Out on tuesday. This is about a topic which is relevant and important but as the authors discussed under studied and underemphasized. I dont want to waste too much time with a big long intro but i will have an intro to highlight the work of luna next to me whos been doing really fantastic reporting for the wall street journal and im going to quote from one of her stories this year because it sets us up nicely. A piece coauthored with him, they are increasingly recruiting intelligent officers as a campaign to shake loose government secrets, current and u. S. Officials say china has grown older and more successful in traditional spy cams including targeting less conventional recruits and she quote the infamous statement by crystal ray, the fbi that no country poses a threat than china. They are doing it through chinese Intelligence Services, through extensively private companies, through graduate students and researchers all working on behalf of china and finally, this is one of my favorite quotes from the piece, he says russia is the hurricane, it comes in fast and hard hard. China is Climate Change, long, slow and pervasive. I hope and suspect all of the people on this stage will have disagreement on these statements between each other about this issue of chinese espionage about what we think we know and organs like the security, mss, what some of the myths are that we believe and arent true so without further ado, i will turn it over to peterson. We will turn to them for 20 to 25 minutes and walk us through the book, how it was organized and how this Beautiful Partnership came about. Then i will moderate discussion here with all three of them on these issues and will save some time for q a. I will plant the seed now that the q a period is primarily, if not solely about actual questions so as you are thinking of the long, you want to make, id ask that you would email it to us instead of using precious time here. We want to hear everyones questions so we can hear about them. So think of questions to ask when we get to that. I will turn it over to matt and peter. Thank you very much for helping us to and thank you all. For believing in the project and carrying them forward. A quick disclaimer, since i am in a public decision, im speaking here solely in a personal capacity. Ive taken leave to be here. I am off the clock. My views are my own and not representing the commission on china or any of its numbers. If youre going to quote i say, at least acknowledge this is being said in a personal capacity and does not represent the people who i work for or as an associate. I hate that this was downplayed expectations in the book. It is meant to be a bit of a reference guide and a primary introduction. We made a number of choices for conservatives and what we chose to include in the standards by why we chose cases or the interest. In part because theres a real need to demystify and not say theres this 5000 here history or 3000 years, depending on how you calculate it. Invoking things that has a mystical embodiment of intelligence operation. What starts from the things we can see and we know and to build outward from there, this is a starting. , not the final answer. We tried to sketch this out, what took place in the development of communists in origins inside the party in the 1920s to where we are today and why the methods look the way they do. For the need to demystify, theres no better place to start than the idea thats been kicking around for a long time. Grains of sand to approach of intelligence. Any of the host of tentacle like metaphors for describing what the Intelligence Services are doing. It got passed around by an antidote saying sand on the beach are the Information Products you want to gather. The russians would have a submarine surface in the night, they would pick up a few buckets of sand and go back to the submarine and be gone by dawn. The u. S. Would pick up all sorts of signals and have sensors along the sensors on the beach and go from there. The chinese, on the other hand would send 1000 and when they left, they would shake out there towels and beach baskets in china with no more than anybody else. Theres a slight problem with that come up with that analogy. National security information is a public beach. You dont get to send 1000, you cant even get 1000 americans onto the public beach in an easy way because of the process. But this view, because it has a nice and catchy story, it had a few problems with that. The first, the chinese intelligence basically did not use graft. They didnt use traditional methods of recording sources or maintaining the relationship between case officers and the passage of information through communications and other things. There are distinct differences and styles but thats not really true and it never has been. The second was that the court of intelligence chinese did, and a lot of these cases, if you go through the book and look at the hard espionage cases, you dont see amateurs leading the way. The third point that i think is important is that it conflated any chinese entity within chinese intelligence. Chinese intelligence had something very different than what it means when you say russian intelligence or u. S. Intelligence. The equivalent would say when you say u. S. Intelligence, intelligent communities specifically are a handful of core agencies within that community. When people use chinese intelligence, they say any chinese person connected who does anything that doesnt look Like Technology or influence, thats a pretty broad definition and isnt a cognate of what we say. Include boeing and every hedge fund and everything america does are brought friends of wall street journal, they must be intelligent because thats how we are doing it. Its different but thats the wrong way to do it. That speaks to why we chose a conservative approach about what we included. The other downside is that it