Transcripts For CSPAN3 Eisenhowers Decision To Begin D-Day I

What did general dwight d. Eisenhower say when he gave the final order to launch the attack . Its puzzling to me, anyway, that perhaps the most important decision of the 20th century did not bequeath to history and posterity a quote to mark the occasion, something to live up to the magnitude of ikes decision. Something iconic like macarthurs vow to the people of the philippines, i shall return. The stakes of the invasion certainly merited verbal splendor, if not eloquence, if the the overlord operation had failed the allies might never have won the war and yet eyewitnesses to eisenhowers great moment of decisions could not agree on what he said and as for eisenhower he could not even agree with himself. He related five versions of his fateful words to journalists and biographers over the years that perhaps even more mysteriously he wrote five different versions of the statement in a 1964 article commemorating the 20th anniversary of dday. To put those words, whatever they might have been into context, the high drama of those meetings leading up to the invasion decision certainly bear repeating. All of the elements of the dday attack were in 1944, nearly 12,000 aircraft, almost 7,000 sea vessels, it was arguably the largest amphibious invasion force in history. Every possible contingency had been planned for, every piece of equipment issued and every bit of terrain studied. The invasion force was like a coiled spring, ike said, ready to strike hitlers european fortress and all it waited for was his command as Supreme Commander, allied Expeditionary Force to go, but for all the preparation there were critical elements that eisenhower couldnt control, namely the tides, the moon and the weather. And the ideal low tidal and bright lunar conditions required for the invasion prevailed a few days each month and as we saw a few moments ago those of us who watched eisenhowers documentary on dday, the days were june 5th, 6th and 7th and if the attack was not launched on those dates they would be forced to wait until june 19th to try again. Any wait increased risking the secrecy of the operation and any wait would also cut into the summertime weather that the allies would have to campaign, and the inescapable consequences of postponement ike would later write in his 1948 memoir, crusade in europe were almost too bitter to contemplate. Upon ike and his staff began meeting in early june to choose the final invasion date and a date now contingent on the best weather forecast. The setting was Southwick House near portsmouth in southern england. The Conference Room where they met was large, a 25 by 50foot former library with floor to ceiling french doors and dark oak paneling and a blue rug which ike would pace anxiously in the days leading up to the invasion and empty bookshelves lined the room and a forlorn reminder of its now decidedly unliterary purpose. Ikes commanders and his weather team led by Group Captain j. M. Stag met in the library twice a day at 4 00 a. M. And 9 30 p. M. On the evening of saturday june 3rd, he reported that they had moved out and a low was coming in. He predicted june 5th would be cloud e stormy, windy and with a cloud base of 0 to 500 feet and too wind toe disembark troops and too cloudy for the allimportant preparatory bombardment of the coastal defenses. The Group Reconvened early the next morning to give the weather a second look, stags forecast was no better and eisenhower reluctantly postponed the invasion for another day. The group gathered again at 9 30 the evening of sunday, june 4th. Ike opened the meeting and signaled for stag to begin. Standing, stag reported a coming break in the weather predicting that after a few more hours of rain would come 36 hours of clear skies and lighter winds to make a june 6th invasion possible and he made no guarantees. The commanders debated the implications of the forecast and they were struggling towards consensus when eisenhower spoke up. The question, ike saids was just how long can you keep this operation on the end of the limb and let it hang there. The order he said, must be given. Slower ships received provisional orders to sell, but ike would wait until the next morning to wait the decision final and he ordered the men to return in the early hours of june 5th. Ike rose at 3 30 and traveled the muddy mile from his camp to suffolk house through withering rain and wind. Stag had been right. If the invasion had begun that morning on june 5th it it would have failed. Ike started the meeting and stag repeated his forecast and the break in the weather should hold. His brow was furrowed as a kansas cornfield, eisenhower turned to each of his principal subordinates for his final say on launching the invasion the next day, tuesday, june 6, 1944. General bernard law montgomery who would lead the Assault Forces said go. Admiral sir better ramirez see, the naval commander in chief said go. Air chief marshal sir traf ord lee mallory, the air commander in chief said go. Eisenhower stood up and began walking the war rooms blue rug back and forth, pondering the most important decision of his life and the fate of millions of people and it was now up to him and only he could make the decision. He kept pacing, hands classched behind his back and chin on his chest and then he stopped. The tension left his face and he looked up at his commanders and said, what . Well, this is where history draws a blank. What did ike say when he launched the dday invasion and why is there no single memorable quote . Well, the eyewitnesses offer answers, but little help. Of the 11 to 14 men who attended the final decision meeting and that number, as well see is in dispute, only four men besides eisenhower reported what they believed were the Supreme Commanders historic words. In the accounts of three of these men appeared in their memoirs published between 1947 and 1969. Lieutenant general Walter Biddle Smith who was ikes chief of staff probably spent as much time