Indict all of them and thats not liberal in my sense of the word. But equally there have been a lot of individuals doing wrong and i think conservatives have been far too quick to defend them and to endorse a way of proceeding within the criminal justice that they wouldnt in any other circumstance. Fortunately, i think thats changing so yes, there is this group but i think the libertarians are winning that argument for short. Rich lowry under other colleagues think about your book, what are your . National review is a very intellectually diverse place. Rich is more of a conservative. In this book i hope to present the arguments. Im not rude to anyone in the book is totally respectful of all of you. And since its a National Review idea. There should be something in it fo i would have brought a copy down but its a pacific and it was too heavy for me to carry. I will interrupt at 1 00 lets weve already gone into open discussion so that well have at least 10, 15 minutes for q a. Lets give a warm welcome to robert service. [applause] it goes without saying but i should say it anyway, that its a massive honor to be able to discuss ideas with a maker of history such as secretary shultz this afternoon. And we thought of doing this in this way, and then i will get round to posting a few questions, get through get to later. But i thought i got to start by emphasizing how dangerous the cold war was. Weekend nowadays to regard the ussr as a pack of cards that was just about ready to fall over or whoever blew on it first, and yet we forget just how dangerous it was as one of the superpowers armed to the teeth and capable of taking a number of options towards its future, other than the Reform Program adopted by mikhail gorbachev. And the cold war was truly dangerous. It nearly became the global hot war in 1962 in the cuban missiles crisis. It could have happened again in 1983. Because of the able archer military exercise that moscow misread as a cover for potential American Nuclear assault on moscow. There was a mutual fear and to some extent misapprehension, this comprehension, ms. Understanding on both sides. A very fragile atmosphere had arisen by the middle of the 1980s. Reagan in moscow, president wright and moscow was seen as a warmonger, more or less across the whole range of the soviet political elite. The possibility of this leading to International Complications and catastrophe only need to be spelled out. And on the other side gorbachevs Reform Program was very unclear in many of its essentials. It was always changing. It changed from 1985 through to the end of the soviet union. It was not a fixed Reform Program. Again, the possibilities for argument and for discussion about what was going on were enormous. Various stages have to be itemized in the progress towards that piece, that ended the cold war. There was the extraordinary january 1986 Nuclear Armed aggression of gorbachev, which flummoxed american policymakers to some great extent, certainly caused a great deal of for the mistrust, but then came the reykjavik summit. And a lot of soviet concessions were offered and in snatched back. And then in the winter of 1986 into 1987, gorbachevs own politburo pressed on him the need to undo the package of nuclear arms disarmament proposals that he had, which president reagan refused to accept as a total package. And ironically the peace making gorbachev was the one who held up the progress to the idea of unraveling the package. I have to say this point how useful it is to be able to use both the american and soviet archives into agency over there, the Hoover Institution archives. Its the most remarkable treasure trove of materials about the end of the cold war in the hope of the world. I dont think theres anywhere like it that has this bilateral facility where you can study both the american responses and the soviet responses, and then tie them together and see what the interaction was between the two sides. Eventually as you all know when reagan stepped down from office, president bush took over, engaged in a pause in which he reviewed policy, and eventually adopted essentially Ronald Reagans policy of engagement with the ussr, particularly after gorbachev declined to intervene in the east european revolutions of 1989. And the achievements of this process cannot be understated. And armed reductions treaty became possible and was signed in 1988. Eastern europe was evacuated by the red army and noncommunist governments were formed. And a largely peaceful way. The World Communist Movement fell apart. It had been falling apart for years and in the case, but it fell apart as a world movement. People and russia and its adjacent republics inside the ussr had new freedoms to communicate with each other, to travel abroad, to listen to tv and radio from foreign countries. Agreements were made unconventional weaponry in europe. In that short space of time, in other words, a half decade at the end of the 1980s, extraordinary decisions were taken that brought an end to the most terrifying not war in human history. There have been hundreds of cold wars in history. The british and the french specialized, perhaps still specialized, in cold wars. And theyve engaged in many hot wars as well but no cold war before the cold war had the capacity to threaten human and other animal life universally around the planet. It was an extraordinarily dangerous phenomenon. Now, what i have the opportunity to do today is to focus on that aspect of the