Depending on who is sitting where and your background, you might find some comments controversial. I have read all the books today and enjoyed all three of them. Happyk you will be very with them. Don, we have a long leash and ship. Started off. We have a long relationship. Start it off. He convinced me i needed to know more, so thank you for being here. Teacher and friend, thank you. I appreciate you being here. Command is not a doctrine, a philosophy. Why i would the book. Why i wrote the book. I think the u. S. Military has great people and recruits well but it continues to remain in the Industrial Age in management and development. I will not use the word training, because training is one aspect of learning. Mulkey, ioes got into his papers. The main thing people keep saying, why do use germans as an example . I get the typical american response, we beat them in two wars. They wrote more in more detail than any country on how to develop people. I want to lead off with a Chuck Richards help andith the chapter on boyd i have spent since 1999 trying to figure out how to develop people to do the [indiscernible] quickly and properly. To translate the action of the commanders intent with little or no oversight. This was written about in the german army. Went to disobey an order. It is written in the doctrine they got terms for it. Extensively taught. Exposed to military. Michigan university of for having the archives. Reading a lot of articles written after the prussian war on this. The typical response is they lost the wars, what is there to study . They were very good but try to substitute strategy for good tactic. It does not mean there is not a reason to study their Educational Learning mechanisms, which were some of the most advanced ever. So my heroes are frederick the elder, somey the and her menanuals commanded in 1942 and destroyed a bunker army. Several chapters about the u. S. Army. But im diplomatic about my criticism. It is better to be diplomatic in criticizing than it is to be harsh. These barriers for good reason why marshall adapted the personnel system he did in 1947. It makes sense with mobilization. These things have to be addressed. I recently was asked to read military review articles on , youon command and i said do not address the barriers to Mission Command or how to develop people to do Mission Command. What happens today . Develop andto Industrial Way of training. Corelooking at the marine from the Industrial Age into the informational age. I call it the cognitive age. Complex problems on and off the battlefield and we have to figure out and how to develop people to quickly think to address the problems. Most of the times the solutions are not probable are not popular. Frederick taylor on the left. George marshall loved the system. In the 1930s. Ed William Depew was the first trading commander in 73 and instill iced institutionalized his training methods. What is the alternative . 2007, 2012, and 2015, we moved to a different learning model. Education,ing and marines are calling it outcome based learning. Adaptive training. The main thing is the models term how we have been taught on their heads turn it on their heads and there a lot of chapters on that. West point, one of the finest people i know with moral courage to change the way the army trained its leaders. Corner we arehe doing a workshop at fort benny in 2015. Great quotes from german manuals ut how do we teach . There are chapters on how to facilitate. Marshall at benny which was incredible. Other techniques used by chris karnes called wargaming. Studies. Ase there is a chapter on how to create outcomes and measures. The people down in quantico trying to figure out this is how do we create outcomes. Wellwritten, and defines success. You figure out how to get there without being told. There is an entire chapter about doing it correctly. It. Accomplish should endorse how they are doing it. These other tools. Withot throw out the baby the bathwater. Which techniques you use to get your outcome. Here are number of methods different. Are you look at the intangible. And then there are chapters that people want to know who is doing it right . Past. Are people in the fourth armored division. And then the army recon force. There are examples right now. The military academy is being part of it back. That concludes my breathing. We are going to make a geographical switch to the american lake. If you notice the title of the book, the author goes up to 1972. I thought, out to where we are today. Thoughtprovoking where we are going in the future. Thank you for advertising this book. Thank you for inviting me. I have never been invited to talk about one of my books. Ine is a different book like all my other books, it started with my father. All of my books have been in the u. S. And pacific, but they all started with him, with his stories, usually in the form of jokes. He was involved in things like the battle of manila and that is where it all started. Advertise this a lot, but this project took me 17 years. It was a back burner project. It was a side project. I thought about doing a and whenn of essays society for environmental history. It were not too interested. They just did not seem interested. Military isout what doing in the field and i started recruiting authors that i thought were doing a new direction and it was primarily the u. S. Military in the 1940s. We did it with all the essays except for one. In the process, i would recruit and they could not make deadlines. I had difficulties with someone writing the introduction and conclusion. They were difficult to find. Eventually, we wound up doing about evan essays and they are very new areas that need a lot more work. Steve did a chapter on the army landbased. Promote did a really excellent institutional study. Just what kind of Institutional Culture and problems that creates when you are an elite within the elite. Phd from theent university of illinois and the most cutting edge of all the essays. He looked at micronesian foodways as they clashed with American Naval administrators who were trying to impose american views of food on the islanders. The clash came about. Looking at something that is , how toever looked at communicate with other units, tovices, other countries up and including handling the communication of the surrender of japan. At what isce looked the first of the u. S. s long string of unsuccessful cases of military advising for the third world. That is the military advising mission in china. 