as anyone during the war reported well, well go and his memoir, eisenhowers sixth grade decisions which came out in 1956, Major General Francis Wiggin who was general montgomerys chief of staff reported we will sail tomorrow in operation victory published in 1947 and in intelligence at the top which came out in 1969, Major General Kenneth Strong whom ike has described as the best Intelligence Officer he ever worked with said okay, boy, we will go. Admiral ramsey died in an airplane crash during the war and left no memoir, but his version survives through the reporting that allen micci of the digest magazine. He published in the 1964 war book the invasion of wueurope a its the best account of a contemporary journalist who tried to verify what ike said near the date of the invasion. Micci writes how he began his quest on june 5g9 pressing ramsey for the moment by moment details of that final meeting at suffolk house and ramsey was fluently unruling his story until he reached the moment of ikes decision barely stalled. What words did he say . What did he use . I cant quite remember, ramsey said, but it was a short phrase and something typically american. Micci peppered ramsey with possibilities all of which the admiral dismissed until the correspondent hit upon, okay, let her rip. Ramsey tentatively confirmed it, but warned micci he would need eisenhowers commitment. He ran to ask an aide. The aide returned a few minutes later and told mitchy that if he was on the phrase, it was a sensor forced mitch to get the quote reconfirmed later when he gave it to readers digest, once again he obliged and okay, let her rip appeared in the magazines august 1944 issue. Mitchys account of the meetings leading up to the decision impressed the military assistant colonel james gault who noted to the article in the diary. He lent his diary to kenneth s. Davis when he arrived at ikes headquarters in august 1944. Notes from the diary found in davis personal papers who were over at Kansas State University confirmed that davis was aware of mitchys version of the quote, but he published his own phrase in his 1945 book soldier of democracy. All right, davis reports, we move. Davis presumably got this from eisenhower in one of his three interviews and his papers do not contain verbatim notes of his interviewses with ike. The davis book project was backed by Milton Eisenhower and ikes youngest brother and the president of Kansas State College at that time now, of course, Kansas State University and milton encouraged davis to write the biography, quote, so that at least one good one is produced, unquote, competing books by alden hatch and Francis Miller were already in the works by 1943. Hatch would do an interesting and incredible job, milton told his brother, but would not be very deep. While he feared millers book would read, quote, like the encyclopedia britannica, but dry. He nevertheless published his own version of the dday quote in the fall of 1944, gentlemen, we will go ahead as planned. Millers account stopped on the eve of the invasion and omits ikes final words. This first of eisenhower bog ravis appeared in bookshelves four day after we landed on normandy so they were very quick. Milton assured ike that the davis book, promised to be one of real value on the home front and to have real, historical information. Although ike would have qualms with soldier of democracy, he thought davis overemphasized here in the cakansas hometown. He improved the recommendation of the work to a man who again, quoting wanted to know what your thoughts were at 4 00 a. M. On that day when you had to make the great decision. Additionally when eisenhower made 250 annotations and his copy of the davis biography, he does not comment on davis version of his dday words. Another wartime writer, chester willmon it t of the bbc reports okay, well go in the struggle for europe which came out in 1952. Willmont interviewed eisenhower twice in 1944 and on august 16, 1945 and he submitted questions to the general before the 1945 interview before the archives here at the library and question three asks specifically for the details of the june 5th meeting and perhaps he got them and like kenneth davis, willmonts interview notes that the at the National Library of australia contain no direct evidence of his quote. Nevertheless, willmontts version was in the documentary dday plus 20 years which we watched just a few moments ago, it was an Anniversary Special filmed in england and france in july and august of 1963 and then aired on june 6, 1964 which was a saturday night 50 years ago. Walter cronkite interviewed ike in the same suffolk room where he made the great decision and in this interview ike said, quote, i thought it, meaning the likely weather was just the best of a bad bargain so i said okay. Well go. Eisenhower had the chance to mend his words when he interviewed transcripts prepared for publication in the New York Herald tribune by the historian martin bloomingson. He made 80 revisions and did not touch the dday quote. The case for okay wont go appears to be strengthened by its use by the late john s. D. Eisenhower and ikes son and grandson and their respective works, allies by john which came out in 1982 and eisenhower at war and what are we to make of johns earlier use of the quote, i guess we better go which appears to letters in 1978. A similar version of the willmontt cronkite quote is stephen ambroses okay, lets go which appears in his many popular world war ii quotes and the Supreme Commander which came out in 1970, he claims he garnered it on october 27, 1967 interview, quote, he was sure this was what he said. And ikes posed president ial records cast doubt on ambroses claim. He did not see the young historian that day and ike was playing golf in augusta, georgia, cursing his slice, not revisiting the past. Furthermore in ambroses book, dday june 6, 1944, the climactic battle of world war ii he mistakenly attributes the quote to the 1967 Walter Cronkite interview which in any case he said