ending of the cold war because we are one of the principles with us on the platform here. And if you think that one aspect of the ending of the cold war thats being underplayed by most scholars is the relationship between the state department and the soviet ministry of Foreign Affairs, and specifically between secretary shultz, who is with us today, and foreign minister, the late edward shown us can. You will have to think for two seconds about this to see why this was the crucial factor. President reagan had many other things to think about than just how we dealt with the soviet union. Mikhail gorbachev had even more things to think about because the grasp of governance in the ussr was much more extensive than the grasp of government is for an american president in the u. S. He was engaged on a massive transformation of his country. It, therefore, fell to the Foreign Policy managers, the secretary of state and the Foreign Affairs minister, to cope with the operational consequences of the generally agreed policy, a policy agreed by the American Government and private soviet politburo, for their own reasons. That the cold war was altogether too dangerous to actually be used as are also the additional reason that without any the cold war it would be very, very difficult to hold onto the remaining fragments of the declining soviet economy. So they had a very practical reason as well as their own claim to moral reason or political reason to end the cold war. So while oversight was constant by reagan and gorbachev, two men had the task of making the objectives of the two leaders of the day operationally practical. And these two men were Eduard Shevardnadze and george shultz. And they have to do this in an extraordinarily dynamic environment where no day was predictable a day before it happened. We all remember the bewildering rapidity of change. So the two Foreign Policy establishments had to be held together by great sophistication in a lot of determination. So we had a deal maker over here in the u. S. In the person of secretary shultz, and we had a radical reformer in the shape of, in the figure of Eduard Shevardnadze. Both the long queue administrations which were not lacking in internal division. Anyone who has read secretary shultzs memoir is well aware that he had continually to struggle for the line that was prescribed for the administration by the president himself. The same was true in the soviet politburo, as a gorbachevs general objections widened and deepened, there was opposition and resistance from people who were not quite so keen on reform as gorbachev was. So both the secretary and the minister had to do what they could, and they did what they could, to embolden the president and the general secretary whenever there commitment seemed to waver. I regard this as one of the crucial elements often missed in the accounts. How did they do it . How do they do it . Well, if you read the soviet accounts, the soviet diaries in the hoover archives over there, the diaries of, for example, [inaudible] and the deputy prime minister, its obvious that one thing that happened very early on was the partnership of secretary shultz and minister shevardnadze. I was very impressed at how impressed the soviets were in the Foreign Ministry at the secretarys decision to invite not just shevardnadze but also shevardnadzes wife to their First Encounter in helsinki in summer 1985. Is touched shevardnadze. Shevardnadze do that he was going to be meeting a real living human being, and so was his wife. So the social aspect to this. And the second example ill give which i think occurs in mr. Schultz memoirs, in fact i know it does but ive read in the soviet accounts, when they went down to georgia in 1987 and shevardnadze put on a huge banquet for the american delegation headed by mr. Shultz and at some point in the of mr. Shultz arranged for a singing of georgia on my mind. [laughter] this might seem a small thing, but it was a big thing for shevardnadze. Shevardnadze was a great georgian patriot. He came from a small nation inside the ussr that had been kicked around by the russians. The word of georgia coming georgian, is not georgia but shevardnadze knew just about enough english to know the word in english was a georgia, and he was very, very touched by this. And so was his entourage. There was a mutual learning expert speakers can interrupt you there . Theres an interesting little story. It actually happened in moscow. And we had a pattern, the foreign minister had this big house. Negotiate in the warning and then a sort of a semisocial lunch and then we go back to negotiations. A lunch always shevardnadze would give a toast and i would give a toast. And we are beginning to inch ahead. The talk was still stiff and i thought ive got to loosen this up somehow. So instead of the regular toast i got the sheet music for georgia on my mind knowing all the background now, and i put the word in russian. Then i had a recording and i got three guys are more embassy who spoke russian to sing it in russian and then i think it. It actually did kind of break the ice. It was a big hit. I didnt change any disposition but it kind of got us a little more relaxed. So after all left office there was a party for the president and nancy down in los angeles, asked me to come and ask me to tell that story. So i went down, my dinner partner that night with dinah shore. She asked what is going to do at a total. Cycad up when i tell the story advancing