Your own personal experience. Henry has a trump card we can interrupt you anytime he wants i will start with you, h. R. , on this question. Thank you. Its very important to the present of all of us to ensure that congressman katko fulfill its constitutional role which oftentimes as you know is vital to our democracy because congress represents the American People but its also caucuses role too often critical in providing sometimes corrected what the unwise policy and for us across emaciation to access the right the point where their staffs do. So the department as you mentioned john, has a primary responsibility for that interaction on the hill but what weve intended to do at the National Council is to have conversations with senators and congressmen and staffers about our key policy initiatives and early in the development of what were calling our integrated strategies. We found that immensely helpful because first of all a lot of the requires remedies and all of them require resources. I think our emphasis has been in relation to question on early consultation from the nsc. But continued coordination between the departments, relative departments and the hill and the relevant committees. Jim and steve, each of you have administrations that at somewhat contentious relations with the congress. How does this issue, they would want to know what you are saying and what you were thinking, but you have an obligation to the president to be as advisor. I think the most important thing is for the National Security advisor and the nsc is, on matters of national, interNational Security to be, project an image of bipartisanship. And my relationship with president obama, i asked him r that latitude to resist putting a political stem on big issues until such time as those issues have been developed and obviously its a political decision. During my time, followed steve, we decided to combine Homeland Security and nas security into one staff. And that was a big difference in terms of the size of the staff. But i think that bipartisan approach is extremely important. I in my military career, i had the good fortune of spending a few years on capitol hill, as a marine Liaison Officer and my motto was always do for the majority what you do for the minority, and vice versa. That i found out when i became nationals could advisor that all of a sudden i was a democrat and i didnt know i was. You know, you have to get through that and you can only get through that by working at it and by making sure that you reached out to both sides, and i think thats extraordinarily important on security issues. Well, of course the nationals could advisor is not confirmed by the senate National Security adviser. I like im sure all my predecessors spent a lot of time consulting informally up on the hill briefing, explaining policies and all the rest. Its an important part of the job. I learned everything i know about being National Security adviser for man in the front row, Brent Scowcroft. And one of the things, worked for him when he is National Security adviser the first time, but we served together on the commission more than most important things about the Tower Commission which was astounds with president reagan in 1986 in wake wake of the iran arms sales was to stave off an effort by the congress to basically take over the National Security structure required the National Security adviser be confirmed, set the number of people come set the organizational structure and brent led the charge to frustrate the effort because its not just an issue of privacy. Its an issue of separation of powers. If the president cannot gather around him or her a staff people in which he or she can have great confidence, but the president is not to be able to carry out the constitutionally prescribed roles with the president has a lot of rules and a lot of leadership. So its a fundamental constitutional principle that needs to be observed. And it is always subject to struggle because in times of war president s get more power. In times presence into getting cars, Congress Takes it back. Its very important for the institution of the presidency to preserve that group that is able to support the president and that constitutional. Henry, nobody had a boss that more difficult relations with the carcass ultimately than richard nixon. How did you balance your obligations to be his advisor but also the accountability to the congress . The question of accountability i see two ways. One, how congress can control the main lines of policy if some of it is carried out by the nsc. And some measures that have to be taken in essentially a secret mode, opening to negotiations, the exploration of new avenues. So thats the basic problem. The administration, during the vietnam war, and you cannot say that bipartisanship was at its height. And several of the people who it started us into that road, the peace movement. So passions were great. And president nixon had to combat it, all of but, in fact, what we did is, is two things. As a matter of principle we did not, or president nixon did not commit that his Staff Members could testify before congressional committees. Or could be subpoenaed by congressional committees. But we agreed with the senator that we would have private meetings, that he would invite me and the numbers of the Foreign Relations committee to drinks in his house, and that i would, periodically and brief them so no formal record was kept of these briefings and it was not a subpoena. So thats, and we invariably briefed the leading members of the various senatorial committees. The problem was that was a philosophical difference, and the country was so deeply divided at that moment that it was very difficult to find a basis for bipartisanship. And how do you end a war that one party has started, the other party [inaudible] and the party that got involved had a ship inside