creates notion of every chinese person has a potential spike. Whatever you think of that proposition, thats not practically useful way for risk, it doesnt help you understand what system is doing what things. It has a notable feature of not really being true. To say the chinese intelligence had more success recruiting Chinese People or abroad, that part you can see. But to say thats been solely the focus or thats where they were putting all of their efforts, i dont think accurately captures the history. So to sum that up with saint chinese Intelligence Services always had tradecraft. These are great classic cases that are detailed. Theres a third country meeting went back, dropping off data for a courier to pick up. There are people going to borders and getting left across not having the passport so they can go to meetings. This is traditional and they run sometime in the 40s to 1985. That encompasses a pretty long history of chinese intelligence. Id also make a point that, for years, what weve seen from the chinese Intelligence Services about the potential impact, because of chinese role in the world, and the Security System and future of taiwan, a whole variety of things, its that scope scale and impact of operations i was a real threat. It wasnt necessarily sophistication. That, however, is changing. You could look at the periods covered in the book and see fairly sophisticated revolutionary periods of intelligence. In the middle heres the prc, not necessarily being there and more recently, an emergent sophistication that is a worldclass Intelligence Service. I attribute that to two things. The first is that when the ministries created in 1983, it basically was a bunch of survivors or rather handful of survivors or the chinese intelligence and a lot of Police Officers were told one day that you now work for an Intelligence Service. Not the best way to train people or give them a lot of skill so again, should we really be surprised that people who arent trained for foreign intelligence have better luck with people who they can communicate with directly into more readily and have shared cultural references . I dont think it is surprising. Beginning in the 1990s, matt and i were significant beneficiaries of this, the security and pla started major publication projects to talk about the chinese intelligence. To bring out the literature and say look, this is what we did and in one of the biographies, the author talks about a meeting they had in the early 1990s who said you need to write this book because our people dont know their history. They dont know what they are part of. We need to build that in the service so we understand the long and glorious tradition there is some associated with the state security professional. The forward to that book is written by the Generals Office and this book is for you to study and see the history. One of the lessons for you in the practice of intelligence . The other thing the state security did is a new Training Program. They realized if you were relying on College Graduate who majored in languages or computer science, you can have the professional skills they hoped they would have when they graduated. There seems to have been an effort sometime in the late 1990s, early 2000 and different parts of the mss to start recruiting people earlier to say look, if youre interested in this career, heres what you should do and say. Heres the assistance we can offer so they spent the time in school and a much more productive way to bring the skills into the service. Ive heard reports, i cant entirely confirm about and different kind of Intern Program so that young officers would get time so they were passing themselves as professional business people, they would look and talk and sound like a professional person. Some of the pictures discussed in chapter six. Business people dont have private meetings in the hotel rooms. They do it in the lounge room or the barr. So not entirely successful but it is, for those of you who have bumped into the Younger Generation of authors much greater degree of sophistication and skill and ability to interact was not there ten or 20 years ago and certainly not 30 years ago. The other reason, i would say that theres been a big change in sophistication, particularly for state security and also the pla, they saw this movement into cyberspace and digitization of storage as a real opportunity. Id call this a dreadlocked moment and technical operation because previously, if you wanted to pick up signals, you had to have an industrial system. You had to have satellites, a global network, you had to have computing hours to do decryption because it had gone long beyond what a human being could readily uncover. There was a huge capacity in which it was largely cut off for most of the pr people. His in the late 70s and 80s that it started to get access to some of this but was still fairly far behind. What this offered, and i think they voted on it well, the mss did it well, was to see this opportunity and invest in a public and private infrastructure. Centered around a handful of mss bureaus that created an ecosystem for defense and offense and therefore, had interchange, contractors, you have the benefits and private sector with the ability to keep people focused and on target and i think this is one of the reasons why they were yelling about the pla. They were in the mid to late 2000, breaking into places and running off with with data. No one figured out where the state security was. That came much later largely because they were much more successful than most of the pla work. This movement, i think is important also for technical operations. The idea of getting inside someplace, you had to get in, find a way to capture communications and excellent treat the data. Its a complicated process. It might for the bug discovered in the state department in 1999, you had to take a photograph in the conference