georgia. Im leaving and it comes dinah shore. She grabs the mic and she says to me, mr. Secretary, let me show you how to sing that song. [laughter] she got through, i said where were you when i needed you and moscow . [laughter] excuse me for interrupting. Thats great, great story. Then only got on very well, but also learn from each other, and secretary shultz made a point of taking economic pie charts and all the rest of it to moscow on his visits so that soviet leaders would begin to understand what quite a mess they were heading into with the economic system. To what we are talking about here then are not just negotiators but were talking about people who were acquainted each other with the nature of their own respective systems, as a learning experience here thats very, very important. The other thing that it think is common to both secretary shultz and minister shevardnadze in this period is that unwillingness to automatically accept what the respective intelligence agencies were telling them. Now, this wasnt true of shevardnadze, this was true of shevardnadze, certainly true of gorbachev as well, inside of the soviet leadership there was huge disrespect for the kgbs reports. There was a lot of reliance, therefore, put on what the soviet leaders saw for themselves with their own eyes in america. On the american side, the state department under mr. Shultz is leadership, was quite abrasive at times in its attitude to cia reporters. Direct negotiating experience and observation of the other country by the leaders was a very, very important to how things turn out. On both sides that was the recognition as well that the ussr really wasnt changing. So the soviet leadership was constantly saying to the americans, we are changing, cant you see were changing ss as we can ask the americans didnt let up the pressure your if the soviet union wanted a bargain, which would give it breathing space to conduct its own internal transformation, and that was the whole point of the reapproachment with america, the whole point was to get breathing space in orderto renovate communism, to preserve, conserve communism. That was their objective. They didnt understand that theyre actually introducing the solvent of communism by loosing the system culturally, politically and economically. They didnt understand the architecture of communism, the chemistry of communism. But this played into the american position very nicely. If they made a mistake in judgment about what was likely to be the consequence, too bad for the soviets. Who on earth wanted communism to survive any longer than it needed to in any case . So they got together, secretary and minister. The minister fought his well judgment thought his way into 1990 and then stood down, but by then most of hardworking been done. Shevardnadze stood down. Secretary shultz, of course, stood down with the exit from office of president reagan. And in the process the two of them conducted an enormous number of grievance, not just about nuclear arms, but about conventional arms, about the demilitarization of the superpower interventions in africa. They made progress on cuba, and they kept pushing the door of internally reforming the ussr. The americans were very, very insistent that there was going to be no deal on nuclear arms if the ussr didnt transform itself into a reliable partner. And this would mean that the ussr had to become a different sort of country. The ussr did set about its internal transformation, but in Foreign Policy it wasnt completely obsessed with america. It was very nearly obsessed to the extent of ignoring the rest of the world in its relationship with america, but its also tried to read fashion its ties with client states like iraq and libya. It also disengaged from afghanistan, and moreover, its not a new relationship with the peoples republic of china as hopefully its not a counterweight to the americans. So there was a lot happening in this period. I think we never under estimate the worldly importance of the process. And we should never underestimate the importance of the intelligence, Intelligent Management that took place, both between president reagan and general secretary gorbachev, but also involving secretary of state shultz and minister of Foreign Affairs shevardnadze. These are the big four who laid the foundations for the peace that followed, for which we all need to be grateful. In the bush years Eastern Europe was liberated, and eventually the soviet union imploded. For 10 years or more, its imploded largely peacefully. We are now in an era where wars are breaking out in parts of the old ussr. But we are to be grateful that the ussr at the point of its initial implosion went into history not with a bang but with a whimper. Now, what i thought i would end with was a few questions that we have a chance to hear sector of shultz answers on. I would really like to know whether there was any point in the process of ending the cold war when he really feared that it really could all go badly wrong. It doesnt seem to be turbine at highly smooth process, was any point at which you felt this is going the wrong way, it could really be catastrophic . And also its a related point, ma how crucial do think it was that president reagan and general secretary gorbachev with the people at the helm of all of this . How much importance of you give to those human . And could have been, what could have happened particularly if some other than reagan had been in power, or gorbachev