. I welcome the courts questions. General, other than passing and appropriations law, are there any limits on what congress can do . So i think at the outset as your questn touches on, Justice Thomas come the term appropriation itself contain some eential requirements. Sohat term is defined to mea about the provides for funding and the specifies both the soce and the purpose of the funding. Thats how it appropriation was defined at t founding. Its how its always been unrstood and that still so it is defined today in sources like the junior redbook which is ngresses own appropriations treaty. We think at the outset isot just any old ball but a lot of the contains beseeches the constitutes anppropriation. I think the question becomes are the other limits out there on how congress can structure funding for particular type of activities or government functions we know from the army appropriio clause the answer is yes with respect toha particular gernment function. Theres a durational limit and its based on the nature of acvi because the framers were specifically concerned about having a Standing Army. The Army Appropriations claus itself demonstrates there are not otherwise constraint in the appropriations clause that would limit congress at how it decides to structure the funding. So beyond the initial almost skeletal requirements duratio and purpose, there is an, if i hear youre right there is no otondition . We dont think appropriations clause places of limits on congress itself when it enacts the funding statute. But i do want to emphasize that our aument also relies heavily on history. If you have in mind some kind of funding statute or arrangement that is never been done at all of this nions history i think the court could take that into account in a future case. Here that we have a specific type of appropriations, a cped lumpsum appropriation that is standing for a Single Agency. Our historical argument is that this is nothing new or unprecedented recall of the agencies i listed had similar appropriations. Is there any rolen appropriations, that appropriatio plays in separation of powers . It seems that at least when i did, was an executive branc that congress exercise appropation to check the executive branch to some extent. If there is in this case, what would be in the case of cfpb, how would that playut . I do aee and think a course of the critical albert of the separation ofowers that congress has control over the purse. Our argument is that congrs has exercised that power. This court is looking at a statute that congress itself enacted that set up this funding mechanism f the cfpb which is similar in kind to the way that congress has funded of the financial eviscerate the kd of exacting control that congress usually exercises in the appropriations process . I dont. To the extent this question is present on the annual appropriatio as a counterpart, i think the question becomes does the constition limit congress with respect to the duration of appropriations . Is there explicitimit and the text the court can define that meansongress in contrast to other laws which of course can remainn effect until the future coness acts, is congress limited in how long to leave aropriations in effect . There i think the Army Appropriations clause does a lot of work because its not like the framers were not aware of this dynamic. They thought specific about t fact appropriations like all her laws might be continuing indefinite until theuture congress acts, and they wer concerned aut that with respect to a Standing Army but they didnt otherwise o limit congress authority. General, one of the things that strike me as o reading it, you have a very aggressive view of congress authority under the appropriations clause. Im not saying remotely that thats not correct but it struck me, you represent the executive branchs well. And its a very song power given to congress. And it struck me that the reason you would want to defend that is because it gives them more power to give away. Legend has it there haveeen times when the same party controlled bot hses of congress and the white house, and in that situation you can see cones empowering the present in a way t might seem unusual to theramers. So keeping in mind that, that in balance, in other words, its kind of paradoxical, the more wer you give congress i think, i think is your friends argument on the other side, theres more that it can give away and enhance the authority of the executive. That a, and unpersuasive concern . Certainly i dont think it is unpersuasive concern but built into your question as understood, mr. Cef justice, was the idea that maybe cgress could do something that would be surprising or anomalous to the framers. I guess what would say is if you look at it through that lens then history should play a powerfulole in trying to understand the limits or scope of homage congress can give away when it becomes too much. Here the courtoes need to artilate any outer limits because we have a specific type of appropriation thats far more constrained and many that conversation enacted throughout history because congress provided funding for Single Agency and capped that about the fun in an amount not to exceed theap set by congress for its pretty unusual to have that agency drawing, been able to request how much everants subject to limit that it only has aot very close to over