How dangerous it was. We regard that ussr is just about ready to fall over whoever bluebonnet first and yet we forget just how dangerous it was. One of the superpowers on to the peace and capable of taking a number of options other than the reform program. And the cold war cold war resting resting dress and it nearly became a global hot war 1962 when the cuban missile crisis. It could have happened again in 1983. It couldve been a military exercise that was misread as the cover for the potential American Nuclear assault on moscow. There was mutual fear and to some extent misunderstanding on both sides. A very fragile atmosphere had risen. They were seen as more or less across the whole range of this the political elite. The possibility of the meeting to the international complication and catastrophe only need to be spelled out. And on the other side, gorbachev Reforms Program was very unclear in many of its essentials. It changed from the index of the union. It wasnt a reform program. And again the possibilities for argument and for discussion about what was going on were enormous. Various stages have to be itemized in the progress towards peace that ended the cold war. There was the extraordinary january, 1986 nuclear arms declaration of gorbachev which flummoxed american policymakers to some great extent certainly called a great deal of further mistrust but then came the summit and a lot ended with soviet confessions were offered and then snatched back. Then in the winter of 1986 and 1987, gorbachev pressed on him the they needed for the Nuclear Disarmament proposal that he had which the president refused to accept and ironically the peacemaking gorbachev was the one who held up the progress to the idea of unraveling the package. I have to say at this point how useful it is to be able to use both the american and soviet archive in that agency over there its the most remarkable treasure trove about the end of the cold war and the whole of the world. I dont think that theres anything unlikely that has been the bilateral facility. And eventually he adopted. Essentially Ronald Reagans policy of engagement with the ussr particularly after he declined to intervene and against european revolutions of 1989. And the achievements of this process cannot be understated the arms reduction treaty became possible and was signed in 1988. Eastern europe was evacuated by the red army and the noncommunist governments were formed in a largely peaceful way the World Communist Movement fell apart, it had been falling apart but it fell apart as a world movement. People in russia and its adjacent republics had new freedoms to communicate with each other to travel abroad to listen to tv and radio from the foreign countries. A green and were made on conventional weaponry in europe and in that short space of time in other words the half decade extraordinary decisions were taken that brought an end to the most terrifying nonlaw in human history. Thereve been hundreds of cold war. The british and french specialized but no cold war before the cold war had the capacity to threaten human and other animal life adversely around the planet. Now why have the opportunity to do today is to focus on an aspect of the ending of the cold war because we have one of the principles with us on the platform here. And i do think that one aspect of the ending of the cold war is being underplayed by most scholars is the relationship between the state department and the soviet ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically between secretary shultz and the late you only have to think for two days to see why this was a crucial fact. President reagan had many other things to think about them just how he dealt with the soviet union. Mikael gorbachev had many more things to think about because the grasp of the government in the ussr was much more extensive than the grasp of the government in the foreign american presence in the u. S. He was engaged on a massive transformation of his country and therefore felt to the foreignpolicy mashers, the secretary of state and the Foreign Affairs minister to cope with the consequences of generally agreedupon policy agreed by the American Government and by the soviet policies for their own reasons that the cold war was altogether too dangerous. They had the additional reason that without ending the cold war it would be very, very difficult to hold onto the remaining fragments of the declining soviet economy. So they had a very practical reason as well as their own claim to end the cold war so while oversight was constant, they had the task of making the objectives of the two leaders of the day operationally practical and these men were with george schultz. They have to do this with an extraordinarily dynamic environment where there was no data was predictable that they before it happened. We all remember the double during change. For the two Foreign Policy establishments have to be held together by great sophistication and a lot of determination. So, we had a dealmaker over here in the u. S. With secretary shultz and both belong to the administrations which were not lacking. Anyone that has read the memoir is well aware that he had to struggle for the line that was prescribed for the administration by the president himself. At the the same was true in the bureau as the general objective deep end from 1989 in particular but even before that there was opposition and resistance from people who were not quite so keen on the reform of the child. So, both the secretary and the minister had to do what they could cut come and they did what they could to embolden the president and the general secretary whenever their commitment seemed to waver. I regard this as one of the crucial elements often missed in the accounts. How did they do it . If you read the accounts in the hoover archives, the diary over the Deputy Foreign minister its obvious that one thing that happened very early on was the partnership of secretary shultz and the minister. I was very impressed how the soviets were in the Foreign Ministry that the secretarys decision to invite to the First Encounter in 1985. He knew that he was good to be needing a real human being and so did his