One of the wonderful things we noticed was that the last quarter of the main script, the did not had sewn match the earlier one. This confirms my suspicion the end have been written later. You cannot see that on the microfilm. It was a wonderful thing to see that in person. Sunday night at 8 00 eastern on cspans q a. Defense secretary Ashton Carter unveiled new plans to update the Defense Departments command structure. He discussed other changes at the pentagon that would try to limit redundancy and excessive documentation. For strategicr and International Studies, this is just under one hour. [applause] mr. Hamre good afternoon, everybody. We are delighted to have you here. It shouldnt be this cold in april. I can down from new york where it was snowing in wilmington, and i thought, what the hell . We are to warm up this afternoon and we are going to have an excellent opportunity to talk with secretary carter. Thank you all for coming. A brief security announcement he has a security detail. Theyre going to watch out for him. Im going to watch out for you. So if we have a problem, follow my instructions. Our exits are right here behind us. This is the door closest to the steps that go down closest to the street. If there is a problem in the front, we will go to the back to the National Geographic society. We have an arrangement with them if there is a problem in the back. We will go to the front to st. Matthews cathedral. Count heads and say grace. Anyway, we are going to be fine. I look forward please follow my instructions. Ashton carter is a man ive had the privilege of working with for almost 40 years. We first met when he was at the office of assessment years ago. I remember distinctly once when he interviewed me i should say for a job and decided i really was not up to what it took to be a success. I do not resent that. [laughter] since that time, we have had the privilege of working closely together for many years. Im very honored he is here. He is doing just a spectacular job. With your applause, would you please welcome ash carter and thank him for coming . [applause] secretary carter thanks very much, john, for that warm introduction, but more importantly, for many years of friendship, of guidance, and of Wonderful Service to our country over some many years, not to mention your leadership of this institution. It is a pleasure for me to be here at csis this afternoon. Since it was founded over 50 years ago, the center for strategic and International Studies has come to be considered one of the preeminent securityfocused think tanks here in the nations capital. You provide important ideas and scholarships on pressing issues, ranging from matters of Defense Strategy and budget, to americas strategic future in the asiapacific, to the growing threats that we face in the domain of cyberspace. To reviewing the Goldwater Nichols act that makes up so much of dods institutional organization. It is because of that last piece of scholarship that i wanted to come here today. As many of you know, i recently issued my Posture Statement for the Defense Department for fiscal year 2017. The first to describe how we are approaching five strategic challenges russia, china, north korea, iran, and terrorism. It is in this context that i want to speak to you today about some key longterm Strategic Management questions. The dod will be detailing and discussing with congressional defense committees in the very next coming weeks. As a learning organization, the u. S. Military and the Defense Department has a long history of striving to reform our command structures and improve our strategies and policies in how for formulated and integrated. Even when world war ii is being fought and before the Defense Department was established, military leaders and policymaking officials were discussing how military services could be unified and exploring ways to develop stronger policy processes and advice. The result was the National Security act of 1947. And its amendments which among , historic changes establish the position of the secretary of defense, the joint chiefs of staff, and the National Security council. Later reforms, particularly eisenhowerera changes help strengthen the office of the defense secretary and gave new authority to the joint chiefs. It was the Goldwater Nichols act, enacted 30 years ago this fall, that is most responsible for todays military and defense institutional organization. With memories of vietnam and the tragic desert one raid still fresh, officials from defense and policymakers again considered reform. After nearly four years of work, not to mention strong opinions by my former boss, then defense secretary caspar weinberger, the resulting transformation was what we now refer to as Goldwater Nichols. It solidified the chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the Combatant Commanders. It affirmed civilian control of the military by codifying and in law that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is outside of the chain of command. In order for him to be able to provide vital objective, independent advice to the defense secretary and the president. At the same time, it also strengthened the chairmans role, created the position of vice chairman of joint chiefs, and centralize the role of combatant commands. It required senior offices officers them to gain professional experience outside of their service in order to advance further in their careers. All Senior Officers know these policies today for they are integral to Career Advancement and achievement and they reflect the reality of