Transcripts For CSPAN2 State Department Official On Nuclear

CSPAN2 State Department Official On Nuclear Security July 13, 2024

Again back in business. And excited to welcome doctor chris fourmac. And for those of you in the know, is of course secretary of state for international. It previously done a tour on President Trump. He worked previously in capitol hill brent naval reserve, but most important link all around great guy. And through these conversations going to be a lot of fun. He held from cincinnati. Home of finley market i might add. Not bad. [laughter]. Will give a few framing remarks and then give you a little time to ask clarifying questions. That went out, chris, welcome back. [applause]. Thanks ryan, its great to be back here. I applaud your assistance. After last time in rescheduling this of the explosion. Its actually not that bad. Those of you have been around washington the long remembered there was a series of exploding mantles in georgetown in the mid 1990s are so afraid thank you for cheaping at it and thanks to all of you are wheeling to come back. It is been nearly ten years since the last Nuclear Security summit. Here in washington dc and there have been or three more after that. I then watched many things together. To the credit support from in proving Nuclear Security practices. While my own views, some of the objectives to the outside of the process will more ambitious. The summit did play a valuable role in drawing attention to the challenges of Nuclear Security. Because just getting countries will encouraged to come up with or to sign up to get packets as they were called. Nuclear security improvement was promised. And things to look at is the challenges of the nuclear challenges. Secure all particle materials around the world for a decade later also much remained still to be done. And despite that, within a weve had a lot to do and about what we are trying to do to help move that forward. So as the summit proceeds. The World Leaders might not close again about Nuclear Security. Is our challenge today, to institutionalize and realize Nuclear Security practices. In a makegood Nuclear Security into nothing special this is that ive suggested before that becomes ordinary individual and natural to all states and stakeholders. In the same way it is to any individual human. With the summit played a valuable role in starting the attention to these challenges. We must now all do together the longerterm work of making sound Nuclear Security into a daytoday habit rather than just a time. In a world of the challenges with Nuclear Materials. Some of the summit practice represented something into a kind of new years resolution if you will, this many people make in order to lose weight, get in shape that kind of think, promises that may catalyze one to go to the gym any right, and workout everyday for a while but thereafter to back into something more like the scotus quo ante. The Nuclear Security, we have something much more something into a longterm health program. We need a new normal that establishes a healthy pattern can in effect will be the same indefinitely. To be sure, the daytoday promise cheaping, involves ensuring sounds the securities best practices and institutionalize these practices worldwide has brought easy. It also lacks the intuitive political draw flashy promise making. And it is still far to go before such practices are routine. But bringing that back is how it should be, i would argue the quote of collective mess of the security agenda. One of the ways in which we have been trying to prevent this agenda is to do the work of a Nuclear Security [applause] room. In scg in informal, involuntary cluster of stated to improving Nuclear Security worldwide. Together periodically to compare notes, to encourage each other, to coordinate our own Sovereign National efforts. To promote effective steps forward. Even among s jeep members, the progress has been a little bit slower than one is helped. But there is a good deal going on we are proud of it. And said sometimes happen can happen in wellintentioned groups, is it too much of an assumption that simply being there, demonstrate a real commitment to cost. And is it too little meaningful action. The gross also making limited progress against the tactic political narratives of disinterest or in taken is him. To the Nuclear Security that still exists in some corners. Here are the improvements to security practices which connect also the cooperative with Technology Sharing. That depends upon the reassurances that are provided by good security. We have as indicated, progress. [applause] Group Interventions and consciousnessraising, from likeminded Member States the iea has been able gradually for the past two years to increase his budget for the security. It also continues to increase the profile activity loophole of the security work. And at the 2013 hosting, in august, opted to a division. The conference has mayday modest but significant step forward in 2018, with its adoption a Nuclear Security revolution. It can contribute to the positive perception of Peaceful Nuclear activities. Thankfully the gp retained its language in 2019 and in it theres a revolution revolution and going back to Nuclear Security and is role of goods and best practices in Nuclear Technology sharing