well go, not okay, lets go. The confusion over ikes dday words would go around the englishspeaking world, and cause their spiegel and interviewed eisenhower in his palm desert, california, Vacation Home on june 6, 1964. His version approximates the cronkite quote, adding okay, well go ahead. Eisenhower reviewed the article before publication and as usual, did not comment on the dday quote, although he did strike out the statement that the allies would have droppeded atomic weapons on germany had the dday invasion filled. The last documented encounter with the version of the dday words is found in a manuscript written by his friend colonel red reader. Reader records well, well go. I rely on the courage of your men and dwight david eisenhower, fighter for peace which came out in 1968 is a childrens book. Ike reviewed the readers draft in july 1967. He made almost 180 comments on the the manuscript, but he did not question the dday quote. In fact, i found no evidence that any of our records that ike ever once commented on or corrected the different quotes he found in the work of journalists, biographers or former comrades and neither did he use them in his own most detailed account of the june 5th meeting and nor for that matter did he use the most recent statement, okay, well go. Instead eisenhower wrote five different version of the quote in drafts of the 1964 article for the paris match magazine. Paris is in france, not texas. The article was about dday, but it had a contemporary, strategic purpose as well, france was becoming more and more independent and the north atlantic treaty organization, nato at that time and reminding the french of the shared sacrifice might strengthen their bond with the allies. As john be monet and leading advocate said to ike in a telegram at that time quote, i felt sure that an article would be politically most important, end quote. Given this importance, ike presumably put a lot of thought into the story which either makes the various versions it contains more perplexing or it may explain them and eisenhower may have been searching for just the right words for his french readers. In his notes for the article ike wrote, yes, we will attack on the 6th and the first full draft of this story he writes, yes, gentlemen, we will attack on the 6th. In the next draft he scratches this out and he writes, gentlemen, we will attack tomorrow. Elsewhere in the draft referring back to his decision, he said we will make the attack on june 6th which he then struck out and said we will attack tomorrow it. And the final draft he makes two references to his decision. We will attack tomorrow and gentlemen, we will attack tomorrow thereby demonstrating once again his apparent lack of concern with exactly what he said in the Early Morning hours of june 5, 1944. The paris match article appeared within days of the New York Herald tribune series and the cbs airing of dday plus 20 years and the spiegel article to put three different eisenhower quoteses in three languages before the International Public at the same time. The quote was lost before there was even a chance for it to be lost in translation. What accounts for all these accounts of ikes dday works, his own and those of the eyewitnesses and others, the historian david howard perhaps captured it best in his description of the june 5th meeting, howard writes, nobody was there as an observer, however, high a rank a man achieves, his capacity for thought and feeling is only human and one may imagine that the capacity of each of these men were taxed to the limit and inclination to detach his mind from the problem and observe exactly what happened, and remember it for the sake of historians. Come the commanders obscured the meetings and what time did they meet . Who was there . Was ike sitting or pacing when he made the decision . And how long did it take him to make up his mind . Various eyewitnesses placed the june 5th meeting at 4 00, 4 15 and 4 30 a. M. Eisenhower was nearly as inconsistent with the time as he was with his words. In the early paris match drafts he states this he made the final decision at 4 00, but in the last draft he says the meeting started at 4 15. In his 1948 war memoir he records he made the decision at 4 15. General montgomery puts the decision at 4 00 in his 1946 account of his meeting, but at 4 15 in his memoir 12 years later. Another six eyewitnesses who note the time of the meeting cast one note for 4 00, one for 4 15 and one for 4 30 and francis omits the june 15th altogether and places the final decision on the night of june 4th as do a couple of witnesses. The identity of these eyewitnesses is questioned by the eyewitnesses. June1944, memo by operations planner puts eisenhower, montgomery, lee mallory, air Vice Marshall james rob, rear admiral george crazy and generals smith, strong, and dwgiggen as present. Ike Administrative Officer abt the officer with my favorite name, apt wigglesworth. In some accounts captain stag attended. Eisenhower is alone in including general omar bradley in his account of the final meeting but Bradley States in his 1951 war memoir that he was aboard the uss augusta at the time of the decision. The eyewitnesses, a deg sig nation rapidly loses its force. Eisenhower paced the room in the account i shared early which i got from general strong but general waller smith acertainty that is ike sat but was it on a sofa as smith writes or at a conference table or in an easy chair . And how long did it take eisenhower to make up his mind once his commanders had expressed their opinions . Was it the 30 to 45 seconds or was it, quote, a full five minutes as general smith recorded in his 1956 memoir . Well, ike pondered these discrepancies in later years and while did he not directly invoke David Howards fog of war explanation, in his essay, he agreed with the simplifications. I wrote when accuracy is all important, memory is an untrustworthy crutch on which to lean. Witnesses of an accident often give under oath contradictory testimony concernin