Opposing military leaders. This is about 50 minutes. Our next speaker is holger herwig. Our next speaker is ohholger herwig. He lives in canada where he holds a dual position as professor at university of calgary and Canada Research chair in the center for military and strategic studies. His list of awards and appointments is staggering. Dr. Herwig is a fellow of the Royal Society of canada, a grant recipient from the Alexander Von Humboldt foundation and he has held numerous distinguished visiting appointments such as the visiting professor of strategy at the naval war college, newport, rhode island. Dr. Herwig has an impressive publication list and many of his projects have been transformed into television documentaries. He has published more than a dozen books, inclusive of the First World War germany and austria hungary, 19141918 that won the norm lynn e. Tomlinson prize for best book. Another important book is the marne 1914. Dr. Herwig will speak to us did about battle of the marne. Of that engagement he writes he wanted to write about it because i regard it as the most decisive land battle since the allies defeated napoleon at waterloo in 1815. I regard its impact for have been spectacular. Germany was denied victory and had germany over europe france was spared occupation britain maintained its foothold on the continent. Without the marne, places such as verdon and others would not resonate with us as they do. Without the marne, no lenin, no stalin, no hitler. Ladies and gentlemen, i present to you today dr. Holger herwig who will speak to us about the battle of the marne 1914, 100e well thank you so much you spared me about onethird of my talk, which im most grateful for. Thank you. The story that i tell in this begins with a lieutenant albert myer of the 5th mount boden regiment on 1914 before war was even declared between france and germany led a patrol on the southern ridge southeast in the mountains where 1,972 years earlier Julius Caesar had advanced against a german force under ariel vistas. Suddenly french guards of the 44th infantry regiment appeared. Myer charged with be striking the first frenchman over the. The remaining french soldiers took cover in a ditch opened fire. Myer tumbled from the saddle dead. And in this unexpected encounter, the 22yearold yeager became the first german soldier killed in what ironically and collectively would be called the battle of the marne which raged from the swiss border to the channel. I have argued as youve just heard, this is the area, that the marne was the most decisive battle of this war. There is our favorite friend in one of his many incredible outfits, william ii. Germany failed at the marne, as you just heard. And the promise was gone. Yes, for all you a zuber fans there was a schleefen plan. It existses. What is so incredible about the marne is the scale. Between 5 and 11 september 1914, the two sides committed nearly 2 million men with 6,000 guns to a front just 200 kilometers wide. The technology of the killing was also unprecedented. Rapid small arms fire machine guns, hand grenades, heavy artillery, howitzers, made the kill ground lethal. Casualties suffered by both sides were unimaginable to prewar planners. 200,000 men per side in the hilly battle of the frontiers in august, another 200,000 on the chalky plains of the marne in september. By comparison brittish casualties were 1,701. No other year of the war compared to its first five months in terms of death. The chapel of the French Military and college at st. Seer had only a single entry for its dead for the first year of the war. The class of 1914. That is before hitler destroyed it. The Immediate Impact of the marne, i argue was stunning. As youve heard, the great assault on paris had been halted. The enemy driven behind the river, france spared in 1871. As you also note, longterm repercussions were tragic. Marne ushered in four more years of what the future German Military historian, a veteran of the song called the monotonous mutual mass murder of the trenches which youll hear about tomorrow. The marne, of course was high drama drama. Winston churchill looking back after 1914 wrote no part of the great war compares in interest with its opening. The measured silent drawing together of gigantic forces. The uncertainty of their deployment. The fickle role of chance made the first collision a drama never surpassed. Never again would battle, he wrote, be waged on so grand a scale. Never again would the slaughter be so swift or the stakes so high. Whats incredible, as so much of world war i, the marne is also enshrouded absolutely in myth. Some were simply propaganda. The kaisers planned entries the white dress uniform of the guards, the 20meterlong german flag especially made to fly from the top of the eiffel tower. The ten Railroad Cars loaded with metals for the almedals for the fall of paris that accompanied first army alone. Other myths were the product of ambitious writers and mythmakers. General did he castrostrocastros general ferdinands communique that while his position in the marshes was quote impossible, i attack, pure myth. Another generals command to the staff on the eve of the battle accentuated by pounding his fist on the table, gentlemen, we shall fight it out on the kb marne. An equally a myth, the persistent claim that the bef save the day by exploiting the gap between german 1st and 2nd armies. Other myths were much more harmful and a test of the sen centrality of the marne in the history of the great war. Largest of these is of a mere saxon Lieutenant Colonel on the generals staff allegedly sflaching victorysflach ing snatching victory from the hands of another by order rg the retreat to two fourstar jebls behind the marne. Why this myth obscured for decades the truth behind the german retreat. Flawed command structure. An inadequate logistical system. An antikwatd communications arm. And two inept field commanders. In the verdict of the german official history of the war, the commander of the 2nd army was hesitant and insecure. Of the 1st army, overly aggressive unwilling toed a here adhere to commands. In concluded in volume 14, in the hour of decision over the future of the german peopleadhere to commands. In concluded in volume 14, in the hour of decision over the future of