Transcripts For CSPAN3 The Civil War Fall 1863 Virginia Campaigns 20240713

General george meade and union forces from july to december 1863 as they followed confederates through virginia. This event was part of historical parks small battles, big result s symposium. Im very pleased to introduce our last speaker of the afternoon, Jeffrey William hunt, director of the military forces museum at camp maybury in austin, texas, and adjunct professor where he has taught since 1988. God bless you. Author of the last battle of the civil war and contributor to essential civil war curriculum and the gail library of daily life. American civil war. His last work is a trilogy from the final stage of the Gettysburg Campaign to the end of 1863 and includes meade and lee at mayan run due for publication next year. So lets give a welcome for jeffrey hunt. [ applause ] thank you. Its a real pleasure to be here. I appreciate jerrys invitation. Its always fun to stand in a group of people who have the same passion that you do. You dont get looked at as strangely as you do when you talk to other people. And i am going to break precedent, apparently, today and have a powerpoint demonstration. And im doing that for several reasons. Jerry did it last night. I dont want him to feel weird by being all along. Secondly, spent a lot of money to put this system in. I guarantee you, you will not have to get a new puppy at the end of my presentation. So i came to become interested in this story about what happens in the Virginia Theater after the battle of gettysburg and before the battle of the wilderness following a conversation i had with one of my favorite professors and my mentor at the university of texas in austin. He taught a class on the American Civil War reconstruction. I took that class and became his teaching assistant, graduate assistant. So we knew each other very well. We were always falling into conversations about the war and various, you know, issues of the war. And one day we were talking about the battle of gettysburg. Wattley trying to do by going into pennsylvania and this kind of stuff. And he suggested to me maybe gettysburg wasnt the end all and be all of the war, the great turning point that the historiography, ill date myself now, the early 80s, when i was a graduate student, said that it was. Completely opposite of everything that ive ever read. So i became curious. Im like, okay, if i wanted to try to answer that question one way or the other, where do i go and look for evidence . And i thought, well, if gettysburg is this great momentous turning point, concurrent with vicksburg, which occurs at the same time, the war in virginia ought to look differently after gettysburg than it looked before gettysburg. Let me find out what was going on in virginia, following the battle of gettysburg. I went to find secondary literature on it, i drew a blank because there isnt any secondary literature to speak of on what happens in virginia between the battle of gettysburg and the opening of the overlaying campaign. You can find a paragraph here and there, page here and there and it will get mentioned in a biography for a few pages, but there wasnt really anything there. Since there wasnt anything in the secondary literature, i was forced to go to the official records and read regimental histories, go into the archives and all these sorts of things to find the answer i wanted. What i discovered was that contrary to the way history has treated the second half of 1863 in virginia, which is to say nothing of importance happened, meade and lee maneuvered around each other, there were a few small battles but it was essentially a stalemate as the armys licked their wounds. Nothing of significance happens until grant shows up. Hi historiography hit a pause button until may of 1864. You have to Pay Attention to chattanooga out west as military historians like to follow the big battles and big blood baths. Thats where the smoke and drama are and the easiest way to sell books is to write about big battles. But when i examine that period and looked at what the men who served in the army of Northern Virginia, army of potomac had to say about it, it, the letters they wrote, lo and behold there is a lot that happens in those six months. This is not a quiet period. Not only is there a great deal of maneuvering, there is a great deal of fighting and both as well as the Strategic Decisions that are made during in period have an enormous conquences for whats going to happen in 1864. In fact this period, for both the eastern and western theater, really sets the stage for the 1864 campaigns. And its also a very important bridge, because if you read about, you know, those first knew days in july and the great victories and gettysburg and vicksburg and hudson, a lot of northerners, president lincoln among them, that feel like this is it. We just have to push a little harder. Victory is on hand. The confederate and federal side, you hear phrases like the confedracy is a tottering cause, this is almost over. And then you fastforward a year and you get to the end of the summer of 1864. And the north seems to be facing its duringest hour. The horrific casualties of the overlying campaign. Vicksburg early on the outskirts of washington, the failure and the red river campaign. The confederates have a hope if they hold out for a few weeks, lincoln is going to go down and mclenlan is going to win and will make it impossible for the north to win the war. Whether that is right or not, that was what the southerners believed. And so how do you get there . How do you get from early july when it seemed that the great turning point itr had happened, the north was inostably going to be won. To a year later the north is on the verge of going down the defeat and the south on the vernl of establishing this independence. There has to be something that bridges that period. Its the six months between lees retreat across the patomac and the end of active campaigning in the december of 1863. Another interesting thing about this period is that it also marks the only interval in which gorge meade is in sholtry command of the army of the patomac. Technically he commands that until the end of the war, we know once grant shows up he is looking over meades shoulder, treating him as a second in command. And so if you want to try and get a handle on how good a general George Gordon meade was, this is the place to look, if youre evaluating him as an army commander. The story begins where most people end the gettysburg story, and that is lees retreat across the patomac in 1863. Thats where most books come to an end. Lee got away. Meade misses his chance, lincoln is furious, the frch press is furious, and the great chance to turn gettysburg into the warwinning victory has been lost. But in fact if you go to the volumes on the official records that talk about the Gettysburg Campaign, youll notice something very interesting. They dont conclude the story until the first day of august of 1863. They end the story two weeks later. And thats because the gettysburg story doesnt end on the banks of the patomac. It ends not at the beginning of july but in august, 1863. There was a continuous flow of operations following lees retreat across the patomac. Thats notp the focus of the talk today, but its important to understand how we get from here ultimately to mine run at the end of november. From me today, youre not going to get one small battle. Youre going to get a fistfull of small battles that have a kmumlative affect that is incredibly important on the way that the war is going to unfold in 1864. So lee crosses the patomac, he hovers in the lower part of the shananndia hally for awhile to rest his army to see what meade is going to do. And what hed really like to do is to follow george mclellons example and sit down for a month or so and recover from the battle of gettysburg. And he writes to his wife that the president ought to be satisfied with getting lee out of maryland, and he ought to laeb this army alone until we can replace or losses, i can appoint you germs, get reorganized, and we have a reasonable chance of going out and fighting another battle and winning a victory. General meade knows thats not in the cards for two reasons. After his failure to attack lee at williamsport, whether good or bad, hes in trouble with the administration. Lincoln has through hallic expressed his dissask which stuck in meades craw, because he got the battle three days before. He was told he couldnt decline the command. Now he fights and wins this great big battle. He believes hes done everything that anybody could be asked to do. And now the president is dissatisfied. And as far as meade is concerned, thats a censure. Thats saying i didnt do everything that i could have done. I didnt do everything that somebody else could or would have done. And since i never wanted this command, i want out of this command. I want you to replace me. And of course you cant replace the victor of a battle of gettysburg two weeks after the great triumph and with whom would you replace him . Hallik changes dissatisfaction to disappointment and says, were not relieving you. Your job is to follow the Confederate Army and cut it up. So meade knows he cant linger north of the patomac. He crosses a few days after le. , it puts him on the strategic flank of lee. If meade plays right he might trap lee in the shananndoah valley, tut him off, and perhaps create the opportunity to do on the south bank of the patomac, what he had just missed the chance to do on the north bank. As a consequence of meades move into the lauden, we get a week and a half long chess match, a game of catandmouse between lee and the shennan doe ah, meade in the mountain, and a flooded shenandoah