empower . This is a bit cheeky. Was there anything you as secretary of state would have done differently if you had your time again . Widget tackled anything with the knowledge you now have about things did turn out that you had done differently . And lastly, what more could an american leaders have done in the early 90s to have settled the post cold war peace better than they did . Was it a situation that you feel those things were done for the better in very difficult situations, or do you think chances were missed . And id like to finish by then sank thanks very much for giving me the opportunity to put these questions, one of which is a bit impertinent. Thank you very much. I can barely remember one question. [laughter] let me start with a story that gets as all of them. After he left office, gorbachev came here to stanford and were standing around in my backyard on campus pic and i said to him, what do you think were both in office when the cold war was as cold as it could do. When we left it was all over but the champagne get what you think was a turning point . He said without a minutes hesitation, reykjavik. I said why . He said at reykjavik the two leaders got together for two days and talked about every subject. So he got so we understood each other. He said what you think a turning point was . I said i thought the turning point was when we deployed nuclear tipped Ballistic Missiles in germany. He said why is that . I said because that showed the strength of our alliance. And the soviets had to see that and realize that we were strong and our diplomacy was based on strength. Now, theres lots of things that happened before gorbachev came along, and that was one of them. Let me recount a few that i think had significance. First of all, there was a mindset. President reagan thought that the soviet union was not all it was cracked up to be. And if you read his westminster speech in 1982 he laid it all. He said of all the people try to migrate these days, none are going to the communist country. They are all coming to the free countries. Doesnt that tell you something . And i had my own experiences when i was secretary of the treasury. We had a big brouhaha about grain sales so i got to see a to help you on that. They did a great job, and in the end we knew more about soviet Grain Production than they did. And i talked to our agricultural people and they were appalled at the poor yields they got because we could track which plans a wonderful i could see the soviets agricultural situation was lousy. My late wife was a nurse and were in moscow. Should go to a hospital or something to say, she could hardly get up fast in the. She said the status of cleanliness in operation dont even come close to what we need. So i could see the Health System left a lot to be desired. And i had lots of interactions with my soviet counterparts, and when were in a formal settings, i could see they were very uneasy about the soviet economy. So my advice was this can change. I may say this was not the attitude in the cia or the dod. They all thought and, in fact, cap weinberger tried to sabotage the some of your key ca cap d bill, bill case of them cia, came to me and said i should ask for george his resignation for what hes doing with the soviet union. After in his diaries as george isnt what i wanted to do. Maybe i should ask cap and a bill for the resignation last night he wrote those things out. Another thing that happened that had an interesting sort of effect, i got back from a trip to china where there was a lot of that happen, god a lot of press. Lucky to land at Andrews Air Force base because it was known. It snowed all day friday, friday night, saturday morning. My phone rings and its nancy on the phone and she says ill be coming over for supper. I want when i go over and the four of us were sitting around and all of a sudden theyre asking me about the chinese leaders, what kind of people are there, do they have a sense of humor. What are they would about . So then they start asking me about the soviet leaders because they knew i have dealt with them. And im sitting there and im saying to myself, you know, this guy has never had an important meeting with a daytime communist leader, and hes dying to have one. So i had with great difficulty gotten permission of weekly meetings with the ambassador and the object of the base was due clear away weeks before the group, no big deal. So i said to him, the ambassador is coming over. What if i bring over and you tok to him but he said thats a great idea. He said this new leader is in a constructive dialogue and about it. We got an unmarked car that came up to the East Entrance of the white house and went up to the family quarters. We wouldve released an hour and a half. We talked about everything. But at least a third of the time reagan focus on human rights issues and soviet jewry, the pentecost. He said i saw something happened or i will say or do i just want it to happen. He said about the pentecostals, remember the rush and or embassy and they were still the. Its like a big neon sign in moscow singh we dont treat people right. Usage ought to do something about. So we were riding home back to the state department and this is why dont we make that our special project . We had memos go back and forth and finally i got one i thought was reasonable. I took it over to the president. I said mr. President of any lawyer would tell you can drive a truck through th the holes ine space