wife said there was a social aspect to this end of the second example that i will give a favorite in the soviet account when they went down to georgia and they put on a huge banquet for the american delegation headed by mr. Schultz and add some point he arranged with georgia on my mind. Now is it may seem like a big thing. He was a great georgian patriot. He came from a small nation inside that had been kicked around by the russians. He knew that it was and was very touched by this and so was his entourage. There was a mutual learning experience. Its an interesting little story. It actually happened in moscow and we had a pattern. He would give a toast and i would give a toast. I thought i have to loosen this up somehow so instead of a regular toast i got the sheet music and i put the words and russian and had a recording that i got three guys on the embassy and it didnt break the ice it was a big hit. It got us to be more relaxed. So after we all left office they asked me to come and tell that story so i go down and my partner that night asked me i was going to do and i told her so i got up and told the story. She grabs the microphone and says to me mr. Secretary what they tell you how to sing that song. [laughter] she said where were you when i needed you in moscow. [laughter] they not only got along very well but they also learn from each other and as the secretary made a point of taking the economic charts on the record to moscow on the visit so that the soviet leaders would begin to understand quite what a mess they were heading into with their economic systems. So, what we are talking about here again are not just negotiators but people who were acquainted each other with the nature of their own respective systems as a learning experience thats very important. The other thing that is common for both in this period is the unwillingness to automatically accept what the respective intelligence agencies were telling them. Now, this was true of gorbachev as well and in spite of the soviet leadership, there was huge disrespect for the kgb report. There was a lot of reliance on the soviet leaders saw in their own eyes in america. On the americans side the leadership was quite abrasive at times in its attitude to the cia report. The direct negotiating experience and observation of the other country by their leaders was very important to how things turn out. On both sides there was a recognition as well. It really was changing. So the soviet leadership was constantly saying we are changing. Cant you see we are changing as fast as we can. Americans didnt let up for pressure. If the soviet union wanted a bargain, which would give breathing space to conduct its own internal transformation and that was the whole point, the whole point was to get a breathing space in order to renovate communism, to preserve, conserve communism. That was their objective. They didnt understand they were actually introducing the solvent communism by loosening the system culturally, politically and economically they didnt understand the chemistry of communism but this played into the american position very nicely if they made a mistake in judgment about the consequence, too bad for the soviets had wanted this. Who wanted to communism to survive in any case. So they got together, the secretary and minister. The minister fought his way until 1990 and then started down but by then, most of hard work had been done and the secretary stood down with the exits from the office and in the process, the two of them conducted an enormous number of grievance, not just about nuclear arms but about conventional arms and about the demilitarization of the superpower interventions in africa they made progress on cuba. And they kept pushing at the door of internally reforming the ss r. Americans were very insistent that there was going to be no deal on nuclear arms if the ussr didnt transform itself into a reliable partner and that would mean that ussr had become a different sort of country. Ussr data set about its internal transformation but in the Foreign Policy, it wasnt completely obsessed with america. Was nearly obsessed to the extent of ignoring the rest of the world and its relationship to try to read fashion at times with client states like iraq and libya and also disengaged from afghanistan and moreover its soft a new relationship with the peoples republic of china as a counterweight so there was a lot happening in this period. I think we must never underestimate the world historical importance of the entire process. And we should never underestimate the importance of the intelligence management that took place both between president reagan and general secretary gorbachev also involving the secretary of state shultz and minister of Foreign Affairs. These are the big four that laid the foundation for peace that followed and which we all need to be grateful. Eastern europe was liberated and eventually the soviet union imploded. For ten years or more is in voted largely peacefully and now the walls are breaking out in parts of the old ussr. But we ought to be grateful that at the point of its initial implosion it went into history not with a bang but with a whimper. Now, what i thought that i would end with is a few questions that we have a chance to hear the secretarys answers on. I would really like to know whether there was any process when he feared it could all go badly wrong. It doesnt seem to me to have been an entirely smooth process but was there any point at which you felt this is going the wrong way and it could become catastrophic . And also in the related point how crucial do you think it was that the general secretary were the people at the helm . Have importance do you give to those men and what they have happened differently from something debate with someone other than Ronald Reagan if theyd been empowered . This is a bit cheeky. Was there anything that he would have done differently if you had your time again . What you have tackled anything with the knowledge that you have now having a good turnout that you have done differently . And last, with more could american leaders have done is to have settled the post cold war peace better than they did . Those