And if you do not, i believe we still have copies at the front desk. By all means, pick up a copy on your way out. We are very fortunate to have with us today, brian graff, this man, my friend and coauthor was also a retired naval officer, formal Deputy Director for american seapower. A prolific writer and also managing director, its a National Security and defense consultancy. Its also a pleasure to welcome david, this man. Also a retired naval officer and defensive uses best writer. I will offer some thoughts based on our monograph. Brian will follow. Then the three of us will discuss, we will conclude with questions and some answers. To the untrained eye, modern military Technology May seem to have eliminated the thought of war that defined premodern battlefields. Victory in historic conflicts relied on the coincidence of skill and luck. The great commander sought in a position to impose his will on a chaotic battlefield in a single moment of genius or a series of moments of genius. Reaching for that moment requires good fortune and the alignment of factors beyond his control. Intelligence traveled only as fast as a man could run or a horse could ride or pigeon can fly. Victory therefore required months, if not years of careful planning. Despite technological advancements, confusion still defines the titanics crashes of the 20th century scores. The u. S. Fleet at midway could only strike japans carriers as fast as it dive into torpedo bombers would fly. Buck proved instrumental. Commanders decision to continue searching for japans Carrier Force in the American Strike which rivals as they were refueling the army played a large role in deciding the issue. Today however, jets fly at hundreds of miles an hour where in the case of hypersonic reference, over 100 miles in two minutes. Travel light circle advanced radars track thousands of targets in the case of the combat system, hundreds. Laserguided weapons are accurate 2 feet and sometimes interest. Its tempting to believe conflict is now mechanical. Any enemy can be found and destroyed without much trouble but the key to victory is simply building faster and longer range missions. Missions and Delivery Systems where the aircraft ships, submarines or landbased launchers are, it can have victory but think that finding the enemy is easier than before and more specifically, the modern u. S. Military can locate and destroy adversaries at will. Temporary u. S. Intelligence surveillance and targeting is equipped to the demands of complication. Particularly in the western pacific. Without serious investment and overhaul, u. S. Risks peace time and defeated in war. Can sailors face the same difficulty as Ernest Hemingways fisherman. The sea is big and old. The u. S. Pacific commanders responsible for 30 million square miles ocean in the western pacific alone. Several island chains break up this fastness while civilian ships and aircraft between some of the world most prosperous nations. Moreover, the u. S. Pacific forces alongside their regional allies face the greatest threats since the soviet union. Peoples republic of china has spent the past 40 years increasing security wealth. In the last 20 undermining the Global Economic order. Over the past decade is transformed military from a force suited to internal Security Missions to one that can protect ours. The chinese have developed a military design to counter american ally capabilities. Transported a region defined by strategic chokepoints and large scale economic destructions could spark protests and threaten regime survival. Thus any conflict china fights must be short, intense, decisive. General secretary does not fear conflict, he worries about it for long competition there allies. Peoples Liberation Army possesses capabilities that will destroy local adversaries military while also forcing the u. S. And japan to choose the risky highvalue assets. Or risking taiwan. Deterring chinese ambitions requires a mix of americans and allies capabilities. The u. S. Military must have a specific set of tools. It needs longrange standoff weapons can penetrate defenses, strike aircraft to carry them, range extenders to enable strikes while keeping carriers secure. Their superiority fighters to defend highvalue targets, subsurface capabilities and infiltrate titles denial and air defense strike and commandandcontrol. These assets have dominated and diminished. Without enough intelligence, surveillance and targeting. China will deploy its missiles on aircraft, ships and landbased launchers. These are relatively small and in most cases highly immobile targets that will be difficult. The u. S. Must be able to identify these targets efficiently and at range. It must be enough space between forward position u. S. Surveillance tools and major fleet formations or longrange bombers to keep the ladder out of harms way. Otherwise, u. S. Must choose between deploying carriers within strike range of china longrange missiles thereby exposing them to risks not run since the second world war. Or backing out of strike range and allowing china to execute the opening stages at its plans. Intelligence surveillance targeting is of equal importance before conflict. Chinese geography gives a strategic advantage particularly in a confrontational taiwan. The u. S. Must rely on communication lines spanning the specific Ocean Pacific ocean and having access to regional reinforcements. China can concentrate forces and foreign reserves much more quickly. Nevertheless, china cannot strike from a standing start. It must concentrate air and Ground Forces across taiwan and prepare for a surge to disable taiwanese defenses while warding off the u. S. And ally response. With enough warning from the u. S. Can increase across the chinese defenses. Even to submarines plus a surge in aircraft from japan and Pacific Carrier groups could make a real difference. But the Early Morning requires longterm surveillance. The u. S. Needs isr feedback and hopes to shake the battlefield and execute the strategy of deterrent by denial. Specifically it needs information on assets in positions within 200 miles of the chinese coastline along with chinas coastal garrisons, airbases and ports in the eastern