Decision in this case is the first time in a court in our nations history has held that congress violated the appropriations clause by enacting a statute providing funding. This court suld uphold the cfpbs funding statute because it is fmly grounded in constitutional tt and in historical practic dating back to the founding. The text of the constitution shows that when the frars one to limit Congress Appropriations authority they did expressly. While the frars restricted appropriations for the army to two years, they applied no similar limits on apppriations for any other agency. History conrms that. Since the Founding Congress has consistently funded agencies through standing appropriations that are not timelimited and that provide significant discretion over how much to spen the First Congress did exactly this at the very first agency it created the Customs Service, a the same is true for of t founding era agencies including the post office, the national mint, the Patent Office, revee office a the national bank. And congress is use this kind of appropriations the default en funding financial relators including the Federal Reserve boa,he office of the comptroller of the currency, the federal deposit insurance corporation, the National Credit uniondmistration, the Farm Credit Administration and the federasing finance agency. The cfpbs appropriations that squarely in this un line of the historical practice. In fact, congress exerc significantly more discretion and control over the bureaus funding by capping i annual is far lower than many otherhat agencies budgets. Respondent argued the combination of features in the cfpbs statute vioome previously unrecognized constitutional line. At the bureaus appropriation is materially identical to the us funding statute i just listed, and respondents concede the statutes are constitutional. This court tot respondents attempt to gerrymandered able to fit the cfpb alone without prov a coherent theory about to interpret and apply the appropriations clause. I welcome the courts questions. Gener, other than passing and appropriations law, are there any limits on what congress can do . So i think at the outset as your question touches on, Justice Thomas come the term appropriation itself contain some essential requirements. So that term is defined to mean out the provides for funding and thepecifies both the source and the purpose of the funding. Thats how it appropriation was defined at the founding. Its how its always been understood and that still so it is defined tay in sources like the junior redbook which is congresses own apppriations treaty. We think at the outset is not ju any old ball but a lot of the contains beseeches the constitutes an appropriation i think the question becomes are the other lit out there on how cones can structure funding for particular type of activities or government functions we know fm the Army Appropriations clause t answer is yes with respect to that rticular government function. Theres dational limit and its based on the nature of activity because t framers were specifically concerned about having Standing Army. The Army Appropriations clause itse demonstrates there are not otherwise constraint in the appropriations clause that would limit congress at how it decides to str the funding. So beyond the initial almost skeletal require duration andse, there is an, if i hear youre right, t is no other condition . Appropriations clause places of limits on congress itself when it enacts the funding statute. But i do want to emphasize that our argument also relies heavily on history. If you have in mind some kind of fuing statute or arrangement that is nevereen done at all of this nations histo i think the court could take that into account in a future cas here that we have a specific type of appropriations, a capped lumpsum appropriation that is standing for a Single Agency. Our historical argument is that this is nothing new or unprecedented recall of the agencies i listed had similar appropriations. Is there any role in appropriations, that appropriations plays in separation of powers . It see that at least when i did, was an executive branch, th congress exercise appropriation to checkhe execute branch to some extent. If there is in this case, what would be in the case of cfpb, how would that play out . I do agree and thi a course of the critical albertf the separation of powers that congress has control over the purse. Our argument is that congress has exercised that power. This court is looking at a statute that congress itself enacd that set up this funding mechanism for the cfpb which is similar in kind to the way that congress has funded of the financial eviscerate the kind of exting control that congress usually exercises in the appropriions process . I dont. To the extent this question is esent on the annual appropriations as a counterrt, i think the question becomes does the constitution limit congress with respect to the dution of appropriations . Is there explicit limit and the text the court can define that Means Congress in contrast to her laws which of course can remain in effect until the future congress acts,s congress limited in how long t leave appropriations inffect . Ther i think the army appropriatio clause does a lot of work because its not like the framers were not aware of this dynam. They thought specific about the fact appropriations like all other ls might be continuing indefinite until the future congress acts, and they were ncerned about that with respect to a Standing Army but they didnt otherwise o t congress authority. Enal, one of the things that strike me as of reading it, you have a very aggressive view of congress authority under the appropriatns clause. Im not saying remotely that thats not correct but it struck me, you represent the executive branch as well. And its a very strong power given to congress. And it suck me that the reason you would want to defend tha is because itives them more power to give away. Times when the same partybeen controlled both houses of congress and the white house, and in that situation you can see congress empoweringhe present in a