The lobby as well and i am told that for those who try to buy the book there was the problem up here but the bookstore downstairs is open for those who want to you get the book can get it by assuming you could get at least two of three authors could sign that. Thank you for coming to the books launch. [applause] the fine against insurgents in fallujah in 2007 and rightabout that day in their books Fallujah Redux they talk about their experience and the rise of isis politics prose in washington d. C. This is one of our. [inaudible conversations] good afternoon. I am owner of politics prose in behalf of the entire staff, thinks for coming alex on this lovely afternoon. Now is a good time to turn off your cellphone. When make it to the q a session because we are being filmed g, we would appreciate it if you would find your way to this microphone to the table to pick up your question. At the end normally we ask the audience to fold up their chairs but you dont have to because we have another event this evening. C on this anniversary of 9 11 it is fitting that we should be gathering here for a book that involves our military and look back at an important part of a longterm fight in which the u. S. Armed forces have been engaged. Iraq war of course, was not necessitated by a september 11 the tax attacks. It was the choice but fought with the purpose, in part to keep america safe and its lessons about balancing force and diplomacy and relying on indigenous forces they remain very relevant today. Especially as we prepare to read engage in iraq to go after another enemy with a group that calls itself the Islamic States. Brigadiergeneral mullen and daniel green served in the entire province and our province but the book that they coauthored Fallujah Redux talks about a critical point called the awakening when the tribes joined the battle with al qaeda of the divorces this is dan and that is bill. [laughter] by the way. Dan is a reserve officer and served as a tribal and Political Engagement officer for a Naval Special warfare unit. In fallujah 2007. He also has done duty in afghanistan as a military officer and as the civilian. His first book three yearsf ago was was one year with the passion passion. Also having a degree from George Washington university focusing on Counter Terrorism and insurgency operations. Dan is a regular here at politics prose and were grateful for that. And being a marine 28 years now currently with the combat Development Command in quantico spending two years in fallujah as the Operations Officer and then as the Infantry Battalion commander through most of 2007. Fallujah has significance in the history of the iraq war to be, the center of the insurgent activity and the scene of the biggest setbacksqq for u. S. Forces retook the city in late 2004 by groups continue to operate. In 2006 president bush decided to surge troops into iraq and the local tribes also moved to reject al qaeda officiated fighters in may could we coordinate through the local tribes with the classification campaign of u. S. And Iraqi Security forces. Backward nation has become undone in the wake of the u. S. Withdrawal and sectarian misrule by the maliki government and fallujah is now occupied by the Islamic State fighters. Although much has been written about anbar offering the perspective of those to serve there. In their book they hold fallujah up as an example0of what could be achieved of leadership and perseverance. The story of the Major Military battles the of the more complex and diplomatic moves that did for a time bring peace to that area. And with all the remarks are personal and do not represent those of his command or the u. S. Marine corps or armed forces. Please welcome predator general mullen and daniel green. [applause] i that i would begin with why we wanted to write this book we remember war is called that is important but but when it comes to the city of fallujah it is iconic status but when itk was one in 2007 victory was not a thunderclap but for that reason it was not cover that much by the media and not very many books written. It is more important to have you finished in our use start. One of the primary reasons is what we felt that the time as the final chapter and to learn about counterinsurgency and it was up process to have an understanding of what was required to bring understanding to fallujah. We want to write the book to capture the moment and maybe some day future units would have a similar task maybe they would read them a more. That is partly why we want to collaborate. Cf also a touche showcase that success there were approximately 750 incidents with sniper attacks you name it and by applying a Counter Insurgency approach to partner with those tribes we could slowly squeezed al qaeda to push them out of the area that six months later rehab less than 80 incidents taking place. You want to put on paper so future generations have the chance and one thing we are keent÷ on is it is not the two of us that got a right but we benefited from those prior to our arrival. , but to take a fantasia of that. Eventually we did achieve success so we will talk about what fallujah was like to share the perspective. And one of the things going on in the military right now is the bifurcation of the matter what happens is the only answer to solving problems m because in many cases the use of force is not the appropriate answer sometimes it is the blanket over the fire to settle down. Then we can do something different. And those within the military like putting a of a glass cage surrounded. Then we will do to the best of our ability. But coming into fallujah itself when i was on the joint staff that is when the first fell happen in april. Less than a month before before incident we also went in with the attitude that we go in and smile you will not live up to that reputation but unfortunately the marine commanders themselves