of paper but have to live with all of the background if we get them to leave the embassy they would be allowed to go home. So thats what happened. I went to the people go all the families, i think about 60 people or Something Like that, and i said to the president , the deal is [inaudible] because he said all the time i will not say a word. He didnt. And i said to myself, you know, that had some meaning. Because president reagan could see you can make a deal with these people, and the solicitors seat they knew very well, look what i did. And he didnt. So basically said, you can trust us. And i think there was something there that help in the long run, but all these things happen before gorbachev came along. So we have said, we have set our agenda very publicly, heres what our agenda is a people said our imf agenda can fit 1500 deploy, we had done. We set our objects in negotiations go to your. People said what a ridiculous agenda, but that was our agenda. In the end we got a. So a lot happened before gorbachev came along, trying to say he wasnt a big figure but i think you asked what i was most upset come after we deployed our missiles the soviets withdrew from the negotiations and to come to a lot of war talk. It was scary in its way, but i would have to give our allies could it. They all stood firm. And gradually over time the soviets settle down a little bit. And by the summer of 1984 i was able to go to the presidency, mr. President , and i think four or five of our embassies in europe, so the government has come up to one of ours and has said the same thing. The soviets blinked. And i said to them, maybe you want to think this over because jimmy carter had canceled those meetings when they went to afghanistan and they are still there. He said i dont have to think it over, lets get him here. The one little incident that gorbachev came, or gromyko came, went into, what was done was i had a Good Relationship with nancy. Should always fix me up with a movie star at state district thats i got to dance with ginger rogers. [laughter] but i said to her, they have been meeting in the oval office, we walked down. There was some standard runtime. We come to the white house hostess, why dont you be there in the stands around time and greet them with so she liked the idea. So gromyko is a smart guy. As soon as he sees nancy he makes a beeline to her. And at one point he says to her, touch her husband want peace of course my husband wants peace. Gromyko says ben, when ivory coast to sleep whisper in his ear, peace. He was a little taller than her, and she said i will whisper in your ear, peace. But it was kind of fun. But then restart the arms control negotiations and we got that going again. Theres an interesting cable to president reagan basically tied by getting rid of nuclear weapons. All this happened, and that set the stage for gorbachev. But i think when you talk about shevardnadze, youre right, my wife and i said hes a new foreign minister, well have lots to argue about but at least we got to the human relationship with them. So the first time they were meeting we went out of our way to see that they were included in social event and introduced around to someone, work on things that way. I think that was very important to him, shevardnadze. I think about it appreciated that. Spent we went a little incident. Sometimes or always wondering whats the relationship between shevardnadze and gorbachev. Shevardnadze commits, is that including gorbachev . I think speed let me tell my story. Soy. I thought you were asking a question. We have the first summit meeting in geneva, and which often put into place a program making it hard to get [inaudible] so the dinner was at the soviet place and were sitting around, about 10 of us and a guy comes around with vodka and he does all the shot glasses with vodka. And shevardnadze gets up and elect a president reagan and he says, mr. President , i had to come all the way to geneva to get vodka, antidowns it. You know they have a pretty Good Relationship. [laughter] how about this question i was putting about whether he would have been anything differently if you did it again . Is there anything on the american side you think you might have looked at begin differently . Well, i think it was a good thing to build up our strength, and president reagan first day in office was to build our military back up. Military people were not even wearing their uniforms in the pentagon. We increased the budget. This budget director didnt like it but he did it anyway. And then we got our economy moving and we worked to see that we have the strength before we really wanted to engage heavily. And by the time we got to early 83, things are beginning to roll very well. So that was good. I think my biggest disappointment came at the end. In december of 1988, after our election, george bush was then president elect, gorbachev came to the United Nations and gave a speech. And i went to this speech and listen carefully. And the hard news that people ran what was he said they were withdrawing 500,000 troops from europe with associate thanks and other equipment. Thats big news. But i thought the bigger news, i listen to the speech, was he basically said the cold war is over. The language of the speech was a stunning. And i later read that he thought it was, Winston Churchill had announced inspect the start of the cold war and the thought he was announcing the end of it. And then we had a luncheon for him over in