Chart on the right hand side that demonstrates that. Of the 175 alerts, seven of them were not from any station, they were actually part of the unit. Just a reminder that the iist actually follows the officers so if he was at a station at the time of the alert transfers to one of the other units. The alert will follow that officer so that unit will be showing as having an alert. So when we see something, that officer may have been at a district station at that time when he obtained the alert. So we have seven total for outside of the station. And we have included all the indicators from 2016 to this quarter so we can see in 2016 we had a total of 46,011. The first and Second Quarter is 1106 compared to this year we have 760 indicators for the First Quarter and 683 for the Second Quarter. And when we are looking at the percentages and the numbers, we can see that we are on a downhill spiral, on a downhill grade as far as indicators and larrys for the department alerts for the Department Since we started keeping track. And these are the indicators per member. So what we can see from 2016, 2295 members, 682 had at least one indicator compared to this year we had 2287 as far as officers and 464 members with one indicator. The chart on the bottom, you can see from 2016 to 2019, its been going down as far as the number of indicators for our department. As far as the ten indicators i spoke of earlier these are the indicators broken down by numbers. So mission station total of 96 indicators for this reporting period. We have 76 useses of force nine dpa complaints, one internal affairs three on duty collisions. Every district station is broken down with that being the fewest of the use of force with 11. Park has four dpa complaints, five internal Affairs Investigations one eo complaint a total of 599 indicators for the district stations. This is a breakdown of all the units. And again the indicators will follow the officers, not necessarily by that unit. We have a total of 84. And we can see all the different breakdowns of all the different units. Having seven uses of force but the airport having nine. So nine was the highest number of uses of force outside of the stations for this reporting report reporting period. On the last presentation, it was requested to have some type of personnel numbers corresponding calls for Service Numbers for the alerts and indicators and thats this page here. So we see the station with 42 alerts, 96 indicator they responded to 23,072 calls for service in this reporting period. They are not the highest number of calls for service. And we also dont have the highest number of officers. But they do have the highest number of alerts and indicators. So what we started to look at in the report was we went through the 69 reports and started looking at the number of stops number of detentions, number of Violent Crimes. And what we are finding out in mission stay station is the leader in most of those categories. It has the highest number of Violent Crimes out of all district stations. They also have the highest number of arrests at 911 for this reporting period. For the total stops in the whole district they have 3838 which is the second highest out of all district stations. When we look at the report mission station has the highest number of Violent Crimes. They are just as high as far as homicide and shootings firearm seizures, they are not too far up there but they do have some significant amount of firearm seizures. They do lead in arrests for this reporting period. And they do lead in the uses of force for this period. So next step we took regarding trying to find out why numbers are so high, especially for mission station is we started breaking down the number of alerts per incident. And what we are finding that mission station seems to have a higher number of officers engaged in a single event. So one event being a high risk stop, we had 24 officers in one event. And that turned out to be 24 uses of force because there were three suspects in the car and eight officers out there on the scene. Other stations do have that as well but we are going through the date and we are going to review the reports more closely, trying to determine whether or not this particular station, if theres an issue or if theres Something Else going on. The last panel meeting, we had the Training Division with us. So with the Training Division, what we did is we took the date for all district stations and broke that information down to see how many officers at each individual station took the critical mindset critical reach course. And i have from sergeant that we are going to go ahead and start expanding that program and start inviting other stations especially those with use of force into that course. We are going to address if thats a training issue whether it calls for service or anything in between. So we are going to start looking into those options as well. On the next page it says the critical mindset coordinated response training. I heard its a great program. It is. A lot of positive responses from it. Yes, we have. Its a great class. Its a really good twoday course. Every officer has to take it as far as their continuing professional training, which is one day out of the four days. But they do offer a twoday class. So the sergeant and captain are going to work on expanding that course to bring more station personnel into that class. We are rolling that into our training and just for the rest of the commission, better coordination at the scene better command and control which we hope will equate to less use of force. Weve had some where a lot of guns have been pointed so the better the coordination, we want to see a better outcome in terms of less use of force with pointing of the firearms. I dont know if any commissioners would be interested but it might be helpful if anybody is interested to be able to sit in one or two days of that course. Absolutely. I will definitely discuss that with the sergeant and see if we can facilitate that. Thanks. Go ahead. We have a use of force. And this is a combined for the first and Second Quarter of 2016. We have 73 the 3 incidents with 1346 members, 935 subjects. For 1878 on the applications for use of force. Compare