river. The whole thing hinges on control of the Mountain Passes and meade is moving down the louden, lee finally figures out what meade is doing. Ive got to get back into Culpeper County into a blocking position defending richmond and the Virginia Central railroad. Lee begins to move. And just at the moment when, if meade pushed things, there might be a great opportunity, meade halts his inventory for 35 hours. The reason he halts is because hes read in southern nurpts that lee has been massively reas reinforced which after the losses of gettysburg would make sense if it had anybody to do that with. Which of course it doesnt. And meade has been perplexed by the fact that lee had hung around in the lower valley instead of rapidly retreating south and getting across the mountains. And so meade is trying to understand, why has lee stayed where he is . Now it all makes sense. Hes waiting for reinforcements, and hes going to go back over to the offensive. This is the moral dominance that robert e. Lee has over the minds of the generals, that after gettysburg, he might resume the offensive, recross the patomac, cut it off from washington, d. C. , then disaster will ensue. Although meade is not 100 certain this is going to happen, whenpart of lees army alone jds toward a federal force that it crossed the patomac the western end of the valley, that seems to indicate, yes, a rebel offensive is a real possibility. So meade hauls up until he can figure out whats going on. When i figures that out 35 hours later, its too late. Meade has already missed his chance. You dont give robert e. Lee 35 hours. He knows what to do with 35 hours. So he begins to cross the river and the mountains at chester and mannasis gap at front royal. There they are. And lee is sending most of his army through chesters gap. And at the same time that his army is going through there, meade belated lee is trying to shove his forces through mannassis gap with the idea of taking front royal and cutting off the confederate retreat. And although meade knows that long streets corps are going through the pass, he believes others are still in the valley. If he can grab it, fight his way through, he could destroy twothirds of the army of Northern Virginia. Now in fact meades intelligence is all messed up. Hes miscon strooug whats going on and what confederate units are in the valley. Its hill and long street already going through chesters gap. Its only yules corps that is in danger. And meade tries to cut it off by sending the third corps backed up by the fifth corps and the Second Corporation through man nasis gap. This leads to the first of our important small battles. And that is the fight at whopping heights when wrights georgia brigade holds off the entire federal third corps for most of a day. Its at 600 guys holding back a federal corps. Theyre helped by the rugged terrain, by the fact that general french who we will talk about in a little bit is very cautious. He doesnt like coming into this Mountain Pass with these great big mountains looming up on his flank. Hes seen too many of those old 1950s wrchz where the endians show up when you go into the box canyon. Hes attaching regiments and batteries, every trail that comes down from the mountains has to be defended. He really doesnt want to move until the fifth corps gets behind him. And so he takes most of the day and at the end of the action, the excelsior brigade launches a dramatic attack on wright that becomes known as the battle of whopping heights. They manage to push them off the high ground there. But its taken them so long that the rest of yules corps has shown up to block the exit of mannassis gap. And meade still believing he has this great opportunity, amasses 3500 troops there on the night of july 23rd. He promised im going to punch my way through and trap a good chunk of the army in Northern Virginia in the valley and destroy. You warrant decisive victory . Here it is. Of course during the night, yule, having done what he needed to do, fades away. When meade advances on the morning of the 24th, the rebels are gone. Theyre gone. Hes not going to catch them. Whats worse, the army is almost out of supplies. And so he has to pivot to the east and hurry toward warrenton where he can reconnect with the railroad and the supply dumps around washington, d. C. Lee, at the same time, has headed to the southeast and reoccupied a position in the culpeper v, and this is the v made by the upper rappahannic which flows to the southeast. The rapahan which flows west to east, and they con vernl at the southeast corner of culpeper before it goes down to the fredericksburg and chesapeake bay. Lee is resting here but not certain this is where hes going to stay. This v of the rivers is a problematic military riddle for both sides. Ptsz a good place to attack into but its a horrible place to defend. The reasons for that are fairly stray straightforward. Theres no good defensive terrain there. Its beautiful countryside and thats usually militarily worthless. Its pretty, open, slightly rolling. Theres no real anchorfor a defensive position. Moreover, this is a narrow county. If you follow the line of the orange and alexian dri cross county, thats only 23 miles. And of course the distance as you go east is much, much more narrow. So if an army fights a battle in the culpeper v and it gets beaten, it gets shoved back across or against the rapidan river. All though its not wide, and its usually not altogether deep, and there are lodes of f joerds, that can change in the blink of an eye. The name rapidan comes from the fact it can rapidly expands and those fjords can disappear after rainfall. A fjord is a funnel. Fight and lose, get forced against a river in retreat, its a recipe for disaster. Moreover, curious thing about Culpeper County is the land inside the county is lower than the land to the south behind the rapidan and to the north behind the rapahannic. What that means is if you get control of the fjords you can mass attacking columns out of sight, then strike across with very little warning. If lee loses control them, ees blinded to what the army of the patomac is going to do. He has been in this position before. This is where he was when the Fredericksburg Campaign started. Burnside had done that to him. He had seized the fjords, used the high grounds, and got to fredericksburg. If the upon toon boats had showed up on time hes across before lee could react. Lee remembers all of that. So culpeper says, offers no field for battle. And hes lingering here for awhile. But hes probably going to go back across the rapidan, which is more easily defended. Meade has every intention of forcing lee to do that. So hes taken his army, taken a couple days to resupply. Then he informs the lifrmgon Administration Im about to try and push across the raphannic river. Im going to seize the fjords and hopefully lee will retreat and not just out of culpeper. He will retreat from the rapidan as well. Meade understands lees army is beaten up, and that hes unlikely to make a stand. And if you push against him just now, you might leap two river barriers without much of a fight. Now, the one thing that meade doesnt know is if lee backing up is the result of his army being weak or a result of lees strategy. Well get to that in a moment. But for meade, one of the most important things hes got to do when he tries to cross the rapahannic, is get control of the station, where the railroad crosses into Culpeper County across the 500foot long railroad bridge. It crossed into raphannic county until november of 1862 when the federals burned that bridge as part of their opening gamut of the Fredericksburg Campaign. If meade is going to pursue lee down the line of the orange and alexandria which will become the federal supply line, hes got to have that bridge rebuilt. He cant rebuild the bridge yet. So meade is preparing to launch this push. He sends word to washington, d. C. , still following my orders from two weeks ago, pursue the rebel army and cut it up wherever it may have gone. But when i cross if lee doesnt retreat theres going to be a big battle and i sure would like to be reinforced before i fight again. The army was as badly cut up as gettysburg and the army of Northern Virginia. Neither army has begun to recover just yet. At that point, the rug is pulled out from under meade. Hallik passes his message on to lincoln, and lincoln reads it and says, wait a minute. Im not telling you to push across the rapahannic river and go fight the confederates. If you want to do it its okay. But dont you dare do it because you think im insisting that you do it. And basically lincoln cant help but take a swipe at meade. He says if it wasnt safe for him to attack and williamsport, how in the world is it going to be safe for him to attack him in Culpeper County . That infuriates meade. He thinks thats grocery unfair. But lincoln is being realistic here. Lee has the ability to maneuver again. And so dont push a battle if the odds arent in your favor. But theres Something Else going on here thats very important to remember. There are Congressional Elections in october and november. If you send the army of the patomac into a battle and it loses and its commanders can say we fought that because lincoln pushed us to fight before we were ready, thats very handy ammunition to give to the Democratic Party during a critical electorial cycle. And so lincoln tells hallic and meade, if you want to fight, go fight. But dont do it because im telling to. Now meade is in a quandary. Technically the pressure has been lifted off, but he knows that the government still would like him to go out and stroy the army of Northern Virginia. He intends to go ahead with crossing the rapahannic. But then hallik sends