military district. Its important to note similar thinking applies to Chinese Forces in south china. The u. S. Requires constant surveillance, po a navy and fleet chips. The Company Aircraft or units moving from parts of Southern China toward both the islands. Finance is recognized the importance of isr t. Even a decade ago, chinas military remained largely backward. It lacked centralized funding must did not rigorously simulate combat situations. Most of it Fighter Pilots did not fly at night. The poa primarily conducted Territorial Defense and internal Security Missions. Still, china has developed its antisatellite capabilities since the 1980s, a series of public tests from 2007 to 2018 and incorporating antisatellite capabilities research into a space program. Satellite capabilities are critical to the u. S. Complex. Not only do they provide valuable conflict intelligence, they also serve critical communication between u. S. Forces in multiple theaters. Tiny strike would disrupt operations globally while undermining american isr teeth, specifically in the western pacific. Currently, the u. S. Are properly monitoring chinese movements. This impedes the u. S. Ability to deter conflict, shake the battlefield and in the end, when a work. Open source analogies undertake the detail determination request by counterparts. Still, isr t has become so hollowed out that the lack of Coordination Development is evident. U. S. Ir t is comprised of inner craft, surfaced in Service Centers and sensors equipped with radio frequency electromagnetic and tools. Neither the navy nor the department of defense have made enough effort to centralize the deployment and isr t structure. Thus, i think its fair to say that no one really knows what is in the western pacific. By extension, no one really knows how current isr t actually relates to quantifiable u. S. Requirements. Im not making a new observation here but a fleet without eyes cannot fight. Policy steps should be taken to overhaul isr t. For one, the navy should bound the problem. Provide funding for the navy to conduct a classified study of pacific isr t capabilities. This would allow may be to develop targeted quickfix responses to capability gaps as it would plan future acquisitions. I think all u. S. Armed services should conduct a similar review. Some measures can have shortfalls in the navy acquisitions of mq foresee triton, uavs will boost capabilities by providing commanders with a high enduran endurance, information and platform. Full Operational Capability is an expected until 2023. The Defense Department can re task u. S. Air force and cube nine from Central Command and deploy them to the pacific in a similar role. Those who answer or might object that we should not have one strategic theater to benefit another are right. Both are essentially an intere interest. The navy should also consider increasing its projected and q4 c3 since the end q4 c3 program capability. Its unmanned platform. Inverting the unmanned carrier launched surveillance and Strike Program to the c bars, the carrier based. The navy has lacked carrier air wing or range extender since the early 2000s. Since our retirement of the asics and f14 carrier air wing strike strong. Any strategy employing standoff strikes would require an aircraft to show the mq25s role. By expanding its missions profile to include isr t would both increase capabilities and i believe weve already extreme cross. They emphasize longrange centers rather than speed. Thereby avoiding the difficulties the program encountered. Ironic characteristic of strategy, i will close my remarks here. Its cyclical nature. Operational methods would be obsolete and arrived with new technologies or strategies, the same deadly effect as before with initial decline. I think about the concept that fell out of practice and battleships. The navy should consider reviving this concept. Developing long endurance uab like the end q4 c or m cube nine to be deployed and recovered by u. S. Surface combatants. This would increase u. S. Irs coverage and making the use of weapons by Surface Combatants more feasible. This could direct the missions toward the targets while destroying the launching missile or whatever, launching the missile would remain strike range. The u. S. Must also coordinate redundant capability develop its for its regional allies, particularly japan. Pan selfdefense is sophisticated and highly competent. The Ground Forces, the ground force still receives most of the funding. Assets in which survive massive chinese strike. The suggestions of hudsons isr report apply equally in the defense of japan. Ill leave it at that for the time being. The podium is yours. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, everyone. Nice to see from the faces in the audience. Im not sure you all understand how fortunate you are today to be here because you get to see davids larder with his hair combed, his beard trimmed and in a suit and tie. Lets like i uniform siding here. Thank you for your invitation, seth. Its good to be here and i want to thank the third member of the team, harrison who happens to be one of the most insightful operation analyst that i know and he did all the math because seth and i dont do math. Why did we do this study . What caused it . Someone asked me about the other day. A couple of things. Number one, 2018 National Defense operation act that directed the navy to do Something Like this, to do a study sufficiency, specifically one of the things they asked for was that the study include operations in a satellite environment which i thought was interesting. To me, it seems as if congress were asking the navy to do such a study, smart people and the congress were worried it wasnt being done so we watched. We have been communicating engorged came out. We didnt see much coming out into the press, we decided we would give attention to it. Another reason to do this study was the National Security strategy that came up in the early months, january 2018. A very big idea in it. Is that the u. S. Posture for unconventional returns would move from that of deterrence by punishment to the parents by denial. They are very different ways of attempting to deter