Appreciation for passion and for cspan, cspan and pc. And theyve been wonderful partners to Gettysburg College and the Civil War Institute. Were thrilled to have them here today as well. So our first speaker, pete familiar. Pete familiar, a graduate of Gettysburg College, he graduated in 1994. Hes gone on. Hes a history teacher at whos satanic Valley Regional High School in the falls village, connecticut. Pete has been in indispensable to our mission here at the Civil War Institute. He has been codirector of our High School Scholarship program. While you are enjoined talks and programs here, pete has helped shape a curriculum for our High School Scholarship winners. They have classes here. Of course. They have other special programs. He takes them out on the battlefield. Said yesterday to many of you that this High School Scholarship program, it has set off a number, a number of very, very fine historians who have gone on. Many have gone on to do phds. Many have gone on to the National Park service. We are extremely grateful to all that pete has done. Pete is a civil war historian who specializes in the home front, particularly on north care in North Carolina. How about that . As my geography . How about connecticut . Especially is connecticut in his working on a project right now that relates to that. But today he is going to talk about the pipe creek line. So let me welcome pete familiar. Hope therell be no questions on the North Carolina home front. Thank you, pete. Thank you to everyone for being here. Its always a thrill for me to come back and speak at Gettysburg College, which of course, is a very special place for me. Its great to be here at the Civil War Institute after three years so much as change. The mattresses in the dorm havent changed by. But whats most important is to come and see so many familiar faces, people whove been friends and mentors. To me for 30 years. And i just want to single one person out because he was absolutely instrumental in the talk that im going to do today. And thats dean schultz, known to many as the dean of gettysburg. And what im going to talk to you about today is, in many ways the product of many, many days of walking the battlefields with dean schultz. So i wanted to take you into my classroom for one second. And when i work with my students in my classroom, i beg of them to shift the focus. Most people know a version of history by reading, you know, the best known account and by reading the best known account, we get an understanding of what that episode in history looks like. But if we choose a different person and we look at the event from their perspective, we see things differently and thats when we learn. And so i think its safe to say that one reason that gettysburg continue in use to capture the imagined emotion of so many people is because of all the what ifs. What if jeb stuart had not been off joyriding . What if you all had attacked Cemetery Hill on the night of july 1st . What if lee had just listened to longstreet . What if Stonewall Jackson had been here and the commandant nominator of all of those is there all from the confederate side and when we look a little bit at the union side, sometimes we get it. Well, what if mead had counterattacked. But our what ifs, our engagement in counterfactual history tends to be on the confederate side. And when we do that, we get a very different perspective of, i think, of the battle. Now, one of those union warriors, of course, is what if mead had fallen back to piper creek . And so i want to use that as my jumping off point to talk to you a little bit about piper creek and what it was. But more importantly to me, because i think theres a use in counterfactual history and it can certainly be fun, but sometimes we get into the what if what if jackson had been here and we forget that theres parts of this battle that we dont look at and theres still things that we dont understand. And thats what i want to use. The piper creek circular to do is to get at the question of how pipe creek impact, what actually happens here at gettysburg. So meads famous pipe creek circular here laid out it, laid out a contingency plan for his army in the event of disaster oyster in pennsylvania. Well talk about the specifics of that plan in a few minutes. Whats important to establish right now is that in part because of the perception that mead wanted to fall back to pipe creek, he was long and widely depicted as being passive content to fight on the defensive and inflexible. What i believe is more important and what i really want to talk about today, is that historians have large lee ignored the fact that portion size of meades pipe creek circular were actually put into effect and that these actions had a dramatic impact on the way in which the battle of gettysburg was fought. Its not just a contingency plan. But first let us back up to those Early Morning hours of june 28th, 1863, in frederick, maryland, only about 35 miles from here. Colonel james hardy of the War Department delivered orders, not an offer orders putting meade in command of the army of the potomac. He also delivered to meet these following orders from general in chief henry halleck. Orders to meade. And i do think its worth spending a second to look at these in detail. You will not be hampered by any. My new instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstance forces as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the army of the potomac is the covering army of washington, as well as the army of operate in against the invading force of the rebels. You will therefore maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also baltimore. As far as circumstances will admit, sir, generally move upon either of these places. It is expected that you will either antis of him or arrive with him so as to give them battle. So its important to note, both for the way that the battle would take shape and for the first few days of meades pursuit