Indict all of them and thats not liberal in my sense of the word. But equally there have been a lot of individuals doing wrong and i think conservatives have been far too quick to defend them and to endorse a way of proceeding within the criminal justice that they wouldnt in any other circumstance. Fortunately, i think thats changing so yes, there is this group but i think the libertarians are winning that argument for short. Rich lowry under other colleagues think about your book, what are your . National review is a very intellectually diverse place. Rich is more of a conservative. In this book i hope to present the arguments. Im not rude to anyone in the book is totally respectful of all of you. And since its a National Review idea. There should be something in it fo i would have brought a copy down but its a pacific and it was too heavy for me to carry. I will interrupt at 1 00 lets weve already gone into open discussion so that well have at least 10, 15 minutes for q a. Lets give a warm welcome to robert service. [applause] it goes without saying but i should say it anyway, that its a massive honor to be able to discuss ideas with a maker of history such as secretary shultz this afternoon. And we thought of doing this in this way, and then i will get round to posting a few questions, get through get to later. But i thought i got to start by emphasizing how dangerous the cold war was. Weekend nowadays to regard the ussr as a pack of cards that was just about ready to fall over or whoever blew on it first, and yet we forget just how dangerous it was as one of the superpowers armed to the teeth and capable of taking a number of options towards its future, other than the Reform Program adopted by mikhail gorbachev. And the cold war was truly dangerous. It nearly became the global hot war in 1962 in the cuban missiles crisis. It could have happened again in 1983. Because of the able archer military exercise that moscow misread as a cover for potential American Nuclear assault on moscow. There was a mutual fear and to some extent misapprehension, this comprehension, ms. Understanding on both sides. A very fragile atmosphere had arisen by the middle of the 1980s. Reagan in moscow, president wright and moscow was seen as a warmonger, more or less across the whole range of the soviet political elite. The possibility of this leading to International Complications and catastrophe only need to be spelled out. And on the other side gorbachevs Reform Program was very unclear in many of its essentials. It was always changing. It changed from 1985 through to the end of the soviet union. It was not a fixed Reform Program. Again, the possibilities for argument and for discussion about what was going on were enormous. Various stages have to be itemized in the progress towards that piece, that ended the cold war. There was the extraordinary january 1986 Nuclear Armed aggression of gorbachev, which flummoxed american policymakers to some great extent, certainly caused a great deal of for the mistrust, but then came the reykjavik summit. And a lot of soviet concessions were offered and in snatched back. And then in the winter of 1986 into 1987, gorbachevs own politburo pressed on him the need to undo the package of nuclear arms disarmament proposals that he had, which president reagan refused to accept as a total package. And ironically the peace making gorbachev was the one who held up the progress to the idea of unraveling the package. I have to say this point how useful it is to be able to use both the american and soviet archives into agency over there, the Hoover Institution archives. Its the most remarkable treasure trove of materials about the end of the cold war in the hope of the world. I dont think theres anywhere like it that has this bilateral facility where you can study both the american responses and the soviet responses, and then tie them together and see what the interaction was between the two sides. Eventually as you all know when reagan stepped down from office, president bush took over, engaged in a pause in which he reviewed policy, and eventually adopted essentially Ronald Reagans policy of engagement with the ussr, particularly after gorbachev declined to intervene in the east european revolutions of 1989. And the achievements of this process cannot be understated. And armed reductions treaty became possible and was signed in 1988. Eastern europe was evacuated by the red army and noncommunist governments were formed. And a largely peaceful way. The World Communist Movement fell apart. It had been falling apart for years and in the case, but it fell apart as a world movement. People and russia and its adjacent republics inside the ussr had new freedoms to communicate with each other, to travel abroad, to listen to tv and radio from foreign countries. Agreements were made unconventional weaponry in europe. In that short space of time, in other words, a half decade at the end of the 1980s, extraordinary decisions were taken that brought an end to the most terrifying not war in human history. There have been hundreds of cold wars in history. The british and the french specialized, perhaps still specialized, in cold wars. And theyve engaged in many hot wars as well but no cold war before the cold war had the capacity to threaten human and other animal life universally around the planet. It was an extraordinarily dangerous phenomenon. Now, what i have the opportunity to do today is to focus on that aspect of the ending of the cold war because we are one of the principles with us on the platform here. And if you think that one aspect of the ending of the cold war thats being underplayed by most scholars is the relationship between the state department and the soviet ministry of Foreign Affairs, and specifically between secretary shultz, who is with us today, and foreign minister, the late edward shown us can. You will have to think for two seconds about this to see why this was the crucial factor. President reagan had many other things to think about than just how we dealt with the soviet union. Mikhail gorbachev had even more things to think about because the grasp of governance