Power Service members train and fight every day as a joint force. Right around this time, albeit unrelated to Goldwater Nichols itself, important changes were made to reform acquisition. These were based on the recommendations of the Packard Commission led by former , secretary of defense dave packard. Implementing the recommendations was another one of the first challenges i worked on early in my own career. As a whole, all these changes were overwhelmingly beneficial, a credit to the work of not only the members of congress to pass who passed the legislation but also their staff. John hamre being one among them, i should say. What they put into law has given us generations of soldiers who have grown accustomed to operating together as a joint force. Overcoming many frictions before and has enabled our administration to draw greater benefit from the advice of chairman from general colin powell and desert storm to general joe dunford today. This year, as Goldwater Nichols turns 30, we can see that the world has changed since then. Instead of the cold war and clear threat, we face an one environment that is for genetically different. Dramatically different. It is time to consider updates to this critical framework while still preserving its spirit and intent. For example, we can see in some areas how the pendulum between service equities and jointness may have swung too far, as in not involving the surface chiefs enough in acquisition the decisionmaking and accountability. Where subsequent world events suggest nudging the pendulum further, as in taking more steps to strengthen the capability of the chairman and joint chiefs to support force management, planning, and execution across the combatant commands. Particular in the face of threats that cut across regional and functional combatant command areas of responsibility. , as many increasingly do. With this in mind, i asked the dod managing officer peter levine and lt. General Tom Waldhauser to lead a confidence of departmentwide review of these kinds of organizational issues, spanning the office of secretary of defense, the joint staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the military departments. To identify any potential redundancies, inefficiencies or other areas of possible improvement. I like to discuss that reviews preliminary recommendations with you today. Over the coming weeks, we will execute some of these decisions under our own existing authority. For others where legislation is needed, we will work with the house and Senate Armed Services committees on implementation as they consider this Years NationalDefense Authorization act. Of course, both committees have their own important reviews underway as well, making this area ripe for working together, something im pleased to report we have been doing effectively and will continue to do on this topic. I applaud chairman mccain, senator reid, chairman thornberry, each of whom i was able to speak to earlier this morning, and also congressman smith. I look forward to continuing to work closely with all them in their committees. When it comes to these fundamental matters of our National Security, that is what we have to do. Work together. Let me begin with transregional and transfunctional integration and advice. An imperative considering the challenges we face are less likely than ever before to confine themselves to neat regional, or functional countries. Our campaign to deliver isil a lasting defeat is one example. As we take the fight to its apparent tumor in iraq and syria, and where it has been metastasizing, our combatant command, Central European command, Africa Command have had to coordinate efforts more than ever before. Increasingly i brought Cyber Command in these operations as well to leverage their unique capabilities in space and cyber to contribute to the defeat of isil. Beyond terrorism, we also face potential future nationstate adversaries with wiping Geographic Reach and also widening exposure, something we may want to take into account in order to deescalate a crisis and deter aggression. In other cases, we may have to respond to multiple threats across the globe in overlapping time frames. An increasingly complex command. We are not postured to be as agile as we should be. Accordingly we need to clarify , the role of the chairman and in some cases the joint chiefs of staff in three ways. One, to help synchronize resources globally for daily operations around the world, enhancing our flexibility and my ability to move forces rapidly across the themes between our combatant commands. Two, to provide objective military advice for ongoing military operations, not just for future planning. Three, to advise on military strategy and operational plans. For example, helping ensure our plans take into account and delivered fashion the possibility of overlapping contingencies. These changes recognize that in todays complex world we need someone in uniform who can look across the services and combatant commands and make objective recommendations to the departments civilian leadership about where to allocate forces around the world and where to apportion risk to achieve maximum benefit for our nation. And the person best posture to do that is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. We will pursue these changes in line with Goldwater Nicholss original intent, which is to enable the military to better operate in a seamless way while still preserving both civilian control and the chairmans independence to provide professional military advice outside of the chain of command. Some