Nuclear deterrents. Having recently served as a commissioner on the strategic, Posture Commission is incredibly urgent that we look at deterrence in a broader lens. Looking at strategic deterrents of which of course Nuclear Deterrents is a key foundation. The reason we need to look at this more broadly is we are facing new threats. New threats of escalation. New domains that can lead to rapid or inadvertent escalation in competition or conflict with china and russia. New domains such as space, cyber. Adversaries might be able to take more risks and we have Strategic Systems that are vulnerable, for example in space. And that could lead to miscalculation or rapid escalation to Nuclear Weapons use. To deal with these new threats we need to also think about innovation in terms of concepts and technologies. This is why im excited about having our three panelists this morning to discuss those issues and the challenges and opportunities ahead. We will first hear from professor andrew ross who is currently at the bush school as a professor in the department of International Affairs at texas a m university. He was appointed to International Policy studies and holds joint appointment with the Los Alamos National labs where he leads the strategic resilience initiative. Looking at new concepts to make deterrence more resilient. We also have colonel alexander rasmussen. Ras is at the Space Development agency that was established in 2019 to leverage proliferated lowearth orbit architectures to increase resilience of our Space Architectures. This is a fundamental shift, not only in terms of increasing resilience of space satellites, numerous smaller satellites that launch more often. This reflects a new concept or acquisition within the department of defense for rapid acquisition and looking forward to hearing from ras and the importance of how that is enhancing deterrence. We are lucky to have Steve Rodriguez join us today. He gives us a unique perspective from his understanding and deep engagement with the private sector, commercial startups and Venture Capital. Hes a Senior Advisor at the forward defense atlanta Counsel Center for strategy and security. He founded one defense, a novel Strategic Advisory firm that leverages Machine Learning to identify advanced software and accelerate their transition to benefit defense will he was recently the study director for the commission on Defense Innovation adoption which was in the atlanta counsel and cochaired by former secretary of defense mark esper and former air force secretary deborah lee james. A seminole report that came out seminal report that came out two weeks ago on looking at how we can improve leveraging commercial capability and innovation. Three different aspects of urgent priorities to enhance Strategic Deterrence. Let me turned it andy to kick it off. Andrew it works. Good morning everyone. Great to be here. Thanks for the intro. Leonor i will talk about a program that i have been engaged in. The inspiration for this. My manager john scott, theoretical design, is the real lead for dsri. Unprivileged have the opportunity to work on the policy and strategy site at the technical side for this. Leonor thanked the panel for being resilient when responding to changes. The real person who should be thanked and her acknowledgment her resilience acknowledged is nancy berlin. Where is nancy . [applause] scrambling this morning to make it with general cottons prompt to make all this work this morning for everybody. Her first email came through at 5 43. I did not see it at 5 43. I saw before 6 00. It is really nancy who should be acknowledged when it comes to resilience. I will provide a quick everything will be kind of quick, because i think leonor is giving us eight to 10 minutes. Everything is pretty quick here. I will provide a quick overview of what dsri is all about. What we have been doing on the policy and strategy side. Give you a flavor of the kinds of workshops we have put together. Leonor also should be credited here. She has been part of dsri as well, participating in all but one workshop. We got here again in march. Our next workshop. She could give this talk probably. An overview of dsri. I will talk about what resilience means. Resilience has been used virtually every day here. Cannot virtually. It has been used everyday here by virtually every speaker. Marv adams even included in the nsa mission. Provide a resilient and responsive Nuclear Security enterprise. That hooks up with some of the things we have been working on. We use the term a lot in document. Its in the National Security strategy and National Defense strategy and National Military strategy. The Previous Administration used it occasionally as well. Until recently, nobody tried to tell us what it means. We have tried to define it and identify dimensions. I will lay that out for you quickly. Then i will turn to other work i have done prior to my time at the lab on how to think about innovation. That is at the heart of what our panel is about. Talk about what we have done in the Nuclear Business on that front. Where we are now, especially with the program of record. Ok. Ill go back to that one. On the policy strategy side the emphasis has been on identifying the potential geopolitical and technological shocks and trends that might undermine the u. S. Deterrent. This is the resilience part of it. Push beyond cold war thinking on deterrence. We have gotten that same kind of push from stratcom. Former commander rework deterrence theoretically. I think he went a little too far. We need to figure out how to apply it in a new situation. We are engaging in a wide community. Practitioners obviously but think tanks, academics, technical experts at