conventionally. The aggressor attains some level of success in their objectives and the threat of being pounded into submission by the calvary coming over the horizon is not to be enough to dissuade them. The other is deterrence by denial in which forces that are present are sufficiently lethal and capable to keep the opponent from the progression in the first place. When you look at the geography of the recent region in the western pacific, because there are so many possible targets of aggression so close to the chinese mainland where so much force could be marshaled in so little time, this decision by the Trump Administration to change the nations conventional deterrence i think was a very smart one. But it was these requirements, it has to be better. Has to be stronger, it has to have more weapons and more isr, more networks that link all of that together. These missile isr mismatch in the navy right now, in january 2015, issue of proceedings, the three in charge of the navy service force, admiral wrote an article where they put forth this idea of distributed the file. In this article under the section where they were suggesting things they needed, to operationally this concept, they write persistent organic Airborne Intelligence Surveillance isr and data relay something they need. An aspect of this, the ability for operations apart from centralized control networks, local, information that which are essential to achieving space awareness. The networks were more capable than those existing today, must be persistent in the environment. The current vertical takeoff Unmanned Aerial Systems have the persistent necessary to support operations remains to be seen. They met shipboard helicopters. The potential for them network and information sharing should be examined. Actions groups to launch and recover fixed wing or partially fixed wing will be pivotal to employing uavs in this world. I mention this because it was evident from the article for almost five years ago that the three cars in charge of Surface Warfare in the navy believed there wasnt isr problem. They believed it enough to put in proceedings and make sure everybody read it. As a young man, i did a lot of Cruise Missile certifications when i was on active duty. A bunch of experts from organizations would come on board and very intense the relation determined the degree to which you are able to employ surface to surface weapons. We used to have a weapon, anti mission. It had a range of 2150 miles. I remembered going through the certifications, discussing the employment of this weapon both with teams and wed sit around on our ship think about what would happen if we ever got to do that. Bottom line was, the weapons range greatly outstripped our ability to understand what we were targeting. It was a firing weapon, the area of uncertainty of the target as this weapon moved downrange. We got rid of it for many reasons. Some associated with treaties but i think one of the reasons the navy didnt fight harder, it was difficult to employ. We didnt have situation awareness. Now im looking at the navy that has tomahawk black for, with ranges at nearly 1000 miles. Looking at the sm six and a surface to surface mode with classified discussions of ranges of 200 miles. We spent the money we need to get the weapons we need out there. The question in my mind was, do we have the isr to support those weapons . In my gut feeling, it was no. We wanted to get after this so we got this and started to think about it. Some of the things we thought about, i have relationships with them today, folks who have sailed through the South China Sea. We talked to them, talked to anyone who operates in western pacific today, they will tell you yes, we believe the chinese have us targeted. Its just the cost of doing business. If they believe all the time that some element of the peoples Liberation Army has been targeted. My position in starting this w was, why cant we create that same sense uncertainty in the chinese destroyer . Why cant we make them understand that they are always targeted, 24 sevenths, 365 in peace time . That those naval forces are operating under in the western pacific so to operate under that imperative my understanding the capability of the systems their ranges and sensitivity leads me to believe there is no way they could pull that off. There is a lot of discussion in the circles about National Technical means or overhead access you get into those discussions that greatly exceeds the room to the congressional direction into bound our study we decided we would not deal with National Technical means under them the control of the operational commanders in the navy and to task those systems or that they would be gone or doing other things. And it was one of the bounding assumptions but we focused on the Unmanned Systems for go the navy has a program of record to buy 68 operational models and to early models im not sure what they call them. The 68 aircraft are over the lifetime of the acquisition program. The operational requirement is for five orbits and four planes a piece. Twenty airplanes worldwide. And we started to think that the major isr platform to fill this targeting requirement or proble problem. Could they pull off this 24 7 365 day problem . We see no friendlier allied contributions to this. Thats probably not reasonable you will likely have friends and allies helping us locate aggressor platforms but for the purposes of inquiry to focus the ability to support the operational requirement that we think is useful. Received a representative level of posture for both the United States and china during peacetime. Peacetime. Remember that. Looking to bolster the conventional deterrence by denial of the United States navy and we do that by putting more and more powerful forces forward that are supplied by sufficient isr piece of the other guy does when they are under way someone is watching thats what were trying to do. United states continues its commitments in europe and elsewhere we assume the ongoing Maritime Surveillance requirements of the mediterranean and the indian ocean were not concerned with the performance of weapons and the analysis. I invite you to take a good dive into