him a message and says, hey, about that reinforcement stuff, not going to happen. In fact what were going to do is were going to start taking troops away from you to enforce the draft. Remember the new york draft riots on july 13th . Theres been draft resistance in other places, led the administration to suspend the draft. And thats a bad thing, because the north is in serious manpower trouble. Were used to thinking about the confederates having manpower issues but now the north has a really bad one. Recruiting has dried up. The northern governments emulated the con scription is extremely unpopular, unwieldy. The first batches of recruits that its creating are desserting in droefbsz. Youve got the bounty jumpers who enlit, then desserts, repeats the process. A lot of the guys who are coming into the army are physically unfit. Some of them are former soldiers who had been discharged for physical disability whove reenlisted. Meade believes this drafting is a disaster and theres no way thats going to get him the soldiers he needs or the numbers of soldiers that he needs. And that said, the draft is the only way youre going to strengthen the union army. So you cant leave the draft suspended. And the administration is certain the only way we can resume is to do it at bayonet point. Theyve got to take almost 6,000 troops from meades army and send them north to enforce the draft. Same time theyre going to take the First Division of the 11th corps, 5,000 men, and send it to reinforce the effort against charleston. Not just because it needs to be, but because the 11th corps is in ill repute after the debackles at chancellorsville and gettysburg. Its first particulars is seen to be as a problem child. Theyre talking about breaking it up and being done with it. They dont go that far but take a good chunk and send it as far away from vairginia. Meade has manpower problems. Thats going to be foremost in his mind for the rest of the year. But he also has an interesting order from hallik, no advance, no battle, dont do anything rash, but keep up a threatening attitude. [ laughter ] so look scary, but dont do anything. Right . And so meade says, all right, well, seizing bridge heads over the rapahannic is as good a way to look scary as i know. He crosses the rapahannic. And that leads to a battle, as were going to see. And that battle is buforeds Cavalry Division crosses the patomac, drives toward culpeper courthouse pushing hamptons brigade under Lawrence Baker almost back that that railroad junction. And then the confederate is sending reinforcements and throw the federals into reverse. This is your second battle at brandy station, and its a nasty little fight, very dramatic. Its fought in 90degree temperatures with heat indexes in the hundreds. And a lot of the confederate horses are so weak from want of grain, that they actually collapse when their riders get on them. Dozens of men have to be sent to the rear because their horses just arent off to the fight. Nonetheless its a fight that the confederates technically win. But the federals do maintain control of the south bank of the rapahannic river, and that allows them after a weeks pause to rebuild the railroad bridge. So if meade wants to advance, once washington unshackled him, he has this Critical Link in the o. N. A. As a supply line. But heres the thing. Meade doesnt want to advance down the o. N. A. The o. N. A. Goes to the southwest, goes in the opposite direction of richmond. The only thing that it ultimately points to of value is gordonsville which is important that connects the Virginia Central railroad ultimately to richmond, but thats 60, 70 miles away. And the worst problem about operating on the orange in alexandria, that troubled me the most, from the rapahannic to washington is about 30 miles. All that have goes through confederate territory, through mosebys. And the only way to ensure it stays in constant operation is to guard every single foot of it. And he has to detach five thousand inventory to do that job. 5,000 inventory out of an army thats already been shot up at gettysburg, reduces his combat power. And meade is looking at the recent past, and hes noted that every battle the casualties get worse. And in every battle the army of the patomac gets weaker. Look at how many men on the peninsula. The 120,000 joe hooker took into chancellorville. I took 80,000 something into gettysburg and lost more than 23,000 of them. If i go and have another battle with lee, the rebels are probably going to dig in in a strong position. I have to assume the tactical offensive. Im going to suffer casualties come mensrat with that. Win or lose, my army is going to be vastly weaker afterwards. And if lee is force the into retreat or he retraets of his own volition and i follow him down the o a, my supply line gets longer and longer and longer, my combat gets weaker and weaker every mile i go south. And lee is apt to keep playing that until he can turn around and hit me with superior numbers away from my base and that could lead to disaster. So meade would rather abandon the o a. He wants to take the army back to a key landing and cross the rapahannic at fredericksburg. That would give him a line of supply. If he goes, lee will have to abandon the upper rapahannic, the rappadan. Ill move fast, wont make burnsides mistake. Ill get across the river before lee, and then i can go down the richmond, fredericksburg, and lee will have to fall back in order to fight me. So ill gain this enormous advantage without spending a drop of blood. As far as meade is concerned, this is militarily common sense. Its and hes right. It is militarily common sense. But this is a civil war. And civil wars are an inherently political thing. And lincoln and hallik veto this proposal for two reasons. First, you cant take the army of the patomac back six months after that disaster. That is an admission of strategic bankruptcy. You want to know what the Democratic Party is going to do to us if we do that six months after that bloodbath . Secondly, this seems to indicate that richmond is meades objective. And lincoln and hallik have been saying, richmond is not the objective. Lees army is. And he doesnt matter where you fight it. Go out and fight it and start to grind it up. Which is wonderful theoretically, but if youre a general and have to plan and find the ground and handle logistics. Its not simple. Meade knows this. This irritates him. The relationship between meade and hallik and lincoln is incredibly dysfunctional. They dont trust each other. Lincoln and hallik are going to forgive meade for failing to strike at williamsport but never forget that he failed to strike at williamsport. Thats going to color their perception of everything he wants to do for the rest of the year. Once more when they hear meade talk intgentsly and logically about the difficulties of supply and fighting my way across rivers, the administration is willing to concede, thats all true. But what theyre really hearing is George Mclellan in their ear, and all the excuses mclellan had for not getting anything done. And this seems suspiciously familiar. So meade doesnt get permission to change his base. He can make whatever Operational Movement he wants, but strategically theres not going to be any great shift. And for meade, this is exceptionally disgusting because he believes that if theyre not going to sanction his plans, then they need to tell him what they want done. And they wont tell him what they want done i dont know vague, go fight lee. And if you cant, cut off a piece of his army, force him back. None of this is very helpful. This is vague advice. And meade writes a letter. His letters have been published, by his son in the 1880s. But they are heavily edited and theyre not all in that book. There is one that i found that meade writes around this time to his wife, who is a very close confidant of his. He says that the administration would love for me to go out and fight and win a battle. Theyre keeping their fingerprints off any defeat because they set me up to be a scapegoat if theres a disaster. Thats what they did to burnside and hooker and pope and mclellan and im not going to let them do it to me. Its a troubled and dysfunctional relationship. So august 1st, 1863, the federals are pushed back. For lee, thats evidence. Cul pepper is no place to leave my inventory. Hes going to take it back behind the rapahannic river. And when he takes his inventory behind the river, he leaves stuart occupying Culpeper County as a buffer between his army and meade. If meade wants it, he can come take it. But he tells stuart, stay here but dont risk your troops. But give me a buffer. And so lee is behind the rapidan. Mclellan rather, meade is above the rapahannic. And under orders from washington, dont do anything. Dont do anything. And so for about five, six weeks, youre going to get a lull. In that the two armies recouprate from gettysburg. They both deal with desergs problems by firing squads. That turns out to be very effective. Its during this period that lee offers to resign because of gettysburg and Jefferson Davis wisely says no way, i wont hear of it. Its also during this period that they fully recovered their strength. Within six weeks of returning, the army of Northern Virginia is up to 73,000 men, a f. The wound of gettysburg heals numerically very quickly and its mostly the result of convalescents returning, men sick and wounded, now coming back. There are some recruits. Fts its mostly convalescents coming back. As lees army regains strength he regains his combativeness. He tells if meade doesnt move, i wish to strike him. Gettysburg has invoked no tactical or strategic epiphany in robert e. Lee. He believes that aggressive action administering frequent