Neutral act we believe this now to a supreme courtra arguments on whether the Consumer Financial protection bureaus funding structure is unconstitutional. Live coverage on cspan2. Decision in this case is the first time in a court in our nations history has held that congress violated the appropriations clause by enacting a statute providing funding. This court should uphold the cfpbs fding statute because it is firmly groundedn constitutional text and in historical practice dating bac to the founding. The text of the constitution shows that when the framers one to limit Congress Appropriations authority they did so expressly. While the framers restricted appropriations for the army to two years, they applied no similar limits on appropriations for any other agency. History confirms that. Since the foundingongress has consistently funded agencies through standg appropriations that are not timelimited and that provide significant discretion over how much to spend. Their congress did exactly this the very fst agency it created the Customs Service, and the same is true for of the ding era agencies including the pos oice, the national mi,he patent office, revenue officers and theational bank. And congress is use this kind of appropriation as the default when funding fanal regulators including the Federal Reserve board, the offe of the comptroller ofhe currency, the federal deposit insurance corporation, the National Credit union administration, tm Credit Administration and the federal Housing Finance agency. The cfpbs appropriations that squarely in this unbroken line of the historical practice. In fact, congress exercise ificantly more discretion and control over the bureaus funding by capping its annual appropriation in an amount that is far than many other cies budgets. Resp argued the ination of features in the cfpbs statute violate some previously unrecognized constitutional at the bureaus approon is materially identical to the numerous funding s i just listed respondents concede the statute are constitutional. This court to reject respondents attempt to gerrymandered able to fit the cfpb alone without providing a coherenty about to interpret and apply the appropriations clause. I welcome the courts questions. General, other than psing and appropriations law, are there any limits on what congress can do . So i think at the oset as your question touches on, Justice Thomas come the term appropriation itself contain some essential requirements. So that term is defined to mean about the provide for funding and the specifies both the source and the ppose of the funding. Thats how it apppriation was defined at the founding. Its how its always been understood and that still so it is defined today in sources like the junior redbook which is congresses own appropriations treaty. We think at the outset is not just any old ball but a lot of the contains beseeches the constitutes an appropriation. I the question becomes are the other limits out there on how congress can structu funding for particular type of activities or government futions we know from the Army Appropriations clause the answer is yes with respect to that particular government functn. Theres a durational limnd its based on theate of activity because the fra were specifically concerned about having a standg my. The Army Appropriations clause itself demonstrates there are not otherwise constraint in the appropriations clause that would limit congress at how it decides to structure theunding. So beyond the initialt skeletal requirements duration and purpose, there is an, if i hear youre right, there is no other condition . We dont think the appropriat clause places of ts on congress itself when it enacts the funding statute. I do want to emphasize that our argument alsoelies heavily on history. If you have in mind some kind of funding statute or arrangement that is never been de at all of this nations history i thi the court could take that into accountn a future case. Here that we have a specific type of appropriations, a capped lumpsum approprtion that is standing for a Single Agency. Ouristorical argument is that this is nothing new or unprecedented recall of the agencies i listed had similar appropriations. Is there any role in appropriations, that appropriations plays in separation o powers . It seems that at least when i did, was an executive branch, that congress exerce appropriation to check the executive branch to some extent. If there is in this case, what would be in the case of cfpb, how would that play out . I do agree and think aourse of the critical albert of the separation of powers that coress has control ove the purse. Our aument is that congress ha exercised that power. This court is lookingt a statute that congress itself enacted that set u this funding mechanism for the cfpb which is similar in kind to the way that congress has funded of the finaial eviscerate t kind of exacting control tha congress usually exercises in the appropriations process . I dont. To the extent this question is present on thennual appropriations as a counterpart, think the question becomes does the constitution limit congress with respect to the duration of approprtions . Is there explicit limit and the text the court can define that Means Congress inontrast to other laws whichf course can remain in effect until the future congress acts, is congress limited in how long to leave appropriations in effect . There i think the Army Appropriations clause does a lot of work because its not like the framers were not aware of this dynamic. They thought specific about the fact appropriatis like all other laws mighte continuing indefinite until the future congress acts, and they were concerned about thatith respect to a Standing Army but they didnt otherwise o limit congressrity. General, one ofhehings that strike me as of reading it, you have a very aggressive view of congress authority under the appropriations clause. Im not saying rotely that thats not correct but it struck me, you represent the executive branch as well. And its a very strong power giveno congress. And it struck me