On our heritage. Org website and joining us on cspan booktv in the future. Those here in house we would ask that courtesy check that our mobile devices of various sorts have been silenced or turned off. For those watching online youre welcome to sending questions or comepts at any time simply emailing us at speaker at heritage. Org and, of course, well post the program on our heritage home page for your future reference as well. Welcoming our guest today and leading our program is dakota woods senior register fellow for defense proposal and our center for national defense. Mr. Woods served nation for decades in u. S. Marine corps. Including Service Strategic analyst for the marine corps. And assignment at the assessment upon retirement he helped organize national bioviolent department of home lapd security effort for five years had he served as a senior fellow at the center for strategic and budgetary assessment after which had he was a strategist for the u. S. Marine corps. Special operations command. Join me and welcoming dakota wood. Dakota. [applause] a real pleasure enhave dr. Krainl from carlisle we took the fastest run hes ever made to d. C. So were glad that to have a lesson interruptful but biographical information and take just a moment of has time to are go over his background. Its its remarkable. Currently serves as chief of Historic Services at the Army HeritageEducation Center up in carlisle bareic and you can see a trend here served as Strategic Studies Institute for several years from work college from 2000 to 2003 where he also held the general Douglas Macarthur chair of research. Also held vandenberg chair for college so interested to have somebodys both an expert historian and land power and air power and being able to talk about intersection of both. All of this followed a 6year career in the u. S. Army. Concluded with nine years as a professor of history of u. S. Military academy and hold bachelor degree from military academy and then masters in degree from stanford, university and general Staff College and a u. S. Army war college by my account authored 11 book or monograves since year 2000. I dont know whether hobbies you might have. But rest assured. Okay. We have at least 11 of them. Civil war, world war ii vietnam and most recent work on reprizing and historic stuff and a putting in modern context from strategy and environments within which that fold here in modern day context it was maimed one of newsweek people to watch in 2007. For his leading work in leading the team that authored f and 3 24 on that army title to it. But i ignore this retired marine. November 2008 named international archivist of the foundation and just recently here in 2016, the select to receive the society of military history Samuel Elliot morrison prize for a lifetime contribution to the field of military history so a real pleasure to have mr. Crane with us and look forward to your insight on where weve been and where were at, and possibly where were going and encountered stability operations. Thank you. [applause] thank you very much. You know, its aen your seat belts i have 30 slides to go through, and leave time for questions. Ive got what im trying to do is not satisfy so buy copies of the book and it is a lot cheaper out there than i can it so i highly recommend it is really good deal out there. This is a image of the book the also picture there is actually outside the embassy in baghdad that was sign struck me as fairly interesting gave a sense of the atmosphere over there. I often wondered who was walking in embassy drinking while they were armed. Reason how i got into this, the term you remember aware cassandra was a figure from greek methodology to never get hurt and i got involved in a number of things in the early early years of millennium the red one on the riffs a piece i did avoiding vietnam where i talked about army spongs to vietnam which was not to learn how to fight wars better but to figure out how to avoid these kind of wars. And i close in 2002 with a plea that we need to revisit counterdoctrine, the one on the left because of work and instability operation put in war with a college came up with a plan to rebuild iraq for mayor of baghdad this is in late 2002 when army thought therm going nb charge of redestruction and day we finished a report was day that secretary roosevelt created the humanitarian affairs under Jennifer Garner and sent to the people to the applicant planners in kuwait and used it to develop their plan and we know how that came out and we became much more famous for being ignored than we were for the plan wof done if people would have paid attention to it. Because of that, when the time came to rewrite the doctrine my west point classmate asking me to be in charge to do that. What general petraeus and also for the marine corps. Were really fortunate at this time in the in the history of those two services that they could pull two of the war and put them in position where they could really revise the training education for the services to bring they m into 21st city on war fight and general petraeus was the engine of change, which is a you know the idea is that you sending people out to the field you get your lessons as fast as you can and you bring them back into the Training Society and get them to collect them into training and doctrine i used to tell people you can see my position and engine of change i used to tell people i was one toots on one cog and dave is engine of change. I can call him dave as a classmate. But there were we had a number of arguments during the during development, doctrine we knew who the boss and i won a fw but not as many as he did. But again the whole idea that were going to create a learning organization for modern warfare he and general mattis doing that for the marine and army. It was atip it call process to develop this doctrine that was light speeds for anyone deal requesting military doctrine are. A lot of it because we have general petraeus as a champion we went around bureaucratic avenue to get it done but also a big tengt we called it a big tengt with a number of contradict tores from all over world involved in this. It was a joingt army marine