[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] thank you for joining us for the second part of our discussion on strategic posture. We focused on what was at the heart and are compatible focus on what we think discussion with leading scholars on the proliferation so directly to my left, a senior fellow for security, Deputy Assistant secretary of defense here and head for policy. We have the army Board Director of capital of the department of defense and the Vice President for Global Programs of the strategy. I like to kick off broad questions. We just heard about the findings or recommendations but i want to ask you, do you think the commission met its mark and come up with a solid path forward . What recommendation would you like to see in the bus. The secretaries of defense in 2009 timeframe and commerce was arguing to build reliable replacement and they are debates the couldnt resolve and the commission with these issues, many of the ideas for in an influence in modern life i. I think what is going on here is while there is a consensus, rises. It was reaffirmed the big question is this commission, the Replacement Program is sufficient but not enough the question is how much more . The need for Nuclear Attacks as well but hasnt taken the next step to determine what change whether they will commission they dont they risk not only National Security concerns section. The cost of war can be entirely independent of who will one the war and the significance of incredible Power Nuclear weapons is in the union a particularly they would leave the victor, it vastly wears off. As i said, it is a physical act. People talk about we accepted a short description. We didnt exactly recognize it is a fact the law of gravity complicates airplane design and that is the ultimate foundation because the possibility that is where you end up is the biggest restraint. The serious problem on the numbers in my mind yes, the chinese buildup is unfortunate also china, the chinese, why are the americans and russians, teen hundred under the armscontrol but its not 1500 and reality, it is a lot more, quietly pretending to be so nervous about force that will be 20, 25 . They may have the capacity to build up i think the numbers are part because it is important to show we are responding in useful ways but its much less what we do and how we think about deterrent strategy, not simple numbers that go up on public works connect having to ask numbers, the way people think about this problem but what if i suggest the numbers that need to increase our modest could be accomplished within the context of armscontrol teamwork so for instance, is a strawman argument people say we need to add a chinese target and russian targeted matched the combined amount. Nobody i know involved suggesting that. It is a smaller number. For instance, it could be the treaty that existed prior was called the moscow treaty and it was 2200 so 1550 up to 2200 can be accomplished are deterrent by going up to 2200 . Is something the administration would have to calculate on their strategy and target the movie that is possible. What if we agree with russia to go back to that level . We saw the china problem yet we have not started our. That assumes you need at least 1500, anything beneath that is sufficient. You definitely need more. I was determined and 2010, this is grandpa before. It is a nonstarter. The question is more, anybody agrees mark not everybody but is not just commission, Global Security research and international csis, they have done studies, they have all found to more is needed but we are not talking, we can solve this without arms race but what we need is the administration to put together a package to explain to us how they would meet requirements laid out in a manner that does not involve the arms race and that can be done. A couple things, i did not find the report compelling that we need necessarily more or different Nuclear Forces at this time. The report is ambiguous and it on the assumptions because you have to make assumptions about russia and china and what assumption not hardly discussed is what russia will doing and conversely, a constraint in russia and at what level . The question of whether we do need additional capability deal with china and china is assessed to have 500 Nuclear Weapons, not all deployed compared to 4000 so something happening down the road more quickly than anticipated a couple of years ago for sure but we are not there yet so it is not laid out in the report and another important question i have, the commissioner emphasized the urgency of some decisions that should be made so we have options available in the future which makes sense but the report was unclear on the decisions have to be made because it is definitely not about keeping production lines more strategic 15 and 20 years so that is not the issue. It wasnt stated until that sense of urgency matched by a discussion, this isnt urgent and the members now, back to the contrary and one other thing, it goes back to the issue of we ought to think more and there is the chapter at the end, can we mitigate the risk we are worried about with russia and china through negotiations and armscontrol agreement defined even a commitment to not succeed those limits and all of that will have the need for the options in this report which would be unachievable and too costly not to mention destabilizing and not a population going to. I suspect i know the answer but one of reports, it must continue order sufficient to get a baseline, we have not had a great one for years, what is it that is the biggest vulnerability that needs addressed now . For me it is the regional aspect so imagine we are engaged in a war with say russia and nato. We are fighting conventional