the lab and elsewhere. Tried to bridge the gap between policy and technical communities. We are disseminating findings through briefings this. There we go. Our work has been focused around the series of workshops. We have done four so far. I wont go through every one of these. Focusing on the role of Nuclear Weapons in the u. S. Strategy, on strategic stability, escalation management. Two on escalation management. Focus on capabilities and metrics. The next one coming up is on the future of armscontrol. Arms control. Why resilience . We alluded to this earlier. When you get the slide you will get my full deck. This is not even a quarter of it. Why resilience . This is the highlights of what we have been dealing with, the changes and some geopolitical shocks we have been dealing with since the end of the cold war. This is not going to end. The most recent one, which is a new addition to this list, what we are seeing in the middle east today is a result of response to october 7, what israel had to deal with from hamas. The response. Then escalation. Vertical and horizontal, arguably. That had direct implications for the united states. What is resilience . I am older than some of the folks around here. When i first heard about dsri, resilience, i thought back to that. Takes a lickinand keeps on ticking and keeps on tickin. The ability to withstand a fight and cover quickly recover quickly from disruption. You think about resilience as the ability to absorb unpredictable threats and shocks. We like to predict things. We are not very good at it. Nobody predicted october 7. Nobody predicted 9 11. Nobody predicted the end of the cold war. All these kinds of geopolitical shocks are unexpected. We need to build resilience to withstand these kinds of challenges. Leonor and her kickoff emphasized we need to think about Strategic Deterrence across the board. Multidomain. Dsri is nuclear focused but not solely focused on nuclear, just like our panel isnt. We need to think about conventional Strategic Deterrence. Space and cyber at the least. In addition to identifying what resilience is we have identify dimensions of resilience. The list keeps growing. Its about two pages on the slide. I will not walk through every one of these but you can see the kind of things we are thinking about. We keep adding to the dimensions. Some of these are obvious. National, political, strategic. Strategic stability. Attempting to identify or describe what these things actually mean theres the second one. Escalation management is something quite a bit of time on we spend quite a bit of time on. It is not the same thing. Our next worship will be on armscontrol workshop will get armscontrol. We had an hour on armscontrol. We will be doing two days worth of thinking about arms control and bringing people together. Initially i would not have included alliance resilience as a result of our workshop on strategic stability. That made it to the list. Organizational, operational, tactical. The emphasis on production and pit resilience up here, too. Ok. Just a few words about the topics we have covered thus far. We kicked this off asking what role for the beer weapons in u. S. Strategy . By strategy, National Security strategy, defense strategy. All the levels of strategy. You can take it down into doctrine and operations as well. What we have emphasized his different schools of thought o is different schools of thought on the role of Nuclear Weapons and strategy. Different schools of thought for strategic stability. And for escalation management. We have always developed concept papers. I wrote the first one. My colleague at texas a m Jason Castillo to the next two on strategic stability and escalation management. I will be doing a fourth one on armscontrol. We have always emphasized tradeoffs for strategic stability. Tradeoffs among first strike arms ability and all that stability. For escalation management. We have emphasized this is a tough problem. Its not at all clear we have our arms wrapped around how to do escalation management. You have the obstacles listed here. Schools of thought, traditional schools of thought, punishment, denial, damage limitation. Give us different answers. There are tensions among those answers. Part of what we are trying to do a sort that out. Identify capabilities and metrics to identify what capabilities might be most helpful. The problem is, a lot of denial on damage limitation tells us to try to do involving involve running experiments. Most of us dont want to run them. One of the challenges in this business, the Nuclear Business is that we have no empirical data. Weve never had a nuclear war. I for one dont want a lot of empirical data. I dont think i want any empirical data, but that increases the challenge because you are reduced you have to rely on theoretical arguments about what needs to be done. How to think about strategic stability and escalation management. Different approaches to accomplishing escalation management. I know im talking too long. How to think about innovation. This is very simple. We are usually preoccupied with the technology. That is what we always talk about. Ai these days. Hypersonics. What is the next big thing is almost always the question when it comes to innovation. No less important are doctrine and organization. The next slide, much more complicated but differ in categories of innovation. Sustaining innovation. That is sort of routine. We go through that virtually every day. That is most of what we see in the defense business, sustaining. We call it modernization in the Nuclear Business as well. That is where the program of record fits. There is discontinuous innovation. People are talking about when they talk about the next