It will comes under pain. The report we are putting out today is probably the most complex to date. It represents a new foray for our modeling and simulation effort. I once acknowledge the considerable effort put into the report by the author, who will be here momentarily. Researching, modeling and analyzing this problem, there were about a million in relation runs that we did to make this happen. Next, i want to acknowledge and thank those who made it possible on the sponsorship side. I want to thank those who came out in person. They generously provided some contributions for the Software Side that made it possible to depict visually. I would say very colorfully, it has been a more abstract topic. All of the subject matter experts, most of whom we listen to over the course. I will say a few words at the beginning and then turn it over to summarize. John hale testified about 10 days ago that in this era, active Missile Defenses have become an element. They are no longer niche weapons. Looking across the full vessel spectrum to hypersonic things. But you cannot defend against what you cannot see. Many of the threats depicted here include high speeds and trajectories, and other features distress designs. Thus the need for new architecture. Last year, we put out a report cyprus hypersonic defense, which nod e characteristics of Hypersonic Missiles may come to define the future of missile warfare. It is often a key driver for transforming a system into the Missile Defense system. The single most important element of that future. Todays report, getting on track , builds on that past work. One thing that we realized early on was that there is not a perfect architecture design. It is an exercise in tradeoffs. It is as much art as science. Policy decisions informed design. Unpacking those tradeoffs, making them explicit is the purpose of this report, to hopefully improve the public discussion related. It certainly contains a list of alternatives. Our teams compiled this information about what you see is how the past emphasis on Missile Warning has begun to give way to more missile tracking. That depicted in orange, relative to blue. We are at a shift point. But not all is of quality support. The same funding when converted reveals similar trends, not surprising, a shift to leo. This report comes in, at a point in the conversation. It would be nice to have all discussions, a mix would be nice and now it is a question of how you go aindi the right mix. Over the course the panel today, we will hack we will be hearing reference to various institutions to tackle this problem. It is one thing to track generally and another to do somethinabout it, to be able to do something out it. They are also relative measures contingent on other elements in the Missile Defense chain. We have paid attention to this with recent defense bills and the launch and test before it goes to sta. A final word about our approach is the emphasis on those applicable to regional coverage. They are sometimes used differently, but when we talk about regional, we are talking about the latitudes most irrelevant. That is what you see here on the right. So, many of the necessary policy programs and institutions are in place or coming online. What remains is a conversation about oversight to make the future architecture architecture resilient. It must first be timely and deploy with sufficient coverage. That is where i am going to pause and invite him. To lock us and invite her up here to discuss. Over to you. [applause] thank you so much, tom. This report would not be possible without time, so i want to thank him for his time. I would not be happy here without him. Im glad to be a key part of making this happen. It was a great view. We are at an Inflection Point and it starts with sensors. This report will show you why that is the case. The goal there are many things coming online and want policymakers to understand what meases are for success. You design every other quirement for Missile Defense around them. It is simportant to get this piece right. Is report does to be of things, demystifying the tradeoffs involved in the acquisition programs. These tradeoffs directly impinge on schedule and architecture. They are the first link in the chain and you have to design everything around them. They impinge on every other piece. After reviewing these pieces, we want to go into pathways and pitfalls. We will not prescribe what to do, but instead, given the policy and technical trends will want to identify what to look out for. The first piece of this is unpacking the tradeoff. This is the reason why we take we pick such a knowledgeable panel. It is the first time we have used key modeling and simulation tools. On the left, you see some of the simulation and an analysis of the perfect and optimized designs that we used. There are other things. We are trying to unpack a complex network of tradeoffs, so we do coverage analysis and signature analysis. That is probably where i will start. The whole story starts with sensors. They drive every other piece of the puzzle. There are to be of the things that i want to tell you. I think the first thing that i want to say is that the same things that make Hypersonic Weapons so unique and difficult to counter are the same things that introduce new vulnerabilities into theystem. We will be talking mostly about infrared, but i want to say that there were other signatures to look f. The surface of the vehicle reacts with the highpressure air and generates unique gas products that could be detectable in other wavelengths. I just want to say that is important. I want to tell you how the tradeoffs affect the final architecture. We are primarily talking about infrared and i want to show you some of the complexities with this problem. They change in brightness over time, but i do not think a think tank has ever shown you what it could look like as a background signature changes and as the satellite moves over its trajectory. This problem is so challenging because Hypersonic Weapons are targets. Smaller