That lament goes Something Like this. Young people are not interested in the civil war anymore. Civil war military history is on lifesupport. Nobody cares about the civil war after the sesquicentennial. Every time i hear that i have to politely push back. And the reason i do so in large part is because of the emerging civil war. It is a great honor and privilege for me to be here to support your work to support emerging civil war and all it has done in a remarkable space of five or six years. Truly incredible. I hope this weekend can be a real celebration of those efforts. First, a copy spine of marylands South Mountain. Sunday, september 14, 1862. Woefully outnumbered soldiers saw to stem the tide of a federal offensive. If successful it would defeat an already divided Confederate Army and curtailed and finish off robert e. Lees first invasion of the north. And three mountain passes almost unrivaled in its ferocity at , least in this point of the war, ensued. Breathless union and confederate troops struggled over difficult terrain and at close range. In many cases well after dusk. According to some veterans they aint muskets not at men but at flashes of enemy fire. In the years after the war, southern writers eagerly portrayed South Mountain as a sort of confederate thermopylae. Good fortune of visiting the battlefield in maryland, you can at least again to apprehend the analogy. The first question anyone who visits that field asks is how could anyone have battled these of these nearly vertical slopes . A correspondent for the cincinnati gazette combed the fields of South Mountain for weeks after the fight, marveled at the superior position held by the enemy. And predicted accurately that future visitors would be amazed to think how it is possible for our troops to dislodge the confederates from these strongholds. Perhaps no one embraced the thermopylae narrative with greater delight than Daniel Harvey hill the confederate commander held foxs and turners gaps for much of the day on september 14. Never one to be selfeffacing, he prepared the confederate account of South Mountain for the enormously popular battle in the civil war series published by sentry magazine in the 1880s. In that contribution he delightedly siezed for himself the role of leonidas. If the battle of South Mountain was fought to prevent mcclellan it was a failure, it was a failure on the part of the confederates. Lees fun to save trains in artillery, it was a confederate success. From whatever standpoint the battle must be of interest to the military reader. Showing the effect of a hallucination and enabling 9000 confederates to hold off 30,000 federals at bay for so many hours. Robbing victory of its fruits and inspiring victors with such caution that a simple ruse turned them back in their triumphal career. Harvey hill was hardly alone in his assessment of the battle among his old rebel comrades. Holding mcclellans army at a the confederates on south , mountain had salvaged lees offensive campaign. Then set up the slugfest that sharpsburg. And its a compass meant of predetermined objects and the skillful disposition of small numbers to oppose overwhelming odds, a confederate staff officer wrote, the battle of South Mountain is without parallels during the war. In the 12 volume military history of the confederacy, general allison capers was even more immodest. The battle was not merely a brilliant demonstration of valor , but the army of Northern Virginias best achievement of the war. It might be easy to dismiss these claims as the pretensions of aging veterans predisposed to , embroider their wartime exploits, if not for their remarkable disparity between their narration in the actual course of events. As it turned out after hard day of fighting the army of the potomac not only notched a tactical victory in each of the passes, but it did that rarest of things. On South Mountain it seized the Forward Momentum from robert e. Lee, who for the first time was ordered to issue a full call for retreat. And contrary to the often repeated claims of the confederates, the army of the potomac did so without numerical superiority for most of the day. They threaded divisions into the fight at intervals throughout the day and without a truly united front. The South Mountain entails two great defenses by the confederates. One in 1862, and a far more successful one after the war that i send it to you that continues to distort the way we think about the 1862 Maryland Campaign. The civil war was 17 months old when it arrived on South Mountain. A densely laurel chain of nice granite and limestone peaks that heat from the earth west of frederick, maryland. In the east loyal and patriotic , northerners spent many of the 17 months wringing their hands, and rationalizing defeat. The war quickly devolved into a familiar Holding Pattern of stalemate, and action and retreat. The summer of 1862 gave way to the colors of auto. Despair gateway to doubt. In the wake of George Mcclellans luckless campaign against richmond, with the rebels resurgent, rumors of corruption rampant, and president lincoln pleading with for 300,000 more. Northerners question is not merely get the work of the one, but if Union Victory and all the suffering and sacrifice was worth it after all. There are many northern war meetings in the summer and fall of 1862. Rather than inspiring than be troops, speakers found themselves reassuring doubting audiences about the wars necessity. , by the fall of making 62, civilians were deeply divided about the purpose of the war in the north. The participation of so many men and great violence. And bold new federal policies that were actively setting the table for emancipation. No