out of lee after the battle, that these are the only instruction that needs going to receive. These are his orders. Until july 7th. And these orders are problematic because meade is given to task to defend baltimore and washington in and be the army of operation against lee. And those are confirmed schlichting things if hes going to protect baltimore and washington. He needs to go on a wide front if hes going to be the army of operation and fight lee. He needs to concentrate his army. If he concentrates his army, that gives lee the opportunity to turn his flank and head for washington in baltimore. If he goes wide, it gives lee an opportunity to concentrate against meade and perhaps defeat his army in detail. And intelligence is also a problem for meade. Its a function of being new to command. He knew richard ewell, second corps of the Confederate Army was, but he knew much less about the locations of longstreet and hills corps and knew to his command. Hes not even sure about the exact positions of his own army or the condition of those men. So this is a problem. But me proves to be a quick study. Incidentally, let me just throw out to you that when im talking to you today is just a summary, an overview of an article that i wrote and gettysburg mag az in 2010. So if youre looking for more detail direct, you there. But meade proves to be a quick study and on june 29th he writes to halleck demonstrating that hes achieved greater clarity. This is meade. Meade has greater clarity in his thinking. He writes, i have concluded as follows if lee is moving for baltimore, i expect to get between his army in that place. If he is crossing the susquehanna. I shall rely upon general couch with his force holding him until i can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which i shall endeavor to do. So his getting a plan is developing as plan, examining a map. Its probably really hard to see. I apologize. Examining a map. Need realize that westminster, maryland, which was the key location for carrying out his orders. And within 18 hours of taking command, he had informed halleck of his intention to move tomorrow on three lines to emmitsburg and westminster. So what did meade see in westminster . The location provided major road and rail connections to both washington and baltimore. And those, of course, were needed. If he was going to block any confederate advance against those cities. Meades chief of artillery, henry hunt, thought its location would help restore to the ranks thousands of stragglers. The road network would bring them there, ample high ground in the westminster area. And again, that road network provided good opportunities for him to fight either offensively or defend civilly. Now all of these are going to become seeds for meade that will grow into the pipe creek circular. Meades orders for june. 30th continued to move his army into positions that would utilize westminster, maryland, as his base of supply. These orders required hard marching despite some of the hottest weather of the campaign. So i think its important to note for for the battle here at gettysburg, as we talk about effects of this planning on the battle. The union army is making forced marches in the days leading up to the battle. The six corps would march to manchester high ground. That would become the anchor of the right flank of the union army. The fifth corps went to union mills in the center of the line. The third corps to tiny town. The second corps to frizzle burg, three and a half miles northeast of westminster. There it was going to be a reserve, an act to protect the rear. Thats more or less what were going to see when the pipe creek circular is put out. With the exception of the third corps line being changed. The first corps and the 11th corps are probing the western edges of the union advance, while the 12th corps is probing some of the eastern edges. So its hunting for lee while hes establishing that line. And thats going to be that contingency line of the pipe creek. So its clear from meades orders, its clear that hes not only thinking defensive of lee, hes actively looking for the enemy. With three infantry corps not simply leaving that task to his cavalry. So if meades marching orders for the 30th effect establish what hes going to put down on paper as the pipe creek line, its worth addressing what appealed to him so much about that location. Pipe creek is a tributary of the monaca c river, following a few miles north and west of westminster and the south bank of that creek offers in spots a near intriguing double defensive position along ravines and ridges. And those ravines and ridges are especially located on the roots of the confederate of a potential confederate advance to that position, a road Network Allowed for a convenient resupply reinforcement and communication. So. Meade then dispatches two trusted aides with eyes for topography. Right. This is henry hunt on the right. Chief artillery and chief engineer. Governor warren. Down to that line to lay out a potential line of battle. So to the extent of putting stakes in the ground, hunt thought the greatest strength was that lee could not turn the position without leaving a concentrated and union stacked union army in his rear. All right. So if lee attempts to move around pipe creek, he puts his army in a very vulnerable spot. So facing an inability to turn lees army excuse me, needs army. Lee would have no choice but to attack meade on the high ground. Heres what hunt wrote. Quote for it can hardly be supplied, meaning lees army having gone up to pennsylvania. They would fall back without excuse me, i read this wrong for hardly be supposed that having gone up to pennsylvania they would fall back without attacking us. Theyre there to give battle. Hunt continued, it would probably have been better had meade concentrated his army behind pipe creek rather than at gettysburg. This is battles and leaders. This is 25 years after the war because