tt the reason you would want to defend that is because it gives them mor power to give away. Legend has it there have been times whe same party controlled both houses of congress a thehite house, and in that situation you can see congress empowering the pr in a way that might seem unusual to the framers. So keeping in mind that, t in balan other words, its kind of paradoxical, the more power you givongress i think, i think this is your friend argument on the other theres more that it can give away and enhance the authority of thecutive. Is that a, a unpersuasive concern . Certainly i dont think it is unpersuasive ccern but built into your question as understood, mr. Chief justice, was the idea that maybe congress could do something that would be surprising or anomalous to the framers. I guess what i would say is if you look at it through tt lens then history should play a powerful role in trying to understand the limits or scope of homage congress can give away when it becomes too much. Here the court does need to articulate any out limits because we have a specific type of appropriation that is far mo constrained and many that conversation enacted thrghout history because congress provided funding for Single Agency and capped that about the fun in anmot not to exceed the cap set by congress for its pretty unusual to hav that agency drawing, been able to request how much ever wants subject toimit that it only has a got very close to over the yearsrom an entity that is also drawing in money from the prive sector. I didnt see any particularly compelling historil analogues to that. Well let me speeded to t extent that takes away from the appropriatio power, its equivocally enhances the power of the executive. So i disagree that theres anything urecedented about this funding arrangement when you look at the relevant constitional value of protecting congresses prerogative. Inow there are a lot of different movingarts and pieces to the arguments respondents have made i as understand it they are attacking four features of the funded facts statute or the standing at standing appropriations, remains a place and is not unlimited. That againsthe director of the cfpb some discretion to act within the statutory cap and requesting the funding. Third, that the cfpb has enforcement and regatory functions and forth come as your question touched on, that the cfpbs fding comes in the source that is not in the words constrained by Market Forces. But we have numerous examples of agcies that have all four of those relevant characteristics. I fear at the outset we dont for the functions of the Market Forces constraint are relevant but even taking the argument on its own terms i can give you founding era examples, customs or in the revenue officers were funded with the kind of mechanism. They have standing appropriations for the Custom Service it. It was uncapped. These were powerful regulatory entities. Th ctoms service aboard ships and seize vessels at the spec records and conduct searches and level penalties and collect fines, a just a way to avo that kind of regulation. The market constraint theory th the users could just opt out our regulated pares could decide not to fund the operations doesnt apply to those agencies. It stillecse of many of the financial regulators today took the ones iou put on that list are the federal reser board, the the ncua, the farm Credit Administration, and the fhfa. G, uorted hermaphrodites want to understand follow up on the chief justices question. Dash im soro interrupt. Is that essential feature to the constitution of this provision or could congrsassed the same law with no upper limit allowing the executive branch to determineowever much it wished to tak site dont think that congress would have to provide statutory specified amount but it would of course have to specify the purpose of the funding. Budgets on the amount, your three doesnt tn there being an upper limit . Are theory doesnt turn on it because take 1 trillion, if, if you wish to do so. No, because congress itself has sed the direct is limited to the amount the phrase when necessary tory out federal if t psident determines that was recently necessary to take 1 a trillion dollars, tt would sis your concern. And on the appropriations clause itself has no upper limit constraint. I think that would violate e statute and the same theoretical possible exist with all of the other financial regulators ive been discussing but if you disagree, of course here we have speed is i just find understand your theory thats all youry to do. Are theory is written in history. Congress has appropriate in this way without a cap for time immemorial in 1789 on. How about on the lownd of the skill . What is the president o was the appropriate some . Im not going to take any money. I dont like the cfpb, you know. I dont think it is necessary to take another dollar. Couldresident do that . I think that would pilot the statute as well stop talking about approiaons clause. So i think that congress itselfpecified the purpose and so i think that if the president for the cfpbirtor didnt comply, that would be a violation and i would expect congress to stepn and change the funding mechanism. All o these possibilities exist with respect to countless other appropriations. All of the other financial regulars for example, likewise i understand the practical and it is to the statutorym arguments. M just trying to understand. Is anything that would prohibit the president from the appropriations clause clg whether to take zero dollars which w reestablishing a take 1 trillion . I dont think the propriations clause would be check, although of Course Congress could exercis i authority and the spar over the purse to chain to the discretion that is provided to require the president or the direct of the agency to te a particular amount. Can ask a question about the treasury . The professors of constitutional law andtory say listen, the appropriations clause doesnt apply at all because these funds not being drawn from the treasury. U agree with that . Its not thergument you made. We are not making