one i submit to you understood the politics of this particular moment. Keenly than robert e. Lee who eagerly anticipated and look forward to democratic victories in the fall midterm elections. In early september, following a convincing victory over john pope at second manassas lee was ready to roll , the dice. He told Jefferson Davis this was the most perpetuas time since the commencement of the war. Andsh across the potomac move on the operational offensive. Lee reached the conclusion despite frank acknowledgment that his army was not properly equipped for an invasion. Liberally fortune resupply up north after all. Willaware the movement attend with much risk, he assured Jefferson Davis. I do not consider success impossible. We cannot afford to be idle. We must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. Ironically enough, at the same moment that lee apprehended a northern crisis of confidence, not shake intuition that the confederate hourglass was running out of the stand. He believed he had a limited window in which to achieve southern independence. The melancholy shadow of the seven days, the federals were actively abandoning the conciliatory policies that guided them in the wars first year. He knew that it was only a short step from outright despair in the north to renew determination. We put everything on the table in september of 1862. Should the results of the expedition justify it, from his headquarters in leesburg virginia, i proposed enter , pennsylvania. Propose to enter pennsylvania. Had nomaintain lee delusions about traveling to the streets of pennsylvania philadelphia and i dont think scranton was on his itinerary, he did not need to maintain delusions. As long as his troops operated on northern soil, as long as they tapped into the northern resentment for the war and let support to the burgeoning notion that lincoln and the republicans could neither win the war or defend citizens back home, as long as he did that lee had already one. Robert e. Lee was fully aware that this invasion, if successful, would deliver him up to the congressional districts represented by the most vulnerable republican incumbents in those 1862 races. Among them the district of pennsylvania are presented by Edward Mcpherson whose tenant , farm on Chambersburg Pike would host the armys the following summer given Edward Mcpherson had been one of the earliest and most outspoken of advocates of immediate emancipation. He would lose his race for reelection in the fall of 1862. From the view of wartime politics, lee had everything to gain and nothing to lose. At minimum he could relieve wartorn virginia. He could feed his hungry threadbare army. Lee then believed this to be the opportunity to spur north. A conclusion that seemed more logical when his counterpart would once again be george for George Mcclellan. Sure, woulde were afford them plenty of valuable time but only tepidly poking and prodding his way towards the invading confederate columns. And only after he was absolutely certain that washington, d. C. And baltimore were secure. After all, lee had driven him into a sulking selfimposed exile following the seven days and those believed the officious general was always annexed by the illusion he was greatly outnumbered posed a threat that was neither grave nor immediate. It would be his greatest miscalculation of his campaign. On september 4, 1862, the lead elements of the army of Northern Virginia splashed across the potomacs at white antiques for. And cheeks fords. In the space of 72 hours they were into frederick. It was at the headquarters he established south of frederick on september 9, this was the first snag in his plans. The rebel commander had anticipated as soon as he entered maryland the garrisons at martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, virginia with old. Harsh, the dean of Maryland Campaign scholars has noted, this was a reasonable assumption given that lees invasion would separate 14,000 garrison federal soldiers from the balance of the union army and in coil around washington. Mining the orders of henry halleck, they refused to budge. Lee was forced to modify his plans. He could not continue the northern gambit, the pennsylvania gambit without first dislodging those garrisons. So robert e. Lee issued special orders 191, which stretched his army across a wide hunt in the hills of western maryland. He ordered six of nine divisions. In addition to the stonewall division. He ordered up those six divisions to move on the two federal garrisons. In the space of 48 hours, capture the enemy there, scoop up any troops that might run away in retreat. Revisvision helds Hills Division and divisions under John Bel Edwards and david jones would advance, telling the reserve artillery, the supply lichens, the trains as far north as billings pro. Boones borough. Awaittreets troops would and reunite with the commands to be dispatched out the Harpers Ferry. According to lees ambitious energetic timetable, this rendezvous would occur on the morning of friday, september 12. And then once reassembled the Confederate Forces would continue their northward thrust. Still days ahead they believed of a finery George Mcclellan. Floundering George Mcclellan. The chief objective of the campaign then was not the reduction of Harpers Ferry, as it is sometimes portrayed in the literature. After all, we believe Harpers Ferry and martinsburg with folded out the pulling of a single trigger. Campaigntive of the and the objective of special order 191 was to preserve supply lines and keep the possibility of an extended campaign north of the potomac. The rebel set out on september 10 from the very beginning they felt