the german people, its leader in the field of battle completely broke down psychologically and physically. I also argue that the battle of the marne was a closerun thing. It recon firmed the Elder Councils thought that no plan of operations survives with certainty beyond the First Encounter with the enemys major forces. There you see general kluck. It also recon firmed the dictum that war is the realm of uncertainty. Nothing about the marne was preordained. Senior commanders did not at first understand the magnitude of the decision at the river. It seemed simply a temporary plip on blip on the way to victory. Soon again on the way to berlin or to paris. Below Headquarters Army and core commands, a million men on either side, likewise had no idea in midseptember what the marne meant except more endless marches, more baffling confusion, more bloody slaughter. The future great french historian mark block with the french 272nd infantry regiment on 9 september recalled marching down what he called a torturously winding road at night, oblivious to the fact that the great german assault had been blunted. With anger in my heart feeling the weight of the rifle i had never fired and hearing the faltering footsteps of our halfsleeping men echo on the ground, i could only consider myself one more among the englorious advantage wished who had never shed their blood in combat. I also argue that there are a whole lot of whatif scenarios attached to this battle. What if germany had not violated belgiums neutrality . Would britain in fact still have ensterredtered it the war . What if could half of the 331,000 soldiers on the left wing have held the right wing to victory in france . What if in panic at the russian advance into east prussia malta had not dispatched 3rd and 9th army corps east. They spent the Russian Campaign in september in Railroad Cars going from one front to the other. Above all, what if papajov had not been the french commander. What if he had been cashiered after he had been badly defeated at the battle of the frontiers in lorraine . Joffres inscrutable aplomb among other major reasons, the french did not win the collapse of 1871. Furthermore, after the initial defeats, joffre recognized he had played the game poorly. He had broken off the campaign with every intention of resuming it as soon as he had repaired the weaknesses discovered. And only once the enemys ultimate intentions to march through belgium had been detected did he move forces brilliantly from his right wing to his left. He cashiered dozens of general officers whom he found not to be up to standard. He orchestrated an orderly withdrawal behind the marne and seine rivers. Pe kree he created the army of maneuver north of paris. And he launched the great attack between the horns of paris and ver dunn. F he concludes, he judicially combined the offensive with an offensive after ordering an energetic aboutface. And by a magnificently planned stroke he dealt the invasion a baltimore tal mortal blow. I hope ive shown the contrast to the physically and mentally broken malta. But still joffe knew the great gamble he had taken. He later mused, i dont know who won the battle of the marne. But if it had been lost i know who would have lost it and been blamed. What if french morale had cracked after the initial battles . Campaigns are not fought against lifeless bodies. The enemy is never tired of lecturing, reacts, innovates, strikes back. Were it not for the passions of the troops comparative figures of opposing strengths would suffice to decide the issue. Put differently, he put it sarcastically, a kind of war by algebra. Whats incredible about the marne in 1914 is that the french poier surprised the germans. He wrote his wife just when it is on the point of being extinguished, it flames up mightily. A bavarian general likewise expressed his surprise at the enemys tenacity who would have expected of the french that after ten days of luckless battles and bolting in open flight, they would attack for three days so desperately. General von kluck after the war told a swedish journalist, the reason that transcends all others in explaining the german failure of the marne was the extraordinary and peculiar aptitude of the french soldier to recover quickly. Cynically, he said, most soldiers will let themselves be killed where they stand. That after all, is a given in all battle plans. But that men who have retreated for ten days that men who slept on the ground halfdead with fatigue should have the strength to take up their rifles and attack when the bugle sounds that is a thing upon which we never counted. That is a possibility we never even spoke about in our war academies. Now, i suggest the marne reveals two different types of command styles. Maltka was content to replain at headquarters, far removed from the front to give his commanders great latitude in interpreting his general directives. He chose not to control them by way of telephones with being, aircraft or staff officer who languished at headquarters. Already in peace time he had let it be known it sufficed for them simply to be informed about the intentions of the high command, orally through the sending of an officer from headquarters. The war proved otherwise. A chief of the military cabinet struck at the heart of the matter on 13 september, it is clear that during the advance into france the necessary tight leadership on the part of the chief of the generals staff had been totally lacking. The next day, maltka was placed on sick leave. More than 30 commanders generals were relieved of their commands. But three of the top leaders were not because they were being held on future grounds. Not even the two most controversial commanders were sacked after the marne. Kluck who disobeyed maltkas orders turned himself east of paris xlanding ingcommanding his army until the spring of 1915. The only commander sacked washauser of the third army because of the case of typhus. On the other side, if we look at joffre, we see someone who played a highly active role. Parrot from issuing a host of special instructions and orders i should tell you the french official history is 144 volumes he showered his commanders with hundreds of personal and secret memoranda, telephone calls, orders, he used his le mans race car driver