said we should not do retribution to the city but went it turned over to the fallujah brigade. Then the decision was made we need to sort this out. Of december 2004 that is a and redid the site survey we needed to inherit the entire area. So essentially we had to clean things up and keep the insurgents out. But the hardest part is with the iraqis we cannot sort out who is to the on the key people who can are the police of the they have been established by the government at that time. That is difficult. And with the unprofessional group of folks but they are cut out for us the difficult process so long deployment to keep things quiet. And when we returned home still keeping a close eye on fallujah because i knew i would be coming back. Men to have that drumbeat lets leave and we had the Intelligence Officer that we could never take it back. Dealing as long as possible. And training young marines. But the biggest thing is to focus your have a job to do. h but to get back into this city things were worse. But they played that game of walkable especially after the first month to say we have to do something different. That is what this book is about. Radically different. Day want to pick up from there . The key lessons that we learned is we will always win engagement against the enemy. What is so whole strategy . Who will take the place to prevent that from coming back . And then you had people who frankly who had cleared numerous ballys the most important piece to didnt . We have 100 per precinct we had the eyeballs watching. Living there in that neighborhood and reporting. And insurgents could not deal with it. Under the strong reaction the majority left to go somewhere else. Something that had not happened before. This was a product to be in the right place data right time. Different things came together to help us during that period to help things calmed down. Talk to the former police chief was terrified and would not go outside from Police Station headquarters you cannot leave that way. Then Brigade Commander was in charge of the iraqi forces was selling weapons. And the guy that takeover and for the second time of fallujah a lot of people thought there is a level of corruption and also to think he is working with the insurgents. And then somebody else took over. City council may have elected and appointed but between the three of them for the Brigade Commander. For a long time the insurgency had the Al Qaeda Branch and the national and surgeons frequently worked with Saddam Hussein and Security Forces of iraq and with those networks they knew how to develop over time but they like the girls to go to school. The brutality of the al qaeda start to cut into the corruption of different smuggling groups so eventually the split developed they may be number two or three from our perspective so we finally had a local partner to work with the that was the process that we had with several local partners many had blood on their hands so we will just set that aside to allow the discussion and al qaeda has a Political Program this proficient that sounds legitimate. He wears of rope he must be legitimate but if you start noticing the City Council Meetings no one would stand up for get into the conversation. [laughter] so to notice these Little Things so when he enters the room he knows a security detail is right before him. So few were not sure that they talk people listen then they stop talking there is a serenity that comes with power. So we had a sheik in town and there were several thousand members he had control of an area that was 70 square miles a mixture of farmland and he could control that area. But the engagement is working with the tribes. But from america as prospective tribes are antimodern but it took awhile to see the social institution was to culture so we had a robust tribal in engagement program. Thank you. And to work with the tribal leaders to help them recruit to be part of the of local protective force to raise those police forces. With regards to classification of the insurgents and the more islamic history next extremist insurgents i bring that up is important what is currently happening with isis. Dont take their cigarettes a way. Bad is bad but your daughter is now my wife. The locals have no say. They were killing people. The people of fallujah and the National Insurgents thought we know the u. S. Military is leaving very professional buddies al qaeda people have to go we cannot live with them. So we may see a similar type of thank they have definitely over reached that we dont do that. That is pretty bad. So at some point the people will turn on them with the government that they could actually trust now that the Prime Minister stood down the in the city westering the Iraqi Military when there is nobody there anymore to be a force Prime Minister maliki took direct steps to push the sunii of the military that is why they did not trust them. That is the interesting dynamic. One of the reasons fallujah switched you have the tribesmen so they have the firepower. The police have the presence they have the manpower but not the fire power so one would bolster the other so that resiliency was crucial but in the political side it was important so to understand the shadow government to use that placement to understand that margins due generally support of mayor. He had no budget whatsoever. So one of the things that i try to do was provide temporary money to provide funds and the even had my parents mailboxes of school supplies. But in return a crucial missing piece of legitimacy. He was very proactive. One thing that was very useful is we had an attack that killed a prominent leader at a funeral procession the next day. That car bomb changed things so the mayor imposed a vehicle p. M. So over nine of the vehicles were allowed in the city the whole city was fenced off for the marine corps you could only enter