defeats as rapidly as possible is the only way the south is going to keep the superior numbers of the unionist off balance. Convince them to give up. This six weeks is very important to both armies. But its not the ohm thing of course thats going on. Because out in tennessee, rose kranz is on the move. Hes advancing toward chattanooga. Burnside has advanced towards knoxville out of kentucky. The confederates defending are grossly outnumbered. Its clear a crisis is looming. So as Early September dawns, the confederate high command finds itself in the same spot that it was in in may of 1863. Theres a crisis out west. It looks like the Confederate Forces out west are not Strong Enough to deal with it. How do we respond . In may it was vikszburg. In september its chattanooga. The options in september are the same as may. We take troops from lees army, which is the only real source of reinforcements, and we send them west to try and redeem the situation. Or lee watches an offensive in virginia to try and wreck the army of the patomac, threaten washington, panic the north, convince them to pull troops from the west and bring them east to defend the capital. We know what happened in may of 1863. The decision was, as lee said, we cant get men to the west in time. He basically implies if we get them out there they wont be used properly. The smart thing, an offensive in virginia. Whats the decision in september . Exactly the same thing. Exactly the same thing. Davis decides to go with lees advice to attack meade. The problem is that just as soon as lee issues the orders to prepare for an offensive, chattanooga and knoxville fall. And when they fall, davis changes his mind, and he orders that long streets corps from lees army be dispatched to reinforce bray. The whole corps isnt going go to, georgia bringing aids will be shifted to charleston to reinforce and also because long street is afraid if those two go through their home state hes going to have a desertion problem with them. The rest long streets corps is going to go west. And of course rumors of this begin to arrive in the Federal Capital very, very quickly. And that makes the yangies very nervous. They ask pleade, has lee sent any troops west . Meade says well, i dont think so. But i cant really tell you because theres a whole county between me and the rebel army occupied by rebel cavalry. They say you need to find out. On september 13th, the federal cavalry corps launches a fullstrength drive into Culpeper County. It gives you on september 13th a dramatic battle of culpeper courthouse where the cavalry and horse ar till free is handled roughly. Theyre driven back which the federals reach. And pleasanton is able to send word back to general meade. Okay, long street is gone. Hill and yule are behind the rapidan but long street is gone. Where hes gone, nobody is saying where hes gone. But hes not here. And so meade has to decide what to do. He asks washington do you want me to advance to the rapidan. Theyre like, its up to you. And so he finally enters a culpeper v which makes him nervous because he understands what a weak spot that is. And getting to the culpeper v, he now confronts the army behind the rapidan. This is going to be his problem now basically for the rest of the year. How do i get at the rebels on the other side of the river . Every fjord is heavily defended. The ground on the other side of the river is higher than the ground on my side of the river. So a frontal attack is suicide. I either have to go east around lees right, or i have to go west around lees left. And of course the union army is operated to the east before during the chancellorsville campaign. But its never operated to the west. One of the interesting things is that despite being at war in virginia for two years, theres swaths of the old dominion that the federalists have the vaguest idea of the topography. Pleasontan sends two decisions into Madison County to the west of culpeper with orders to scout the roads, the fjords and see if we can cross on lees right flank. And that leads to on the 22rd, the dramatic cavalry action at jacks shop. This is really cavalry time in virginia. The two rival cavalry fourss fight three major actions against one another in a sevenweek period of time which is unprecedented outside of a major campaign. The second battle of brandy station, the battle of culpeper, and jacks shop. Stuart responds aggressively, manages to chase the yankees back. He believes that the reconnaissance gives general meade the information you need, which is you dont want to go west. Thats not the way to get at the rebel rebels. At the same time all this business is happening in madison, out in georgia the battle of chicka mauga. They chase the federals back into chattanooga. Brag follows. Against long streets advice, doesnt strie to outflank them but lays the army of the cumberland under siege. Now the crisis is on the other foot. In Early September it was the rebels desperately figuring out, how do we save chattanooga . Now in late september, its the federals trying to figure out, how do we save chattanooga . And of course they order all reinforcements available in the west to go to the threatened point. Grant is plucked out of basically cooling his heels and doing virtually nothing after his vicksburg victory and told to go to chattanooga, fire rose kranz if you want, and of course he really wants to and is happy to do it. But thats not enough. He seems like war needs to be done. And so the federals now have to make the same kind of decision that davis and lee were making a few weeks ago. Do we do what secretary boris stanton and chase and wells are suggesting and take troops from the patomac and send them west . Or do we do what lincoln and hallik prefer, and launch and offensive in virginia . Because if lee sent a corps to the west, hes weak. Hes weaker than hes ever been. Meade is a strong as he was at gettysburg. Heirs a great tint. We should take advantage of it. Standon and chase and wells say, you got to be kidding. You know were talking about meade in the army of the patomac, right . Theyre not going to take advantage. Its not going to happen. But lincoln is not going to be rushed. He has hallik send a message to meade and says, do you have any definitive plans for an immediate offensive . And meade, kind of suptding why theyre asking, says, bufored is just getting back from his reconnaissance, but no, i dont. And lincoln says, not good enough. And so the 11th and the 12th kofrps are detached from the army and certainty out west under joe hooker to help save the situation at chattanooga. Interestingly, this changes the strength of the army of the patomac not at all. Just as the 13,000 men in these 2 corps head west, all of the guys sent north to enforce the draft come back. The army of the patomacs strength stays the same. Lee is down though. He was outnumbered but 17,000. Now by almost 35,000. The odds have shifted very badly against him, except for this. All pleade can see is, ive lost two of my seven corps. I still have to spend 5,000 men to guard the railroad. I dont want to go down this line anyway. And therefore i am no longer capable of offense ichb action. It turns out that stanton was right, meade wasnt going to take advantage of these circumstances. He has it in his head that lees army is as big as his own. Hes not going go over to the offensive. Robert e. Lee is of a different mindset. When he hears that two federal corps have disappeared, he goes over to the offensive. On october 9th of 1863, he swings his troops out of orange into madison, trying to get around the flank of the union army and come down on it from the west and hit it in culpeper. The federals pick up hints of the confederates moving from their signal stations, but the information is not definitive. And theres a possibility that the rebels might actually be retreating, which would make sense, right . If youve sent a whole corps to the west, backing up to richmond would be logical and prudent. Meade doesnt really know, is lee retreating or is he advancing . And meade decides to prepare for both possibilities. So he throws part of his army into a defensive position to the west. But he sends the other part, the larger part, down to the rapidan with orders to prepare to cross the river for an offensive. And buforeds division crosses with orders to go up the south bank, up cover the fjords so that they can cross the river and pursue the rebels if they are restreeting. The one thing meade is very conscious of, he let lee get away at williamsport. He let him get away at mannasis gap. It is going look bad if he retraets from behind the rapidan and the union army is not in hot pursuit. His gut tells him theyre going over to the offensive. Meade who is extremely competent general, a smart guy, doesnt go with his gut. Because washington is looking over his shoulder. All of the backandforth between he and the administration and hallic have basically put him on edge. Weve been there, right . Were good at something until someone says i want to watch you . And then were like, now im being watched and youre going to mess it up. This is sort of what meade is doing. And it is late in the day of october 10th, and he finally figures out what the rebels are really up to. And he orders a general retreat. And he begins to pull his army out of the culpeper v. And that is a cautious move, but its a prudent move. Thats a bad place to fight. Its surprise to his troops who are ready to tangle again after gettysburg. But nonetheless, it makes sense. Dont be in the vulnerable position. Get yourself north of the river. And meade is especially worried that the rebels might not just be trying to get at him in culpeper. They could be making a wider march to cut