We meet regularly, the defense ministers of the coalition, and we are urging other countries in the coalition to do the same. We have seen some welcome announcements from other European Countries that they are prepared to do more. General martin may want to add something about syria. I think there is a clear distinction between the coalitions contribution in support of the Iraqi Government and that that it is able to manage in syria. Arerly in iraq, we supporting the sovereign entity, and a military command. Those relative advantages do not exist in syria where we are marginally engaged in the air across a much less homogenous battlefield, where the identification of the parties, and tribes is much more difficult to determine. With respect to harnessing the significant grant component, which might maximize the Tactical Advantage the coalition were to provide, makes it that much more difficult. In terms of the decision made by parliament to move with airstrikes, any idea on the cost today, from the day parliament made the decision to today . I dont think we have yet [no audio] provide the committee with an estimate of that. I dont think we have completely yet released figures on the cost, but i would be py the cost, i think, it would be best if i were to come back. I would lick to follow on with you, if i may, from what you just said. Syria, we are, in marginally engaged from the air only. This is because of the question of, who are we supporting on the ground . One of our terms of reference is will aire question, alone be effective in defeating . Aesh from a purely military perspective, would you give your opinion as to whether airstrikes on their own could defeat daesh or simply to grade them to some extent . My view is that airstrikes on their own are not going to defeat daesh, but they are going to both to grade them and constrain their ability to continue to develop. Materially, they are already having an effect. Our contribution over syria is not exclusive to striking. Were also delivering substantial surveillance and reconnaissance, which is even more essential in syria where it to make precise targeting decisions without having a footprint on the ground. There are a number of particular target sets. The first is the ability of the caliphate to command and control itself. The second is to tackle the finances and reduce liquidity. The final piece is to destroy some of its infrastructure. In all three respects, air power , but a vital role insufficient without coordination on the ground to subsequently defeat. Exactly. This is what i expected. If this organization is going to be defeated, it has to be defeated by the use of air power in close support of forces on the ground that we are able to support. Can i run over some of the statistics to make sure that ive got them right that have been supplied . Taking the figures from the beginning of december because that is the point at which we began airstrikes in iraq, my well in understanding is there have been over 760 airstrikes in iraq against 1349 targets. , from theame period beginning of december when we began in syria, there have been 43 airstrikes against 103 targets in suryria. Isnt this pretty much what we would expect when we are working closely in cooperation with active fighting forces on the butnd in one theater, iraq, the same cannot be said of the other theater, syria . Too include with conclude with statistics, i understand our estimated number of enemy combatants killed for , the beginning of december to the end of april, in number,518, a sizable but in syria, it is only 22, and the 22 or made up of zero in december, six in january, 16 in february, zero in march, and zero in april. Would you like to comment on whether or not that is precisely what we would expect given the different circumstances of having fighting forces on the ground in one theater that we are closely supported by airstrikes but not having the same helpful situation in syria . By saying iart think it is extremely misleading to look at statistics in that particular way. We are only able to estimate enemy killed in action. These are crude estimates because we dont have people on where we cant investigate every single attack. The aim of these missions is not to kill as many daesh as possible. It is to degrade them. Occasion, by targeting their leadership, but in the end, to undermine their will to fight by attacking their command and control, infrastructure, and so on. It is too simplistic to measure a mission by the number of people who are killed, and as you are implying, many of these missions are to gather intelligence rather than to inflict casualties. It is the preplanned missions that are usually targeted at infrastructure where we take great care not to kill people. Spillingare to avoid casualties but perhaps general martin will add to that. I think your statistics arent currently characterizing the nature of the tactical theaign, which is come in first instance, focused on a strategy of iraq first. We are now in the game of the second year of building up Security Forces, and they are missions upfensive the euphrates and the tigris. It is a logical extension that the weight of their effort will be in terms of Close Air Support provision in order to ensure a tactical overmatch as they come up against the opposition in these river valley towns and cities. By comparison in syria, the object is to disrupt command and control and to interdict and disrupt lines of communication. To a target array that is principally infrastructurebased. Once you have destroyed the infrastructure, you dont need to revisit it as frequently as you do on the tactical battlefield in support of ground troops. That is what i expected to hear. Im sorry the secretary of state thinks im trying to extrapolate too much from the numbers killed. I only added that as an afterthought. The plate i was trying to put to you is, in iraq, we are having Something Like 15 times as many airstrikes as we are in syria. I dont think that is open to dispute. The question