the monograph that we provided with charts and tables and graphs that describe the operational challenges associated with attempting to just do what harrison referred to to take an airborne radar of 50000 feet with a 287mile area of concern, if you want to look at one. 66 million square miles every 12 hours and thats just one time covering every one of those square miles, you need five in the air at any one time. Just to mow the grass. Mowing the grass is insufficient if you are looking at targets of opportunity because you know youll hit somebody and say that somebody we want to stay on. That target requires persistence which takes away from your ability to continue to mow the grass and we go into that into the discussion. We talk about the time to get to station does to the ability of airplanes and how many airplanes you need for go look at guam specifically i think i remember it was along the order of 2000 miles from the center of the South China Sea. Would have to fly from guam 2000 miles to get to the model thats one the middle thats a lot of fuel. But if youre going to maintain 24 7 365 environment , to the fidelity that i think we need the current supply will not get us there. It will not get as close to their. So then we decided whats called pilot math that has a couple ofs assumptions there are no false targets. You get every bit of the Horizon Limited radar range there is no weather problems. This is the very best possible case for radar surveillance. Obviously there are other ways to survey all those waters it helps in an important way so back in the envelope that led us to believe the emq c4 five is incredibly insufficient if we devote all 20 airplanes to the pacific all 20 operational airplanes we would have a difficult time meeting the objective of covering the chinese surface vessels. So to make a few recommendations i would like to drill down on a couple of those in my remaining time. First i would like to see the organization tasked to do this research that has the facility clearance necessary to really get at the merged environment that brings in the satellite characteristics of the centers that are in the region and on the airplanes to give a better view. I want someone to do this maybe the navy to participate but an outside organization to report on this. I want to bring your attention to two particular kinds of endurance uav. There was an idea that was called tern an aircraft with long gestation time and a variety of sensor packages to dramatically increase the isr capabilities. The marine corps currently is working on a program of the Expeditionary Capability we provide the links in the report you dont look at the what the marine corps is asking for but i remember the brief they provided thinking this is what i want for the service force. It is a virtual overlap. The marine corps has a lot of different ways to get their requirements ship based could be one landbased could be the answer we are looking into which would work best. That they are putting real money against trying to fulfill this set of emerging requirements for isr to support corroborations and the commandants new vision of naval integration. I think we could buy them faster think we need to spend some money there is maritime version and to turn them into maritime assets. Somebody said should the navy or air force operate . I dont care. I really dont care. I do care that we get more assets to help. Before i turn this over, i recognize what im talking about is just the first several steps of the kill chain. I really havent spend time on the weapons or the networking. Those are important if you want to get into them, we can talk about that but thats my presentation i hope you enjoyed the report and i look forward to questions. [applause]. So one of the assets that you left out you see the p8 making it to the isr one of the constraints we put on ourselves is dealing with unmanned access because the manned assets have other missions. If we were added time of increased tension or serious with the isr of undersea assets of the Chinese Submarine fleet the understanding is it would be very busy with the submarine threat and less a factor in service contact. There is also an issue of cost and what threats it faces in that area. With the reduced uav. If somebody is brave enough and doesnt understand those acronyms we are using just raise your hand we will say what it is. In any case there is a cost issue there. Especially with those in abilities as they are now. You discuss some of the threats they are facing. With the global hawk shot down by iran 180 million. I hate to be the guy that brings up cost but that discussion afterwards is there was reporting and Foreign Policy that really freaked out dod they lost a 180 Million Drone to the iranian missile. There was discussion of canceling the whole program. But what would you say to people that say we are spending too much money on exquisite access thats too vulnerable quex. It is certainly an issue but its not as though there are alternatives that are lower cost and those are mentioned in our report. Yes. Its a lot of money to lose in a drone but fortunately is not the only way to deal with those capabilities and it does have extended range and not the only game in town. The two ideas to be bound up in the question getting back to deterrence if your desire is to maintain posture which is to keep that from happening, you spend money on more exquisite technology but if the other guy is not deterred it its always match to a certain level. If that desire exceeds your posture, then we talk about the shooting war and the things that are important. Sons since we get into a hot environment all of those concepts that are important were fighting but theyre just less important before the shooting starts. Before these more exquisite technologies are useful. One more thing. We really have to think deeply about how Unmanned Systems lower the bar for conflict. The iranians believed they could take shots and probably get away with it. Lo and behold they got away with it. Because we did not consider the loss a war inducing event. So will everybody just start to believe the unmanned vehicles of everyone else are fair games and