him off from washington. If youre north of the rapahannic youre prepared for either possibility. When meade gets north of the rapahannic, he loses sight of the confederate infantry. The yankee cavalry cant tell meade anything about where lees infantry is. Lee could be doing one of two things. Hes gone to culpeper and hes willing to stop there. Or hes outflanking me and trying to cut me off from washington. Meade deploys a Cavalry Division at war loo and jefr soon with orders to watch out. Theyre going to run into gregs cavalry and ill know what hes doing. Nothing comes from greg for half a day. Bad luck for the federals. They dont see that lee is actually moving in their direction, going where meade is afraid hes going to go. So about noon, meade gets nervous. I backed up and didnt fight, and lee is not trying to cut me off from d. C. Wow, thats going to look bad in the papers. Thats going to look bad to the administration. Maybe i should, if lee is going to be in culpeper, go fight him. So he sends two corps under john soejwick, the fifth and sixths. Back into culpeper courthouse. Takes half his army back into culpeper to see if lee is there and willing to fight. All thats there is a cavalry brigade under pierce young which has a bad half a day trying to hold back a union avalanche. But sedgwick figures out, lee is not here. So by dusk, lee is not here. Hes not in culpeper. But greg hasnt reported the rebels trying to outfwlank me. Where did they go . And some of meades officers are like, you know what theyre doing. This thing was a feint. Now theyre pulling back closer to richmond. At night he leaves his army where it is, half of it north of the rapahannic, half of it south. And of course bad news for general meade, lee with stuarts cavalry and a. P. Hill and yules are slamming their way up across the rapahannic, mauling the brigade at jefferson and sulfur springs. By nightfall stuartls cavalry closer to the orange and alexandria at warrant injunction than the army itself. And so meade doesnt find that out until 10 00 that night when a messenger finally arrives from the upper rapahannic with the horrible news. And meade once again has to order his troops out and put them in Rapid Retreat toward centerville to get out of the way of whatever blow lee is about to land. As he retraets the railroad bridges thats all of six or seven weeks up goes up in flames. Job security, railroad bridge builders, theyre always going to have bridges that need to be rebuilt. The federals begin retreating. The armies are going both up the o a, half going along a parallel route through awe bush. No time to talk about that oopz oop. I got 100 pages on it in my second book. If you want to know, theres a place you can find out. Theres a scarefor the federal second corps at auburn. But it manages to get away. And on the morning of october 14th, a. P. Hill and yule are swinging around toward the railroad. Most of the federal army is going to get out of their way. But when hill comes down on bristoe station he sees the tail end of the federal fifth corps, thizs that the union, says go get it. But as hess division moves the second kofrps comes up. Its a fluid situation. Union troops are moving behind the Railroad Embankment at bristoe. Confederates spot them and the leading brigade say, theres something dangerous to our right. Pay attention. And hef takes that to hill, and hill says, stop everything. Lets try and figure out whats going on. He pauses for ten minutes and sees andersons division coming up and says, go ahead. Those ten minutes are critical because they allow the federals to get behind the railroad. If the confederates had gone ahead and moved they would have been ahead, shot up the federals. Instead its the other way around. Fedrat advance takes fire, wheels toward the railroad, makes an attack, not one ordered by hef or hill. Its just a response to the tactical situation, and they get shot to pieces. Lee tries to concentrate his army before dark to attack the isolated second corps, it doesnt happen. And the federals manage to get away. And although stuart pursues to bull run and harasses the union army, meade has escaped. And lee knows his campaign has done what it can do. Its late in the year. His troops are not equipped for winter campaign. If he yoit flanks meade again hes going to go back to washington, d. C. And i cant get at him there. And Northern Virginia after two years of war is a wasteland. Theres no forge. I cant feed my army here. I cant rely on the o a. Meade burned the bridge. To lee orders a retreat. And as he retraets he destroys the orange and alexandria railroad. He burns the rails the tiles. Nails the rails, chops down the telephone pole, literally obliterates the railroad all the way back to the rapahannic. He knows without that meade cant follow him. Hell have to rebuild to keep flyi supplying. Which means anything happens at the pace of rebuilding the railroad. For meade, rain that floods will run slows down a pursuit. So does fear that lee is going to outflank him. Meade doesnt begin his pursuit until october 18th, which is the same day lee gets his infantry back into Culpeper County. The federal cavalry eventually pursues, and that leads to the fight at buckland mills on october 19th. When stuart feigns a retreat. While fits lee tries to come in and cut him off. Kufrt saves the day because he had lingered in the rear and the confederates just manages to miss a chance to destroy the third Cavalry Division of the you wereu union army. They do route it back to hey market and gainesville. This becomes known as the buckland races. This is the court of moral counterbalance to the debacle. This humiliation of the yankee cavalry at buckland mills. Kilpatrick has been embarrassed. He has to explain what happened. Justin kill patrick being himself is not going to explain it in a way that makes him look bad or even comes within whiff of the word truthfulness. Kilpatrick and kufrt both tell meade, we got beat there because the rebel cavalry was supported by a line of infantry two miles long, wider than pickets charged. Theyre at warnton. Meade says thank god at last i know where they are and i can go and fight them. He shifts an entire army ore to gainesville, lines it up in a column of corps, goes storming down, and of course theres no one there. Even stuarts cavalry has gotten out of the way. So for the third time at williams port, at mannasis gap, and now at warrenton, meade has landed a mighty punk inch into clouds. The railroad is now destroyed. And he figures, the campaign is over. I cant do anything else. Lincoln agrees with him, except that its obvious to meade this has hurt his reputation. He thinks hes done the right thing, the smart thing. But the papers are lambasting him. And its clear the administration is disappointed again. And meade is a modest fellow. The man has no vanity whatsoever. But he cared deeply about his reputation as a soldier. And to see that reputation trashed by people he believed to be uncomprehending who really didnt understand what was happening, that wounds and that wounds very deeply. So as his men rebuild the railroad, he creeps south, and by the end of october, hes around warnton still basically on this line. The confederates are behind the rapahannic. And at the end of the first week of november, youre right where you were at the end of july. The confederates and the cul pepper v meet up here to the north. But this time lee has decided to defend the culpeper v. Hes learned something about meade. Hes cautious. Hes not daring. And lee, still looking for a chance to land a blow, comes up with a daring strategy. Hes going to stay in the culpeper v. How do you counter act the problem with the Higher Ground above the rapahannic . Hes going to keep a bridge hand there, which is a springboard for a potential offensive. And if meade comes down and sees that bridge head, hes going to realize that lee could attack out of it and potentially sever the o a railroad. If meade wants to push south, hes going to have to shield that position and send the rest of his army across at kellys fjord where high ground dominates. Lee is willing to let them do that. Lee would love for him to do that. Because if he keeps half of his army containing rapahannic station and sends the other half into this culpeper v, i can throw my entire army against that portion of the aop and shove it against the river and destroy it. So this is a very clever trap. And when meade gets to the railroad, he recognizes, very clever trap. And so he tells lincoln, i shouldnt walk into that trap. We should take the army to a kia landing and cross the river at fredericksburg. And im issuing orders. Im going to do it. And hallic quickly says, no, youre not. I thought we had this conversation, mister . And so against his better judgment and with great anxiety, meade walks into lees trap. And so on the morning of november 7th, 1863, he has the third corps and the second corps and part of the first corps storm across at kellys fjord. Theres the advantage they have, they get across the river. Of course that was anticipated. Now whats going to happen add rapahannic station is one of the greatest feats of arms of the army of the patomac, courtesy of david russel who organizes a daring dusk attack on the confederate entrenchments. This is where the third book starts. We dont have time to talk about it here. It is one of those stunning small battles. When the confederates lose that, the louisiana tigers are lost here, almost all of them captured, lees plan of defense in Culpeper County is shattered. And he has to orders a Rapid Retreat back into orange county. And so we get to the middle of november, and were where we were at the middle of september. Meade rebuilds the