than the pixels used. They get diluted with all their surroundings. It is like finding a cup of tea that you dropped into a swimming pool. It is a simple dictation. In reality, the fieldofview will be much larger. Because the target signatures you need to extract them from their backgrounds. This is something that we did with our analysis. On the right, you see the signature that comes out of our environment. We texture it th various temperatures. We do not model plumes and we do not model leaks. That is the signature that we see based on opensource information. The middle slide shows the optical flow of each pixel over 20 frames that we captured. It was an algorithm that we used to extract the motion vector. They are then illustrated in the center. These are things you cannot see. The reason why we talk about this tradeoff is because we are i think the panelists will get into this more. You want to get a coverage of a larger area. You might need a resolution that you can fix with a better supply chain, but we will get into that later. Those differences matter. Here you see different architectures. Completely different fields of regard. One sensor has 120 degree and the other has just 10 degrees less. The one on the left is satellite and the other one that is a real difference. These tradeoffs are linked to schedule tradeoffs. They are linked with a bigger story about how we think about these architectures. In this report, we talk about the many decision points that exist. I want to focus on one thing. I want to talk about what it takes to get persistent coverage. The late 20 20s will be a decisive and dangerous period. How do we make sure that we are covering consistently . If there is one take away, it is this one. You can propose two designs that generate the same amount of coverage at the end, but those designs can have dramatically different capability on the way to getting there. Since we care so much about regional coverage, how do we think about that . It is Good Practice to have many constellations of highly inclined orbits, if you want to sufficiently cover the globe. If you look at this, you will achieve Global Coverage, but it is not persistent. You are covering one portion. We want to get to this kind of persistent coverage. It delivers global and persistent coverage, but it is made with the same orbital plane that you saw earlier. That is the same as seven out of nine deployed. You are not getting consistent coverage when youre already 80 there. The problem is that it does not achieve persistent coverage until you reach the very end. How do we get to that line . One approach might be to split coverage up into several steps. You could deploy earlier and get back coverage that you want, and it looks like this, before you step it up to a combination to get that coverage that we care about later. This is the direction that they are moving towards. It includes lower inclination payloads. We think that is a welcome development. For reference, here is what that coverage looks like. The idea is that you can step things up. But it raises a related issue. We do not get coverage of these regions that we care about so much most densely. We do not get dense coverage near the equator but near the poles. We do some analysis to show. But how can we get more coverage near the equator and regions that we care about for other things . One method might be if you look at this, you notice that the biggest poles are in the middle of the map. And so, an alternative approach might be to leverage the unique defense and drawbacks. A lot of arguments have been advanced for why mixed orbits are useful and resilient, but we have not seen an argument that they are also useful for coverage and filling in gaps. We noticed that here with just eight additional satellites, you can compensate for a lot. A final point. We can also add under ladies. A key point is that we could use Airborne Sensors to provide point coverage of the regions that wca about. This technology is mature and you can really expand coverage of these targets. There are obviously a lot of tradeoffs to consider. It is something worth investigating and something to be explored in the report. The report notes that there are policy temptations. There is a rocky road and some things that we need to avoid. We need to build a resilient architecture. We need to emphasize staying on track and building an architecture. It is only recently that we paid attention. They offer great modalities. It might be possible soon to put satellites up more cheaply than adversaries can shoot them down, but we want to have a complex capable of challenging the ability to synchronize. Synchronize attacks. We cannot put all of our eggs in one basket. In the past year, the amount of Collision Avoidance maneuvers that needed to happen were in order of magnitude greater than the last few years combined. It could pose an area threat. Another area threat that we talked about in the report are nuclear pumping threats. This has not been discussed since the cold war in enough detail. Nuclear tests, even performed over an old territory could pump the constellation with radiation. It does not go straight out. It is kept in those bands by a magnetic field. We cannot put all of our eggs in one basket. The other we have to watch for is the temptation to over optimize for coverage efficiency. In other words to prevent from going to that yellow line that we were talking about. They are built around it for a reason. They are intent on spiraling. But we welcome the addition of more lower inclined layers to build that little part of the capability. We think that should, moving forward with the architecture. Equally crucially, we need to make sure that the systems will in place before they reach orbit. Finally, i want to close by talking about fire control. Were at a key junction. By fire control, we mean the capability to detect and track missiles with enough ability to deliver that capability. These challenges are linked. Better sensors mean cheaper interceptors. Sensors