And the north korean policy review that President Trump has just completed. So for north korea watchers, twentysomething has certainly been an interesting year. President trump decided to review policy shortly after his inauguration, and he came back with a policy that emphasizes maximum pressure and engagement. There is been some mixed signals of what exactly guide states that be looking for from north korea before entering into negotiations. Software also has a new president. He has expressed interest in talking to the North Koreans south korea under what conditions remains somewhat of an open question. Then of course the north korea weve seen a number of Ballistic Missile test already in 2017 including some new systems. All of this is leading up to the summit that trump will hold in washington, d. C. , later this month. So dont make sense of all of these developments are and where fortunate with us today Michael Elleman and Suzanne Dimaggio. We will start today Michael Elleman, a senior fellow for Missile Defense at the institute for international and strategic studies. He has spent some time at Booz Allen Hamilton the expense of the market and cooperative Threat Reduction programs and of be remiss if i didnt add that elses written several excellent pieces for arms control today which i would encourage you to take a look at. And if obama is available in your program. Then well move on to Suzanne Dimaggio fixes and as a director and senior fellow at the new america foundation, has years of expense working on track to diplomatic initiatives and a range of issues including nonproliferation and interNational Security. With countries like iran, myanmar and north korea. She has been at the asia society and she was most recently in pyongyang in february and she has met with the North Koreans i believe just this past month and attracted ilog. Siebel turned it over to mike to get the discussion started. Great. Thank you, chelsea, thank you to the Arms Control Association for the opportunity to speak today. Im going to try to keep my comments as brief as possible and kelsey is agreed to kick me if i go over my time. It will be good entertainment for tv anyway. So i want to focus on making three essential points instead of kind of rehashing the different systems and such north korea is currently developing and i want to highlight them for recent. I hope this comes at the end clearly. One, weve seen this new pattern of missile testing under the regime of kim jongun. His grandfather, kim ilsung, under his reign for making 84 841994, i know he began before 1984, but they started missile testing in 1984. He conducted a total of i think it was 15 test, want and have missile tests per year kim jongil, under his reign there were 16 or so tests, this includes a few satellite launch attempts but they came in clusters. In 1998, and then in 2006 along with a number of other missiles fired in a single day and then again in 2009 you saw a cluster of testing. In both instances this would be inconsistent with testing to develop new systems even though im to develop the satellite launch as it turned out to be. But it seems the rational for testing was to train troops come to great operational readiness and for political purposes. Especially the july 2006 testing. Under kim jongun weve seen this wrap up of testing, i think he has now done, at last count 78 missile launches. There may have been more that failed, i dont know what i think the number is right around there. Thats 1315 test per year. Thats consistent with the Missile Development program. Compare that to say what iran is doing. I ran on average tests may be three to five are you. They make minor modification and test them out. They use them in wargames. That is far less and it is not enough testing to develop a new capability in a short period of time. When i say short printed time im talking talking three to five years. So its clear to me what weve seen is a number of new systems emerge, and ill talk about that in a moment, but what is clear is north korea is trying to great new capabilities and are going about it in a reasonably technically valid way. The second point i want to make is weve seen more north korea move beyond the scud and new dollar technology. All the missile up until kim jongun came to power were basically powered by either the scud or the nodong engine picked this includes the space launcher which it uses nodong scud technology. You can see the results and a very large system. It could in principle be converted into an icbm comp still have to be tested as an icbm to prove it a as a missile but also to validate the reentry technologies. And warhead survivability. But this would be an immobile missile. It would be launched, prepared and launched from a fixed site that it would be vulnerable to preemption picu would probably have few in number. The preparation time is on the order of days, not ours. In 2016 weve seen the emergence of three new Propulsion Systems and i think this is very important. One, weve seen the moussa don, a very different engine, much worse if than the scud know dont technology. Its derived from the old soviet era are 27 technology. Its a retired system now but it appears that north korea was able to import the engines at least if not more technology took all this technology by the way comes in either design bureaus. The engines are think almost every missile. They had a very close working relationship. Until a few months ago i thought that was the primary Virtual Network for north korea. With this new engine that we see in the moussa don even though that missile still a number of times i think its out of six to eight launches its at one apparent success and one partial success. It uses a different type of Higher Energy fuel, a much more sophisticated engine. With that type of technology you can now build in principle a road mobile icbm. And, in fact, the presumption has been that the engines would be the main power plant for the kn08 or the k in 14 at not yet been tested that