addis small number of the entry points every some person in the city had the identification card. Every house had a number on the map there was control. It was very important but to impose that vehicle and then to set up a series of buses you could imaginepx people would revolt but the iraqis surrendered they knew that was part of the strategy. The amazing part was the heat was just unbelievable in the summer it gets 130 degrees. So they told us with that car bombing it was horrific. Of lots of people were killed because with their practices they take them into the house as fast as possible. It was horrific. The mayor saidahe would impose the vehicle began day and, i good luck with that i did not see it working. But it did. Their radio from stopping people of driving that did not get the word was to shoot at them there was a lot of shooting going on to get them to stop driving around but they did it. And from the time this was in place they were walking in at 130degree heat. Then you have a Police Captain move out there with 20 or 30 iraqi police to set up a new precinct. Then you add to that a Neighborhood Watch. For example of funny stories we have Neighborhood Watch. It would be one man from every household and work a letter commanding people to do this. They have special shirts and hats made up for them. One of the shirts in the Neighborhood Watch in arabic were threeinch letters which somehow he mistranslated. It went from threeinch tall letters to threeinch wide letters. It was just Little Things like that but essentially what you are doing is employment so all these militaries are getting a job there is an honor wearing the uniform because the the insurgency has so overreach that its no longer considered cool to be with the insurgency. Its now considered to be better with the police force. We do one neighborhood at a time and eventually had to squeeze out cut out of the city so they started working in rural areas. One of the key aspects of getting the police to go out there is we had marines and we have the police and as long as we were there we could prevent the iraqi army and police from fighting which was a consistent problem and we could give them the confidence that if somebody tried to blow up that precinct or attack the precinct we were there to help defend it. That gave them a lot of confidence in many cases the only reason they would stay there is because we were there with them. He was getting off with a Forward Operating bases and getting in a mixing them at these people. A lot more foot patrol instead of vehicle patrol. The barriers we have put around werent he could walk through them which was fine. You just could not drive a car through them. We set up these precincts with two checkpoints that people had to stop. They were manned with the police supervising them so they could check to see was coming into the neighborhood. This gave them a sense of ownership and they really liked it. Again all of these things you think about in the american context i can imagine doing that in america. I cant begin to imagine that. The thing i also wanted to add is why did it take so long to do this . Why is the resting place of our military institutions in combat and conventional warfare. Across the spectrum not just the marines but the army in the state department and usaid they were all generally designed to fight nationstates and work with capitals and national governance. The problem said of al qaedas insurgencies has aspects of that but its predominantly outside the capitol. Its frequently tribal not formal institutions. Its often a very dangerous area so force protection concerns of u. S. Personnel frequently trumps accomplishing a mission sometimes. The problem is the exact opposite frequently and how we are organized for success. Part of this is to capture in book form that theres a differ way of doing this and its not always about killing people and breaking things. Its about their own defense and empowering them at the local level. These arent things you typically hear from earnings were naval officers. Its very different from a career path. We wanted to capture that at least at one point. Again the bison publishing is towards combat. There are plenty of books written by Junior Officers directing directly involved with the combat. Thats not how you win wars at the end of the day. As part of the solution but not the fundamental insurance. Going back to my comments at the beginning there are a lot of folks in the military that think of you can do the highend type or you can do anything else. You can adjust and one of my favorite quotes is if only two of you know how to use a hammer its amazing what can look like nails. Frankly i think thats why it took us as long as it did because there were a lot of units over there. The only tool they wanted to use was a hammer because Everything Else was too slow and too frustrating. It wasnt real combat but how do you win . You dont when by depopulating the area. Thats not peace. You win by getting people to decide okay we have had enough of this. We are going to get involved. We are going to take her neighbors back and calm everyone down. We are going to get the military out of the neighbors. One of the problems we had when i got there was the iraqi army had given space in the city that they were in charge of. It just happened a month before we arrived. How do you tell them now we have a plan to get you out of the city and we will put the police in your place . They didnt trust the police at all. That was and what they wanted to hear. The way explained it to them was like look the role of the Iraqi Military is to defend iraq. Its not to keep control of the cities. The final result in the city was police in charge of the city and false enforcing the rule of law in that city. Thats it. We dont vote along here in the Iraqi Military doesnt belong here. We have to give them the co