war, we need forces to deter nuclear use and we have bombs delivered by Fighter Aircraft but what happens if while we are engaged china decides to engage taiwan . We are still deterring nuclear use against russia and deter china. All of our Nuclear Assets are in europe. Are you going to move them to the asian region . You dont have to make that choice if you build capabilities dedicated to that feature. If china knows we have those capabilities and they are less likely to engage in war. We dont have any structure there so one example you have to ask the allies the fact that china does have another we can use promptly and there is no way to use limited and it adds to the deterrent and it requires additional capability. To be fair, they recognize that problem. You could take tactical fires and move into the region are used the watch they are not necessarily prompt. One of our biggest problems in asia is building a structure of in the region that people are willing to stand up to china because most of the Asian Countries have the option of some kind of accommodation, and its a problem we dont have to nearly the same degree in nato, and i think one of the greatest advantages of a nuclear arms [inaudible] Cruise Missile is it for all practical purposes, not necessarily, but for all practical purposes, it is an asiafocused capability, and it would allow us without the incredible political chaos of trying to deploy permanently deploy american Nuclear Forces in japan or the philippines or wherever. It provides genuine [inaudible] highly survivable. It is prompt. It is very accurate. It probably has a good penetration capacity as anything else, and we can point to it and say this is the physical manifestation of our commitment to use Nuclear Weapons if necessary in asia. Now, i dont necessarily believe that that would succeed in deterring the chinese strike if for some ultimate reason they decided it was important, but in order to have credible conventional defense, with a Nuclear Element to it, and in order to have a Political Coalition in asia, that will stand up to the chinese, in many ways, it is as important to reassure the allies as to deter the chinese because they are intimately linked. A system like this i think is a big contribution to doing that. So first of all, i just want to agree with something that was said earlier in which the Commission Also said is the best way to deter a nuclear war or conflict is to deter a conventional one between great powers with Nuclear Weapons. As a taxpayer, i would rather see my added dollar go to defenses and new technologies and not to [inaudible] Nuclear Weapons which i dont think we need. Second of all, we have capabilities, we have submarine launch ballistic missiles, now thanks to the trump administration, has a low yield option on those systems. We have air delivery capability. Were investing in more Long Range Standoff weapons, so theres plenty of Nuclear Capabilities that can brought to bear in the region to certainly to assure allies and also to deter china. This is one of the points that was brought up in the first panel, but i wanted to ask your views on the recommendation about new arms control agreements and the likelihood that we could even get russia or china to come to the table on Different Levels of numbers, different types of testing, the different types the new modern bombs that china is developing, so just, you know, given the current context, how can you get one russia to the table and two, how would you get china to the table . Well, first of all, i think it is a really important element of the report. I would like to see it amplified in that we have to we should be looking to see whether arms control broadly defined, meaning not just legally binding agreements, but, you know, cooperative arrangements, commitments, risk reduction, whether all of that can be used to, you know, reduce the threat that we see currently and could develop further. I thought the report was, you know, kind of silent on the fact about or the question of whether it actually mattered to us anymore to try to maintain restraint with russia on strategic numbers which i think is still important and as a way of bounding the threat and also what we have to do with china. Also i think it is potentially achievable, not now clearly, but at some point, the fighting in ukraine is going to stop, and the climate will change, and an opportunity i think will arise with especially with the pending, you know, expiration of new star that there will be a desire and i hope it is a mutual desire to maintain some mutual limits on Strategic Forces, and that does need to include now the new systems that russias bringing online. I also share the aspiration to bring in all Nuclear War Heads and nonstrategic war heads. I think that may be a longer term proposition. Again, with china, it is an even longer. I think were further away from arms control, but the first steps of dialogue, it needs to be spur pursued, but part of that the report talks about kind of independently establishing our requirements and then seeing what you could do with arms control, but it is more of an iterative process because your requirements are partly determined by, you know from new star, it wasnt just how many weapons do we need, how many, what kind of weapons do we think we need if russia will agree to these limits, and do we need more, you know, if they exceed it . So it is not you know, it is not a question that you answer on your own. It is a question you answer in connection with what is the other party willing to do, and it may not seem viable right now, but im i think the opportunity will return in the future. I think there is an well, you only have arms control agreements or any other kind of agreements if