thats just a cost of doing business . . Or whoever we are talking about had good reason to be freaked out but better reason to be freaked out not that the drone was lost but that there was no response afterwards because talking about deterrence if you want to deter that from happening again you have to make that clear theres a cost for doing it and that cost wasnt necessarily without most of the time going to war. This sets up an interesting deny on Dynamic Forces are in a constrained area we both have created these isr environments to know where the others are all the time. Then the distraction of the isr asset is different than other aggressive acts because at that point you have to ask yourself is the opposing force trying to poke my eyes out before they do something bigger and more aggressive . I refer to this in a meeting a conventional balance of terror in isr aware that helps provide stability a conventional stability to a region. One of the things you could get into from the pentagon is that if they could see my triton then we should go even further with the asset which of course will drive cost with the volume business so how do you guard against the drive to not be seen to put up the most exquisite thing in the air versus your need for a lot of coverage . Some of both. We need volume and low signature more exquisite stuff to do the serious missions we may not want the other guy to know you are doing it. I found one of the interesting things was the organic isr Surface Combatants one of the areas i was uncomfortable was the idea of targeting the harpoon missile to send the helicopter over the horizon and if you send it against a Surface Combatant then theres nothing for them not to shoot down the helicopter then you risk the pilots life. The unmanned isr seems to solve that problem but you also run into the problem now to say to your friends and Naval Aviation we need a drone not completely out of business but to a certain extent so this coming together and wonder if you believe the navy is set up to have that coverage you are looking for. I am a consultant and i consult to the navy. So now what i will tell you normally not what i get paid to do. My opinion is that this is a very thorny bureaucratic problem and we alluded to that in the report in the first draft i did a hell of a lot more than allude to it. Then i back to the language out. Service people believe we need more organic isr something that takes off from a ship, under my control, completes my loop of fire control. Anything that takes off from my deck is paid for by the airplane guys in the navy and they have quite justifiably said for years you dont have a requirement for that. You have not showed your requirement and this is a function of missiles moving out the cave on capability faster than the isr could catch up. This is why the Congress Asked the navy to do it study to determine whether or not such a requirement exist because they have begun to move forward. I dont know if its a program of record. I dont know exactly if it is or not but there is a lot of talk about it. But there are bureaucratic problems between the surface people and the aviators and the isr people because aviators by trucks and then pentagon buys isr it also buys them from the satellites. So there is a question of what they consider to be efficient so these organizations have to come together to determine if they are out to lunch or if they have got it. I think the concern about this indicates they want to know if they have god it or not. Im looking for agreement ff one of the problems that stands in the way of the bureaucratic reordering and one of the obstacles is its very difficult to relate to a particular strategy. What is the navys role if there is a conflict in the western pacific what is the navys objective . And the difficulty here goes back to the idea as it is currently construed in the Defense Department of joint warfare and discouragement of individual services to present their ideas were to do anything about it because everybodys involved in the game. But that wasnt my central point. Would it be easier to reorder bureaucracy specifically this and if it were clear that reordering the bureaucracy serves a strategic purpose . You cannot get proxy within 30 minutes absolutely. So yes i want to move on a couple of other issues. This renewed push the last few weeks around 355 ships, acting secretary of the navy has been clear he wants a plan to get us there by 2030 and that was echoed by the National Security advisor just recently who said when President Trump says 350 ships he means 350 ships. So if you look at that situation in comparison to what was said recently that ohio would be 40 percent of our budget, it feels like there is a lot and not a ton of resources to execute that. So how do you make the case spending on extra isr capabilities to balance against political promises and the things that i navy wants to do or what it says it is required to do . To fulfill the National Security obligations. Its a really good question because the increases the administration has proposed and agreed to by congress are going to turn around two years from now. So we will start we are going to start seeing decreases in the Defense Budget beginning with 1. 8 . As difficult as it is to reach the 355 ship goal in 30 plus years its going to be more difficult with the budget on the decline. So i am afraid i dont have an innovative or creative or imaginative answer to your question. I just a very simple one, that if the American People and their representatives want to be safe and wants to understand what threat is materializing in the west pacific and is likely to continue to realize in the future you have to spend the money. A lot of meat here. Ship counts are an unsatisfying way of qualifying a navy. They work for two things. Number one, they work in comparing your gross size to other navies of the world gross size and they work in comparison to previous u. S. Navys. There must be a better way of quantifying a navys power. I just dont know what it is. Acting secretary mostly has made it clear what he wants of his use of forms. How do we get to 355 and ten years. The National Security adviser as