And if you do not, i believe we still have copies at the front desk. By all means, pick up a copy on your way out. We are very fortunate to have with us today, brian graff, this man, my friend and coauthor was also a retired naval officer, formal Deputy Director for american seapower. A prolific writer and also managing director, its a National Security and defense consultancy. Its also a pleasure to welcome david, this man. Also a retired naval officer and defensive uses best writer. I will offer some thoughts based on our monograph. Brian will follow. Then the three of us will discuss, we will conclude with questions and some answers. To the untrained eye, modern military Technology May seem to have eliminated the thought of war that defined premodern battlefields. Victory in historic conflicts relied on the coincidence of skill and luck. The great commander sought in a position to impose his will on a chaotic battlefield in a single moment of genius or a series of moments of genius. Reaching for that moment requires good fortune and the alignment of factors beyond his control. Intelligence traveled only as fast as a man could run or a horse could ride or pigeon can fly. Victory therefore required months, if not years of careful planning. Despite technological advancements, confusion still defines the titanics crashes of the 20th century scores. The u. S. Fleet at midway could only strike japans carriers as fast as it dive into torpedo bombers would fly. Buck proved instrumental. Commanders decision to continue searching for japans Carrier Force in the American Strike which rivals as they were refueling the army played a large role in deciding the issue. Today however, jets fly at hundreds of miles an hour where in the case of hypersonic reference, over 100 miles in two minutes. Travel light circle advanced radars track thousands of targets in the case of the combat system, hundreds. Laserguided weapons are accurate 2 feet and sometimes interest. Its tempting to believe conflict is now mechanical. Any enemy can be found and destroyed without much trouble but the key to victory is simply building faster and longer range missions. Missions and Delivery Systems where the aircraft ships, submarines or landbased launchers are, it can have victory but think that finding the enemy is easier than before and more specifically, the modern u. S. Military can locate and destroy adversaries at will. Temporary u. S. Intelligence surveillance and targeting is equipped to the demands of complication. Particularly in the western pacific. Without serious investment and overhaul, u. S. Risks peace time and defeated in war. Can sailors face the same difficulty as Ernest Hemingways fisherman. The sea is big and old. The u. S. Pacific commanders responsible for 30 million square miles ocean in the western pacific alone. Several island chains break up this fastness while civilian ships and aircraft between some of the world most prosperous nations. Moreover, the u. S. Pacific forces alongside their regional allies face the greatest threats since the soviet union. Peoples republic of china has spent the past 40 years increasing security wealth. In the last 20 undermining the Global Economic order. Over the past decade is transformed military from a force suited to internal Security Missions to one that can protect ours. The chinese have developed a military design to counter american ally capabilities. Transported a region defined by strategic chokepoints and large scale economic destructions could spark protests and threaten regime survival. Thus any conflict china fights must be short, intense, decisive. General secretary does not fear conflict, he worries about it for long competition there allies. Peoples Liberation Army possesses capabilities that will destroy local adversaries military while also forcing the u. S. And japan to choose the risky highvalue assets. Or risking taiwan. Deterring chinese ambitions requires a mix of americans and allies capabilities. The u. S. Military must have a specific set of tools. It needs longrange standoff weapons can penetrate defenses, strike aircraft to carry them, range extenders to enable strikes while keeping carriers secure. Their superiority fighters to defend highvalue targets, subsurface capabilities and infiltrate titles denial and air defense strike and commandandcontrol. These assets have dominated and diminished. Without enough intelligence, surveillance and targeting. China will deploy its missiles on aircraft, ships and landbased launchers. These are relatively small and in most cases highly immobile targets that will be difficult. The u. S. Must be able to identify these targets efficiently and at range. It must be enough space between forward position u. S. Surveillance tools and major fleet formations or longrange bombers to keep the ladder out of harms way. Otherwise, u. S. Must choose between deploying carriers within strike range of china longrange missiles thereby exposing them to risks not run since the second world war. Or backing out of strike range and allowing china to execute the opening stages at its plans. Intelligence surveillance targeting is of equal importance before conflict. Chinese geography gives a strategic advantage particularly in a confrontational taiwan. The u. S. Must rely on communication lines spanning the specific Ocean Pacific ocean and having access to regional reinforcements. China can concentrate forces and foreign reserves much more quickly. Nevertheless, china cannot strike from a standing start. It must concentrate air and Ground Forces across taiwan and prepare for a surge to disable taiwanese defenses while warding off the u. S. And ally response. With enough warning from the u. S. Can increase across the chinese defenses. Even to submarines plus a surge in aircraft from japan and Pacific