in the ussr was much more extensive than the grasp of government is for an american president in the u. S. He was engaged on a massive transformation of his country. It, therefore, fell to the Foreign Policy managers, the secretary of state and the Foreign Affairs minister, to cope with the operational consequences of the generally agreed policy, a policy agreed by the American Government and private soviet politburo, for their own reasons. That the cold war was altogether too dangerous to actually be used as are also the additional reason that without any the cold war it would be very, very difficult to hold onto the remaining fragments of the declining soviet economy. So they had a very practical reason as well as their own claim to moral reason or political reason to end the cold war. So while oversight was constant by reagan and gorbachev, two men had the task of making the objectives of the two leaders of the day operationally practical. And these two men were Eduard Shevardnadze and george shultz. And they have to do this in an extraordinarily dynamic environment where no day was predictable a day before it happened. We all remember the bewildering rapidity of change. So the two Foreign Policy establishments had to be held together by great sophistication in a lot of determination. So we had a deal maker over here in the u. S. In the person of secretary shultz, and we had a radical reformer in the shape of, in the figure of Eduard Shevardnadze. Both the long queue administrations which were not lacking in internal division. Anyone who has read secretary shultzs memoir is well aware that he had continually to struggle for the line that was prescribed for the administration by the president himself. The same was true in the soviet politburo, as a gorbachevs general objections widened and deepened, there was opposition and resistance from people who were not quite so keen on reform as gorbachev was. So both the secretary and the minister had to do what they could, and they did what they could, to embolden the president and the general secretary whenever there commitment seemed to waver. I regard this as one of the crucial elements often missed in the accounts. How did they do it . How do they do it . Well, if you read the soviet accounts, the soviet diaries in the hoover archives over there, the diaries of, for example, [inaudible] and the deputy prime minister, its obvious that one thing that happened very early on was the partnership of secretary shultz and minister shevardnadze. I was very impressed at how impressed the soviets were in the Foreign Ministry at the secretarys decision to invite not just shevardnadze but also shevardnadzes wife to their First Encounter in helsinki in summer 1985. Is touched shevardnadze. Shevardnadze do that he was going to be meeting a real living human being, and so was his wife. So the social aspect to this. And the second example ill give which i think occurs in mr. Schultz memoirs, in fact i know it does but ive read in the soviet accounts, when they went down to georgia in 1987 and shevardnadze put on a huge banquet for the american delegation headed by mr. Shultz and at some point in the of mr. Shultz arranged for a singing of georgia on my mind. [laughter] this might seem a small thing, but it was a big thing for shevardnadze. Shevardnadze was a great georgian patriot. He came from a small nation inside the ussr that had been kicked around by the russians. The word of georgia coming georgian, is not georgia but shevardnadze knew just about enough english to know the word in english was a georgia, and he was very, very touched by this. And so was his entourage. There was a mutual learning expert speakers can interrupt you there . Theres an interesting little story. It actually happened in moscow. And we had a pattern, the foreign minister had this big house. Negotiate in the warning and then a sort of a semisocial lunch and then we go back to negotiations. A lunch always shevardnadze would give a toast and i would give a toast. And we are beginning to inch ahead. The talk was still stiff and i thought ive got to loosen this up somehow. So instead of the regular toast i got the sheet music for georgia on my mind knowing all the background now, and i put the word in russian. Then i had a recording and i got three guys are more embassy who spoke russian to sing it in russian and then i think it. It actually did kind of break the ice. It was a big hit. I didnt change any disposition but it kind of got us a little more relaxed. So after all left office there was a party for the president and nancy down in los angeles, asked me to come and ask me to tell that story. So i went down, my dinner partner that night with dinah shore. She asked what is going to do at a total. Cycad up when i tell the story advancing georgia. Im leaving and it comes dinah shore. She grabs the mic and she says to me, mr. Secretary, let me show you how to sing that song. [laughter] she got through, i said where were you when i needed you and moscow . [laughter] excuse me for interrupting. Thats great, great story. Then only got on very well, but also learn from each other, and secretary shultz made a point of taking economic pie charts and all the rest of it to moscow on his visits so that soviet leaders would begin to understand what quite a mess they were heading into with the economic system. To what we are talking about here then are not just negotiators but were talking about people who were acquainted each other with the nature of their own respective systems, as a learning experience here thats very, very important. The other thing that it think is common to both secretary shultz and minister shevardnadze in this period is that unwillingness to automatically accept what the respective intelligence agencies were telling them. Now, this wasnt true of shevardnadze, this was true of shevardnadze, certainly true of gorbachev as well, inside of the soviet leadership there was huge disrespect for the kgbs reports. There was a lot of reliance, therefore, put on what the soviet leaders saw for themselves with their own eyes in america. On the american side, the state department