david said made it clear that is an administration goal. If we continue to count ships the way we do today, 292 ships today, 355 ships is almost 22 larger, 40 billion more a year to maintain a navy of that size, you cant just buy the ships, you have to maintain them, put people in them, get food to them, fuel, greece, parts, training, all those things associated with the increase in the size of the navy is gigantic. I would not want to be one of those uniform for stars in the navy or 3 stars who has to try to figure out how to send the acting secretary a shipbuilding plan that gets you to 355 if we count the same way we do today. We ignore smaller ships, we ignore him you 4s which are important in this network naval force. We dont plan to count large unmanned surface vessels, these are plan to have 32 missiles on them a piece, cspan22 missiles, we are not counting these as part of the navy, we didnt count Coastal Patrol boats in our counsel before. Secretary mavis tried during his time to increase the navy ship count by counting stuff that wasnt being counted and he got pounded by the hill on it. I think he would be well advised to bring the hill, the joint staff, the Navy Uniforms together, go out to a Conference Center for a weekend and say come out with a new way to count but you all sign up on and sign up with because if the goal is to get to 355 as we currently count it is a pipe dream because we dont have 40 billion additional year for the navy unless number one a giant defense increase that funds all the services larger happens which is the way we generally do it or a serious strategic choice is made to privilege see power over other elements of military power. I dont see that happening. I go back to goldwater nichols. You know, the United States in the past has made Strategic Decisions to underfunds, defund one service, the army and up funds another service, Strategic Rocket forces during the Eisenhower Administration because eisenhower said this is deeper and whats more, is needed to compete so it is not as though that has never been done but in the current Political Climate it is extremely difficult and i agree with ryan that simple ship numbers are not a full proof expression of power but i am searching for a better one and i agree without any question that simply counting the legacy ships we have right now, ones that will be included in whatever number is decided on hens limitations and faults that we should be looking if we are going if we make as much of a move towards unmanned vehicles on the surface as well as in the air those should be encountered at the same time. We are going to build extra large manned and unmanned surface vessels, those are diesel submarines without people in them. Why would we not count those . Doesnt make sense to me. The acting secretary needs to change the frame of reference as he pursues the number. I will turn it over to the audience because im a hopeless nerd about wargaming and things like that. You mentioned in your report about the chinese, the assumption being china can see all of our ships, based on what you know and is unclassified what is your sense on that. What is the extent in the region is it a safe assumption to say that they now because that kind of limits it is also limiting if they really could see everything we are doing in every where we were so i wonder what your sense is of that. The technical term for the perception that the chinese enjoy targeting ubiquity in the first island chain in executive terms is crap. Things like sunspots, things like weather patterns, things like maintenance on facilities, things like attrition, all kinds of things go into what the probability of detection is at anyone point in the ocean from some other point on the globe. We tend to think and people tend to think there is this pizza wedge that goes out from china out 1000 miles and it is seafloor to 100,000 feet and if youre in there they will find you, thats not the way it is. It is hard to do, really hard to do. There are tools that are going to make things easier but the concept that they have it all is wrong. The concept that i have that we should be able to do the same thing within the first island chain is hard. The weather gets in the way, see state gets in the way, temperature, sunspot activity, all these things get in the way. The other thing is we other have we have to understand if we are going to operate in that environment alltime we have to understand from day today, hour to hour where are the weak spots in that isr complex. And operate near those weak spots and project power from those weak spots but that is a technical challenge that i think the navy is working on. I want to return to something you said before and that is the subsection among our ceos of their vulnerability and im reminded of an old sawhorse, the question is how many minds does it take to create a minefield and the answer, 0. If the ships captain thinks there is a mine he is going to act accordingly. I intend from participating on tabletop exercises several years ago, beginning several years ago that the perception of at least naval officers playing the game is they can see this. And they can target us. I agree with brians technical term but when you see people actually doing things at least in attempts to simulate the real world, different story. We intended to have time for questions so we will open the floor to questions and would you please identify yourself and your organization if there is one. Would you also tell us to whom your question is directed and also last, ask your question in the form of a question. We moved back. Please wait until we get the mic. Im peter, a former diplomat. I can promise you the prc has agents in every single port in the western pacific just like in pearl harbor and they know everything will us ship coming in and out. At least that they can fix. I am also wondering if it is okay to include coast guard vessels and the other question is did you look at Surveillance Drones and all, parking one of those in the stratosphere will take care of a lot of our problems. Lets start with the coast guard. I do not believe the United States coast guard has a role in the South China Sea, period, end