way that might seem unusual to the framers. Soeeping in m that, that in balance, in other words, its kindaradoxical, the more powerou give congress i think, i think this is friends argument on the other side, theres more that it can give away and enhance the authority of the executive. Is that a, and unpersuasive concern . Certainly i dt think it is unpersuasive concern but built into your question as understood, mr. Chief justice, was the idea that maybe congress could do something that would be surprising or anomalous to the framer i guess what i would say is if you look at it through that lens th history should play a powerful role in trying to understand the limits or scope of homage congress can give away when it becom too much. Here the court does need to articulate any outer limits because we have a specific te of appropriation that is far more constrained and my that convertion enacted throughout history because congress providedunding for Single Agency and capped that about the funn an amount not to exceed the cap set b congress for its prettynusual to have that agency drawing, been able to request how much ever wants subject to limit that it only has a got very close to over the years from an entity that is also drawing in money from the private sector. I didnt see any parcularly mpelling historical analogues to tha. Well let me speed to the extent that takes away from the appropriations power, its equivocally enhances the power of the executive. So i disagree that theres anything unprecedented about this funding arrangement wn you look at the relevant constitutional value of protecting congresses prerogate. I know there are a lot of fferent moving parts and pieces to the arguments respondes have made it as understand it they are attacking four features of the funded facts statute or thetanding at standing appropriations, remains a place and is not unlimited. Thatgainst the director of the cfpb some discretion t act within the statutory cap and requesting the funding. Third, that the cfpb has enforcement and regulatory functions and forth come as your question touched on, that the cfpbs funding comes in the source that is not in the words constrained by mket forces. But we have numerous examples of agencies that have all four of those relevt characteristics. I fear at the outset we dont for the functions of the market foes constraint are relevant but even taking the argument on its own terms i can give you founding era examples, customs in the revenue officers were funded with the kind of mechanism. They have standing appropriations for the ctom service it. It wasncapped. These were powerfululatory entities. The Customs Service aboard ships and seize vessels at the spec cords and conduct srcs and level penalties and collect fines, and just a way t avoid that kind of regulation. The market constraint they that the users could just opt out ouregulated parties could decide not tound the operations doesnt apply to those agencies. It still because of many of the financl regulators today took th os i would put on that list are the feral reserve board, the fdic, the ncua, the Farm Credit Administration, and general, unsorted hermaphrodites want to understand follow up on the chief justices question. Dash im sorry to interrupt. Is that essential feature to the constitution of thi pvision or could Congress Passed the same law with no upper limit allowing the executive branch to determine however much it wished to take . Site dont think that congress would heo provide statutory specified amount but it would of course have to specify these of the fuin budgets on the amount, your the doesnt turn on there being an upper limit . Are theory doesnt turn on it because take 1 trillion, if, if you wish to do so. No, because congrstself has specified the direct is limited to the amount the phrase enecessary to carry out federal if the president determines that was recently necessary to take 1 a trillion dollars, t would satisfy your concern. And on the appropriations clause itself has no upper limit constraint. I think that wouldiote the statute and the same theoretical possible exist with all of the other financial regulators ive been discussing but if you disagree, of course here we have speed is i jt find understand your theory thats allou try to do. E theory is written in history. Congress has appropriate in this way without a cap time immemorial in 19. How about on the lower end of the skill . What is the president o was the approia some . Im not going to take any money. I dont like the cfpb, you know. I dont think it is necessary to take another dollar. Could the president do that . I think that wouldil the statute as well stop talking about appropriations clause. So i tnk that congress itself has specified the purpose and so i thinkhat if the president for the cfpb director didnt comply, that would be a violation and i would expect core to step in and change the funding mechanism. All of these possibilies exist with respect to countless other appropriations. All of the other financial regulars for example, likewise i understand the practical realities and i appreciatehem and it is to the statutory argunt im just trying to underan is anything that would prohibit the president from the appropriations clause clg whether to take zero dollars which we for reestablishing a take 1 trillion . I dont thinkhe appropriations clause wld be a check, although of course congssould exercise its authority and the spar over the pue to chain to the discretion that is provided to require the president or the direct of the agency to take a particular amount. C ask a question about the treasury . The professors of constitutional law and history say listen, the appropriations clause doesnt apply all because these funds not being drawn from the eary. You agree with that . s not the argument you made. We are not making tt argument. We accepted the appropriation clauseashe weakest of the trim and the constitution referred t the public treasury as general matter, that specifically to the treasury dertment. At the time of the fndg ratification the Treasury Department had not even been created