big thing. Architectural innovation. That is organizational and doctrinal. That last box in the bottom righthand corner is what most folks want. Revolutions in military affairs. The old transformation business under rumsfeld. Information Technology Revolution in military affairs. We got big chunks of it and we are still talking about doing transformation. That is rare. Incredibly rare. You look back over history. There are a dozen or so rmas you can identify. The Nuclear Revolution is one of them. That was relatively quick. It was built on decades of work. But in three years, we developed a bomb. Discontinuous technological breakthroughs. Fusion, fission diffusion, delivery systems, icbms, longrange bombers. All of that continued the Nuclear Revolution. There are architectural breakthroughs. The Atomic Energy commission. Doe. Nsa. The doctrinal level. Massive retaliation. More recently, integrated deterrence. For the lab, sciencebased stockpile stewardship is innovation. Most of the program of record is sustaining innovation. Is that enough given what some of our adversaries are up to . We have made the case for capability strategic resilience. I will not walk through all this but recognizing that we have incredible capabilities we have drawn on in the past and we need to harness that for the future. And the Nuclear Business specifically and defense business more generally. Natural innovation system. The previous pal we talked about emdi and the partners in that enterprise. One of the partners left out was universities. It certainly wasnt highlighted. We need to be thinking about our allies and partners in business as well. The bottom line for me, for capabilitiesbased strategic resilience, a complex Nuclear Enterprise with the ability to take on challenges on the order of the Manhattan Project. This is not up there but the timeline of the Manhattan Project. That is tough for us right now. His incredibly tough. That is demanding. It is incredibly tough. That is demeaning. Im done. [laughter] she has been trying to pull me. [applause] leonor thank you. Col. Rasmussen great to be here with this esteemed group for the summit. I want to thank nancy has we had a 6 00 a. M. Call about how to navigate the schedule for me being at Space Operations command this morning and not breaking traffic laws coming down 66 to get here in time. Excited to be here from the Space Development agency. I want to highlight our model on the lower left of that. Except for the Space Development agency focuses on schedule. Delivering on schedule is the most important thing we can do for our war fighters and for our nation. We are the constructive disruptor and how we are going about tech development, acquisition, and livery. Delivery. We will talk about that. Here we go. Our focus that brought the Space Development agency into existence and the focus of the proliferated war fighter Space Architecture was to close the sensor to shooter kill chain. To identify the threats worldwide, track them worldwide, and get that information anywhere in the world to terrestrial commanders for them to take actions against the enemy or against threats. That is our focus. Identifying threats, advanced threats, hypersonic advanced threats, advanced missiles. Getting that information anywhere in the world for commanders to respond. We are launching a proliferated consolation in lowearth orbit that does bring a lot of resiliency. We are not just about satellites. We are a global weapons system to deliver capability to war fighters everywhere in multiple domains. A couple of things i will highlight as we have the transport layer. That will be 400 plus satellites in space. It has the mesh network, edge processing to bring data to war fighters anywhere on the ground whether it is maritime, army, aircraft. Low latency anywhere in the world taking advantage of what we see in the commercial sector. We have the missile morning and missile tracking layer. That is what i am the chief of. That is to see targets anywhere in the world and get that target data to anyone at any time to take action on contact. We will talk about that. We have the navigation layer providing can we stop the arms race . [inaudible] col. Rasmussen sorry. We have a little disruption here. [indiscernible] col. Rasmussen moving on. We have the navigation layer that is supporting war fighters worldwide for alternative navigation signals. Thank you. [indiscernible] col. Rasmussen the other thing is we have a Battle Management layer that takes advantage of that edge processing. We have applications in orbit that upload applications and distribute data and other things. Next slide. Thats me. You probably hear about this on the news. We absolutely embrace it. We look to launch new capabilities every two years. New capabilities every two years. Requirements with the war fighter counsel, with the services. Very frank, candid discussions about where is the threat and where they are going with the mission and the state of technology. We look at what we can do the next satellites. If we get it in, we do. If we cant, we only have to wait two more years. Its not an eightyear decision. We can take advantage of new tech coming online or respond to threats and provide what is needed for combat commanders worldwide. I will also highlight on this, with this consistent demand with industry and competition we can drive down costs. You will see t0, the transport satellites. Tranche two averaging about 13 billion for the outlaw variant 13 million for the outlaw variants. That is enabling us to drive down costs as well. Our Business Model is the development that i just went about. Its opportunistic and responsive. We have a competitive marketplace. Every tranche