Goldwater nichols, the roles and chairmans of the joint chiefs of staff, and the commanders. This morning, we seek to understand how Goldwater Nichols has impacted the effectiveness of u. S. Military operations, and what reforms may be necessary. We are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses, who will offer insights from their many years of experience and distinguished service. General norton schwartz, president and ceo of Business Executives for National Security. Admiral james, former european commander and u. S. Southern command or. Currently the dean of the Fletcher School of law and diplomacy at tufts university, and frequent appearances on various media outlets. Dr. Christopher lamb, director of the institute and the National Defense university. More than anything else, the Goldwater Nichols act was the result of escalating concern in the congress and the country by the effectiveness of u. S. Military operations in the vietnam war, the failure of the hostages in iran and grenada all pointed to the defense enterprise the need to be addressed for the sake of National Security, and particular, Goldwater Nichols insured community and the forces jointly. As we have explored in previous hearing, many questions remain about the balance our military is striking between core competitiveness, competencies, and joint experiences. As it relates to combat effectiveness, there is no doubt as one former chairman of the no otherefs put it country can match our forces on the battlefield and fight jointly. The subject today relates to the many steps hold water nichols took to improve the command. And made commanders asked responsible to the president and secretary of defense for the preparedness of commands. It also removed the joint chiefs of staff from the operational outn and permitted forces of command from approval. Commanders were given the ability to issue authoritative direction on all aspects of operations, joint training and logistics, and internal chain of command, and personnel within the responsibility. These steps were effective in establishing clear command authority, and responsibilities that translated to a more effective fighting force than we had in the 1980s. However, 30 years later, we have to take a hard look at this command structure in light of current threats and how our model of war fighting has evolved. The that states confronts the most diverse and complex set of crises since the end of world theii, from china, russia, growing asymmetric capabilities of nations ranging from iran to north korea. And the persistence of islamic extremism and cyber terrorism, these cut across regional structures embodied by geographic combatant commands. So we must ask, what are the current combatant command structures that best allows to us to succeed in the 21st century . Should we consider structures organize less around geography . At the same time, as numerous witnesses have observed, while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the war fighting arm of the military, the department of defense that function has largely migrated as a joint task force, especially on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging contingencies. This suggest that people have identified a shortcoming in the current design, and have adopted measures to work around the system, as we see quite often. This should inform our efforts to reevaluate and reimagine the command. At the same time, combatant commands have come to play a very important piece time diplomatic function. These developments argue for this change, and at a minimum, it would call into question the topheavy and bloated structures that we see in the command. Time and again during these hearings, we have heard how increases in military and civilian staff have persisted, even as resources for war fighting functions are increasingly strained. As former secretary of defense Michele Flournoy pointed out this week, combatant command staffs have grown to 38,000 people. That is nearly three divisions worth of staff in just the combatant commands alone. We have to ask if this is truly necessary, and whether it is improving our war fighting capabilities . At the same time, we have to examine whether the duplicate functions in the joint staff, combatant commands, and subordinate commands can be streamlined . That includes the question of whether we really need all of the current combatant commands . Do we really need a north and south com . Do we really need a separate com headquartered in germany, when the vast resources reside elsewhere . We have to revisit the role of the chairman of the joints nicholsnd the goldwater strengthens the commanders at the strength of the services. Secretary of defense robert gates raised this issue when he testified before this committee, because of his frustration with the lack of responsiveness. Many of our witnesses have discussed whether the chairman hashe joint chiefs Statutory Authority to perform the strategic integration of the department of defense all too often seems to do poorly, integrating priorities, efforts, and resources across regions, across domains of military activity, and across time. Balancing shortterm and longterm requirements, the question has been raised whether the chairman should be placed in the chain of command, with the service chief and Combatant Commanders reporting to him . Testimony for and against have heard testimony for and against. These are questions that have direct bearing on the effectiveness of u. S. Military operations. And as a consequence, on the wellbeing of our war fighters. We go it to them to look at this seriously, ask tough questions, challenge gold assumptions, and embrace new solutions, if and when