in case of defeat, meades line of retreat would have been comparatively short and easily covered. While lees would be four to marches through an open country before he could gain the mountain passes. So we think about what actually happens, right . Lee has a fairly short withdrawal from gettysburg to the mountain passes, but from pipe creek. If lee has to retreat, hes going to be in the open for a much greater distance. Its interesting, by the way, that meade gets the criticism for wanting to to fall back to pipe creek. But heres hunt openly saying we should have done it knowing the result. At 11 30 p. M. On june 30th, secretary of War Edwin Stanton communicated directly with meade, forwarding a report from Brigadier General hermann haupt, a railroad man. Lee is falling back from the vicinity of harrisburg and concentrating all his forces. The concentration appears to be at or near chambersburg. The object apparently a sudden movement against meade, of which he should be advised by courier immediately. So stanton sends this message. Lee is concentrating and thats the trigger for meade in his mind. Lees army is concentrating, perhaps for an offensive strike at meades army, and meade then commits his thinking about the upcoming battle to paper and for distribution to his Corps Commanders. And that is what we know as the pipe creek circular. Circular is too lengthy for us to talk about it today. You can easily find a copy of the whole thing on the line, but i think its important to talk about a few essential parts, he writes from information received. The commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished. So weve moved our army forward in essence, weve prevented harrisburg from being taken. We forced the concentration of lees army. Then he writes, if the enemy assumes the offensive and attacks, it is meades intent then to withdraw the army from its current position and form a line of battle along pipe creek line. And he then lays out he then lays out the positions of the union army. So we see the six corps. Heres manchester. Heres westminster. Heres gettysburg. The sixth corps. The fifth corps. The 12th corps. The 11th corps. The first corps. The third corps. And the second corps in reserve. Right. Thats the proposed pipe creek line. Whats really important is the pipe creek line is not just about these positions. He says other things in it and those become essential, i think, to what happens here at gettysburg. So one thing he says, one thing he says is that in the event that the army is to concentrate, the the fifth corps, george sykes has been in command of the fifth corps only as long as meades been in command of the army. The fifth corps will fall under the command of Henry Slocombe. Slocombe will command the 12th and the fifth corps. But again, these arent orders. Its just a contingency plan. He writes, whenever such circumstances arise, as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming the general line indicated a notice of such movement will be at once communicated to these headquarters and to all adjoining Corps Commanders. So the responsibility is not needs to give the order. Hes empowering his Corps Commanders. If you need to fall back, fall back to this line, just make sure you tell everybody the goal of it here is to protect the individual core of meades army. Weve got the first corps, the 11th corps, the 12th corps out alone, probing. Well, the first and the 11th. Right. Theyre sort of together. And theres a real risk that theyre going to be attacked by a concentrated Confederate Army. If that happens, meade wants them to fall back to pipe creek and let everybody know. Theres no time posted on the circular. We dont know what time its sent out, but we can infer from context that its probably midtolate morning on july first. And of course, what do we know that meade doesnt know . Theyre already fighting here. Its a popular view. Put forth early on by meades chief of staff, dan butterfield, and third Corps Commander dan sickles, and still postulated by some historians today that with a confederate attack imminent, meade wanted to fall back to the preestablished defensive positions at pipe creek. In other words, he had no desire to fight at gettysburg, but other actions that meade takes when viewed in the context of a whole circular bring his true intentions into focus prior to the circular being issued, meade had sent John Reynolds with the left wing of the union army, the first, third and 11th corps. And he had told reynolds of a likely confederate concentrate at chambersburg or at a point between chambersburg and york, north of gettysburg. He instructed reynolds, the commanding general, cannot decide whether this is best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concerned. Trading. This is what he wants reynolds to do. Where is that point . Go find the enemy and let us know. He also tells reynolds that in the third corps is Division Commander andrew humphreys, who has an excellent engineer in ai. And reynolds should use humphreys to find good ground. And then he says to reynolds, the general would like your views. So in his classic book, the get the Gettysburg Campaign is studying command. Edwin coddington wrote that meades simultaneous order to advance and retreat to pipe creek, quote, seem to reveal extreme vacillation and if not a collapse of moral courage on the part of meade. Hancock believed that reynolds, his movement was only a mask to allow the movement to pipe creek, but that quote, it turned out the enemys march, the enemy started to march down the same road a little earlier than anticipated. Did this message. This is the contingency aspect of pipe creek. Meade never wavered from saying he might act defensive or offensively and that the movement of reynolds and slocum is consistent too. Looking to land a blow when they find the Confederate Army. Its important to note that while reynolds was familiar with meades thinking, he did not re