under mr. Shultz is leadership, was quite abrasive at times in its attitude to cia reporters. Direct negotiating experience and observation of the other country by the leaders was a very, very important to how things turn out. On both sides that was the recognition as well that the ussr really wasnt changing. So the soviet leadership was constantly saying to the americans, we are changing, cant you see were changing ss as we can ask the americans didnt let up the pressure your if the soviet union wanted a bargain, which would give it breathing space to conduct its own internal transformation, and that was the whole point of the reapproachment with america, the whole point was to get breathing space in orderto renovate communism, to preserve, conserve communism. That was their objective. They didnt understand that theyre actually introducing the solvent of communism by loosing the system culturally, politically and economically. They didnt understand the architecture of communism, the chemistry of communism. But this played into the american position very nicely. If they made a mistake in judgment about what was likely to be the consequence, too bad for the soviets. Who on earth wanted communism to survive any longer than it needed to in any case . So they got together, secretary and minister. The minister fought his well judgment thought his way into 1990 and then stood down, but by then most of hardworking been done. Shevardnadze stood down. Secretary shultz, of course, stood down with the exit from office of president reagan. And in the process the two of them conducted an enormous number of grievance, not just about nuclear arms, but about conventional arms, about the demilitarization of the superpower interventions in africa. They made progress on cuba, and they kept pushing the door of internally reforming the ussr. The americans were very, very insistent that there was going to be no deal on nuclear arms if the ussr didnt transform itself into a reliable partner. And this would mean that the ussr had to become a different sort of country. The ussr did set about its internal transformation, but in Foreign Policy it wasnt completely obsessed with america. It was very nearly obsessed to the extent of ignoring the rest of the world in its relationship with america, but its also tried to read fashion its ties with client states like iraq and libya. It also disengaged from afghanistan, and moreover, its not a new relationship with the peoples republic of china as hopefully its not a counterweight to the americans. So there was a lot happening in this period. I think we never under estimate the worldly importance of the process. And we should never underestimate the importance of the intelligence, Intelligent Management that took place, both between president reagan and general secretary gorbachev, but also involving secretary of state shultz and minister of Foreign Affairs shevardnadze. These are the big four who laid the foundations for the peace that followed, for which we all need to be grateful. In the bush years Eastern Europe was liberated, and eventually the soviet union imploded. For 10 years or more, its imploded largely peacefully. We are now in an era where wars are breaking out in parts of the old ussr. But we are to be grateful that the ussr at the point of its initial implosion went into history not with a bang but with a whimper. Now, what i thought i would end with was a few questions that we have a chance to hear sector of shultz answers on. I would really like to know whether there was any point in the process of ending the cold war when he really feared that it really could all go badly wrong. It doesnt seem to be turbine at highly smooth process, was any point at which you felt this is going the wrong way, it could really be catastrophic . And also its a related point, ma how crucial do think it was that president reagan and general secretary gorbachev with the people at the helm of all of this . How much importance of you give to those human . And could have been, what could have happened particularly if some other than reagan had been in power, or gorbachev empower . This is a bit cheeky. Was there anything you as secretary of state would have done differently if you had your time again . Widget tackled anything with the knowledge you now have about things did turn out that you had done differently . And lastly, what more could an american leaders have done in the early 90s to have settled the post cold war peace better than they did . Was it a situation that you feel those things were done for the better in very difficult situations, or do you think chances were missed . And id like to finish by then sank thanks very much for giving me the opportunity to put these questions, one of which is a bit impertinent. Thank you very much. I can barely remember one question. [laughter] let me start with a story that gets as all of them. After he left office, gorbachev came here to stanford and were standing around in my backyard on campus pic and i said to him, what do you think were both in office when the cold war was as cold as it could do. When we left it was all over but the champagne get what you think was a turning point . He said without a minutes hesitation, reykjavik. I said why . He said at reykjavik the two leaders got together for two days and talked about every subject. So he got so we understood each other. He said what you think a turning point was . I said i thought the turning point was when we deployed nuclear tipped Ballistic Missiles in germany. He said why is that . I said because that showed the strength of our alliance. And the soviets had to see that and realize that we were strong and our diplomacy was based on strength. Now, theres lots of things that happened before gorbachev came along, and that was one of them. Let me recount a few that i think had significance. First of all, there was a mindset. President reagan thought that the soviet union was not all it was cracked up to be. And if you read his westminster speech in 1982 he laid it all. He said of all the people try to migrate these days, none are going to the communist country. T