of the situation that you feel most things are done for the better in very difficult situations or do you think the chances were missed . And i would like to say thanks very much for giving me the opportunity to put these questions, one of which thank you very much. I can barely remember one question. [laughter] let me start with a story that gets at all of them. After he left office, gorbachev came here and we were standing around in the backyard on campus and i said to him we were both in office when the cold war was as quick as we could get. What do you think was the turning point . He said without a minute of hesitation record at the two leaders got together for two days and talked about every subject so we understood each other. I said what you think the turning point was . I thought the turning point is when we deployed Ballistic Missiles in germany. Why is that . I said because it showed the strength of our alliance and the soviets had to see that and realize that our diplomacy was based on strength. There were lots of things that happened before gorbachev came along and that was one of them. But the recount a few of them that have significance. First of all, there was a mindset. President reagan thought that the soviet union wasnt all that it was cracked up to be and if you read the speech he said for instance of all of the people trying to migrate into these things doesnt have to leave something in the salon and i had my own experience when i was the secretary of the treasury. We had a big brouhaha about sales so i got the cia to help me on that and they did a great job. And in the end we knew more about production than they did. The agricultural people were appalled because we could track how much and so on so i could see that the situation was lousy. My late wife is a nurse. She could hardly get out fast enough. It left a lot to be desired. And i had about his interactions with my soviet counterparts. And i could see they were very uneasy about the soviet economy so i might say this is the attitude or the dod. They tried to sabotage the summit and at one point she writes right i should ask for the resignation for what hes done with the soviet union. [laughter] and she says he is doing what i wanted to do maybe i should ask the captain for that resignation. Another thing that happened i got back from a trip to china and we were lucky to land because it was snowing. She said how about coming over for supper. So we go over and all of a sudden they are asking me about the chinese leaders. Can you find the bottom line. Then they started asking that the soviet leaders because they know that i have dealt with them and i said he has never had an important meeting with the communist leader and hes trying to have one. So i had gotten permission into the object of the meetings were no big deal. So i said what if i bring them over here and they said thats a great idea. Well take me ten minutes and i want to told him that this new leader was interested in a constructive dialogue. Suffice it whatever you want. We were there for at least an hour and a half. And we talked about everything but at least after a certain time, Ronald Reagan focused on these issues and the soviet caskill pentecostals. They said we dont treat people like this. We ought to do something about it. So he says let me make that a special project. So thats the back and forth and finally i got one that i thought was reasonable. I said any president would try for the holes in this piece of paper and i had to believe with all the background they would be allowed to go home so thats what happened. It wasnt just the people its about 60 people or Something Like that. He said all the time i wont say a word. And i said that had meaning because president Ronald Reagan could see that to make a deal with these people, look what i did. So they basically said while. And i think there was something there that helped in the long run but all of these happened before gorbachev came along. We have set our agenda very publicly here is what our agenda is. People set up the agenda and be at 1500 deployed and we said our objects to go to zero. Im not trying to say that he wasnt a big figure but a after redeployed to the soviets withdrew from the negotiations and they drummed up a lot of trucks and gradually over time they settled down a little bit and by the summer of 1984 i was able to go to the president and say a soviet diplomat has come up with and namely if they are invited to washington and come to the General Assembly in september, he will accept. I said to them jimmy carter canceled meetings when they were in afghanistan and they are still there. One little incident i had a Good Relationship with nancy she always fixed me up with a movie star at the state dinners and thats how i got to dance with ginger rogers. [laughter] they have a meeting in the oval office and we wont download. We come into the hostess said why dont you speak to and at one point he said that your husband wont piece and she said of course my husband wants peace. They set every night before he goes to sleep whispering in his ear piece. Shes at a low whisper whispered in your ear. [laughter] we started the arms control negotiations and got it going again and there was an interesting table basically talking about getting rid of the Nuclear Weapons and that set the stage for group of. But he said hes a new foreign minister will have a lot to talk about but we ought to still have a relationship so we went out of our way to see that they were included at the social intervention and work on things that way. I think that he really appreciated that. Whats the relationship. We had the first meeting in geneva and he put in place a program making it hard to get out of. So the dinner was at the soviet that the soviet place and we were sitting around about ten of us. He gets up and looks at the president and pieces i he says i had to come all the way from them to the geneva ticket vodka. How about this question of whether he would have done anything differently if you did it again. Is there anything on the american side of it you think you might have looked at differently . It was a good thing to build up our strength. Pres