1970sson we went to the is nicholas looked at the transition of the u. S. Controlling okinawa and the role of the military and media interacting in that process. An area that is almost never americanat least not military historians. At interservice rivalry and what i was looking at was the depth of bitterness and hatred between u. S. Army and u. S. Navy right after world war ii. And vice versa. They really hated each others guts. A lot of the documentation over how to organize crossroads, how to carry it out and what it meant for the defense policy. Also, i had excellent records for the introduction and the they really helped to pull things together, but it was difficult in the sense of recruiting people to finish the project. They told me not to do it. It was really good to get into these new areas of history. I am glad that i kept at it. Universityo the president of kentucky. [applause] we are going to take another bite of the future with the next author. John. Thank you everybody for coming. I can see some colleagues and friends out there. It is always a pleasure. An anthology, a collection of essays. We were attempting to assess land power. We use that as a term. We have an institute of land power and we say we have a school. The army has defined it as early as the 2000s, but we are going to look at an academic mode for a variety of perspectives and look at how we have been doing in land power since 9 11. Part of the challenge we had was lee van a conference, we got the. Est speakers that we can get this was december 2015 and we did this at the facility. We got a lot of people to participate. We were going to lose this as our critical analysis. We were should be given a task to do that. We think that is what we should be doing, so we did the conference and the appraisals. We said we want to publish this. Publishing is a lot harder than running a conference, so that is what took the next five years, to get the papers edited and published. We found gaps in the process. Good earlysome reviews. We are not trying to be over controversial or negative, but we are trying to be critical. We are not trying to candy coat some things that we think that the army did wrong. We are looking at it as a strategic appraisal of how did we use and employ land power . There are parochialism out there. Even withchallenges, being an advocate because some people view me as a zealot for land power. I think they all have to to be done in conjunction. Ourselves, betand critical of ourselves and what we do. He works there with us at the college, so he did some look at our early work. Here is the conference panels. Panels, 53e days, 12 participant. We thought that we got a pretty of people who participated, and we were going to try to boil that down. We tried to cast the net fairly ,roadly to look at concepts euro, pacific or asia. We looked at contrasting on the field. That is something that we have come to rely on. Looked at Civil Affairs and ethics. We also looked at the role of women in the military. , some youe speaker may know, he has been critical of the u. S. Army. He volunteered to give a presentation. So what was the result . We came up with a total of chapters. These are some of the first eight. Strategic manpower application, Civil Military applications, strategic failure. One could argue we are looking at another potential failure of land power in another place in the middle east. When you look at the commitment, when you commit 1000 people on the ground, is that a massive amount of land power . I do not think so. We looked at enduring freedom, historical parallels, and we tried to get a better perspective of the marine use of power. Airpower,oked at intelligence involvement with affairs,r, east asian isis s projection of land power. They provided interesting insight. They wanted to seize the caliphate. By using landd power. And then there is my favorite chapter. I was looking at how we use and abuse had orders. We do not necessarily regard headquarters. They are those obnoxious people above platoon and we consider them overhead. I have a different view. If you are interested, you can read my chapter. The army is not a single component. Also do disaster relief. We looked at social and cultural considerations on the war on terrorism. We also looked at the posttraumatic stress, the impact of the war on humans. We cast a broad net. In theot a coherent book sense that we have a coherent theme, other than theme is land power. Force onplied military land and how have we done in the past 15 years or so . We think this will contribute to the path of learning. This should contribute to the intellectual discourse. We are involved in actively trying to improve the u. S. Army. S we do with terms of concepts i would like to thank dr. Jason. He is the editor. I am not. E worked for me you know how that is when you have a subordinate who is somewhat of a revolutionary. Effort. Group i am only one of the contributors. Opportunity and we appreciate the university of and thank you for letting me be here. Thank you. I will take comments or questions. We frisk everyone on their way and. Please use the microphone. I will see. Maybe can be probably a more important service. Grew up as a naval officer. Is, does theo you change in economy america is maritime nation. Does the current economy, the way things are evolving, does that change the calculus between america as an island nation and american now as a more robust ,art of the World Economy asking you if you could comment on that. We are heavily involved with multidomain operations. Consequently, i do think that all domains have to be considered. I absolutely agree there are times when land domain is not the most important. I can even call the cognitive domain, but what is the reality . We need to have capabilities