and is clearly getting more attention. The ia has brought focusing more on this english security in a way that complements and reinforces, but the agency news ongoing work in the safety and the Cooperation Program as well. This does new focus is helping to focus that its not derailed and that they might need to enter authorize access to the technology. As for the nfc gsl, [applause] group itself, its deliberations recently produced a statement regarding Nuclear Security. Its on the website now. Its not the sort of consensus negotiated those common denominator task that went often and seed nor is it simply a highlevel summary having an conclusive group of deliberations. Instead, it is an informal food for thought statement designed to pull useful trends of thinking together in a constructive way to help inspire and channel that to move forward on the security agenda more effectively. Im proud the rule that weve been able to play in bringing this document together and helping regroup in that respect we hope that this document will indeed prove useful and constructive thought about how cities can plate more productive rules. Broadly as well as intimately. In the paper you may have seen, available on the website, is entitled commitment. I think there are important and hopefully contribute to International Engine in this respect. We radiate our october 62618, is the circular statement since around and is founded at the nfc g. Those principles are still at the very core of or the groups coming from. This paper also makes clear that good Nuclear Security is also required in order to prevent the weapons of liberation material and terrorism and in order to ensure the maintenance of a strong foundation. Ensuring the benefits of the peaceful technologies. The later is particular important because it highlights the way in rather than competing with each other, Nuclear Security and Technology Sharing also go handinhand. Specifically, Nuclear Security improvement are clearly identified in the paper as a crucial enabler for sharing the benefits of peace and uses of technology or white. Because they help forum the foundation of farm arrest the global system of Technology Sharing is already provided in the auto humankind in which we intend to help preserve and in which we intend to help preserve for many years to come. It is a quote from the paper. To most of you this probably seems is it just me, like basic common sense. It seems pretty obvious to me that it wouldbe difficult to have an expansion uptodate worldwide sharing. That went out confidence the Technology Materials wouldbe reliably kept out of the hands of unauthorized persons such as terrorists. Nevertheless there are still some people dont see good in the security pack practices as an enabler or facilitator in. Instead they exist in some kind of tension which global cooperatives in price frankly is wrong. Not in place at the end of cg news collective commitment paper makes it so clear that there has brought intention here rather a strong commentary. But the neither didnt doesnt voices important insight about how security articulates a practical topics or themes pointed out to the second that provides focus and efficient for us. As members, and a broader community, works to identify where their efforts can be most successful. The importance of each state in touring adequate national Nuclear Security legislative regulatory framework. Also the countries can play an Important Role in assisting each other is appropriate in developing and maintaining such best practices do cooperative. It makes it clear that states strengthen or should strengthen their own Regulatory Frameworks by such things as promoting universal hearing to an implementation of relevantly interest for example. Protection of Nuclear Materials and International Convention for the suppression of acts of Nuclear Terrorism news. As well as universal implementation of Security Council 1540 which of course seeks to non actors. Mandated protection of sensitive goods and knowhow. Ensuring the transferring between states are appropriately regulated. The importance of all states improving their own National Security practices, such as that protecting against insider cyber threats. And strengthening that security of radioactive sources. Ensuring preparedness and coordinating with support members and reconciling security and sharing best practices with other countries. This paper places a strong emphasis on iea and Nuclear Security as well. And they must undertake this mark with vigor and attentiveness providing this Nuclear Security promotional activity with the resources and political Institutional Support and encouragement they need in order to succeed. In our view this paper is a viable way forward to help guide our collective approaches here and we think it will be useful. I encourage people to read it and focus on its awareness of the points it raises but who are trying to use this as a stepping stone for our own engagement with Public Partners and hopefully likeminded estates in the security Contact Group can and will do likewise. In practical terms the work were doing at the state department, for example, in addition to working bilaterally with partners and all away as i just described we have a great deal of engagement with a very kind of Capacity