that to what we have for the first and Second Quarter of 2019, we have 518 incidents, 844 members, 600 subjects and 1058 applications. So on the right hand side, you can see the graph. Every single year, we are going down. We are going down on a number of alerts, number of indicators and hopefully we can continue on with this information. And here are the applications of force for the Second Quarter of 2019. Between the first and second, we did have that 29 percent increase. So 211 we had a total of 485 uses of force with firearm. You can see the remainder of the categories, we were pretty consistent with previous reporting period or we actually went down. So the question gets asked what those are, thats deployment of the flash from the tactical unit. It didnt fit into any category to its under other. Our favorite, university of chicago they provided a final report. In the last update, we asked the university of chicago to fix errors and gapes not accounting of internal affairs, officer involved shootings and officer involved discharge cases that were opened and closed at the time of the study. They fixed the errors in the dates but refused to fix. We dont have the back page in our materials. You should be able to fix the screen so we can see the whole page on the monitor. If you zoom it. There we go. Okay. So they fixed the dates. We didnt get the other information fixed. So almost half of our cases were still open. So the information thats not really correct at this time. That includes what i have. Thank you. Could you go back to page 3, which is the flowchart . Yes, sir. This may have been answered at another meeting. But in the center of that page is that box that is the subjective box to me. And it says review by supervisors. And you said that we tried to feel if theres a risk of behavior, at Risk Behavior if theres a pattern taking place. Is that just subjective . Is there some protocol you follow . How do folks make that determination . So the sergeant will be the first line for that officer who receives the alert. The sergeant is more than likely the sergeant which means they do their performance evaluations every six months and that pit sergeant will be with the officer most of that reporting period. So they have a better understanding of how that officer is. Normally their schedules coincide with one another so they work pretty much every day. Now when i review the alert prescribe to getting it out to the chief sergeant, i have the flexibility of looking at it, not knowing that officer. Most of the officers i dont know unfortunately these days. What i get to do is read those officers reports i get to review the body cam i get to see what was the reason for the alert. And then i can see if i see a pattern outside of that immediate street sergeant. How do you decide if you see a pattern . Im trying to really bore into that to understand how you do it. Its on a case by case basis for me. So what i will do is look to the reason of the alert. One officer had five uses of force within a threemonth period. I went out and started investigating as to why that officer has five uses of force. Come to find out, that officer helped every officer that was in a fight and he had to report it. So did i see a pattern of at Risk Behavior . No, i saw a pretty wellgauged officer that was trying to protect wellengaged officer. So in that case i ended up not sending out that alert because i did all the work to review it. Im trying to take on as much work i can to leave the street sergeants to do what they need to do. So i will make that determination and close it out if i feel thats okay. Can you give me an example of where you did feel there was a pattern of at Risk Behavior . There was an initiation we just initiated today. There was a pattern over 18 months of not attending mandatory assignments. And so i reached out to the sergeant directly. I sent it out to that street sergeant, which he concluded he agreed with me that there was Something Else going on. So thats why we initiated the intervention today. Okay. Thank you. Vice president taylor. As you can imagine im going to focus on the 30 percent increase on page 4. Yes maam. I want to as much as you can unpack. Its great the other numbers for the most part went down. But 30 percent is a huge increase from one quarter to the next. And i want to understand, to the extent that you know, if you can unpack why we have such an increase in the pointing of firearms in such a short period of time. I mean what go ahead. No, so thats one of the reasons that we are running the reports are applications with incidents. So what we found out is that we have let me see if i can locate my notes. So for mission station what we looked at is we saw six incidents that showed up on our radar and out of those 6 we had 46 officers with the use of force and out of those 6 incidents we found out it was a high risk felony stop on multiple cases and with having multiple officers and possibly multiple suspects the officers have to report that use of force in each individual person that had their gun pointed at each individual person in the vehicle. So what im starting to find out is that someone these incidents where its high risk felony stop where theres numerous officers and something as far as pointing firearm it may not be the number of incidents that go up, it just may be the number of officers for that incident. And when officers report it correctly that number, in this particular situation with mission station, it was 24 uses of force for that one incident. So just so i understand, was the number you mentioned 46 officers before . Yes, that was for mission station total. Did all of those officers point their firearms. It was six different incidents but yes. So every time the officers go out and because i mean, i take your point you might have a large number of officers in the same incident. But if thats 23 officers in one incident all pointing their firearms at i dont know how many people, one person potentially thats. Three incidents . Yes. This is where the training comes into place for critical mindset. So when we get into that type of training we have a sergeant that comes to the scene. And that sergeant will normally take