and work synergistically. Educated officers who understand how the domains work together. There are times when each of those domains have to do their job. We do not have a soft domain. I would submit that special fromtion forces operate the land, all the land and they do things on land, so i would submit that soft is an extension of land domain. I think all of the domains are important. Not to be a zealot for land power, but that is my favorite. Good afternoon. I have two questions. One for two different authors. For mr. Vandergriff, on Mission Command, we are given to believe that because it is true that trust is a major component to making Mission Command work. My question to you would be, . Hat do you think within the different echelons of mission can best Mission Command Mission Command. I do not know if you touched on any of this in your collection has the warut college looked at the impact of what it hasars on done on the ability to synchronize combat power . Has that atrophied . How does that impact where we are going . You are exactly right. Trust builds Mission Command. The misunderstanding is the amount of development required. So often i address audiences and the first thing i ask is what is Mission Command . I get 15 different answers. Some quotes out there. The number one threat is careerism. People. Blame a lot of until the army, i loved the article about Mission Command. Great guy, great leaders, but they asked me what i thought and i said, you did not address the barriers to Mission Command. They have to be addressed. We are the society that breaks the speed limit every day. Recruitingd job of new people, but that we have the office hours. I see it and i live it every day. People, start trusting we will never do Mission Command. Your question is a good question. One of the challenges we have as an institution is that we sometimes try to use the principle of or of some city to an absurd limit. What do i mean by that is that when we are in a long period of counterinsurgency, we focus on counterinsurgency. It is very difficult as an focusor to get people to during the period where you are preparing to deploy. You come back and you will prepare to do it again. It is difficult to get people to think about those operations. Challenge that we had, even with our students, what is most of their arians . It is counterinsurgency. Now we are thinking about how dr. B. This is not what we intended with modularity. We did not intend the army to become that is what happened. The army to be brigade taste. We wanted to be able to do large scale operation. Became bct centric and smallscale. Trying to reverse that with doctrine. We are looking at things like field armies. Students tell me that is a mythical beast that we have never used. Really . I think we have used those before. That is one of the challenges that we have. On the missions at hand. The mission has been on hand for 15 or so years. There is atrophy that has occurred. Some of us have tried to maintain it intellectually, just like i remember trying to maintain insurgent and. Ounterinsurgent we tried to let that atrophied because we were focused like a laser on europe. Any further questions . , thehe three authors current area of interest that everybody is thinking about, writing about how do you envision that would fall into the comments or the themes that you have developed in each one of your works . Cyber, whichrea of is hard to define. That is an excellent question. I just read an article two weeks ago about how the Cyber Command took down isis, and it was really a Mission Command. Training on any article that talks about Mission Command. This organization had Senior Officers and cyber warriors. They found out when they were that it wasses making the cycle slow, so they allow these people to go because their actions on one system could impact the entire campaign against isis. They allow these people to go need to dod say, i this in the scope of the campaign plan. It sped up to the point where they were running cycle circles around isis. It was an excellent article. I askedanother question my audience. Is, is i am it cutting down the chain of command to speed up my decision cycle. It reminds me of the question about which dimension of warfare is the most important. During that discussion, i was thinking ground, sea and air. Cyber warfare is another really expensive area of warfare. We are already involved in. We are also 22 trillion in debt. Questions was on economics and globalization. Argue that our most important dimension on warfare is, we better get our International Economy in much better shape, like it was in 1946. I have a slightly different take. I think we have a Better Organization for conducting cyber organization. We are trying to figure out what the name is. It is not just cyber. Words have meaning. Is a lot ofhere money and cyber. One of the terms that we use to operations. They are looking at naming themselves the Army Information warfare command to broaden the portfolio to more than just cyber, to be more encompassing, or psychological operation. Cognitive activities, somewhat to the imagination. The challenge was not properly organized. I think we are working on institutional pieces that i see. I think we are behind the power curve. That we need to work on these things as part of the aspect of land power that i am an advocate for. Thank you very much. [applause] a special thanks to you for orchestrating this and we look next round ofr books. This is American History tv on cspan3 where we feature programs exploring the nations past. Follow the house impeachment inquiry and the administrations response. Online. Ed coverage watch pantheon primetime reenters on cspan. Org impeachment. Next, a visit to the National Portrait gallery. It is the second of a twopart program. Historian gives American History tv a guided tour of an exhibit marking the centennial of the 19th amendment. Using political cartoons and images of separatist picketing the white house, exploiting the National Womens Party Tactics under the leadership of alice paul. About them i am the
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