that party so that the objective in principle to the policy they themselves had advocated. I dont say that as a criticism. That was, in fact, the situation. But even during the nixon. We thought we made strenuous efforts to involve the congress and other decisionmaking. What the key issue really comes down and continuing debate, to what degree do the operations of the nsc become so pervasive that they would act like a department . There is a category of decisions which i think most would believe have to be done to some extent secretly, and to commit but then when it becomes a daytoday occurrence thats when it arises, whether theyre still congressional control. I i think most of the time the c has stayed on the right side of the line. But one could argue that if the nsc is an institution conducts the continuing negotiation that goes on over several years, that then it is really doing, taking steps that ordinarily are under departmental and congressional control. You anticipated the next question i was going to ask. Because there is a critique in washington these days at the nationals could be counsel has become operational. Its taking on the activities of the departments rather than being a coordinating and advisory. Each one of you probably dealt with that criticism. Henry has given us his thoughts. Stephen, how do you think about that . I mean well, one of the things is that part of the bargain about the National Security adviser and the nsc being not subject to Senate Confirmation or testimony and the like is that it needs to be respectful to confine its role so it does not preempt the role of the departments and agencies or cabinet secretaries who are the ones that are confirmed by the senate, and to whom slots and monies appropriated to carry the foreignpolicy. It requires a National Security adviser to enforce discipline on the staff, and to be selflimiting, and particularly not get too public in terms of what they are doing. We, you know, we learned in the iran arms sale in irancontra the dangers of having an nsc that runs operations. On the other hand, i would suggest simply this. I think in this he spent lot of time developing ways of building policy options for the president. I think there is a role though for the nsc, not in writing operations, not displacing the departments, but to make sure that once the president makes a decision and sets the policy, that the departments and agencies are implementing that policy effectively. Its not this the substitute Fe Department of agencies but it is to make sure that they are in plummeting the president decision and hold them accountable. I think thats kind of a new frontier for the nsc and something that a think we need because the greatest policy is no good if it isnt implementing and is it causing effects on the ground to advance the interests of the country. I think the biggest cancer in the nsc is when it crosses over from the strategic to operational. And we have to guard against that. Its not easy. Technologies a doubleedged sword in this case, where Technology Allows someone in the nsc if he or she wishes to to pick up the telephone and call an Operational Command on the field in afghanistan. And thats a problem for every administration. Thats not just one administration. As as a marine officer i was one receiving end of direction from, direct from the white house as the captain in the operation off of cambodia. Well contented intentioned stae you wanted to talk to captain jones and he could do that. But that is, that is the big problem, and its one of the jobs i think the National Security adviser and whoever else can convey is that under no circumstances will you do that. Under no circumstances it becaue once you open that door, then you do get into running, micromanaging and running operations and that something that the nsc should guard against absolutely. H. R. , panic which was spot . Sure. First let me say its been a great gift to be able to study the nsc from a Historical Perspective and then to learn from those who are here and especially general scowcroft tos been just a tremendous role model and mentor for me as well. So much of his work is very relevant to this question on emphasizing the role of the nationals could be counsel, coordinating and integrating the cross Department Agencies to provide options for the the president and once the president makes decisions and stephen has pointed out, assist with a sensible implementation, execution of those decisions. In recent years for whatever reasons, more and more authorities have been centralized, or centralize within the nationals could be counsel. And it did cross a line between a coordinating and integrating organization into an executing arm of the government. So consistent with president trumps guidance, we have devolved responsibility and authorities act to the departments where it belongs, and emphasized that coordination and integration role. One of the ways weve done it is with the time we saved by not calling up captain jones or his equivalent. What weve done is applied that time to reestablishing our strategic confidence, to think longerterm, and to involve the heads of the departments and agencies, the state department in particular, to play a foundational role in framing problems, in giving situations around the world that affect our National Security through the lens of vital interests and then based on that framing, to establish longterm goals. In more specific objectives associated with those goals. Then what happens is the principles issue guidance to the departments and agencies which then allowed them to get to work and actually start doing things. If its already within their authority to meet whatever the principles guidance is. And that would bring those decisions to the president that require his decisions. The approval of that framing and then ultimately we deliver to the