have recommended the opposite course to put the chairman into the chain of command. Both chairman dunford and i agreed that would be eroding the chairmans objectivity as the principal military advisor to the president and the secretary of defense. We appreciate csis reached the same conclusion. Secondary areas is in our combatant commands. Adapting combatant commands and continuing to aggressively streamline headquarters. Adapting to new functions will include changes and how we manage ourselves in cyberspace in accordance with the emphasis placed on cyber in my Posture Statement and that the president made in his fiscal year 2017 budget. There i made clear that in each of the five challenges facing dod we must deal with it across all domains, not just the traditional air, land, sea, and space, but also cyberspace. Where our reliance on technology has given us great strengths and great opportunities, but also some vulnerabilities that adversaries are eager to exploit. Ours why we increased total investment to 35 billion next years and why we should consider changes to cibers role in dods command plan. Some of you may know that dod is currently in the process of reducing our Management Headquarters by 25 in needed staff. We are on the road to composting accomplishing that goal next to the partnership of the congressional defense committees which once again we deeply appreciate. We can meet these targets without combining northern and Southern Command or inviting or combining european and african command. Actions that would run contrary to why we made them separate. Because of their distinct areas of emphasis and increasing demands on our forces in them. Indeed those demands have only , increased with each demand in recent years with each growing more visible. Instead of combining these commands to the detriment of our friends and our allies and our own commanding control capabilities, we intend to be more efficient by integrating functions like logistics and intelligence and plans across the joint staff, combatant commands, eliminating redundancies while not losing capability and much can be done here. Additionally, in the coming weeks the Defense Department will look to semper fi simplify and improve command control where the number of fourstar positions have made headquarters either topheavy less efficient than they could be. The military is based on rank hiarchy. Juniors are subordinate and right to their seniors. This is true from the platoon to the core level. But it gets complicated and some of our combatant command partners where we have a deep bench of talented senior leaders. Where we see the potential to be more efficient and effective, billets filled by fourstar generals and admirals will be filled by threestars in the future. The next area want to discuss is acquisition. 30 years after the Packard Commissions recommendations led to the establishment of an undersecretary of defense for acquisition, Service Acquisition executives and the roles of Program Officers and managers is clear that we still can and must do more to deliver better military capability while making better use of the taxpayers dollars. Six years ago, when i was undersecretary of defense for Acquisition Technology and , logistics, dod began what i call better buying power, an initiative to continuously improve our acquisition system. And under the current secretary frank kendall, we are now in the third iteration. While were seeing compelling indications of positive improvements like reduced cost growth in cycle time but there , is still a constant need for improvement. Practically as technology, industry, and our own Missions Continue to change. One way we are improving is involving the Service Chiefs more in accountability, consistent with Legislation Congress passed last year. Including giving them a seat on the defense acquisition board and giving them Greater Authority and what is known as milestone b. Thats where engineering and Manufacturing Development begins. That is where programs are first defined and a commitment to fund them is made. As ive discussed with the Service Chiefs, with this greater responsibility comes greater accountability. The chiefs themselves and their military staffs will need to sharpen the skill set, which in places has atrophied over the years. To be successful in discharging their new acquisition responsibilties. I also expect them to leverage the many lessons they have learned over the last years as operators. Many of them in war where speed and agility are critical to help our acquisition professionals deliver even better capabilities to our war fighters. Another way we will seek to improve is by streamlining the acquisition system itself. This will include evaluating and where appropriate reducing different members of the acquisition board. It is currently composed of about 35 principles and advisors, each of whom is likely to feel empowered as a gatekeeper for acquisition. Reducing these layers will both free up staff time and focused decisionmaking energy on overcoming real obstacles for Program Success rather than bureaucratic hurdles. We also intend to reduce burdensome acquisition documentation. For one example, in cases where the defense Acquisition Executive serves as the Milestone Decision Authority and current process dictates that 14 separate documents he correlated within the department. Reducing these paper requirements in a meaningful way and pushing Approval Authority down when authority is on the right track will eliminate redundant reviews and shorten review timelines, ultimately getti