room, you had to know the quality of your picture to recognize the true color of it so when you recreated it, you actually had it accurately captured. You had to have the skills to create the batteries to fit in that constrained space. You had to have a microphone, and exultation plan for getting the data out and save your battery so they werent just running and using up your energy while it was in the building. In this shift in craftsmanship that went into those devices, the skill set that the countries had to do well, the chinese didnt necessarily have the same experiences because when they did it domestically, they controlled the environment. They outlawed Counter Measures so those were only in the hands of the government. Not in the hands of anyone else. But when you look at what it looks like today, you think code. Its in the software code, not in the delivery device for that. Its a usb drive. You can come up with ways to hide it and theres some skilled in their its a different set of skills and its much easier to teach where we are now today then where we were before this moment. My last point, its very important to understand institutions involved. Intelligence officers, the state security for the pla, bureaucracies and bureaucracies work in particular ways. They were reward particular behaviors and they may not have, they may or may not be centralized as we tend to think. So the cases in the book, you see some tradecraft that is quite effective and useful and you see some boneheaded things that you wonder, why would we take it seriously . One of the answers to understa understand, the state security itself is a simple ministry, 31 units and dozens and dozens of local state Security Bureau. All of these organizations hire on their own. Should we really be surprised that the state Security Bureau at universities look slightly different than the state Security Department . Should be really surprised given the variety of what that place in china, this diverse look . Brings up an important thing that you cant just say intelligence, their sophistication and not here. You wouldnt get to this if you didnt understand the history of how people came up there may have been Police Officers first and Intelligence Officers getting back to a generation of people that have been Intelligence Officers first rather than something else. Thank you. I like to think the foundation and the people who sponsored us to complete this work. We are sometimes hacking our way through the jungle but here we are. I wont say i will take you through a tour a hip history, i will take you through the violent and exciting path that led to today. 1927, the year of the Chinese Communist party split was the year of intelligence failures for the Chinese Communist party. Had virtually nothing in place. They had assassins, they had vip protection people and they had a few spies here and there but they didnt have a structure. So the nationals in that year came as a complete surprise and at the end of the year in december, the uprising, he called that the same intelligence, he said we failed because we knew virtually nothing about the enemy. It was in this context that he found his first professional organization and it got off to a rocky start, it was hard to recruit patients at first but then they recruited their first concrete useful aspiring, which is referred to today as the heroes of the dragon player, leak was mentioned earlier. He was of those three people, the ringleader. Hes the one who survived more than a few years and went on to lead intelligence in the early years of peoples republic. So the resulting structure that followed with intelligence people, drivers, Everybody Needs draggers. Analysts and people who do communications and technical work, that resulting structure basically survived into the present and it seemed a great deal but the special Services Section was founded at that ti time, had successes that saved a lot of lives. However, when their boss went over to the nationalist in 1931, that was a disaster. To this day, one of my distant relatives is a black sheep in the camera, you cant find a picture of him. [laughter] in 1935, by that time, although its been depicted at the time of brilliant operations, by clever individuals, actually there was a slow rolling disaster for the Chinese Communists as nationals hear people out of the city. In 1935, the special Services Section was a polished and this is about the time the dome started to have concrete, Strong Influence over intelligence operations and his focus was enemies within. If youve studies chinese, youve heard of the 1931 32 when he purged a great deal of the red army of everybody who was opposed to him and this was one of the first of what chinese call left deviations. They all say these are all germans by himself but they were. Those other three left deviations that are acknowledged today, the Salvation Campaign in 1943 and of course the cultural revolution. In between those, 1955, theres a gigantic purge of intelligence people when he decided one of his chief spies was actually trigger because he hadnt reported a meeting with an age agent, a big agent. That left a legacy of purchase to solve problems. We see that today, even though he declared the age of political campaigns is over with, when he ascended to become chinas paramount reader what today we see the Corruption Campaign being used to purge the enemies and hes left many others intact but the point is these purchase of individuals going on now, intelligence people and indeed these different purges i just mentioned, each have cleaned out the ranks of Chinese Communist intelligence and had very severe temporary sets. Part of that legacy, too, that we see today is areas during the revolution or control with Chinese Communist and pupils were public, is a toxic environment for people who wanted to come in and spy on the current government. This