Building that was referenced in the paper itself. Our office of Nuclear Energy and state security leads efforts to develop an opponent policies that are related to Nuclear Security such as cochairing several u. S. Inter agencies and coordinating body to focus on security. This Group Supports our engagement for Nuclear Security Contact Group and serves as apartment lead on interagency physical productions, assessment teams with ensuring adequate of u. S. Obviated materials abroad and efforts of that sort. Our office and Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs assist in and limited the offices skinny, the efforts of the division of Nuclear Security that i mentioned before to help prevent Nuclear Terrorism targets effort with vulnerable materials. Our weapons are mass destruction that against it rather than for it and provides a focal point for our work against terrorists acquiring Nuclear Radioactive materials or outside revelatory control that includes those lost during the breakup of the soviet union. The wmt office manages our role as the cochair in the 89 member Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism which is instantly one of the bright spots of the russian cooperation with the russians and we recently are in a new iteration of that Co Chairmanship which started up last year and has been quite effective cooperation, i must say. We work with nuclear forensic International Technical working group to identify socialized best practices and nuclear forensic with foreign partners such as the iea and interpol and office on drugs and crime in many ways but these are multiple facets of how we engage on these issues and few are office of export control cooperation we do a great deal of Capacity Building to help with their best practices and ways the component these goals very effectively as well is in our office of cooperative reduction. That is just a sampler of the many ways in which that apartment engages with these questions but let me finish up in terms of throwing out where we seek conceptual challenges as we look ahead at the future. If you have asked me what the main challenges are as we try to move from the era of promise making to this era of what i think of as institutionalized promise keeping normalizing best practices, if you will, i would wait to what one might call the three camps in the two wounds. I will explain what that means. Some countries may fall short in providing for adequate Nuclear Security because for one reason or another they may simply cannot to meet the standards. These are the cans if you will. They might for example not be aware of the need for good Nuclear Security and some particular context or might not be aware of best practices and tail that is the first possible cant. The second kant relates to possible failures of educational capacity such as where despite good intentions of government may not know how to strengthen Nuclear Security in its country in order to have appropriately high standards. Or perhaps it lacks the resources or capabilities necessary to do so. That is the second kant. The third kant relates to other mental bandwidth and the challenges of prioritization. It is full of pressing challenges such as where government may be unable to address the Nuclear Security properly because relevant leaders or personnel are occupied with meeting some other pressing challenge or threat in their context. As a practical matter it is not, of course, always easy to solve the challenges presented by these three cans but most of the dip omatic engagement that we engage in as well as in the apartment of energy and in the Nuclear Regulatory commission, not to mention in the iea itself, much of that work is devoted to helping partner states solve these problems. We got a pretty good track record working with countries to improve things when it comes to the camps. Things are challenging on occasion with regard to whatever i described as the two wounds. Some countries civilly choose to deemphasize Nuclear Security or even hostile to it. The first potential wont relates to the perceived costs of appropriate security or competing economic interests such as where parties convince themselves that proper Nuclear Security measures will unduly increase the expense and equipment or capabilities they wish to acquire. This attitude may perhaps time for them to cut corners sometimes potentially quite dangerously. Similarly, supplier may see security as a needless cost that can be shirked in the name of market share. All such sinking, i would argue is shortsighted of course since just as with Nuclear Safety if you are truly worried about cost the worst possible outcome would be to face a Dangerous Nuclear incident resulting in one from own negligence. All the same, such attitudes can sometimes be a problem. That is the first wont. The second moment is more a pathology of outlook, if you will. Believe it or not, as i indicated some countries may still resist Nuclear Security measures because i feel focus upon Nuclear Security is perhaps some kind of a western imperialist imposition or some such. At best such a contingent is simply silly. At worst, that position may in fact smack of a shameful cultural or racism as if to imply prudence and competence an

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