they have been paraded by the North Koreans. Weve seen, and this is very puzzling to me dick i still havent quite been able to figure out exactly what new engine this is. In september of last year they did a ground test of what they called an 80ton thrust engine. The statements i came out after the test were it was destined for use on a satellite launcher and then earlier this year i think it was in march, they tested the same engine at the attached steering or when your agencies that operate in parallel. And they suggested that this would be use for a new capability. They basically said be prepared and lo and behold, two weeks ago they tested an intermediate range system. It flew to a very High Altitude of i think 22, 2100 kilometers but only about 500 kilometers range. If flown on a standard trajectory dismissal could reach ranges of 4000, 4500 km. In other words, is a is a real intermediaterange missile. Its not clear if that was the first test launch of this particular missile. There may been one or two that occurred before that failed. Its uncertain at this point. Mostly because the intelligence agencies around the world have been less than forthcoming for soul to rely on open source literature. Ill talk about why this new missile is really important along with the moussa don but i wanted to know we have seen north korea employed solid propellant motors. This is a submarine launched missile and that this new land mobile system that they launched out of a canister on a track vehicle. I think there in the first steps of mastering the production of solid propellant. I believe this is being indigenously produced it was probably designed locally. It is not a copy of any known system although it shares the central features of all firstgeneration summary launch missiles. That is its two stages, about one and half meters in, about nine meters long. There are technical reasons why you come to that Design Solutions i dont think they copied this from anyone. But its a worrying trend that if they masterfully the solid propellant technologies, they can make any missile of any size in any range that you want in the future. It will just take a lot of time and ill discuss that a bit on comments on timelines for icbm. This hs 12, the engine that powers it its a little unclear to me. Its certainly not from the bureau. It appears to be consistent with the rd 250 engine developed. As another russian concern. It is now called the premier engine manufacturer for space launch vehicles in russia. This engine was used for a number of medium lift space launch vehicles, but also for the r36, i think we called it the ss nine icbm, which was produced in of all places ukraine back when they were part of the soviet union. This means that north korea probably has an expanded network for illicit procurement. This is really worrying to me for two reasons. One, this engine in particular could be the basis for an icbm, but we now know that they probably have expanded their procurement capacity beyond, therefore we dont know how large it is anymore. We dont know what else they might have. So predicting what system they could develop in the near term to midterm is down complicated by this diversification of sources of technology. The other thing i would note, because hs 12 is a new system and its important, the outrage that we always associate with any missile launch, i think that we need to stop, or start looking at those launches which are most consequential versus those that are just kind of stand and politically oriented. I dont worry if the test a new scud, a scud or nodong type type system. I do worry to do think its important when the test moussa don or the h2o. I would preserve my Political Capital to express sanctions or other punitive measures of preventive measures and reserve those for the missiles that matter like hs12, like moussa don. Those are far more important than even satellite launches in my view. I think we should rethink how we express our concerns about what north korea is doing here i want to wrap up with timelines for icbm because thats what if one seems to be interested in these days. Its always challenging to forecast the future. A lot of things can change, but if they wanted a nearterm solution, meaning something that would be operationally viable at the end of 20182019, they could try to transform the satellite launcher into an icbm. It would have to replace the upper stages was something new, test it and invalidate the design as well as the reentry technologies. So you could see something for what i call an emergency use, probably 2019 or so. A more practical approach would be to use either the hwasong 12. They need to continue testing and more fully develop the intermediate range capability but with a few more successful successful flights of hwasong 12. I think they could from a technical perspective move towards icbm attesting. When they could create that capacity and opera glacial lies it really depends on what the requirements north korea imposes on their systems, how reliable does it need to be, 50 , 75 , 99 like u. S. And chinese systems, or russian systems. Thats an open question and thats why its difficult to project a timeline within real fidelity but assuming they want something that is at least as reliable as successful most of the time you can define most as you wish, but i think youd see at least a dozen flight tests with 75 of them being support successful then they would be operationally viable in my view, granted it would be under a more relaxed criteria. That could occur in 2020 at the very earliest, 2021 is more likely date, assuming everything went well for them. It could stretch out even further but it might be good for emergency use, say if they are being attacked by 2020. The third option they have was to use this to solid propellant technology. Its one thing to make solid rocket motors the size that you see in the k and 11 and kagan 15. But its quite another thing to build a 25, 30ton rocket motor for a first stage of an icbm. Typically it takes countries five to 12 years to move from the size you see in the k in 11 to icbm size. So its a longterm project that north korea would have to embark upon to create an icbm based on solid technologies. Therefore i would be very surprised if had something that was operational by 2025. 