it is needed. I look forward to the testimony, senator reid . Senator reid let me join you in welcoming the witnesses. I have had the village of working with general schwartz. And the admiral as medication commander, in the Defense Department now. I deeply appreciate. Gentlemen,ery much as the chairman said, we have undertaken a very rigorous under his direction review of Goldwater Nichols. And we heard just a few days ago from secretary of defense, former secretary of defense Michele Flournoy, about one of the initiatives. It has become a routine bottomup staff exercise that consumes many manhours, rather than a topdown leadership exercise that sets clear priorities and allocates risks. One of the things i would hope the witnesses talk about is the planning process, the formal and informal process, how we can improve that that is just one of the items i think there is a long and important list of topics that we could discuss. The role in the authorities assigned to the staff, whether he should be placed in the chain of command for military operation, an improving structural reform to combatant commands and field activities, and the potential benefits of adopting organizational changes, including consolidation and functional teams to achieve efficiencies and provide senior militaryand leaders more timely recommendations. In previous hearings, our witnesses have observed better capitalizing on the gains achieved through those improvements may require significant changes to enter Agency National security structure and processes, as well ,s this was made by jim walker the godfather, if you will, of the Goldwater Nichols. No matter how you transform the Defense Department, it is quite broken. And the problems that confront this nation require an interagency response. Executed ato National Security mission by itself is long going, we do not have the ability to integrate everything that exists. I think it is important to keep that in mind. And the chairman, again, let me commend him for beginning this process with the department of defense. I hope it is a catalyst on the issue for serious review by other committees and other agencies about how, together, we can improve security in the u. S. Thank you. Senator mccain welcome, general schwartz. General schwartz thank you, sarah mccain and Ranking Member reid for improving dods internal governments and Defense Organization by the Goldwater Nichols reforms. It is a privilege to return to his room and offer a few related ideas on how to improve performance in the department of defense. It is a special pleasure to sit beside the finest flag officer of my generation, jim. While there are many issues that warrant petition, resource allocation and overhead reduction and joint credentialing of military personnel and the potential for consolidation, among others, i wish to focus this morning on the three that i am persuaded that hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. They are the role and authority in the chairman of the joint , rightsizing the combatant commands and establishing the joint task forces for the execution of operational missions. Im certainly prepared to address the other matters you mentioned, at your discretion. As a formerence member of the joint chiefs of staff, the functional Combatant Commander in the chief of service, i have come to the conclusion that the chairmans informal role in supervising the Combatant Commanders in the jcs is insufficient for the demands of our time. While it is true that delegated authority from the secretary of defense is an alternative, there should be no doubt in the armed forces about the Directive Authority of the chairman. Subject to the close and continuing scrutiny and oversight of the secretary of defense. Fortegic guidance employment, force allocation tradeoffs between combatant commands and establishing Strategic Priorities for the armed forces should not be the result of bureaucratic negotiation. Or the exclusive application of personal persuasion. But rather, the product of strategic leadership. This capacity is constrained by the chairmans inability to exercise executive authority on behalf of the secretary of defense. And the remedy i suggest is to place the chairman and the line of supervision, between the secretary and his or her Combatant Commanders. Combatant commands are complex entities, number oone of which are alike. Some with Regional Response abilities and functional roles, the command strives to serve both peacetime, crisis response, and war fighting obligations. The composition of the combatant command staff clearly reflects the inherent tensions in this excessively Broad Mission array. Peacetime administration, deterrence, training, and Partner Engagement versus maintaining the capacity to conduct complex Contingency Operations in peace and war. The proliferation of resource directorates, joint intelligence centers, Security Assistance program offices, typically j4s, Partner Engagement, typically j9s, are the result of this expansive assigned mission set. And over time, the war fighting role of the combatant commands have evolved to be honest exclusive use, some would suggest excessive use, of joint task forces, up to and including fourstar led assigned missions. The simple question in my mind is, can a combatant command, no matter how well tailored, perform each and every associated task with equal competence . I do not think so. And the attempt to infuse greater interagency have to into the combatant command has come in my experience, detracted the core operational focus in either peacetime or in conflict. How have we squared the tension between combatant command peacetime and wartime roles . I would argue by again, extensive