determine every other part of the kill chain, which is why it is so important to get this right. It is on the cusp of launching to be prototyped satellites. They are slated to launch early next year. They will incorporate six sensors, pictured inink. But how do we scale this . How do we move the schedule and make sure that those requirements make it into the final architecture and make it . I want to thank everyone. I want to take a step back. This mission is really important. Peoples lives have been saved by missile detection and missile tracking. The time to modernize this and add tracking capability is long overdue. The future missile threat is going to look like the Hypersonic Missile threat. It will be lower and faster, more maneuverable. It is why im so excited to release this report. Im grateful to everyone and i hope that you read it. Im happy to introduce the leader of our aerospace program. Thank you so much. [applause] good afternoon and thank you. Congratulations on this excellent comprehensive report. I was the person in the back room doing analysis, but i know that was not the case here. This report does a superb job of analyzing and visualizing the key issues and tradeoffs described. I would like to emphasize a key finding, the future of Missile Defense will be contingent on the development of the characteristics and timeline. The report highlights that there are no silver bullets. It talks about the need for Global Coverage and providing capabilities. I appreciated your discussion on ground fusion and data integration. You mentioned it is underappreciated but it is essential to making it work. They do not do well unless they are integrated. One of the great things about the program here is that we have a lot of projects where we have common interest and a superb bench of scholars who are willing to collaborate. Im glad that we could contribute to the research. Im glad to be here and part of the relief and to introduce this next segment. I would ask the panelist to join me on stage while i introduce them. First i would like to welcome john hill, the secretary of defense secretary of defense. He has deep Institutional Knowledge and has been a leading counselor for 70 who have picked who have passed through the office over the years. He served as the principal director for state policy in 2013 to 2021. He was a representative in negotiations with afghanistan and the agreement that enabled a presence of u. S. And nato forces. He is deeply respected internationally. He has played a key role in shaping our relationships with japan and as a director for northeast asia. We are especially fortunate to tap into his extensive knowledge. Next we have the colonel, chief of the tracking layer. He is in a key position, ensuring the development of a satellite constellation that will enable us to track hypersonic and advanced missiles. The architecture at the agency is breaking the mold. An extensive background and nearly every Ground Combat system relies on gps. His job plays Key Management roles. He has served as the first product manager as part of Army Futures Command and the executive office. Over his career, he has served in a variety of deployments, including deployments to kuwait. Next we have rich ritter command and control. Mitch has been involved in 70 aspects of Missile Defense since he arrived. He currently serves as the Program Executive for command and control. It is actually the work that rich has been doing for years in the missiledefense domain that brings it to life for me. The acquisition and ensuring the connectivity of missiledefense systems. Testing detection data to tracking radars and targeting information across Different Military services and different companies. And also excited to have ryan with us today. He is a professional staff member for the strategic forces. Having been in his position, i know a tremendous amount of work that he does. He serves as a key expert for leadership. Congratulations for getting the act to pass last week. He also served on the National Security council. He is also an Intelligence Officer and has extensive congressional knowledge on the intelligence committee. Lastly. Thank you. I would like to turn the floor over. Thank you to all of the panelists. We are glad you can join us. I have a lot of questions for you and we will have a great conversation, but we also want to emphasize that you can i can present them to the panel. To start off with policy perspectives, this was an important feature in the review that came out last november. Talk to us about how we got here on the policy side and maybe some of the key policy challenges that have yet to be tackled. Sure. As noted while testifying, i thought it was good, a we are going to have to deal with . That is a topic we are going to have to deal with in its own right. Once it is launched, you are trying to increase your probability, engagement success and you are trying to improve your confidence in your Battle Damage assessment. So you have sensors for detecting and tracking. You have sensors for as you noted, adding in fire control is something coming in with modern and a rations. In the past we are focusing on Missile Warning. Which can tell camorra about the hypersonic ballistic center. You have the sensors of the interceptors themselves. And the fusion of all of that which kerry was speaking to. It is a critical part of things. That is why i was thinking i did not much like the title of the report does not do it justice. Getting on track is kind of i thought if you went with sensors and sensorabilities or Something Like that that would be more likely to sell at least in the literature stores. It is really fundamental. The policy we put out is very much saying this is where we have to go. I need to reduce the numbers whether it is regional, homeland Missile Defense, i want to reduce the numbers of interceptors i have to use for any engagement. As we talked about in missiledefense review and as i said in my testimony last week, the missiledefense is part of