2025. I think the more likely date would be 2030. It will result in a lot of embarrassing mistakes. Thats just the nature Missile Development. So i think that would be a longterm project, the most likely and viable system they could develop would be based on either the moussa don or the hs12 technology pic as a set again we can see that as the next president takes office after 2020, if its not trumped it someone else. So i will conclude and leave room for questions, comments, outrage, whatever. [laughing] great. Thank you, mike. For those of you in suspense i did not have to kick in. He stayed on time. So now to talk bu but i might be able to address the rising tension and to think about some of the options or engagement with north korea Going Forward im going to turn over to suzanne. [inaudible] ill try not first let me extend my thanks to the Arms Control Association, to daryl, its such an Important Organization at this moment, maybe more important than ever. If you are not already supporting them, i urge you to do so. Thats my pitch. Let me focus, i want to focus first mostly on the policy options for the u. S. As kelsey said the administration now has completed its policy review, and for all intents and purposes it seems like it was a fairly cohesive interagency review. It declared at the end of strategic patience is over. I think an actual funeral was held in washington, and that a policy of maximum pressure and engagement was replacing it. Frankly to me it still seems very unclear if this new policy is really much different from the old policy or if its just they been given a new wardrobe. That being said there appears to be several key elements to the policy as far as i can see. What is it puts back on the table all options including military action, more aggressive action. For example, just today we know that there are naval maneuvers happening in the area of north korea, and for the first time in two decades an increase to u. S. Aircraft carriers. Also the joint roku. S. Military exercises, that just happen in april included nav navy seals, special teams that reportedly was focused on socalled decapitation exercises. So this does seem like a little bit of a ratcheting up on that side of the equation. And then during his visit to the region in march, secretary tillersons statements hinted at the possibility of a preemptive strike to destroy nuclear capabilities. He also stated that all options are on the table when questioned about a military option, opening a door to the idea of repenting worker the problem with this approach as we rely upon it exclusively is that when you threaten, you have to be prepared to use it. Its a major risk. The fact that we do not know at the North Koreans would retaliate, we would imagine that they would respond in one way, shape, or form, and that could escalate. It could inflict mass casualties, Severe Damage to our allies, south korea as well as to our other ally, japan and potentially to u. S. Forces that are based in the region. This leaves out the question how would beijing react, lead to a regional war, fullscale war . We all know that there is really no military solution to the north korea issue, and i feel very strongly about that. The second element i see is a greater reliance on china to mount more pressure against north korea. At least rhetorically. China of course is killing gangs biggest trading partner pyongyang biggest trading partner. About 90 of the total trade came from, was china including most of north koreas food and energy supply. So it is a very unique position. I think today the u. N. Security council is considering a resolution, additional sanctions while japan, south korea and the u. S. Are pushing for more pressure, more sanctions, it seems china is resisting and is instead pushing for dialogue at an emergency meeting of the u. N. Sc. Its containing today. President trump recently tweeted quote that china is trying hard, unquote to rein in north korea and u. S. Ambassador to u. N. Nikki haley recently stated that beijing is using a back channel to try to stop the dprk from testing. This is worrisome to me because it indicates to the not have direct channels . Weve heard of rumors of worsening relationship between, the fact that kim jongun since has gained power has not visited beijing. He has not met xi jinping pics we really have to question whether or not a reliance on china to help solve this issue is a wise approach. Im very skeptical about it and, of course, chinas National Interests are not necessarily aligned with hours when it comes to north korea. We can go through a whole litany of things, everything from a fear that the regime downfall could lead to a refugee influx, a collapse would allow u. S. Troops to have direct access to the chinese border and, of course, the recent supplementation of that is starting to the chinese. The third element of this new policy i see is an emphasis on more sanctions. Of course president obama, his administration, also focus on sanctions as well so its not necessarily new. The fact is that this approach hasnt worked so far. In fact, i would argue as is outlined in the previous presentation, as we layered on more sanctions against north korea, we see them steadily accelerating the progress on the nuclear and Missiles Program in face of increased sanctions. There was a study done by researchers recently at mit that found u. S. Sanctions imposed against north korea have been largely unsuccessful at curbing the country alyssa procurement because in part North Koreans been able to adapt. Theres growing capacity to work around sanctions. So could sanctions and pressure on north korea alone resolve the Nuclear Issue . Is very unlikely. I think even if we look