the years from an entity that is so drawing in money fromhe private sector. I didnt s any particularly compelling historical analogues to that. Well let me speeded to the extent that takes away from the appropriations power, its equivocally enhances the power of the executive. So i disagree that theres anything unprecedented about this funng arrangement when you look at the relevant constitutional value of protecting congresses prerogative. I know there are a lot of different moving parts and pieces to the arguments respondents have made it as understand it they are attacking four features of the funded facts statute or the standing at standing appropriations, remains a place and is not unlimited. That against the director of the pb some discretion to act within the statutory cap and requesting the funding. Third, that the cfpb has enforcement and regulatory functions and forth come as your question touched on, that the cfpbs funding comes in the source that is not in the words nstrained by Market Forces. But we have numerousxamples of agencies that have all four of those relevant charactistics. I fear at the oset we dont for the functions of the Market Forces constraint are relevt but even taking the argumen on its own terms i can give you founding era examples, customs or in the revenue officers were funded with the kind of chanism. They have standing appropations for the Custom Service it. It was uncapped. These were powerful regulatory entities. The Customs Service aboard ships andei vessels at the sc records and conduct searches and level penalties and collect fines, and just a way to avoid that kind of regulation. E market constraint theory that the users could just opt out our regulated parties could dede not to fund the operations doesnt apply to those agencs. It still because of many of the financial regulators today took the ones i would put on that stre the Federal Reserve board, the fdic, the ncua, the Farm Credit Administration, and the fhfa. General, unsorted hermaphrodites want to understand follow up on the chief justicesueion. Dash im sorry to intru. Is that essenaleature to the cotition of this provision or could Congress Passed the same law with n upper limit allowing the executive branch to determine however mucht wished to take . Site dont think that coress would have to provide statutory specified amount but it would of course have to spif the purpose of the funding. Budgets on the amount, your three doesnt turn on there being an upper limit . Are theory doesnt turn on it because take 1 trillion, if, i you wish to do so. No,ecause congress itself has specified the direct is limited to the amount the phrase when necessary to carry out del if the president determines that was recentlyecsary t take 1 a trillion dollars, t would satisfy your concern. And on the appropriations clause itself has no upper limit constraint. Ihi that would violate the state and the same thretical possible exist with all of the other financial regulators ive been discussing but if you disagree, of course here we have speeds i just find understand your theory thatsll you try to do. Are theory is written in history. Congress has appropriate i this way without a cap for time immorial in 1789 on. How about on the lower end of the skil what is the president o was the appropriate some . Im not going to take any money i dont like the cfpb, you know. I dont think it is necessary to take another dolr. Could the president do that . I thi tt would pilot the statute as well stopalng about appropriations clause. So i think that congress itself has specified the purpose and s i think that if the president forhe cfpb director didnt comply, that would b a violation and i would expec congress to step in and change the fundi mhanism. All of these possibilities exist with respect to countless other appropriations. All of the other financial regulars for example, likewise i understand the practical realities and i appreciate them and it is to the statuto arguments. Im just trying to understand. Is anything that wld prohibit the president fromhe appropriations clause clg whether to take zero dollars which we for reestablishing a take 1 trillion . Dont think the appropriations clause would be a check, although of Course Congress could exercise its authority and the spar over the purse to chain to the discretion that is provided to require the president or the direct of the agency to take a particular. Can ask a question about the treasury . The professors of constitutional law and history say listen, the apply at all because these funds not being drawn from the treasury. You agree with tt . Its not the argument you made. We areot making that argument. We accepte t appropriation clause was the weakest of the tr and the constitution referred to the public treasury as a general matte that specifically to the tasy department. At the time of the founding ratification the treasury departntad not even been created and thas also how this cotas described the scope of the appropriations clause in cases like opm versus richmond were referredoublic monies generally. Of crs the contrar approach would expose the gaping loophole and congress authority because would mean the executivet has funds that are not helping the general treasury has been Even Without Congress appropriating it or providing that authority inhe first place. Are the money, the monies