both parties think its in their interest. And i think one of the things we ought to do is to focus on some of the things some of the concerns that only Nuclear Superpowers can have, and one is being sure that if you use Nuclear Weapons, it was really really necessary, and this is sometimes described as an accidental problem. It is i think much more a problem of Decision Making under incredible pressure. I think there are a number of steps which could be taken, which do not include dealerting which is the worst possible answer and the worst way to make the problem harder rather than easier, but there are other things that could be done. It might be an area where you could talk seriously to both the russians and the chinese. There is another area which is how do you well, let me think about how do i articulate it and i will comment. I was going to note that the Biden Administration is currently undertaking a nuclear fail safe review. It was mandated in the National Defense authorization act. Its looking specifically at kind of assuring the safety, security, reliability of u. S. Nuclear weapons and commandandcontrol systems to avoid inadvertent or miscalculated nuclear use, so things like looking at Cyber Threats or, you know, problems in the supply chains. This review should hopefully, you know, yield some technical as well as some policy recommendations for steps the u. S. Can do, maybe unilaterally but also there may be some ideas for things that we could do in parallel with other states with Nuclear Weapons or encourage them to do on their own, and anyway, i think if Something Like this was done Something Like this was done 30 years ago, it is now being done and thats an example. One other thing about the threats from the other side, there is some element of we have to ask ourselves about our own restraint and thinking about, you know, what is the reaction that our actions, even our planning, let alone actually developing and deploying these things will engender on the other side. You know, the Missile Defense discussion is a good example of something that could be seen as very provocative to china and russia. You know, all these everything in this report, the laundry list of items that matt read to us, i mean, just the idea that were planning for that can be very provocative, and i think some thought needs go to whether, you know, because at some point if we dont do certain things, it wont be senseical for another country to keep building up. I agree with her as we get close to the expiration of the new star treaty in 26, peoples minds will go to what comes next. I think we have time to assess our requirements and build that into a proposal that we can then present to the russians. China is got not going to come to the table. Forget about three way talks. It is not going to happen. We will determine our requirements. Russians will figure out what their requirements are and now we have a basis for negotiations. Lets bring in the politics. Republicans are not going to agree to a follow on new star framework unless there is some Additional Nuclear force capabilities. Im not talking about 5,000 more Nuclear Weapons but some number of up loads of the current missiles. Likewise, its going to be difficult i think for the republicans to secure Administration Support for these additional capabilities, unless there is some arms control framework built into that; right . And there can be restraint. 2200 going back to 2200, theres a constraint. The community will not like the fact that were going from 1550 to 2200 but should like the fact we still have constraint. I would like to also before we get to audience questions talk about the other ways to provide deterrents through space, through cyber. Lets start with space. Its becoming a more and more critical element to detection, to potentially being able to shoot down an incoming missile, what more needs to be done in this realm to bolster strategic posture . It is probably first of all, i assume most of the interesting answers to that question are classified for very good reason. The second thing is i think space is primarily relevant for warning and surveillance and commandandcontrol rather than another place to put Nuclear Weapons. I mean, yeah, the two sides should agree not to do [inaudible] because it is a stupid system, very dangerous, but also stupid. But i think we need to think a lot more and it may well be going on in the system on how we use space to strengthen surveillance and control and survivability and resilience of a workable command system. I go back to something walt said about survivability of u. S. Nuclear forces. I think it is the same in space. The key to stability, the key to not having to use Nuclear Weapons, the key to deterring the adversary is to make sure you have the ability to respond; right . Survivable Nuclear Forces, now we need to have survivable space forces as well. I think the administrations general approach is to, you know, proliferate the number of censures that we have out there to make sure the adversary cannot conduct a first strike that would blind us, right . Were also looking at potential Counter Space capabilities against the other side. So this is happening, but again the key here is going to be survivability. I dont think theres an arms control framework that solves this problem the least survivable part i think it is survivable, but the most vulnerable to disruption is not any of the nuclear systems, the platforms. Its the commandandcontrol system, the early warning, the communications to the force, that i think is a place and i understand i understand why the commission didnt emphasize it because theres not a heck of a lot you could say about it, but it is terribly important. The commission spoke about Miss