was already brought whereas many of these airstrikes are in support of inund forces, they are not syria. In syria, they are targeted at infrastructure. Idea how manyy occasions out of the 43 airstrikes that have been inried out in syria december, january, february, march, april, how many of those were in support of forces fighting on the ground, and if support of forces on the ground, how many of those were in support of Kurdish Forces fighting on the ground in syria or other moderate forces fighting on the ground in syria . Have any of our airstrikes been in close support of nonkurdish fighters fighting on the ground in syria . Yes, they have. How many . Most recently come in the last few days, north of aleppo in the fighting taking place along the murray online. I think they probably could you get could get you that count of information. We are part of a coalition. The selection of whose aircraft is a part of each particular mission is something that is decided on a coalition basis, but we will do our best to get you that information. Share and also amplify the sense that in terms targeting, there is much less of a distinction made between syria and iraq. The plan is to a tackle tackle daesh across its length and breadth. Whilst the battlefield geometry might suggest that the Coalition Support is for iraqi forces, we might not be doing as much in syria, in fact, we are pressuring the entire Daesh Network in those areas it has been most vulnerable. The reason behind this questioning i would like to know i dont know if the secretary of state will tell us is which forces other than the kurds the airstrikes are in aleppo. Of near the question in my mind is the much vaunted figure of 70,000 moderate fighters, and if there were 70,000 moderate fighters when we began airstrikes in syria in order to support, one would have expected there to have been a considerable number of our airstrikes in support of such forces fighting on the ground in syria. That doesnt seem to have happened. You havent seen the figures yet, and we will provide it. Considering that there were kills and all across four months, and a large proportion of those were against infrastructure, there cannot have been many you are simply referring to our airstrikes. The coalition has been involved in this campaign. There have been strikes by series of aircraft every night, but we will get you the figures. A significant portion of the airstrikes have been in support of the Syrian Democratic forces, and so far as the figure of 75,000 is concerned, when you say it is much vaunted, we continue to confirm that figure. Is our intelligence suggests there are still on that order of people fighting the Syrian Regime, and they have been fighting them for over five years, which itself is a testimony to the size of the opposition that there is. We will come back later to the composition of that opposition and to what extent it is or is not islamist. Which hasn to raqqa, been described as our Prime Minister as the head of the force the Syrian Defense has been built up largely by the americans, but my understanding is that that force, which is going to launch an assault, hopefully to defeat daesh in ra qqa, is predominantly made up of ces, abouth ypg for 80 made up of the kurds. My question is actually this the kurds and a limited number of nonkurdish Syrian Forces succeed in taking aqqa, to whom will we hand over control . That kurdishne forces would be willing or able of raqqa in control indefinitely. Who would we be looking to hand raqqa under whose government would raqqa be . There are a number of assumptions you have made, and i would question some of them. Forces will encircle raqqa, and clearly, it is going to be a long campaign. We already see kurdish and arab forces under pressure from the regime. We see them taking on daesh in the northeast and northwest of syria. Perhaps general martin can speak to that. The military contribution of the Syrian Democratic forces has suggested this far that they represent the single most capable maneuver force with an exclusive focus on fighting daesh. Elements findon themselves in a multipledimension fight against regime, regimebacked foreign militia, and other elements within the opposition itself. It represents in some respects the most capable and homogenous organization. With a tactical ambition in the first instance to secure the traditional northern syrian towns. What we have is a force that helps to take control of the headquarters of daesh, and three quarters of them are made up of kurds. They will not be welcome indefinitely, even if they are successful in taking control of raqqa. Arises, as it so often arises in these circumstances, what do we do after the initial military success in terms of creating political stability . The problem that we have in syria is that apart from the kurds, youve got a sod on the one side assad on the onesided and a variety of fighting organizations on the other side, the majority of whom are islamist. Over controlhand of that city to in the longterm . Longterm or even in the mediumterm. We want to see raqqa returned to a legitimate authority in syria. When you say there are all these different factions doing the fighting, there have been, but they are starting to do the talking, and they are now meeting as part of a forum we to workrted to convene syria towards a new political settlement, which is representative of all of syria. Before i hand it over to my colleague, may i remind you secretary state of state of the written answer you gave last year . In october last year, you are asked, which moderate, nonIslamist Groups with credible Ground Forces live in the kurds are fighting daesh in syria . There are ae was, number of moderate Opposition Forces focused on fighting the a regime. Me assad many are also fighting isil in areas of strategic importance. Then you added, the vast majority of these opposition andps are islamist, similarly, the Prime Minister in his evidence to the Liaison Committee on the 12th of january there are 70,000 