effort a true effort each chapter had a army marine core author for it. We had a human rights as one of the major sponsors initial vetting conference she contradicted to manual as well and people gave us stuff people from academia. The media when we have our major vetting conference with jim there, and george pac or, you know tom is involved in some of the early stuff we tried to get a lot of people involved in give ing us their ideas on how to better fight these kind of wars. We have a lot of help from think tanks, rand a number of others like that who also gave us their input. But in the end it was going to be the army and marine corps. Authors who really sat down and figured out final form of this and general from officers ill talk about this. General petraeus read every word that we did. She was the last guy to look out before it went out for general review for the forces. I still have pstd over what i call petraeus pronoun so if they use the phrase this is or it is you have to be real real sure what the this is or it refers back to. I have precedent nightmares about some of this stuff. But that tell its this this story say im not hard, yeah, you are. The intent of the manual was to be applicable to anywhere and any time but the 2006 version especially ended up being shaped very much by iraq not just because he knew he was imponing to iraq because most of the inputs from krittics from soldier and marines out in the field giving us their ideas was shaped very much by iraq. So the 2006 version of the doctrine when you see it you have to understand this is very much a manual aimed at iraq. But details most of you may be made aware of these how it was different from a normal focus and in combat was population center. You have to protect the population first, an even people need to main goal is legitimate governorring authority you have to kill and capture people theres still a lot of force involved. But you have to be careful how you apply it in a mo somedayic war that differs valley and city to city and a youre not going to win in military alone. You cant, general said you cant kill yourself to victory in these kind of wars. This takes a team effort with not only your own but also with the with the the home the host nation that has got to win a lot of its own war as well. Intelligence gathering is more cull cherl angt apology in these kind of wars you have to understand how society, economies work and how politics, gender role a very different kind of intelligence process and you have to think all Campaign Design is and illustrate here in a second unlike old day when is i came into the army in the 70s, i knew who the enemy was. Enemy was the next soviet motorized it over the hill maybe going back to those days not quite sure. But in the basically way they fought the war was beat along soviets, second an you nuke them and mod wars you dont know who the enemy is. First step before the plan is figure out whats my problem set, a different kind of warfare so you have to have this process called Campaign Design which we introduced in which is now involved in all our doctrine. Youve got to youre fighting a set of enemies not an enemy so you have to dig aggregate enemy and how to deal with each ore eone differently. Perception and what people think you do is more important than what you do in many cases. So you have to manage information and big dominant theme of the whole doctrine was learn and adapt. You have to learn to adapt faster than your enemy did. The dominant approach was clear hold build ill talk about in in a little bit. Its expensive, time consuming but very effective and line of efforts which ill illustrate here in a second. And again a point ill make later of what is called counterinsurgency is modern warfare as much as we may not like it it is not going away because modern warfare is not going away. This is where i talk about line of effort and modern war fire in a diagram what youve got is youve got a whole set of operations going out. Not just combat operations. It is also developing those nations security forces, developing essentially restoring essential services. Developing good governess, and also economic development. This is all a part of what it takes to be victorious these kind of wars because youre trying to change peoples attitudes. Youre trying to get more people to support the government than dont. This is not hearts and minds coin. Artsz and minds get so it is a social Society Approach how you make everybody love you. We realize when were doing doctrine there are other parts of the anatomy you have to grab sometimes to get people tods what yowpght them tods. So theres a bunch of cohearsive things you do as well as you use carrot and stick both. You want to change peoples behavior but most support the governing authority and everything is wrapped in Information Operations. Everything you do has an information reaction. Youve got to deal with that as well. So this is this is modern warfare in a simple diagram. Way it looks on the ground this is a general mattis plan and province when he came in with the marines early in the iraq campaign. And he goes to move out and he had identified his problem set as three different enemies. Three different insurntle cities when we were doing the doctrine never sure who were talking about insurgent, but there was a tribal with the sunni tribes. There was a baptism from all of the people we threw out but they have to in 2003 and then there was i grew up from al qaeda, the foreign fighters and the idea was you have to deal with each of those prattly that sunni tribes wanted to get back in society so attracted with jobs. Baptist want to get back into the government and be with some political compromise. The foreign fighters they have to be killed or captured. Eventually as we know what happens inprovince we get sunni tribes who kill al qaeda guys they turn. We turn the tribes it that come over to our side and about they help us take out the foreign fighters. Thats way these kind of war tengd to go. Now we have a number of battles within we have internal battles and external battles to try to get this doctrine done. One of them is numbering manual. Manual set them 3 24 