railroad bridge, brings the railroad into culpeper. But now hes under enormous pressure to take advantage of his recent victory. He knows time is running out. Winter is coming on. Elections have already happened. Doesnt have to worry about that anymore. And so theres an expectation of offensive. And meade, having studied this problem of course two months ago in september, is ready to make a decision. He knows he cant go around lees left, so hes going to go around his right. Hes going to cross the river at jacobs fjord and culpeper mine, hes going to swing around to the west. Hes going to bring his columns in. And hes going to try and destroy yules corps, which is closest to him, before a. P. Hills corps, almost 20 miles away on the far end of lees line, can come over to reinforce. A chance to destroy the rebel army in detail. You have to move fast. Speed here is of the essence. And unfortunately for meade, he tries to launch this offensive on november 24th, but theres a rain. And the roads become muddy. And the rapidan rises. And he has to call the whole thing off. But enough of his troops had gotten close enough to the rapidan that stuarts cavalry has seen them. And lee, who of course can read federal minds apparently, has been anticipating that meade is going to go around my flank. Hes going to cross the river here. Hes not anticipating hell turn west to attack the army of Northern Virginia. He anticipates a march south, an attempt to get between lee and richmond. Lees answer is the same hell have in may, march down the orange turn pooik and plank road, hit the columns hard and for the federals, when they finally get their advance going, things are not going to go well. So, the movement finally is launched on the 26th of november, thanksgiving day. The federals finally begin to move. And the rappa dan is still up. They dont have enough pontoon bridges, so theyve got to pause to build tressels and this sorts of thing, but the real problem comes on the federal right flank, which is the 3rd corps and the 6rd corps. Its going to be the corps closest to the enemy, so theyre on that side of the advance, and leading the advance is Major General william f. French, who has commanded the 3rd corps since the aftermath of the battle of gettysburg, because he brought a division in to reinforce it after gettysburg, and he gets the job by seniority. D d dansickels having given a leg to the cause. Good mexican war record, service in the seminole war, helped to write an artillery manual with general henry hunt, who is in charge of the aops artillery. At the beginning of the war, he was commanding troops at ft. Duncan in eagle pass, texas, and he refused to surrender his garrison upon demand of the secessionists, marched it all the way down the rio grandee, put it on boats and took it to key west. Impressive stuff. And so, he gets a brigade, and with the brigade he does fairly well, and so he gets a division. And hes a mediocre Division Commander and a very unlucky one, because he gets to attack the sunken road at antietam. He gets to attack the stone wall at fredericksburg. He gets to try to hold assailant at chancellorsville. None of this goes well, as you can imagine. And it has an impact on the man. And this is something, i think, that we always forget when were examining civil war history. We tend to look at most of its characters as static what they are at the end of the war, what they are at the beginning of the war. We fail to take into account how what theyre experiencing is affecting them. You know, a lot of generals are drunks. Well, remember that there is no aspirin. Liquor, any ache and pain, its a bottle, right . And ptsd, which is something we recognize now, was a problem in the civil war, too. If you ordered your troops to attack the sunken road to attack the stone wall at fredericksburg, isnt that going to have an effect on you . Its going to affect some men differently than others. And i think its injected caution into frenchs character. Maybe its led him a little bit too heavily to the bottle. Nonetheless, hes the guy thats in charge of the right wing of the union army, and his corps moves late that morning. And when it gets to its crossing point at jacobs ford, which is there. That is a place that you cannot get to. That is on private land. Though i suppose most of you are seeing it for the first time. This is to the north. You come over that ridge. You come down to the river. This is taken last december. Theres the ford itself. This is whats known as a horse ford. So you can wade horses across, but not wagons. And of course, two army corps have a lot of wagons and artillery pieces and stuff with them. And the real problem is that even once you build the tressel to complete your bridge, youve got to get up the opposite break, and federal troops say that that was the worst possible place they had ever seen, the river. And pictures never do elevation any justice, but this gives you some idea. This is almost a sheer cliff down here to the bottom. And of course, its muddy because its been raining. And the more troops and batteries that go over it, the muddier it gets. Youre probably going to have to cross here to the right, where you can theres a little bit more of a slope. But we went up and down that in an atv, and that atv had a hard time getting up that hill. And its so bad that the federal artillery is trying to double and triple its teams to get up, and its barely managing to do it. And so, this is taking a long time. French has fallen behind schedule. And when meade hears that, he is furious. But because french is behind schedule, he not only sends word to french demanding to know, why are you behind schedule, which seems unhelpful at the moment, he orders the other two columns to suspend crossing the me, thi great blunder in the campaign, a campaign in which speed matters more than anything else. The two teams that are crossing furthest from the rebels are told to stop crossing the river until french can get across the river. And there doesnt really seem to be a good reason to do that, except meade was a guy who once he made his plan wanted to execute his plan the way that plan was made. And moreover, he is absolutely convinced that if hes going to fight a battle and suffer the casualties of a big battle, that battle has to pay off, and the only way that battle pays off is if i land one massive blow with the entire army. And the goal is to get across the river, to swing west, to get the army on a line centered on robertsons tavern and then move the whole force against lee and hit him hard. And so, there is a pause, and that pause lasts until night. So, at the end of november 26th, only the 3rd corps is across the river. The 6th corps has barely begun to cross. And although warrens gotten across and the 5th corpss gotten across, not all of the 6th corps has gotten across, so youre already a day behind schedule. And lee knows whats going on and hes shifting yules corps down to block the federal advance well to get into position to attack the federals. Because remember, he Still Believes theyre going to try and go south toward richmond. And hill is coming up from the south, but he is going to be almost a day behind what yule can do. Now, for the federals, the real problem is truly just beginning because theyre in the wilderness. Theyre in the wilderness. And this is virtual impenetrable. There arent any roads to speak of between the plank road and the turnpike. And french is moving along a series of wood trails, and his orders are always bear to the left. Every intersection, bear to the left. And when a guide is sent to french and he sends up to the leader henry prince, henry prince is talking to a southern ebenezer mcgee, who is a spy for george sharp, who is in charge of the federal Intelligence Service with the army of the potomac. Mcgee knows the route that french is supposed to follow, but thats all he knows. He went and he scouted the route. Prince says, well, where does this other road go and this road . And mcgee cant tell him. Its like, look, in my neighborhood, i know how to get to my house. Dont ask me where the other streets are in my neighborhood. I never go there. I cant tell you. So prince says, well, youre no guide at all get out of here. I dont want anything to do with you. So he goes blundering into the wilderness with great uncertainty. Every intersection becomes a quandary. And as a result, hes going to eventually blunder into confederates. And youre going to get a battle in a place where there was never a battle intended. The rest of the federals are going to come in and theyre going to run into rebels around robertsons tavern. Sykes is going to run into gordons cavalry brigade and then the leader of the corps, hess division, and far earlier than meade intended for it to happen, his columns are in action, and that slows everything down the chance to hit the rebel army while it was divided has already been lost. The biggest fight of all of this is going to be the battle of paynes farm, which is fought between the 3rd corps and allegheny johnsons division of ewells corps. And this is an accidental battle. So, this is prince coming down on the wrong road. He should be actually going this way. He is coming down toward the road that links robertsons tavern and raccoon ford, and hes got a little bit of cavalry out in front of him who blunder into johnsons column and open fire on it, and that leads johnson to halt his troops and form a line of battle along that road. And the federals begin to deploy to counter that, and it takes a long time to do this in these dense woods here. Its very difficult to throw forward skirmishes and lines of battle, so this is going to burn up even more daylight. And eventually, the federals who are started