to great advantage, constantly on the road to inspect to order to encourage, and where necessary, to relieve. In fact he sat two army ten corps and 38 commission commanders in the first month of the war. Some he fired because he thought they were overly pessimistic. Others because he found them nervous and imprudent. But he maintained a core of loyal and aggressive army commanders. He promoted many of them because, as he said they had faith in their success and who by mastery of themselves know how to impose their will on their sbordubordinates and dominate events. He never regretted his sometimes unjustified firings. And after the war, hes probably the only french general who declined to engage his victims in a war of memoirs. Ironically for me as a German Military historian, the elder maltkas strategic use of railways in 1866 and again in 19 1970, was absent in 1914 at the front. The brilliant Railroad Performance was joffres who used his directorate of railways and interior lines. And when he realized by 24 august he had lost the battle of the frontiers the germans were sweeping through belgium, he altered the entire center of gravity on his dispositions to achieve numerical superior or the at the western extremity of the front. He dissolved ineffective armies. He sent to reinforce the trench camp at paris. He orchestrated a staggering transfer of forces from lorraine to greater paris. 4 corps, 9 corps, 15 corps, 21 corps. All of this here you have three of the french xhabdzers and commanders and of course the famous parisian taxis. They are lore. They are in the museum in paris. I can tell you from the french official history, 90 got lost broke down ran into one another, and delivered very, very few to the front. But it was gaelic it was chivalrous. Pardon that lorraine. Artillery, as you well flow ruled the battlefield. German howitzers ripped men and horses alike into shreds of flesh and deposited their remains as mounds of pulp. The french 75s filled the air with shrieking shrapnel shells that exploded above the enemy drenched those below with thousands of iron balls. American journalists who accompanied both armies wrote, incredibly, for four weeks, crude, stinking crowd kded ambulance wagons jostled the wounded back to barns hastily converted into field hospitals where the unfortunate laid for hours in clouds of flies drinking their blood. For days, in words one historian addressed to the soldiers of 1914, you aintte nothing, drank nothing, no one washed you your bandages went unchanged, many of you died. The living and this again caught american journalists the living moved on amass a stinking mass of unbathed of humanity amidst a stinking bed of foul air of dying cattle and mutilated horses to fight another battle another day. On yously ly obviously the murderous nature of industrialized warfare changed the common soldier regardless of social regional or religious origin. They wrote home of the filth and dirt, the horror and fear of their front line experiences. Some remembered the initial euphoria marching through fallclad orchards, the camaraderie, and above all, the liberating of wonderful wine cellars. Then they remembered the constant nagging hunger and thirst, the endless marches by day and night, the choking dust the searing heat then the cold rain and oozing mud, the burning villages, the growing of the wounded, the deathly rattle of the dying. Just remember, 1st army alone in september marched 523 kilometers on foot. Fought 17 major battles and had zero days of rest. A german soldier wrote home, my opinion about the wars remain the same. It is murder and slaughter. It is still incomprehensible to me that humankind in the 20th century can commit such slaughter. A professor of art from munich stated his feelings in better terms ive seen so much that is grand beautiful, monstrous base, brutal heinous and gruesome but like all the others, i am totally stupefied. To see peopledie, hardly interrupts the enjoyment of the coffee ive brewed in stark filth under fire. This is september 1914. A french poet described the same beautiful innocent at news of victory, victory, quickly took flight as he surveyed the battlefield and he wrote his parents, there a lieutenant of the 74th. There a captain of the 129th. All in groups of three or four. Sometimes singly and still in the position of firing prone. Red pants. These are ours. These are our brothers. This our blood. The harrowism of 187071 he said was gone. We feel small, so small, in the face of this frightening thing. Some with bloody arms. Others with boots ripped to shreds by red holes. The meaning of it all escapes me. We do not know not really if weve done anything for use for the country. Incredibly despite the savage warfare, morale held. There were flo wideno widespread refusals to obey the callups. Large numbers of all in tears, even in grossly exaggerated for public consumption runs to the recruiting depots, no major rebellions, no major strikes took place. The marne i argue, prefigured the resilience of european militaries and societies to endure horrendous sacrifices. To be sure there were those at imperial headquarters who understood that the time had come in the fall of 1914 to end the great folly. Field marshal hazler activated at the tender age of 78 advised william ii, it seems the moment has come to end the war. The plan has failed. The kaiser sent him away. Chief of staff maltkas successor in november informed the government it is impossible to beat the allied armies to such a point where we can come to a decent peace. By continuing the war, germany runs the danger of slowly exhausting ourselves. This is from a chief of the general staff, we must make peace with russia now. The civilian chancellor rejected the counsel and sent him home. Well, to sum up it began at the marne in 19 well stay with that. Thats not lunch. As you heard already in the introduction this morning, it ended at versailles in 1919. In between we all fudge our numbers somewhere around 60 million to 65 million young men had been mobilized. 9 million possibly killed. 20 million wounded. And of course with the 2020 vision of hindsight, the great tragedy of the marne is that it was strategically indecisive. Had german 1st army destroyed frenchs 5th army east of paris or had there