in the cfpbs budget appropriated moneys . So for cstitutional purposes just because congress established theunng statute and it has both the source and nn within the meaning of the constitution this counts as an appropriation. Thats a opm and executive branch, ngo and congress under sincehe source of the funding. What to make of the provision in doddfrank act which has that the bureau fund, will, shall not be construed to be Government Funds appropriated moneys . So that was cgrs try to control for the interaction betweenhi funding mechanism and of the background rules that pl to appropriations they go through the annual appropriati process. There are rul about things like procurement and whether you nse appropriated moneys i essence the litigation expenses, miscellaneous statute requires agency to deposit the revenues in the general treasury and some of his background rules would actually interfere with the funding that conversation tended for this agency. It was just try to control for the interaction. Other agencies have that statement is incorrect. In the doddfrank act itself is these are appropriated moneys . I dont think that statutory provision was taking a stance on the constutnal question of whether this fits the defin of an appropriation within the meaning of the conion. As i mentioned congress has used this formulation for other agencies as well like the occ andhe fca and again itsll intended to just allow congress to control for the interaction of various statutory provisions doesnt does it use itt office, for the mint and oer agencies of that nature. Was justice sotomayor, im not familiar with whether t particular language appears in the statutes governing the pt office. The post office was originally created and foun 1792 and so its not clear somef these of the bund rules existed. Certainly we can point to an example today including the occ and the fca which had the same lin wood andts meant to ensure again thes no disruption with the funny operating in way congress can i go back to Justice Thomas question . Theres appo be, im sor to be bound up in this question of the appropriations bill, te separation of p and nondelegation. Now, i know the court below said not quite sure i understand it, ybe you could explain it to me how sepn of powers different from nondelegat why wasnt thether . But do you see those o provisions, separation of power, nondelegati as having a place in other constitutional provisions besides the appropriations clause . And if it has no placeere, why not . Y. I thinkbvusly these concepts ofeparation of powers and t scope of the appropriations clause and nondelegatn principles he in many respects potential overlapping functions in thisonxt. We intesd respondents to be makingnrgument about the appropriations clause in particular and that fifth circuit found they had that simply raise a nondelegation challenge. I guessha i would say as to the extent the court i thinking about this from the perspective of general separation of powers principles, the things the court generally consults and understanding the structul provisions of the constitution are, first, the text and second, the history. Those indicators of intent are erwhelmingly on our side. The court ishiing about some delegation principles there you would have to look at hto and as Justice Scalia emphasized in his concurring opinion, if you look across t course of history from789 on, it has it has been in t appropriations context marked b very broad delegations of authority to the exutive branch to spend within the bounds set by congress. In the very first appropriation laws wer suctured like this one and a sense of providi executive could spend up t a cap set by congress. I think the claims what you think about the aument response our present is under the appropriations clause but if mechanize as a course to get more broadly about these issues the other doctors could come into play. General, could i take you back to the light of questioning for your Justice Gorsuchs talking about . Your reply brief on page 18 you discussed a standing appropriation of up to a quadrillion dollars for the president to find besides the army. So just on this question of where your outer lit are and what theory we might use to say there are some limits, what d you want to say about that sort of statute . Would that be a constitutional violatio if so, why so . And why is that different from this . Es. So that statute as we understd it would be completel unprecedented. It would effectively take the whole of Congress Appropriations authority and transfer it to the executive branch. Congress has never done that for the pt30 years and its hard for me to igine congress and would do that. But if they could the court we confronted with the issue in a future case they could will recognize limits and t limits would come from history. The court in any number of separati o powers cases has said that the facthat a method of structuring government has no historical precedent can strongly counsel against recognizing it as a constitutionalayo proceed. That was anasi set in Free Enterprise fund, a reputed to have been seila law but tt history works both ways. The court has lewe said a fact that away structuring government is well rooted i history and trace it back to the founding isowerful evidence that the contemporaneous understanding ofriginal intent. Thats the box we