deploying in an l shape here are attacked by johnson. Johnson doesnt know whats in front of him, but they say, your line of battle is longer than whatevers in front of you. And for allegheny johnson, thats good enough. Unlike the federals, the rebels are willing to attack at the first opportunity. And so, they attack at a place called paynes farm. And this great, big, open field here, which is whats in this picture, is actually the top of a hill. So, this is lower ground and this is lower ground. This is kind of on the same plane here. And the confederates swing out into that open field to try and break the union line and theyre shot to pieces on the attempt. Then the federals try to cross the field, and the confederates shoot them to pieces, and you get a stalemate here. And they blaze away at each other for the rest of the night. Over here on the left flank, however, maryland stuarts brigade launches an attack that breaks the federal line and drives deep down that road before it runs into wards division and yankee artillery, and theyre stopped and forced to pull back. This battle at paynes farm, its a hardfought engagement. It goes on well into the night. It costs the federals about 940 casualties and the confederates about 545. And although after the battle is over, its the confederates who are going to leave the field, this is the decisive check for the federals. The confederate division has basically stalled two federal corps for most of the day. And when the rebels pull back, meade, who now is getting very nervous about whats happened, has decided to consolidate his army, so he brings the 1st corps up from his left flank, and he orders sedgwick over from his right. He gets his army in line here and then he advances toward the confederates on the morning of the 28th, expecting the rebels to still be in front of robertsons tavern and new hope church. Hes going to hit them. But during the night, lee has pulled back. Lee has pulled back behind mine run, which he considers to be a temporary position. He intends to pull back even further, but it takes him a while to get his troops here. Theyre very tired, so he is going to pause. Meade advances the entire army of the potomac through the wilderness in a very cold rain. A fronts come through. Its pouring. The roads are disappearing. The temperature is plummeting. Its going to be 28 degrees that night. Waters going to freeze in mens canteens. And so, moving the troops, the batteries and all this becomes exceptionally difficult work. And by the time that meade gets his army into position, confronting the rebels, daylights just about gone. But the federals come up fast enough to dissuade lee from further retreat, because he considers that too dangerous, so he puts his men to digging in. And here, for the first time really in the war you saw some of it a few weeks earlier after the retreat following rappahannock station. But for the first time in the war, you get the phenomenon of an entire army entrenching. This is going to become the dominant theme of the war going forward. And when the federals get up on the morning of the 29th, the confederate positions behind mine run look impenetrable, overnight. One soldier said the brush works roses if by magic. Solid line of defense. The terrain, of course, a and ill go down and ill threaten lees flank. Its important to know, ill threaten lees flank. Make him think were about to outflank him, and hell pull out, and we wont have to attack this position. Warrens not suggesting outflanking lee. He, in fact, as he makes this march, makes it ostentatiously lets make noise lets make dust lets let the rebels know were coming. And if we get down there, and maybe theres a chance to launch an attack, then well launch it. So, lee, of course, is very aware of whats going on. Stuarts cavalry does a great job of this campaign giving lee intelligence. Warrens been reinforced with terrys division of the 6th corps. And as he comes down on the rebel flank, although this has taken him an exceptionally long periodt, an opportunity. I mean, lees got troops down there, but he doesnt have a lot of troops down there, and theyre not heavily entrenched. But as warren approaches the road that would allow him to turn into the confederate flank, theres a railroad cut, an old railroad that had never been built. And you can see it there through the woods. There are confederate cavalry skirmishers in front of it. And warren sees that, hes like, oh, my god, entrenchments. Those are rebel entrenchments. They knew i was coming and theyve built a line of entrenchments. And i dont know how many rebels are behind it, but ill bet there are a lot of rebels behind it. Theres a great irony here, right . Because he used a Railroad Embankment to hurt lee. Now a Railroad Embankment at mine run is going to hurt meade, because, well, its not an entrenchment. Theres not any rebels there. But warren takes 2 1 2 hours deploying a division and artillery to attack the Railroad Embankment, and when they go forward, the confederate cavalry of cadets out front scatter away, fire shots, and then warrens men are on top of the embankment, and oh, theres nobody here. Thats awkward. And so, warren goes ahead, turns down the road, gets above mine run, gets to a place, there are rebels, theyre entrenched, but nothing like what there is further north. And so, warren sends back word to meade im beyond the confederate flank for all intents and purposes. Reinforce me, and tomorrow morning, i will land a blow that will perhaps destroy the army of Northern Virginia. Meade had already decided that on the morning of november 30th, he was going to send the entire army forward in a frontal attack. But now hes got a better option. So, meade, kind of daring for meade, he denudes his center, leaves just a couple divisions. He settles the 5th corps and one 6th Corps Division off to his right to strike the confederate right. He gives two of frenchs divisions to warren, who now has six infantry divisions, almost 26,000 men. Warren has twothirds of the army of the potomacs infantry to launch this massive attack at dawn on november 30th of 1863. And an hour after warren hits, sedgwicks going to hit a double envelopment. And if this attack had been launched, it would have been the single largest attack ever made by the army of the potomac, throwing the most troops in across the widest front. Its entire history, grant has never even come close to pulling off Something Like this. Overnight, of course, the confederates have shifted in front of warren. Lee has settled troops south. And once again, the confederates pull off their magic and they dig in like beavers. And the next morning when the federal troops wake up and theyre cold and theyre hungry, meade had left his supply wagons north of the river to speed everything up, carried eight days rations. Most of thats been eaten up. No camp fires because that will give away our position to the rebels. So even though the temperatures are freezing, nobodys got coffee, nobodys got hot food. Everybodys getting hungry. And they wake up and they look across the valley of mine run, and the rebels are there. Theyre there. And youve got almost a half a mile to a quarter of a mile of open ground. Youre going to have to come over a hill, go down a hill, cross the creek, climb the next hill. And the rebel position is such that they can take you under fire every single step of the way. In a lot of places, theres abatees, you know, the felled trees in front here. Even the skirmishers are entrenched. The confederates were so confident, they were sitting on top of their earthworks, daring the federals. Come on, yank come on over and all of the federal troops who sneak forward and get a look at this say this is going to be worse than fredericksburg. In fact, this is the only thing that we can hope for is the first waves will be enough of a moving breastwork that us getting shot down will allow the followup la followup lathes to get close. And now the men begin to write their names on their pieces of paper and pin them to their uniforms so they can be identified. On succeed williedgwicks fronts front, everyones certain this will be a disaster. But a disaster doesnt happen, because warren looking at this, understanding whats at stake, understanding his reputation is at stake, does an incredible thing. He said, i cant do it. I cant waste these men. This is suicide. And so, he sends word back to meade, im not going to attack. And just as the courier heads towards headquarters, the artillery opens fire, the big bombardments begun, the confederates spring into their works. Everyone along the union line is tensed, here it comes, and then nothing. Nothing. And when meade gets warrens message, he cries out loud, my god, hes got twothirds of my army and he races down to warrens front, furious. But when he looks where warren has looked, hes forced to concede. Youre right, we cant do this. And for my money, this is, perhaps, certainly after gettysburg, the greatest contribution that George Gordon meade makes to the union cause. He could have launched that attack. And even though hed have been beaten, he would have gotten credit for being brave enough to launch an attack. His standing in the administration would have undoubtably gone up, and in the press, too. But he would have killed or wounded 10,00015,000 federal troops for no gain, and after another fredericksburgstyle debacle when april and may show up and those threeyear enlistments are running out, the men who have just been through a repeat of fredericksburg at mine run reenlist. And i think the answer is, most of them probably say, to hell with it, no way. And they go home. And that means youve got a very Different Army of the potomac going into 1864 than you