use of joint Task Force Organizations to execute operational missions. It is my conviction that the efficacy of the task force Employment Model is beyond dispute. The National Counterterrorism joint task force and straights conclusively demonstrates conclusively in my mind the enduring vallevalue of welltrained and equipped joint task forces. It may well be that High Performance parallels exist for National Joint task forces in and airace, maritime, domains, as well. What we should continue, however, or what i should say we should discontinue, is the proliferation of joint task forces and each combatant command, with the attendant Service Component and headquarters staff. Task force 510 in the Pacific Command might qualify, however, as an exception to the rule. In short, mr. Chairman, we need to have within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority. We need to aggressively taylor combatant commands headquarters, composition to its core mission or missions, and refrain from creating subordinate task forces out of service headquarters. And finally, we need to drive toward employment of longterm, highly proficient National Joint task forces for combatant command employment. Thank you, terry mccain, Ranking Member reid. And members for your attention, i trust my presentation will assist in advancing the noble cause of Goldwater Nichols reform. Senator mccain admiral . Admiral other distinguished members, pleasure to be back with you. Generale year with schwartz, who was not only a service chief, but a Combatant Commander, as well as being director of the joint staff there is no one who can talk more coherently to these issues than him. And as well my good friend, dr. Christopher lamb, who can best address the questions of planning and strategy that senator reid raise the moment ago. I spent 37 years in uniform, i spent probably a decade of that in the pentagon. I wish i had been at sea during those years. But in that time, i managed to serve on the staff of the secretary of defense, the secretary of the navy, the chief of naval operations, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. I have seen sort of inside the building, and as senator mccain mentioned, i was twice a Combatant Commander once in europe and once in southern command, latin america and the caribbean. So i am going to simply walk ideas that ifive think might be interesting for this committee to discuss and debate, none of these are fully formed ideas. But i think they relate to the objective of what the committee, i think very correctly, seeks to do as we sit here kind of three decades after Goldwater Nichols. And they all rate in one way or the other how the department is organized. I will start with one i think that is controversial, but ought to be considered. And that is doing need a cyber force for the u. S. . I would invite you to think about where we were 100 years ago. We had an army, navy, and marine corps. Did we have an air force . Of course not. We barely flew airplanes 100 years ago. I would argue today that it feels like that moment a few years after the beach at kitty hawk. Clearly, we need a cyber command. And i think we are moving in that direction. But i think it is time to think about whether we want to accelerate that process, because our vulnerabilities in the cyber domain, in my view, are extraordinary. And we are illprepared for them. Some part of our response will have to be done by the department of defense. And the sooner we have not only a cyber command, but in my view, a cyber force small, capable i think will be well served. I think we should have a discussion. Of they, to the question interagency. And the power of how to bring those parts of the government together, i think an interesting organizational change to consider would be to at each of the regional combatant commands to have a ambassador is a u. S. Or perhaps some other senior diplomat. Would continue to need a military deputy, and order to conduct military operations. But a great deal of what combatant commands do is diplomatic in nature, and i think having a senior representative from the interagency present would be salutory. This is been tried, and i think it would be an effective an interesting idea to consider to look at combatant commands. Thirdly, and the chairman mentioned this, in my view, geographically, we have too many combatant commands. We have six today. I think we should seriously consider merging north and south com and emerging u com and africa com. There are obvious deficiencies in doing so, operational additional benefits that derive. And i think finally, it is a way to begin reducing what has been correctly identified as the bloat in the operational combatant command staffs. Would associate myself with general schwartz and a number of others who have testified with the idea that we should consider independent, general staff in strengthening the role of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Practice, as a Combatant Commander, i would very typically all the chairman. Check signals with the chairman. I would not undertake a radical departure without talking to the chairman. Inhink putting the chairman the chain of command, as general schwartz as outlined and a number of other witnesses have mentioned, is efficient, sensible, and frankly, codifies what is in effect today in many ways. In addition, i think the chairman would be well served with what some have termed a general staff. This is the idea of taking midgrade military officers of extraordinary promise and pulling them from their services and more or less permanently assigning them to this general staff. This model has been used in other points i other nations in history. I think it is