president in an integrated strategy, much as we did as many watched us do it on the cuban policy which is probably the most public one. But there are policies on iran, for example, which you will hear more about this week. I could go on and on, but i think what has helped us has helped us address this potential of centralizing too much control in the nsc, making dse to operational comp is to focus more on the development of these integrated strategies. Hendry, i think when you were a National Security adviser, you had a staff that was 40 or 50, im not exactly sure, i think it was 42, 45, Something Like that. We see big staffs in the nsc in recent years. I mean, is this just a simple question . More people are looking for things to do, they take on command. Is part of this, h. R. , you started with can only talk about how big a step is and how influential it is given its job . Okay. Well, if you talk to get sure you can you can get away with 40 or 50. If its me i need more help. We should remember you probably need a few more staffers if youre not henry kissinger. But we have made a a conscious effort to reduce the size of the staff, and to make sure that form follows function. As we default responsibilities back to departments and agencies, as we get out of management of tactical issues, they were able to reduce. We have reduce significantly the numbers of policy people in overall staff. It was over 400 or so at its peak. Were down to about 360 something epic that sounds like a lot. Of those 360 to about 160170 policy people, and the rest is the white house situation room which runs multiple shifts and information technology, those who manage the president travel and visits the foreign leaders. So theres a large administrative component. Its not as big as some of the numbers you hear talked about. What has contribute to the growth over time as well from 50 or so to 167 is the emphasis on Homeland Security especially after the mass murder attacks on our country on september 11, 2001. A nationals could be counsel has a blended staff that also includes some Homeland Security council. Does it mean we cant get smaller . We cant i think the emphasis is to have the right people with the right expertise and because of the coordination and integration efforts, the right personality a lot of times to lead by charm and bring people together around these important issues. So i think we are at a good place now in terms of the size and effect is especially of extremely talented as all of you know the dedication and talent of the people on the National Security council, its astounding. It just make you proud every day when you interact with your teams. But it did grow for a number of reasons. It is getting smaller again but the numbers can be deceiving in terms of policy. We didnt start with a fixed idea of the number of people that should be on the staff. I think one of the problems is what you define as National Security policy. And when we started in the nixon administration, we concentrated on a number of key issues like russia and opening to china. Four or five key issues, and we let most of the others to the departments. Then gradually over time the line between strategy and daytoday policy got eroded, and so there was felt to be a greater need for white house supervision. Theres a reason for this. In the ideal world, the people who lose a debate accept it and march along. In the world that i knew, which i know has improved, the party that gets overruled tends to think it was misunderstood. [laughing] and that, that there is a need to carry out the implementation as close to the original overruled point that you could find. So theres a tendency for the departments to slide over into the preference of their members. This is, of course, maddening to the president who think they settle something and then they gradually slide two, i think this accounts for the fact that [inaudible] got but that function of, which steve hadley mentioned, to add to policy relations, the need for supervising implementation. Because very often the difference between success and failure is and if you screw that up, even a great policy decision can fail. So it wasnt the desire to improve, and, of course, i must say from a historically important view, relations between the operators and the receivers were never better than when i had both the jobs. [laughing] which actually was not a good system. Jim, you brought up this question about how technology is changing the nature of the National Security council. I think when come henry, i think i remember you telling us when you first open the channel to china, it was a typewritten note that went through mail channels and it took a while for even to know if if it got bigger that e would is sitting with a piece of machinery on their belt thats got more Computing Power than dod used about 40 years ago. The channel to china, on the chinese side was a handwritten note that was delivered and packaged and brought to washington by a pakistani diplomat. And ill reply was typed our reply was typed on paper that had no watermarks on it, and came back the same way. So each exchange took a minimum of nearly three weeks. And the real time was two to three months between these exchanges. And so now jim is talking come hes had the experience where its a battlefield commander can get a phone call from the president , and this is hard to run National Security council with that kind of immediacy. How did you deal with it, jim . Well, if i could just make a comment on the psychology to go back for one more second on the previous because i feel pretty strongly about this. The size of the National Security council is not whats important. Its what the National Security does, National Security council does. If you look at the range of issues that the president has to deal with every single day, just in the seven days since ive