State acity of new york. Text and tradition make clear that new york city restricted premises license and accompanying transport bannekers constitutional. To transport the continuous and uninterrupted premised on a view of the Second Amendment as homebound right. With any ability to venture beyond the curtilage with the firearm even locked and unloaded a matter of government grace. That view is and can student with text history tradition and this courts cases. The text of the Second Amendment to protect rights to keep and bear arms. That letter right makes clear that the Second Amendment protect rights that are not strictly limited to the premises. There is no historical analogue for the citys prohibition on transporting firearms to places where they may be lawfully used. To the contrary, the Second Congress required the militia to take their own firearms from their homes to the training ground. The regulations on limiting where firearms may be discharged or training may occur that the city invokes both underscore that the general rule was that firearms can be safely transported between and among places where they could be used in discharge. The court recognizes this much in heller both by recognizing the long history of handgun possession outside the home and by recognizing the governments interest in limiting possession and sensitive places, not every place outside the home. The city of course has struggled mightily ever since the Court Granted abto make this case go away. Those efforts are unavailing and only underscore their continuing view not the transport of firearms is a matter of municipal grace rather than constitutional right. The standard a the city has now been blocked by a state law and the state has not been party to these proceedings. The state says the city does not enforce the regulations. Whats left of this case the petitions have gotten all the relief they thought they could carry guns to second home they can carry to fire, to Practice Range outofstate. Justice ginsburg, the petitioners have not gotten all the relief to which they been entitled. We would also be entitled to injunction that did three things, prohibit future enforcement of the transport ban, prevent the city from taking past conduct in violation of the ban and licensing decision. An injunction to transport meaningfully such that it would be limited to continuous and uninterrupted transport. As far as what you said about enforcing past violations, no plaintiff has alleged that they ever violated the regulations when they were in effect. Thats actually not correct justice ginsburg. If you look at paragraphs 12, 15, 17 of the complaint pages 28 and 29 of the joint appendix, all three of the individual petitioners alleged they regularly went outside the city of new york for firing ranges outside westchester and new jersey. All three of my clients are on the record as saying that in the past they engaged in conduct that is inconsistent with the transport ban. I believe that the city has forced warren any future prosecution for past violations. I thought that thats the representation they made to this court. In their latest letter they were very careful about what they represented. They represented that they wouldnt try to prosecute somebody from past conduct if the past conduct didnt violate current regulations. If the past conduct happened to involve a stop for coffee and not continuous uninterrupted a the business to do with the current law hasnt been decided by the court below. That is a complaint about the limits of the current law and not the limits of the old law. Youre asking us to mix apples and oranges now. I dont think so. I think what im asking you to do is exactly what this court did in the knox case. No, what you are asking us to do is to take a case in which the other side has thrown in the towel and completely given you every single thing you demanded in your complaint for relief and you are asking us to opine on a law thats not on the books anymore. And one thats not on the books not because of something necessarily the city did because the state, a party who is not a party to this litigation has changed the law and prohibited them from doing it. This is, i think, something quite different. You are asking us to opine on an old law, not the new law. The new law hasnt been reviewed the yet. I really think what we are asking to do is exactly annul before whats the court. In knox the thrust of the underlying complaint was that the supplemental fee assessment that the union imposed on the members was unconstitutional. Thats what the complaint framed. In terms of the continuous we dont know whether the city is taking the position that you cant stop for a cup of coffee. Presumably if you leave your gun in the car, im not sure how they would know you are traveling with a gun but put that aside. Before i put it aside, let me just say i do think we know the answer to that because in subsection 7 of the new regulations that are promulgated specifically to try to move this case they made clear that the kind of transport and they were allowing, at least within the city of new york had to be continuous and uninterrupted. I dont know what continuous and uninterrupted means of doesnt if it means you can make stops for coffee. I assure you i think the right way to think about this for article 3 purposes is if we had been successful in the lower court and proposed injunction i guarantee the words continuous and uninterrupted would not be in our proposed injunction. If the city had offered their proposed injunction and included that limitation we would have said we dont accept that with tickets inconsistent with the right we just prevailed on and that dispute would be continuing dispute that would render the case not moot just like in knox there was a continuing dispute about the sufficiency of the refund notice that the union offered in its effort to moot the case. The dispute that was still alive between the parties about the sufficiency of the refund notice wasnt the exact same dispute that initiated the litigation, but the case was still alive controversy for article 3 purchases and this a athis court could address the question presented here and leave the question of continuous and uninterrupted for