actually got going into 1864. So, meade hopes to find some way to redeem this, but try as he might, theres no answer. He shifts his troops back around. Lee, however, is anxious to attack. Here are the yankees. I so badly want to hit him. And his officers say, no, no, no, no. Another fredericksburg. Think about that, general, another fredericksburg. Wouldnt that be nice . Dont do anything. Let the enemy come at us. But after meades army digs in on the other side of mine run throughout december 31st, meade says okay, theyre not going do another fredericksburg, and if theyre not going to do that, ill do another chancellorsville. So he shifts two divisions, anderson and wilcox, down below the federal flank. And although terrys division has refused that, theyre still beyond the federal line and lean looes argument is on the morning of december 22nd with all of the daylight available, hes going to replicate what jackson did at chancellorsville in may. And it doesnt happen because during the night, while lee is shifting into position, meade is going backwards. Theres a very stiff wind. The federals arent hurt. Lees own movements helps to obscure what theyre doing. And when the confederates go forward on the morning of december 2nd, the enemy is gone. So, lee lands a blow on thin air, and the federals managed to get across the rappahannock river, and that is the end of the mine run campaign. The consequences of these six months are monumental. First off, theres a real chance that after mine run, meades going to get fired. And theres a lot of talk about it for a while. And at the end, lincoln says, well, if i fire him, who do i replace him with . Whos better than him . So meade keeps his job, but one of the reasons that meade keeps his job is that lincoln now knows he can hand that problem off to somebody else, and thats the guy whos suddenly being talked about as a replacement for halleck, and its ulysses s. Grant. So, what do these six months mean . First off, they rob gettysburg of all of its strategic fruit whatsoever. Gettysburg becomes one more big battle that inflicted massive casualties, is full of drama, but simply takes you back to the stalemate in virginia that youve had since at least the peninsula campaign. You can say that because of gettysburg, certain things that might have happened didnt happen. Can we not say that of every other big battle, virginia, cant we say that of fredericksburg . Of chancellorsville . Of second manassas . Of gaines mill . So its a negative, not a positive, all right . So, the failure of meades army to land a blow at williamsport, to land a blow at manassas gap, to land a blow at warrenton, to land a blow after rappahannock station to land a blow at mine run, mean that the second half of the year has passed away, and you still have a stalemate in virginia. The confederates at very little cost these six months, 4,000 casualties perseid on the battlefield. The confederates have basically held the line of virginia without a big battle, without the casualties of a big battle. They maintain the stalemate. That stalemate is going to be in the same place when the campaigns of 1864 start. So, for the confederates, this is a huge strategic victory, even if tactically theyre the ones who twice at bristow station and rappahannock station come off on the short end of it. Strategical strategically, this is a success. It also shows us that lee has not changed because of gettysburg. Hes still aggressive. He still wants to fight the same way. He Still Believes in the same strategy. It shows us that george meade is not ulysses s. Grant, but hes also not joe hooker. Hes not john pope, and hes not ambrose burnside, either. Hes clearly up to this point the best general that the union has had, even if hes prudent and hes cautious. Lee said it when he took command he will not make a mistake. And although meade does make a few, he doesnt make a catastrophic mistake whatsoever. Bigger picture. What happens in september and october of 1863 . And november and december set the stage for whats going to happen in 1864. In the tacticaloperational sense, literally because when grant comes in to supervise the operations of the army of the potomac in the spring of 1864, the two armies are exactly where they were when the mine run campaign concluded. Grants got to get over the rappa dan, just like meade had had to get over the rappa dan. And meade tells grant, if we cross, theres only one place to cross, its where i crossed it in november. And when he crossed there, lee will back up to mine run and hope we come get him. And we should go a little further south, get out of the wilderness and then turn up and attack him, and grant says, thats our plan. So, grants plan of campaign at the beginning of the overland operation is to refight mine run, better. Lees plan of campaign is to do exactly in the spring what he did in the winter. If the federals cross the river at those fords, were going straight up those two roads to hit them as hard as we can. And of course, we know thats what gives you the battle of the wilderness. That battle is fought in the consequences of that battle are such as they are because grants there. Why is grant there . Because in september, the confederates, unintentionally, unknowingly, and quite reasonably, made a huge mistake, and that mistake was sending longstreet to georgia. At the time, it made perfect sense, shifting troops east to west is something that a lot of confederate leaders and newspaper editors and generals have been saying we should have done a long time ago. Its what we should have done instead of going into pennsylvania and fighting at gettysburg. So, that decision was bold, it was daring. It bore fruit at chiccamaga, but not the kind the confederates wanted. Before longstreet left to go to georgia, he met with lee. It was a very emotional parting between those two men. And as longstreet got on his horse to go, lee said, you must beat those people out west. And longstreet said, if i live, but i would not give a single man in my command for a fruitless victory. What was chiccamaga . It was a fruitless victory. Perhaps it need not have been if bragg had done things differently afterwards, but he didnt do things differently, so lets take it at face value what actually happened, a siege of chattanooga. And who is sent to rescue the siege of chattanooga . Grant. Who was basically unemployed until that moment. With what intention . One of the things i found in researching this is that halleck writes a letter to rosecrans and meade in september, and he says, the reason the rebels are concentrating against rosecrans is because they know that if meade and rosecrans can hold their ground in virginia and tennessee, while banks and grant clean out the transmississippi, the rebel cause is doomed. It sounds like in hallecks mind, grants new job was in the transmississippi, and if not, an advance on mobile. Nobody is talking about making grant general in chief until after chattanooga. And after that victory there, suddenly, lets make grant general in chief. And so, chattanooga elevates grant to supreme command, puts him looking over meades shoulder and gives you the overlane campaign. It gets rosecrans fired, thomas put in his place, sherman in charge of all of the armies heading toward atlanta. If there is no confederate victory at chickamauga, which there would not have been in longstreet had not gone west, theres no siege for grant to redeem. And that means that in 1864, William Rosecrans takes on the drive toward atlanta against either bragg or joe johnson. And meade is left alone to assume the offensive in virginia. And grant is either in arkansas, louisiana, or hes moving against mobile. And ultimately, what does that mean . We dont know. We cant know, because it doesnt happen, right . And counterfactual history is fun, and the first step you take into it is on solid ground, but everything after that is quicksand, right . But we do know things would have been different, right . So, at the end of the day, counterintuitively and its easy to understand why the south did what they did. I would have probably made the same decision in september. But if you look back now, it probably would have been far better to leave longstreet in the hands of lee and let lee assume an offensive with equal odds against meade in virginia. And where that takes you, nobody knows, but it certainly wouldnt have wound up with ulysses s. Grant and William Sherman running the Union War Effort in 1864. And we do know how that turned out. So, its not a boring six months, and a lot happens and a lot happens thats really important, and it doesnt deserve the dark hole of history that its been shoved into, which is why i was happy to write the books and continue to write the books to shed light on this important passage. So, thank you for your attention. Weeknights this week, were featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan3. Tonight, foreign dignitaries and Holocaust Survivors gather to mark the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the auschwitz bergenau concentration camp. Then, the National Holocaust museum in washington, d. C. , hosts a commemorative ceremony to remember those who perished and to mark interNational Holocaust remembrance day, followed by holocaust scholars discussing the brutality of the nazi regime. American history tv, tonight beginning at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan3. Civil war scholar james morgan discusses the october 1861 battle of balls bluff that occurred near leesburg, virginia. Fought during the first year of the war, he argues that this union loss was largely do to informati misinformation and miscommunication among the officers. This was part of pamplins small battles, big