Carrier groups could make a real difference. But the Early Morning requires longterm surveillance. The u. S. Needs isr feedback and hopes to shake the battlefield and execute the strategy of deterrent by denial. Specifically it needs information on assets in positions within 200 miles of the chinese coastline along with chinas coastal garrisons, airbases and ports in the eastern military district. Its important to note similar thinking applies to Chinese Forces in south china. The u. S. Requires constant surveillance, po a navy and fleet chips. The Company Aircraft or units moving from parts of Southern China toward both the islands. Finance is recognized the importance of isr t. Even a decade ago, chinas military remained largely backward. It lacked centralized funding must did not rigorously simulate combat situations. Most of it Fighter Pilots did not fly at night. The poa primarily conducted Territorial Defense and internal Security Missions. Still, china has developed its antisatellite capabilities since the 1980s, a series of public tests from 2007 to 2018 and incorporating antisatellite capabilities research into a space program. Satellite capabilities are critical to the u. S. Complex. Not only do they provide valuable conflict intelligence, they also serve critical communication between u. S. Forces in multiple theaters. Tiny strike would disrupt operations globally while undermining american isr teeth, specifically in the western pacific. Currently, the u. S. Are properly monitoring chinese movements. This impedes the u. S. Ability to deter conflict, shake the battlefield and in the end, when a work. Open source analogies undertake the detail determination request by counterparts. Still, isr t has become so hollowed out that the lack of Coordination Development is evident. U. S. Ir t is comprised of inner craft, surfaced in Service Centers and sensors equipped with radio frequency electromagnetic and tools. Neither the navy nor the department of defense have made enough effort to centralize the deployment and isr t structure. Thus, i think its fair to say that no one really knows what is in the western pacific. By extension, no one really knows how current isr t actually relates to quantifiable u. S. Requirements. Im not making a new observation here but a fleet without eyes cannot fight. Policy steps should be taken to overhaul isr t. For one, the navy should bound the problem. Provide funding for the navy to conduct a classified study of pacific isr t capabilities. This would allow may be to develop targeted quickfix responses to capability gaps as it would plan future acquisitions. I think all u. S. Armed services should conduct a similar review. Some measures can have shortfalls in the navy acquisitions of mq foresee triton, uavs will boost capabilities by providing commanders with a high enduran endurance, information and platform. Full Operational Capability is an expected until 2023. The Defense Department can re task u. S. Air force and cube nine from Central Command and deploy them to the pacific in a similar role. Those who answer or might object that we should not have one strategic theater to benefit another are right. Both are essentially an intere interest. The navy should also consider increasing its projected and q4 c3 since the end q4 c3 program capability. Its unmanned platform. Inverting the unmanned carrier launched surveillance and Strike Program to the c bars, the carrier based. The navy has lacked carrier air wing or range extender since the early 2000s. Since our retirement of the asics and f14 carrier air wing strike strong. Any strategy employing standoff strikes would require an aircraft to show the mq25s role. By expanding its missions profile to include isr t would both increase capabilities and i believe weve already extreme cross. They emphasize longrange centers rather than speed. Thereby avoiding the difficulties the program encountered. Ironic characteristic of strategy, i will close my remarks here. Its cyclical nature. Operational methods would be obsolete and arrived with new technologies or strategies, the same deadly effect as before with initial decline. I think about the concept that fell out of practice and battleships. The navy should consider reviving this concept. Developing long endurance uab like the end q4 c or m cube nine to be deployed and recovered by u. S. Surface combatants. This would increase u. S. Irs coverage and making the use of weapons by Surface Combatants more feasible. This could direct the missions toward the targets while destroying the launching missile or whatever, launching the missile would remain strike range. The u. S. Must also coordinate redundant capability develop its for its regional allies, particularly japan. Pan selfdefense is sophisticated and highly competent. The Ground Forces, the ground force still receives most of the funding. Assets in which survive massive chinese strike. The suggestions of hudsons isr report apply equally in the defense of japan. Ill leave it at that for the time being. The podium is yours. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, everyone. Nice to see from the faces in the audience. Im not sure you all understand how fortunate you are today to be here because you get to see davids larder with his hair combed, his beard trimmed and in a suit and tie. Lets like i uniform siding here. Thank you for your invitation, seth. Its good to be here and i want to thank the third member of the team, harrison who happens to be one of the most insightful operation analyst that i know and he did all the math because seth and i dont do math. Why did we do this study . What caused it . Someone asked me about the other day. A couple of things. Number one, 2018 National Defense operation act that directed the navy to do Something Like this, to do a study sufficiency, specifically one of the things they asked for was that the study include operations in a satellite environment which i thought was interesting. To me, it seems as if congress were asking the navy to do such a study, smart people and the congress were worried it wasnt being done so we watched. We have been communicating engorged came out. We didnt see much coming out into the press, we decided we would give attention to it. Another reason to do this study was the National Security strategy that came up in the early months, january 2018. A very big idea in it. Is that the u. S. Posture for unconventional returns would move from that of deterrence by punishment to the parents by denial. They are very different ways of attempting to deter conventionally. The aggressor attains some level of success in their objectives and the threat of being pounded into submission by the calvary coming over the horizon is not to be enough to dissuade them. The other is deterrence by denial in which forces that are present are sufficiently lethal and capable to keep the opponent from the progression in the first place. When you look at the geography of the recent region in the western pacific, because there are so many possible targets of aggression so close to the chinese mainland where so much force could be marshaled in so little time, this decision by the Trump Administration to change the nations conventional deterrence i think was a very smart one. But it was these requirements, it has to be better. Has to be stronger, it has to have more weapons and more isr, more networks that link all of that together. These missile isr mismatch in the navy right now, in january 2015, issue of proceedings, the three in charge of the navy service force, admiral wrote an article where they put forth this idea of distributed the file. In this article under the section where they were suggesting things they needed, to operationally this concept, they write persistent organic Airborne Intelligence Surveillance isr and data relay something they need. An aspect of this, the ability for operations apart from centralized control networks, local, information that which are essential to achieving space awareness. The networks were more capable than those existing today, must be persistent in the environment. The current vertical takeoff Unmanned Aerial Systems have the persistent necessary to support operations remains to be seen. They met shipboard helicopters. The potential for them network and information sharing should be examined. Actions groups to launch and recover fixed wing or partially fixed wing will be pivotal to employing uavs in this world. I mention this because it was evident from the article for almost five years ago that the three cars in charge of Surface Warfare in the navy believed there wasnt isr problem. They believed it enough to put in proceedings and make sure everybody read it. As a young man, i did a lot of Cruise Missile certifications when i was on active duty. A bunch of experts from organizations would come on board and very intense the relation determined the degree to which you are able to employ surface to surface weapons. We used to have a weapon, anti mission. It had a range of 2150 miles. I remembered going through the certifications, discussing the employment of this weapon both with teams and wed sit around on our ship think about what would happen if we ever got to do that. Bottom line was, the weapons range greatly outstripped our ability to understand what we were targeting. It was a firing weapon, the area of uncertainty of the target as this weapon moved downrange. We got rid of it for many reasons. Some associated with treaties but i think one of the reasons the navy didnt fight harder, it was difficult to employ. We didnt have situation awareness. Now im looking at the navy that has tomahawk black for, with ranges at nearly 1000 miles. Looking at the sm six and a surface to surface mode with classified discussions of ranges of 200 miles. We spent the money we need to get the weapons we need out there. The question in my mind was, do we have the isr to support those weapons . In my gut feeling, it was no. We wanted to get after this so we got this and started to think about it. Some of the things we thought about, i have relationships with them today, folks who have sailed through the South China Sea. We talked to them, talked to anyone who operates in western pacific today, they will tell you yes, we believe the chinese have us targeted. Its just the cost of doing business. If they believe all the time that some element of the peoples Liberation Army has been targeted. My position in starting this w was, why cant we create that same sense uncertainty in the chinese destroyer . Why cant we make them understand that they are always targeted, 24 sevenths, 365 in peace time . That those naval forces are operating under in the western pacific so to operate under that imperative my understanding the capability of the systems their ranges and sensitivity leads me to believe there is no way they could pull that off. There is a lot of discussion in the circles about National Technical means or overhead access you get into those discussions that greatly exceeds the room to the congressional direction into bound our study we decided we would not deal with National Technical means under them the control of the operational commanders in the navy and to task those systems or that they would be gone or doing other things. And it was one of the bounding assumptions but we focused on the Unmanned Systems for go the navy has a program of record to buy 68 operational models and to early models im not sure what they call them. The 68 aircraft are over the lifetime of the acquisition program. The operational requirement is for five orbits and four planes a piece. Twenty a