the lower court if it wanted to but theres no basis for not answering the question presented. Im sorry, thats the oddest decision ive heard. Answer an old law thats no longer in effect and reserve consideration of the new laws interpretation for the lower courts . If they have agreed and you agree that everything but the continuous and uninterrupted has been resolved and that youve gotten everything you wanted as demanded in your complaint, you can travel to a second home you can travel to any lawful firing range. Thats all you are original complaint demanded. If you got all that, thats the issue before us. A new question is, and youve agreed, we should leave that to the courts below with continuous and uninterrupted is. That happens we dont think weve gotten everything we have gotten including continuous and uninterrupted but with all due respect we would like given our five years of history in this litigation with my friends on the other side would like something more than their representations to protect us against the use in the future of past conduct licensing. I have one question, they try to give you a lifeline by saying you could get damages. But i read he representations to court and you said we could get damages. I dont see a request for relief where the damages are nominal in your complaint. You dont say we want damages in your submissions to us. Did you ask for damages . We asked for all other appropriate relief in our complaint. We did not make specific work quest for damage below. Im happy to confirm that we like damages but i also think a acourse you have to ask for permission to amend your complaint to seek that. Would have to do that. With all due respect to solicitor general. We were happy they recognize the case wasnt moot we did it feel like we needed to damage a lifeline because we think we had multiple strong arguments based on this courts press and including the knox case that said wholly apart from damage is to dispute is it moot. Just one more of the damages. As far as i know this court has never used a late, meaning in this court and not below, request for damages to save the case from moot. I dont know of any such case. Are not aware of one either, justice ginsberg. We think we have plenty of cases from this court that are now in the situation. With respect, i dont think the practice of getting the recognition after certiorari is granted that a certiorari grant might this not signal anything good for the defendant. Its quite common practice if they then come up with an idea to moot the case. If you think of a couple of recent cases not just knox, Trinity Lutheran and parents involved are all involved latebreaking efforts often by Government Entities to make the case go away. In each case this court said thats too little too late and this court starts accepting these kind of post certiorari maneuvers its going to be hard for the court to continue. I dont think its bad when people who have an argument settle their argument. Unless thus there is no longer argument. So i wonder if commissioner asked this question . You say this case is still alive because the city of new york might prosecute one of your clients because they stopped for coffee on the way to a firing range. I think im going to ask matt and i have a suspicion they will say no. We are going to prosecute that particular individual. So then what should i do . We have a dispute. That suggests to me that we have the kind of live controversy and the standard for mootness is whether its possible to provide a factual relief, i guarantee an injunction back attempt forcing those promises is going to give my clients more factual relief. Keep in mind what makes this case quite different from a lot of others is this a discretionary licensing process where the city makes judgments about good moral character. There are 79 officials in the Licensing Department of the city of new york. Where are they going to look for guidance . They could i think look for guidance to a Court Ordered injunction. Im not sure theyre gonna pull the transcript from this argument let alone a letter from the city to the Solicitor Generals Office for this. We think we are entitled to that kind of meaningful effectual relief. We think on the merits this case is actually quite straightforward because there is no historical analog for this kind of transportation restriction. As i suggested, if you look at the second militia act passed by the Second Congress they not only understood he could transport your firearms from your home to a place where they can be lawfully discharged but they required of the members of the militia. If you look at the history and traditions of this country there are very few laws that try to do anything like this and the few that tried to do this were invalidated by the courts. As i understand new york a new york has two kinds of licenses, permits his license a license. You are attacking the premises license scam on the ground that it doesnt allow you to carry. One of you just adapt the carry license scam if you want to carry, why didnt your clients get a carry license . I think what my clients wanted in this lawsuit and plenty of other lawsuits out there challenging carry restrictions. They wanted the right to transport, not the right to carry. Transporting is a kind of carrying. You take your gun and it goes with you someplace. Thats the kind of carrying. I think its also a bearing which i think this is such a straightforward case. Lets all im asking is, theres a premises scam in the carrying scam and your clients want to carry, which suggests you shouldve brought a challenge to the carrying scam. If you thought that was deficient. With respect higgins, my clients for years at least two of the three had with the city for a while called target license. It didnt give them a full right to carry but it did give them the right to transport their firearms to new jersey and other places probably wouldve allowed him second home though im not sure the issue squarely presented. My clients did not insist on getting a carry license either under the before this lawsuit was filed or in this lawsuit. What they want is to rule is to restore right, transport firearms between and among places where they can be lawfully used. Thats