initial memory for the manual was f mp3 22, which meant it was the 22nd category under stability operations. We got in, and i showed up, i said this is among the team we talked about and we said this is difnlgt because of the level of violence involved and we felt it need its own category. So to the director at Fort Leavenworth i said i want to change the number on the manual like a monkey walked into the vatican and asked the pope to rearrange the Old Testament it was mass panic. Whole doctrine system will collapse if you change this number. [laughter] two weeks later general petraeus had had the same idea and i guess they thought thought about it for two weeks because when he made discussion it was a great ideas are. So the number changed. We also this is only manual youll find in the u. S. Government inventory that has a reference bibliography of civilian works civilian reading that implied government endorsement of civilian published works. Again, that was the lawyer told us that, but when general petraeus asked they gave him a different answer so we have a reference to bibliography it in 324. Reading level Army Doctrine are is written normally at 8th grade reading level because idea is that it is going to be read quickly and absorbed quickly. The argument i made was that this is being for bah battalion staff and above and read a harder text so it is reading is up 12th grade level i think is where it ended up. So good it has been used as a college text an at the number of university a number of professors complain when manual got revised in 2014 that they were losing their best textbook and didnt want to change it and gives breaks. The opt it is that was a big debate eventually got resolved because of the Mccain Feingold bottom line is there was Congress Passed the regulations, the rules for it. Another army manual became standard for it so we didnt have to deal with it because it was a real, tough not to deal with and a big keact with human rights on that when we wrote manual and eventually decided we would not allow any gray areas in any kind of morality no torture, no waterboarding then man yule basically took a hard line on that and reenforced by what congress came up with. The air power appendix i decided we need it and air power because that got to understand the air roll better, marines didnt want to do it. I kind of force it on peoples throats we wanted to get the air force involved in a air force didnt care until we start to get publicity and then they write and pose their own appendix and first thing they talked about was the air force controlling all air power. If you want to get marines trolling off the ceiling tell them youre going to that i can their airplanes away we have to do a basically a referee between air force and marines other how that would be. In the end, leans are probably right we probably end up doing more harm than good with the air force still im kind of antichrist for putting them in the appendix and lucky they got that. They got that if marines get their way but air force interested in this and done pretty good things since. Same problem with the Army Intelligence center they were uneasy with our social cultural intelligence, and even which wily got them to come onboard but delayed manual two months and delayed by that ravel peters had a chance to write nasty editorial called manual wimpy and other things. Petraeus approach if you bring it out, and draw them into the mix that a big debate between ralph and steve referee, we change 7 sentences in the manual. 7 sentences but that was good enough so when manual came the in December Ralph Peters called it most improved publication in the last decade. [laughter] but at the time the manual came out he actually supported it. In the last one was the paradox this was my idea to put the manual which is actually now a nato manual continued through doctrine to get peel to realized this is a different kind of war you have to think about a different and there are some dilemma you have to fix and how you use force and conduct it. First one sometimes in order to protect your force you cant lock yourself in a base you cant be a ffabit you have to patrol an take some risk. You have to provide People Security and they have to see you out there. You know, sometimes the more force you where use is used less effective it is it doesnt pay to five to backlash and createses 50 more you have to be careful how you do that. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. Some of the best weapons for coin do not shoot and ballot and dollars are more effective than bullets and bombs and if tactic work this is week it might not work next week and in this prorches may not in the next. Why not . What is your enemy doing . Theyre learning and dapghting too the bastards you have people involved in war an theyre continuing to change. So you ever got to understand that if you something works mow it might not work in the next swirl is lag. Enemy will department and when they find a good tactic in iraq it shows up in afghanistan a month later. The enemy is communicating as well a learning dapghting kind of war youve got to be in. The last one most important decisions are not made by generals who has the last say . The generals so they change that. But at least they kept it in and they change most of the many but again ill get to another point later that it might revision my thoughts about this process after watching the doctrine many in action. Thats really not right either that most important decisions are not made by any soldier at all. Criticism a lot of people didnt like the doctrine. [laughter] write an article called military malpractice way to do the way they did it against russians you have to make the people fear you more than they do the insurgent and enemy centric sz peters number of people say that i was surprised they got invited to give a precious at nyu, and i walk into the conference an they didnt tell me the name of the conference. The campus is new imperialism. I didnt realize i was doing that. To be honest but some see this as brutal and the way for the way to continue an they argue that civil wars are different and there are differences but also a lot of s