governors island, and Vice President was there and a few other people, and it was a nice event. And i just come from the speech. Not that the others had come from the speech. As we are eating president reagan says to me, whats the matter with george . It was obvious he didnt want to be there. And then i read that in Brent Scowcroft memoirs comp basically this is all a big charade and we should wait and not get involved. So that took a big pause, and i think jim baker and i give him credit, he made friends with shevardnadze just as i did but it took them about six months to get back on track, and that was lost time. But anyway, it came in and they managed the endgame of the cold war the cold war very well by not counting their chest. When the wall fell he didnt go over screening. Spent i think that was very important that the americans didnt let out a lot of cheering. By 88 and 89 the soviet union was entering a critical phase and was giving away concessions that were only imaginable five years before. But some of gorbachev needed to retain his dignity, and a different pair of president s might have not had that. I think they did it very, very well. Do you think that things wouldve been different with a different american president . How much do you think the personalities mattered and this as against, say, the macroeconomic problems of the u. S. As our . Well, i served president eisenhower. I had some contact in the kennedy and johnson administrations. I served in the Nixon Administration three different posts, and reagan. And my favorite is reagan. He was comfortable with himself come and get deep values, and his ideas had continuity. He stuck with what he thought. And when he came to washington, he was called in a new bowl boob or Something Like that, and he was happy with that because he if he was underrated he would just go right by them before they realize. Thats what happened. So i thought reagan was fantastic in that sense. He was a senior fellow here at hoover, and he came to dinner at our house more than once and went real deep discussions with them with some powerhouses. And have interesting how he stood up and argued with those guys. What you got out of it was he had these views that he expressed in very simple terms but he understand why you that hes picky set our problem is to get the government sent out of your pocket and out out of your pocket and off of your back. Congress would take yours to express the ins and outs of that. But he understood what he was talking about. What about gorbachev, what do you make of him . He was come he is i should say a brilliant man. I got to him reasonably well and like them a lot. When he came near, it was not long after i left office. He was still general secretary and became your to visit me. He asked that we have a similar with some of the leading minds at center. Is going to be at after he privately had to be a Nobel Laureate to make the cut, and we had physicists, chemists, mathematicians, economists like bill friedman. It was a starspangled group. I had a rehearsal the day before. I said to them, we only have one hour, go around the room come to think of something to say in your field that has some real content, but four minutes, five maximum. So we went around the room like that come and gorbachev responded to each of these interventions with content, and he had no way of knowing ahead of time with who was going to be there. It was brilliant. Everybody was stunned. There was one guy there who was an earthquake expert on andy called me up after the session and he said, we had an earthquake in San Francisco and some of the older buildings have trouble, and they had one at the same size in armenia and everything fell down. I said why dont you just say the first part . Thats all he said. Gorbachev without a minutes hesitation second we had one about the same size in armenia and everything fell down. And he said we have some pretty good engineers. I know you could india but we have good engineers, too. Our problem in the soviet union and we cant get people to build things according to the engineering specifications. But what a penetrating remark. He was a person who would listen. I remember the first time i met him. It was at a funeral to be one of the last delegations to be received. Vice president bush was a better site didnt have to lead. I the luxury. Most i could sit back and watch. Afterwards i said to our delegation, this is like he is much better informed but quicker. Hes going to be a tough adversary. But one thing different is you can have a conversation with them. You sit across the table from somebody and he says something that goes by your area and you Say Something that goes by his, thats not a conversation. Conversation is when you listen and respond to what the other person says. You can see thats what gorbachev was willing to do. So you could really engage him. And for instant you mention charts. We worked on the human rights issue, and one of our ideas was that we are moving into an Information Age, and an Information Age is getting left behind if your society is closed. I had some charts and things, and i had a terrible presentation on that come and gorbachev listen carefully. And later he told me it had some effect. He was willing to listen. I mean, i do know that, that appears in the soviet documents, your conversations about the Information Age. I have to say that when i was going to the soviet union in those years, it was a rare day when you