different from a license that says i get to have this firearm with me at all times loaded, ready to go. What they wanted was to restore their right to transport firearms, locked and unloaded between places where they could be lawfully used. Thats what they asked for, thats what there is no historical analog for. If i could emphasize, i think it would send a very important signal to the lower courts to say that when regulation like this is inconsistent with text and has no analog in history or tradition its unconstitutional,. If text history and tradition they will uphold the law but if text history or tradition are to the contrary, courts proceed to a watereddown form of scrutiny thats heightened in name only. I think this board should reaffirm that text history and tradition essentially is the test and can be administered in a way that provides real protection. How do we go back just one second, to the question presented, does new york citys ban on transporting a license locked and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside the city limits consistent with the Second Amendment . There is no new york city law for transporting a license locked and unloaded handgun to home or any other place. I think you will hear that. What new york very brief response. There is a question presented they say there is no ban and you say abyou can finish the question. That was the question. Mr. Chief justice, thank you. My answer in a nutshell is knox, my slightly longer answer is every time this court confronts a post certiorari maneuver to moot the case. In almost by definition will a athe question presented concerning the constitutionality of special assessment it did not concern the added woodsy of the refund notice but this court decided both. Thank you counsel. Mr. Wall . Mr. Chief justice and the court. One point on the merits and will mootness. On the merits text history introduction all condemning new yorks transport man. Such bands are been rare and commonly struck down precisely because of the right to keep arms keeping and bear arms must entail and have is always entailed the ability of a lawabiding citizen to carry a firearm unloaded and walked from one lawful place to another. On mootness petitioners pointed below to economic harms from the violation of the constitutional rights. If they prevail here the District Court could award them damages just like any other 1983 plan. But they never asked for it. Thats true but theres a specific rule on this federal 50 4c which says the prayer of relief binds on a default judgment doesnt bind on merit. The question for article 3, grant and there are questions about potential questions about whether under the rules the court should allow them to inject the hearing and weighed against citys tardiness in changing its theory the case as well but for article 3 purposes the question under abis it impossible for court to grant sexual relief . It is not. Its possible for a court to award them damages they have sustained as a result of the citys conduct. Has the solicitor general ever asked this court to allow such a late introduction of the damages question to save the case from mootness. Mr. Quinn said he was not aware of any such case, are you . I dont know of any case in which is directly come up or we weighed in on it. We participated on merits before the city suggested the mootness and we felt compelled to explain to the court exit didnt come up in ali john reno and it was decided the other way that the court said no we are not going to allow that to happen . That predates the federal rule. I think the facts are somewhat distinguishable from here where they got evidence in the record at the Summary Judgment stage of their economic harms. Do not focus on damages. What they wanted was to engage in conduct. Not focus on damages is an understatement. They practically want to take damages. It had every opportunity to say they wanted damages including today and for whatever reason mr. Clement has physically said this case is not about damages. Thats not why we think its not moot and its not what we want. I heard mr. Clement say im happy to affirm my clients want damages but we dont think we need that lifeline from solicitor general. I think the question under knox admission products is is it impossible for court to award damages . Theres evidence in the record of economic harm. If they get a declaration on merits that they are right in the matter of the Second Amendment there is no barrier to their receiving award of damages from a court. Would you remind me where in the complaint they said fourth damage . I think the best examples are pages 32, 33, 35, 36 of the joint appendix and again 52 through 54, 56, 57, 59 to 61 those are both pleading and Summary Judgment affidavit and rely on two kinds of harm. One is competitions they were not allowed to attend with firearms and the other is the cause of dues and membership fees to the in city ranges which i think implicitly are suggesting higher than the other city. They filed a complaint they filed a motion for Summary Judgment debriefed the case before the Second Circuit they filed this petition then in response to the suggestion of mootness they filed another brief they are ending none of those places today ask for damages. Damages has been injected into this case because of the solicitor general in a very latebreaking threepage letter. I will certainly grant that theres a lot of postgrant maneuvering on both sides. The city has withdrawn its law and the petitioners have come up with theories of why the case is not moot. As matter of article 3 argues that damages can change hands. He could also rest on future consequences and say the citys representations have come too late. I thought that in your brief in your letter brief you specifically rejected every other theory of why this case was lied. We think the court credits those kind of assertions by government litigants it did in diff units. The facts here are a little different. A scheme that expressly allows you to consider conduct. You dont have acknowledgment from the city that its former conduct was caught unconstitutional and representation that comes as mr. Corbett said in his letter at the 11th and and a half hour. On those facts could y