a story. That is my view. It is not widely shared. The coast guard doesnt have an of things to do with the missions it has right now. When we assign them navy missions, we tell ourselves a false narrative we are making a better, we are not. We are taking away from some other thing the coast guard is uniquely constituted to do. Secondly, there are some interesting concepts about ships for surveillance, some of the things you are talking about. We didnt think of those. We didnt cover them specifically in our inquiry in my view mostly because they are not either programs of record or ideas that are seriously under consideration by the navy right now. At least at the level that we understand classification. Other questions . Lets see. There is one over here. Im a vietnamese american. I would like to talk about naval surveillance in the era of Great Power Competition and you have made it clear that the number of ships does not reflect their capability and you made it clear that we dont have adequate money to fund the required 40 billion. My question is using the whole government that recently put out wide jones we use the whole government idea and if you look at the budget the dod requires 750 billion the state department, 40 billion, one year of making 20 of the ships amount that you are talking about and if we are talking about distance in the South China Sea, why not talk about the distance between vietnam, okinawa, taiwan to china, is there a different calculus we should look to, to increase the tractability of our navy and normally that, to deter china. I am afraid when i heard the recent news that our assistant secretary randall cyber just resigned, because he is the top pentagon asia hand and he resigned because what he proposed not being approved or going up the bureaucracy. Direct consultation ideas to the current administration, to the state department, to the allies and to our Human Resources in the Defense Department in the state department especially it has been stressed that the Indo Pacific Strategy at the heart of it and at the recent meeting the us had no presence. Would that somehow undermine your work . Thank you. Whole government approaches have been to the question of china for example have been discussed at high levels of government, for example mike pence advocated that from his platform last year. There is a gap in the distance and this is something we need to do and naturally having it happen. But it is important to begin by saying this is navy. I would like to talk about your point about the bases in the west pacific from which we operate. The proximity question you point out is correct, no arguing with that geographically but those bases have to be supplied and those bases have to be defended. And that supply and that defense is something that we rely on allies for but for example with guam that is us, that is hours to supply and defend. There are still limitations on logistics ability from the bases in japan from which we operate and to guam. I thank you for your question because it is very smart and i dont want you to think that because you are sitting in a room with guys from the department of defense that we dont either value or prize what it is the state department and the rest of the government does. We do. Our alliances in that region as far as im concerned are among the most important we have. Those alliances are tender and the daily basis by hardworking diplomats. Im confident that they continue to do their very best to Carry Forward the message that we are involved, we are engaged, we care, we have your back. Secretary shriver, i dont know him. I understand from people i respect that he is one of the best. I want you to know that there are a lot of very good, very smart people continuing the work he was doing or others who are ready to come back into government, they are there and i think i dont think you are going to see a big change in our policy because of the loss of one person no matter how good he or she is at their job. The whole government thing is absolutely essential. It isnt just navy. It isnt just the military that is going to keep the peace in the western pacific. It is going to be making sure our network of alliances, i would not trade our friends for chinas friends. Specifically i would like to be more friendly with vietnam. I wouldnt trade that and i share your fear of that network diminishing. I dont know that i have much feared that it is going to happen. I think we will be able to keep our friends. You are looking at the wrong guy to defend the personnel decisions of this administration. [inaudible question] i think that is fair. A question toward the back of the room. Good afternoon. Im a retired marine aviator, a strategic bread team analyst for the defense detection agency. Thank you for the presentation. You already answered one of my questions. I dont know if you thought about using pizza or balloons like use over bases in iraq for Early Warning and tethering those to see hunter surface vessels. I will defer to your expertise on Naval Surface vessel knowledge so my other question is keeping these assumptions in place, what are your recommendations of increasing the program of record so i will make assumption the navy is not going to increase manpower and i would like to hear from both you gentlemen. With no increase in people power youre asking for an increase in procurement and altering them cute 25s. I assume thats more technicians, more drone pilots etc. What would you recommend to the navy to reduce or cut, thank you for your time. To cut . If youre making the a simpson of increasing the Program Record which would mean more drone pilots, more maintainers, same with them cute 25s, what would you recommend the navy reduce or cut if there is no increase in overall people strength. I am going to answer the way i want to. I am not in the business of advising the navy or anyone else on how the navy should make do with less money. Im here to tell you they dont get enough, they need to make a better case and explain to the American People why it is that seapower is different and why these programs should be funded. The unmanned surface vessels and airships, those are good