saw a photocopier, because photocopiers were thought of as instruments of subversion. So the change in the technology that they had to make was going to threaten, as a lot of them thought, the whole system. In a way that soviet leaders who pointed to the dangers of reform had a point. Once you start there will be no end to it. Yeah, but if you dont start you go further and further behind. Interesting, im somewhat of an asian bath and when i was in office i went out that way quite a bit. I always stopped and had a chance to talk to bill, a great guy. One time we were there i said look what would happen if that enable fight between our forces in the pacific and the soviet forces. He didnt take a minute the he said we would wipe them out. I said why is that . He said our kids come on the ships come in the subject remember a carrier is just a big computer with planes and guns on the into the. Our kids come on the ships and their familiar with all this stuff. And so they are at home. And so the kids have never seen these things before and they dont respond. Do you think bill gates is the right information . [inaudible] spirit unto the audience would love to ask some questions. We have roving mike max, and a little bit of time. So whos going to go first . Please identify yourself also. Yes. Im Tom Hendricks at a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. My question is regarding the reagan doctrine as it applied to support of the mujahideen in afghanistan, in angola and the contras in nicaragua and love it in cambodia. Can you tell us how important it was in the whole scheme of things . And if youre inclined can get tied to similar policies in which the present administration is trying but youre not working very well, so if you have a commentary on that it would be terrific. We thought that the soviet union should be challenged in the places where they went. The way we went about it was decided we would support the people there who were presenting a challenge and provide them with arms and other things and encourage them. We didnt have the idea were going to deploy a lot of troops aror there or anything. In poland, for instance, we were very clear in supporting them but we also cautioned them dont push the envelope too hard, we are not going to have a new war over this, but push a little. Interestingly we had a little project that the president approved of to try to loosen the ties of the Eastern European countries to the soviets. And John Whitehead was my deputy. So i put him in charge. He is a smooth operator. He goes to warsaw and hes met at the our part and i said, mr. Secretary them everything is set. Called the meeting she wanted. The president was here at 10 00 with the foreigners and so on. Lech walesa is stuck over, where is it, and so he wont be here but Everything Else is out. So the white house says no problem, dont worry about it. Dont problem. I will fly over there and see him over there. No problem. So in our other the same statement, then one on one will be here lech walesa will be are after all. Were making a little headway. I remember visiting hungary whether to shop like a free market shop comes a natural i went and bought something. I learned that Margaret Thatcher had been there and their graduate trying to stir up trouble. Let me move on. My name is sydney, and a good friend of mine and a person for whom i have the highest respect for his career is andrei sakharov. Using hasnt been mentioned once, and i was his name has been mentioned once and im wondering if it reflects a judgment that really did the Human Rights Movement beyond his bomb building was not much of a factor in the course of events, am i correct, or is that anything you could add to that . Well, i think he was a presence were very well aware of. I believe by the time i took office he was banished to corky, but we could see heres a man who stood up to this regime. I think it was over continued testing which he objected to end was very clear about it. So he stood up to the regime and he was banished. But we kept come we always will we thought we had a big human rights agenda, he was audit. And when gorbachev came to power, well, he thought sakharov would come back to moscow and she had, i called on him a couple of times. You told me you called on him once at the neighbors were objecting because the symphony came and played for them and they said its too noisy around here get what he was very proud of. The thing i meant the most very proud of a high quality of the cookies his wife had. Actually they were pretty good. I think sakharov is a really important aspect of the late history of the soviet union. In a way, they spread to the political elite. It would have gotten arrested 20 years before, perhaps even 10 years before. What they did threaten is changes inside peoples mind in a big way. It was a giant of the 20th century. David. Theres a good book about to come out in october of a conference we had. Its going to be an important book. David holloway, stanford, when you responded to the most dangerous period when you were pessimistic you mentioned the aftermath in germany, as i recall president regan made a speech in january of 1994 that was widely seen as reaching out to the soviet union. Can you say more about that period . Was it a response a worry about the war scare or propaganda of war . You mentioned that the deployment was a keyturning point, but dealing with the aftermath we were trying to calm things down. It was a