and thats also how this court has described the scope of th aropriations clause in cases le opm versus richmond were referred to public monies generally. Of course the contrary approach would expose theapg loophole and congress authority because would mean the executive it has funds that are not helping the general treasury has been Even Without Congress appropriating it or providing that authority in the first p are the money, the monies in th cfpbs budget appropriated moys . So for constitutional purposes just because congress established the funding statute and it has both the source and funny. Within the meaning o the constitution this counts as an prriation. Thats a opm and executive branch, ngo and congress under since the soue of the funding. What to make of therosion in doddfrank act which has that the bureau fund, will, shall not be construed to be Government Funds appprted moneys . So that was congress try t control for the interaction between this funding mechanism an of the background rules that apply to approprtis they go through the annual appropriation procs. There are rules about tng like procurement and whether you can use appropriated moneys in esnce the litigation expenses, miscellaneous statute requires agency to deposithe revenues in the general treasury and some of his background rules would actual ierfere with the funding that conversation tended for this agency. It was just try to control for the interaction there. Othergeies have that statement is incorrect. In the doddfrank act itself is incorrect. These arepppriated moneys . I donthink that statutory provision wasakg a stance on the constitutional questio of whether this fits the definition a approiaon within the meaning of the constitution. I mentioned congress has used this formulation f oer agencies as well like t occ and the fca and again its all intended to just allow congress to control for the interaction of various statutory provisions in this context. D does it use it for tt office, for the mint and other agencies of that nature. Was justice sotomayor, im not familiar with whether this particular language appears in etatutes governing the post ofce the post office was originally created and founded in 179 and so its not clear some of these of the background rules est. Certainly we can point to an example today including the occ and the fcahich had the same lin wood and its mea to ensure again theres no disruption with the funny operating in way congress can i go back to Justice Thomas question . Theres appear to be, im sorry, bit const, there appears to be bound up in this question of the appprtions bill, the separation of powers and nondelegation. Now, i know the court bel said nondelegation was forfeited. Not quite sure i understand it, maybe you cou explain it to me how separation of power is different from nondelegation. Wh wnt the other . T do you see those other provisions, separation of power, nondelegation,s having a place i other constitutional provisions besides the appropriations clause . And if it has no place here, why not . Yes. I think obviously these concepts of separation o powers and the sce of the appropriations clause and nondelegation principles have in many respects potential orlapping functions in this context. We interested responden t be making an argument abo the appropriations clause in particularndhat fifth circuit found they had that simplyai a nondelegation challenge. I guess what i would says to the extent the court is thinking about this from the perspecti of general separation of powers principles, the things the court generally consults and understanding the structural provisions of the constitution are, first t text and second, the history. Thosendicators of intent are overwhelminglynur side. The court is thinking about se delegation principles there you would have to look at history d as Justice Scalia emphasized in his concurring opinion, if you look across theourse of history from 1789 o it has it has been in the aroiations context marked by very bad delegations of authority to the executive branc t spend within the bounds set byongress. In the very first appropriation laws were structured lik this one and a sense of providing execiv could spend up to a cap set by congress. I think the claims what you think about the argument response our present is under the aropriations clause but if mechaniz a a course to get more broadly about these issues the other doctors could come into play. General, could i take you back to the light of questioning for you jtice gorsuchs talking about . In your replyri on page 18 you discuss a standing appropriatio o up to a quadrillion dollars for the president to fd besides the army. So just on this question of whereou outer limits arend what theory we might use t say there are some limits, what do yo want to say about that sort of statute . Wouldha be a constitutional violation . If so, why so . And why is that dferent from this . Yes. That statute as we understand it would be completely unpredted. It would effectively take the whole of congress apopations authority and transfer it to the executive branch. Congress has never done that for the past 230 yea and its hard for me to imagine congrs and would do that. Butf they could the court were confronted with the issue in a futureas they could will recognize limits and the limits would come from history. Theou in any number of separation of powers casas said that the fact that a method of structuring government has no historical precedent can strongly cns against recognizing it as a constitutional way to proceed. That was analysis setn Free Enterprise fund, a reputed to have been seila law but that hiory works both ways. The court has likewise said a fact tha ay structuring government is well rooted in history and trace it back to the founding is powerful evinc that the contemporaneous understanding of original intent. Thats the box we are in here. I guess i would the court to save for another day whether ere some theoretical possibilityhat congress could go too far with the kd of appropriation weve never seen before and instead focus on this particular appropriatio