ideas. I was in our analysis we were trying to stay more in programs of record and other things that have some institutional momentum that we are aware of. And and in number, i think that if we bound that problem by looking at the number of people who function and necessity for keeping a large force that would produce significant savings that could be applied to deterrence. A Great Power Competition or not. With postcold war mentality we are never going to get there. The American People will have to decide if they are serious about this. Americas leaders have not made the case effectively that we need to get serious. We have a larger civilian bureaucracy, bureaucratic workforce today than during the cold war and we should. It out to be looked at. That is what i was saying. Another question . Mike is on its way. My name is ari brown. Question regarding use of assistance, we dont have access at this level. How could uavs fill a niche role that doesnt unnecessarily duplicate the efforts. Merely operating under the assumption that you have a satellite overhead that is looking down and also are they doing active or passive isr . Booked after of and passive and the way they fill the niche is that you are able to do the focused search, perhaps the overhead asset gives you the general area of interest, then it can continue to do that sort of sucking up all the data job and more maneuverable, programable them cute 9 than does the focused search and stays on the target and provides the data back to whatever network you have or networks that do that. Is it possible what you guys had . Im not sure what you are talking about. The no falsepositive rule was a way of trying to say that what we are doing in the study is presenting the very best case. What we are saying is because we are not dealing with false positives but perfect radar data, we are giving you the very best ranges and numbers. Time for one more question. Yes . My name is roland evans and my question is simple really. We have seen back in the 1990s a surveillance of the South China Sea, the pipeline to hong kong and my question is very simple in the South China Sea, with china, that was going on back then and my question is why doesnt the us so and well reagan in . It would cause absolute chaos from a psychological point of view and operate 13 marines off of it and the helicopter. To me it would tie up a fortune of their budget on this little outpost in the South China Sea . Thats not a bad idea. Theres a whole range of things the United States could do but is not doing right now. That one could certainly be considered. I dont see why not. To expand a little bit on that the defense of taiwan is an area where this administration has improved over the record of its predecessor, but it has come this far but that leaves between here and the other side of the room. We are not doing that. There are all sorts of things the administration could do if Vice President pences suggestion about a whole government approach not just to china but to our alliances, our Security Architecture were made possible. The administration has done some of it but theres a lot left to be done. I applaud the progress taking place so far and hope this administration ever once succeeded now or in the future take the same view of our security interests in that part of the world and act accordingly. Im a former us we are in good company. Your study focused a lot on surface targeting using targeting surface vessels but im curious to hear your thoughts on isr t in the term of undersea warfare. Chinas attack submarines have still and endurance and attack capability that can threaten our see lines of communication or Carrier Strike groups well supplied. Im curious to see what your recommendations would be for improving the navys undersea warfare. That is one of the areas where im really satisfied where things are. Its dangerous for someone like me to say im satisfied. We are buying a lot of them. The ans qr 15, the ams qr 59 victor 15 system we are putting on our ships turn those ships into significant longrange active and passive asw platforms. I havent even gotten to the worlds best submarine force yet. There is no military skill. The we are the difference between the number one nation in the number 2 nation is larger than in the subSurface Warfare. Are submarine force is just that good. I put those things together with unmanned undersea vessels that are gliders that carry acoustic platforms beneath them. We are doing quite a bit to ensure that we maintain and undersea mastery over china versus their submarines. I think one of the things we have to worry about is the kind of arrogance i just displayed and that is undersea warfare dominance is not a birthright, china has a lot of engineers working hard to figure out how to make the sea less opaque. I know our own submarine force toxicity are going to keep Getting Better faster than the understanding environment but thats not a Winning Strategy for the longhaul and we have to continue to take there is w capabilities more seriously. We have got to go. I saw the proverbial hook coming. I would like to thank you for joining us this afternoon. Excellent participation from the audience and hope you will be here next time we have another one of these discussions, thank you. And thank our panelists, everyone else, please. Have you thought about using quantum computing . Mister chairman there are 23 eyes and 70s. The articles agreed to, the resolution is recorded favorably to the house. The ousted to sherry committee approving two articles of impeachment against donald trump, abuse of power and obstruction of congress the House Rules Committee will meet to determine the guidelines of how the debate will unfold on the house floor. Watch live coverage tuesday at 11 00 eastern on cspan 3. Watch online, cspan. Org impeachment or listen live at the free cspan radio apps. Donald trump and first lady milania trump hosted a hanukkah reception at the white house during the event the president signed an executive order that defines judaism as a nationality under federal civil rights law. Speakers at the reception include Senior Advisor jared
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