coordinated thing. Not long after that, there was a meeting somewhere, i was there, and i made a more operational version and we had a meeting. It was a civil meeting. It was the beginning of something. Amir. Yeah. Amir with the stewart department. My question to secretary how would you compare sharpavov with whom you dealt with, communism. On the other hand, you have jinping, how would the two deal with any of that. I met with both with them. Theyre both extraordinary people, very able. People say sometimes the orientals are hard to interpret, not jinping. I went to china and with jinping, we said, you put anything you want to talk about and ill put on the table i want to talk about. Well make an agenda of that. Ill agree to come to beijing at least one once a year and we both go through International Meetings and talk three or four hours just the two of us and can have staff work on this agenda, it worked very well. He had a meeting in july, robert shaw had been there recently. I asked him, what do you think . He doesnt know what to do about the economy. Its going to blow up in his face. I said, what about china . I started with agricultural, then Small Businesses and people succeeded. So people want more of what success, im giving them what they want to our economy is going to blossom. Now china is reading for the two openings. We are going to open china on the inside so people can move around. I said whats the other opening, the other opening to the outside world. Im glad theres a reasonably coherent world. I thought he was really first class. Richard, over there. Im richard at the Hoover Institution. You mentioned a little bit the fall of the wall and a trip to hungary, did you see that we are limited on time so you only get one question. Did you see this coming . About the war . [inaudible] i thought peter peter wrote down the speech and i reflected on that. I didnt happen to be in berlin at the time. He had done a good job of fighting for it. It seemed to me that i reflected on, it was a metaphor to reagan saying to people, this can change, even this wall can come down. So he was basically sending the message. Its got to change. That was his message. He delivered that consistently. He gave a fascinating speech moscow state university. He was invited to talk to students there and i sat there and i had the i could see him talking. I had a place where i could watch the students. At fist they had a business guy and all of a sudden, i could see him saying he is talking about us. You can see it all come to life and start paying attention. Regan had a way of talking that way. Peter and then last question. Peter. Where did Peter Robinson Hoover Institution. Where did he come from and the bureau was responding and identify heard it say that reagan, although by our figure, they their standards seemed a quite vigorous man and, the bureau was in something of a jam , question for secretary schultz whether he knew what it was doing and affect two generations and maybe David Holloway if we have deliberations at this point. Where did that man come from . He went to london. He got word, we can do business with this man. But you have to remember were the first leaders of the soviet union ever to live in the soviet union. All the others are in special cocoons. They didnt know what life was like in the soviet union. Both grew up and they made by way the bureaucracy and so on. They lived there. They understood. And i believe its correct, im not absolutely it must have been a shock to him to contrast with the so soviet union. So he was different without a doubt. He was a very bright observant guy, but he actually lived in his own country. He went back home and would go to a special place and so on. Last question. Yes. Yeah. I mean Lisa Anderson in hoo, Hoover Institution, is there any evidence that what was happening in United States in terms of the success and builtup of the economy and the other efforts that have been discussed, that they decide that this led to the selection of a younger more vital open leader in gorbashev . I think that during the first reagan presidency they tried their upmost to cope with the sort of threat, the sort of pressure that youre talking about in international relation, but this comes back to peters question also. All through secretly debated the whole change of political economic, cultural, religious and imperial problems if you think of Eastern Europe as part of the empire, and they did it endlessly. Theyre all over there in the archive and looked to the symptoms of the disease more or less on a weekly basis. What they could never get around to was agreeing on the need for a cure. They were like a doctor who could talk endlessly about symptoms but was fearful about framing a cure, and i feel that it was american pressure over years as weve been saying, but it was also they had four or five years where they tried to control their problems and nothing had happened. And that meant that garbashov was given a better chance to reform the soviet union than he would have done if elected four or five years earlier. That run into so much international and internal difficulty. Thats the answer. Were out of time. I think we could go on for another hour, however, we must be reasonable. I want to thank secretary schultz and professor for a wonderful presentation. [applause] [inaudible conversations] this is book tv on cspan2, television for serious readers. 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