that person out. If you have eight officers not all eight people have to have their handguns out. So the sergeant will go in the scene t control and remind the officers you can step back. We will have relief if we need to for those incidents. But thats where letting the sergeant in there having the sergeant respond to the scene, we are hoping to see if this is going to be one of the indicators that will bring the number down for use of force. Thats what i was getting at. Not every situation a sergeant will arrive at the scene and what we are stressing is somebody has to take the lead whether or not you have that or not, somebody had to coordinate it. So thats the essence of the course is when theres coordination and control of the scene, we hope we will not have as many officers pointing guns because its coordinated better. Thank you. You know, you mentioned that a lot of this is likely stemming from mission station. And do you know what percentage roughly of this 30 percent increase is because of that particular station or . I do not. I dont have that information for this reporting period. Okay. Elias. Thank you for your report. I have a lot of questions actually. Because to me the cis system seems extremely subjective. And i look back at my notes and i know that the First Quarter the last time you presented was on june 5, 2019 and we asked for some data with respect to this presentation and i didnt see the data that i requested so im hoping you can point it out to me. If you can turn to page 3 for for me. Because i think commissioner hirsch had an excellent point with respect to the subjectivity of this sort of flowchart but the subjectivity starts at the very beginning which is the review by you because the review by you, the first sort of rectangular red box underneath threshold activation is you. So you review it to see if theres a valid alert and then it goes to the station supervisor and they review it to see whether or not theres a pattern and they determine if its valid and then it goes back to you if the supervisor finds that it is valid, then it goes back to you again to review. So i know ive asked last time for you to provide me the numbers for how we get down to the bottom where it says intervention. Because right now, we only have five interventions going on. But i want to know how many cases came to you from the blue box to the to your box. Yes. So out of the 175, 90 cases were sent to the sergeants, 85 of them i ended up closing out in the office. So let me get this straight. There were 175 then they come to you and after your first round of reviews then how many go on to the supervisors . 90. Okay. So you essentially give or take, and math is not my strong suit, but 80 youve already disregarded. 85. Then from 90, from the supervisor back to you again is how many . They all come back to me, all 90 come back to me. Well, okay, so all 90. And then from the 90 that came to you, only 5 warranted intervention . No 5 is what we had previously. We had no initial interventions from this reporting period. So all 90 that came back to you you discarded and put into the closed box. I didnt discard it but i reviewed it again and if i saw any at Risk Behavior then we should initiate the intervention. But i didnt see anything in this reporting period. Out of all 90, all of them you closed out right . Yes. So theres no cases that warrant intervention this quarter, is that what you are saying . Yes. Okay. And you are the only person that reviews sort of this stuff right . Thats correct. Okay. So my other question is why arent interventions automatic . Why are we sort of doing this trickling process all the way down to the intervention so all those steps that you had on the flowchart . So the reason being is if we sent out an intervention for every alert that came out, some of them are invalid in the sense of some of them have cases that have gone into that so what might happen is you might have a use of force you might have a dpa complaint and you might have a lawsuit, all three items being related to the same event. And so all three of those will be counted at one. Now the program cant make that distinction so thats why im going to review it. But as far as the cases for any type of use of force, the example i gave of the officer who had five uses of force it wasnt an officer initiating any of those uses of force, it was an officer backing up other officers. So am i correct in understanding you when you say that example you gave were three incidents one was the citizen complaint, one was the use of force and then i forget what the other one was because those were three separate incidents in terms of the factors, you would not consider that sort of interventionworthy right . Because theres no pattern because it doesnt fit one of the specific boxes . I would consider that one incident. Im looking for a pattern of performance. So if im seeing any type of pattern that is consistent within that reporting period im looking for everything altogether. Now if. Dont you think its problematic if an officer has three different indicators that even though they arent the same sort of incident or group of indicator meaning its not all citizen complaints, not all use of force but there are three different violations in one of these various categories you have determined to be a risk factor, why doesnt that warrant some concern versus a pattern where we have to say, we have to have five different or five citizen complaints, they have to have five officer sort of uses of force . Its not absolute as far as it has to have five of any particular category. What im saying is for all three of those incidents because they are all linked, i would consider that one incident, because when you take the dpa complaint, when you take a lawsuit and take the use of force and all that is combined into one thats going to be one event. If we are seeing repeats of that event in other circumstances, im going to go ahead and my interest is going to be piqued into that officer. With me going out and reviewing it and say i dont initiate an intervention at this moment doesnt mean im closing it out and not paying attention. Next quarter im going to go back and review. And thats what goes on. I rev