moderates. He said, i repeat, yes, some of the Opposition Forces are islamist. Some of them are relatively hardline islamist, and some are what we would describe as secular democrats. This seemed to me to be something of a deconstruction of this idea that there are 70,000 moderate forces in support of whom we are waging a military campaign in syria. I think you are continuing to cast out on this figure of 70,000, which we continue to confirm. Its very odd that a battle has been fought against the Syrian Regime for five years if there wasnt a substantial opposition number of opposition fighters. The question is no one doubts the amount of opposition fighters the question is whether they are moderate or whether they are islamist. As you admitted to come is significant number of the people you are talking about are relatively hardline islamists, and we have had testimony from several witnesses who made it quite clear that the overwhelming majority of Opposition Forces, opposition people with guns are islamist, which is what you said in october in response to the written question. Let me answer that. Mr. Secretary, i am resigning from it. I am saying that the 70,000 socalled moderates are in fact in large part islamists, and that is why i want to focus on battalions of moderates. There are battalions of islamists. The question is, are there 70,000 moderates . The Prime Minister seems to have admitted that these forces are overwhelmingly islamist. The test is, are they prepared . The test we have had to apply, since we have had to consider, who are the right people to engage in the talks for the test settlement of all these groups is, are they prepared to lead within a plural political settlement that can in the end be democratic and take syria towards elections . That is one of the tests that is applied and should be applied. The nature of these islamists they are a group of nonextremist opposition whom we could imagine buying into a broader political settlement in syria. That isnt to say that all of them are exactly the same. There is a range of them. They are what we view as nonextremist. Let me close, and then i will give richard ample time to develop a thesis, as well. America, was said in virtually all the opposition is it was so messed islamist one way or the other at this point. He went on to say i hope we can reach some convergence we make a distinction between those andare saladi jihadists political Islamist Groups tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, the likeliest source of acceptable allies we could work with. It appears to be we have had similar evidence from other experts it appears to be fairly well conceded that the majority of the opposition said in your own written answer, a have a majority are islamists. It is just a question of distinguishing between those islamists who are regarded as beyond the pale, quite rightly, ists, and other islamists who might be more closely affiliated with organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. That seems to be what we are getting from the experts. Is what you are saying is that socalled moderates, or moderate islamists like the bubble moderates are moderate islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood . We could argue about what our precise definitions of islamists, what is beyond the pale, etc. The political process that is starts to askay these groups to make their choice, what are they are prepared to work with us for a political settlement in the part of the democratic process. That should be the test as to under somey can live form of secular and plural settlement. As long as their assurances can be believed, of course. Is really important is to get the civil war stop, to get people to focus on the , get themdaesh defeated, and give syria a future to which its own people can have confidence in rather than be driven to make a dangerous cross into europe. Thank you. I want to ask you to comment on this. Percentage of the precivil war population of syria is about 0. 5 . I wouldnt be surprised if there were not that number of relatively secular individuals who, given the right incentives, would be prepared to coordinate their activities in fighting daesh or the regime. The key point i would like to ask you about is, what are we talking about here . Littlenot talking about green men on one side and civilians on the other in a binary. Our activities in iraq and syria an be in support of structured course of some sort, or it could be in support or to alleviate the pressure on to individuals with ak47s protecting their village. I think the committee would benefit from a clear understanding about what we are dealing with. This is a fluid, multifaceted conflict with individuals protecting their house, their village, their valley, and in some cases, a concept that might be wider than that. I hope you might be able to bring to our report a clear understanding about what Friendly Forces exist out there, excepting that there is goodnatured moderation. It would be helpful to have an understanding of that. Just to start, i do think we ought to ask ourselves, given the might of the Syrian Forces, the might of the syrian war machine, how it is they have been defied for over five years now, since march of 2011. If there werent at least 70,000 theng them on, i Hope Committee will reflect on that, how that civil war has been maintained so long. The question is whether they are moderates. Question of the moderate islamists, what it comes down to is not extremists who we believe we can work with and who we believe will be committed to an enduring political settlement in syria when it comes. I dont have the details in front of me, that they are various groups of various Different Levels of military capability. I think that is the question you are getting at. Some are more organized than others. Say, i think your soundserization accurate. At this stage, in a very brutal , pragmatismtruggle characterizes the approach for a quite a scope of organizations who are fighting for their live