willfully by schedule. Those men would fall even further behind when the approach to Harpers Ferry failed to occasion a quick federal retreat we anticipated that we anticipated in the order 191. The obedient troops stood their ground. None of this would have mattered except for the fact that George Mcclellan was in at this very moment and aggressive pursuit. Yes, your steering is just fine. I didnt just use aggressive pursuit in the same sentence as George Mcclellan. Having secured washington, mcclellan pushed into the old mine state on september 7. His snaking columns converged on frederick on september 12, a mere two days behind robert e. Lee and the confederates. The citizens of frederick who had sneered at the proclamation of the people of maryland lees , whistle overture to those men who allegedly possessed to lofty a spirit to present to abraham lincoln. The men collectively exhaled. Bluecoatedof the troops. The young napoleon. Little mac, he would not exhale. And he wouldnt rest upon his laurels. As joseph harsh first pointed out. Out forn ordered pleasant to drive further west to a fully developed confederate position. In advance of the discovery of special orders 191. Mcclellan was on the move. It was the next day, saturday, september 13 that became fabled but only in the history of the campaign but also in the larger narrative of the war itself. That was today for three soldiers from the 27 indiana volunteer infantry discovered that straight copy of special order 191 that is been addressed to hill wound around three cigars. A coincidence to remarkable for fiction allowed for the quick authentication of those orders. But the trauma of that story and the memorable boast of George Mcclellan notwithstanding, with these paper i will with bobby in a growing number of historians believe the discovery of the document really did little to material of change materially change the course of the campaign. It offered no estimates of enemy strengths, only the vaguest information about their dispositions. In a larger sense any notion that mcclellan swiftly changed course after discovery of this document really faces is a compliment in getting the army of the potomac up to speed and into maryland and ready to go. In a remarkably short period of time after their defeat at second manassas. This was something even robert e. Lee was willing to concede. He did so in a clumsily worded report that Jefferson Davis on september 13. He said George Mcclellan had advanced more rapidly than was convenient. [laughter] more rapidly than was convenient, indeed. George mcclellan was poised and ready to search through South Mountain gap. If he got through the gaps, he would defeat lee in detail. The evening of september 13 is often portrayed as a date that is important for the federal side of things. Really, i think that is more important for the confederate side of things. Evening of september 13, cognizant that frederick is teaming with federal soldiers, cognizant that the union army had come up with unexpected energy. Those of the words of walter taylor, lees aid. Lee got to work. S to hisd out plea subordinates and Harpers Ferry. Get that work done. Bring networking Harpers Ferry to a close. Then he ordered up a reluctant james longstreet. Come back down to a position north of boones borough, maryland, behind the beaver creek a position which the next , day comes to the aid of dh hill who was holding turners gap. Should a federal offense of be launched, which was still a foregone conclusion in lees mind. It was becoming a foregone conclusion for Daniel Harvey hill who had the loneliest task of all these operations. His task of holding turners pass in South Mountain was made even lonelier by the almost criminal neglect of jeb stewart. When a civilian informant supplied the confederate cavalry chief the news that mcclellan was in possession of the lost orders, or what stewart assumed to be lost orders. Stewart quickly determined that little mac would invest all his energy and release of Harpers Ferry and only two brigades a federal troops would press towards turners gap. He assured Daniel Harvey hill dont worry about it. He felt confident parking a single infantry brigade. The fifth virginia cavalry. Before scurrying away into the night. I dont like jeb stuart. [laughter] cook appeared into the valley below, the georgian immediately apprehended stuarts gross miscalculation. That only twosion brigades of federal infantry were forcing their way towards turners gap beggars exhalation. He had seen enough on the ground in the last few days with cavalry skirmishes, operations run frederick, to understand this was more than just two brigades. But here they were. Is singletch garlands North Carolina brigade to the mountain and then would come up to the passes the next morning to make a personal examination of the mountain. That would prompt hill to some of the rest of his brigades. For extending as far as his eye could see this morning. Lines of blue. Ready to punch through those gaps. Rutherford hayes accurately summarized the strategic picture in a letter to his uncle that evening. Enemy will be the a most terrific thing, defeat israel and to them, a retreat without a battle is a serious injury to them. He instinctively Daniel Harvey hill and robert e. Lee knew this. The engagement both hayes and hill anticipated would come the next day. September 14. Shortly after 6 00 on the of september 14, the ninth core order to provide infantry support for the cavalry operations began ascending the mountain. Snaking up the old national road. Coxlong into his march, detected a familiar face. At little crossroads. The familiar face was colonel augustus moore. Of then bor