that arme. We accepted the appropriation clause was the weakest of the trim and the cstution referred to the public treasury as a general matter, that specifically to the Treasury Department. At the time of the founding ratification the Treasury Department had not even been created and thats also how this court has describedhe scope of the appropriationslae in cases like opmersus richmond were referred to public monies generally. Of course the contrary appac would expose the gaping loophol and congress authority because would mean the executive it has funds that are not helping the general treasury has been Even Without Congress appropriating it or providing that authority in the first place. Are the money, the monies in the cfpbs budget appropriated moneys . So for constitutional purpost because congress established the funding statute and it has b the source and funny. Within the meaning of the constitution this counts as an appropriation. Thats a opm and executive branch, ngo and congress under since the source of tding. What to make of the provision doddfrank act which has that the bureau fund, will, shall not be construed to be Government Funds appropriated moneys . So that was congress try to control for the interaction between this funding mechanism and of the background rules that apply to appropriations they go through the annual appropriation process. The are rules about things ke pment and whether you can use appropriated moneys in essence the litigation expenses, miscellaneous statute requires agency to deposit the revenue in the general treasury and some ofis background rules would actually interfere withhe funding that conversation tended for this agency. It was just try to control for the interaction there. Other agencies have that statement is incorrect. In the doddfran act itself is incorrect. These are appropriated mon i dont think tha statutory provision was taking a stance on the constitutional question o whether this fits the definition of an appropriation within the meaning of the constitution. As ioned congress has used this formulation for other agencies as well like the occ and the fca a again its all tended to just allow congress to control for the interaction various statutory provisions in this context. Doesnt does it use it t office, for the mint and other agencies of nature. Was justice sotomayor, not familiar with whether this partul language appears in the statutes govni the post office. The post office was originally created and founded in 1792 and so its not clear some of tse of the background rules existed. Ceainly we can point to an exameoday including the occ and the fca which had the same lin wood and its meant to ensure again theres no disrupith the funny operating in way cs can i go b to justice thom question . Theres appear to be, im sorry, a bit congested, there aea to be bound up in question of the appropriations bill, the separation of powers and ndelegation. Now, i know the court below said nondelegation was forfeited. Not quite i understand it, maybe you could explain i to me how separation of power is differenm nondelegation. Why wasnt the other . But do you see those other provisions,ation of power, nondelegation, as havin a place in otheronstitutional provisions besides the appropriations clause . And if it has no place here, why not . Yes. I think obviously these concepts of separation ofowers and the scope of theppropriations clause and nondelegation principles have in many respects potential overlapping functions in this context. We interested respondents to be appropriations clause in the particular and that fifth circuit found they had that simply raise a nonation challenge. I guess what i would say as to the extent the court is thinking about this from the perspective ofal separation of powers principles, the things the court generall csults and understanding the structural provisions of the constitution are, first, the text a second, the history. Those indicators of intent are overwhelmingly on our side. The court is thinking about some delegation principles there you would to look at history and as justicalia emphasized in his concurrin opi if you look across the course o history from 1789 on, it h it has been in the appropriations context marked by very broad delegations of authority to the executive branch to spend withi the bounds set by congress. In the first appropriation laws were structured like this one and a sense of providing executive could spend up to a ca s by congress. I think the cim what you think about the argument responseresent is under the appropriationslae but if mechanize as a courseo get more broadly about these issues the other doctors could come into play. General, could i take you back to the light of questioning for your Justice Gorsuchs talking about . In your reply brief on page 18 you discussed a standing appropriation of up to a quadrillion dollars for the president to find es the so just on this question of where your outer limits are and at theory we might use to say there are some limits, what do you want toay about that sort of statute . Would that be a constitutional violation . If so, why so . And why is that different from this . Yes. So that statu a we understand it would be completely unprecedented. It would effecti take the whole of Congress Appropriations authond transfer it to the executive branch. Congress has never done that for the past 230 years and i hard for me to imagine congress and would do that. But if they could the court were confronted the issue in in a future case they cou will recognize limits and the limits wouldom from his the court inny number of separation of powers cases has said that the fact that a method of structuring government has no historical precedent can recognizing it as aainst constitutional way to pce. That was analysis set in Free Enterprise fund, a reputed to have been seila law but that history works bhays. The court has likewise said a fact that away structuri government is well rooted in history andra it back to the unng is powerful evidence that the contemporaneous tanding of origina