Do what they need to do or whether or not it would push them away from the ne gauche yating table. At this point, we think it would push them away from the negotiating table. So although i have Great Respect for the chairman and for senator corker and all the members of the u. S. Senate, and i believe the intentions here are all absolutely right on, k4 is to keep the pressure on iran to do what is necessary here to give the give the International Security were looking for and to cut off all the path wayings. They believe quiet strongly at this moment in this negotiation, additional action would potentially derail the negotiation. And that iran is quiet clear that the congress will pass legislation at any moment that it is deemed absolutely necessary to do so. Can you quantify how much going from 20 to 5 delays, the break out time . Is that quantifiable . Does it make it six months, the breakout time . Does it add five months . Is it quantifiable . What id prefer, senator, if i could, is in terms of specific break out times brief that in a classified setting. Setting the delay, it obviously has to have a step in the right direction. Every element that we can deal with helps on break out. But until we get a comprehensive agreement, we will not have a durable agreement that will give us the kind of assurance were looking for. And its from oxides to fuel plate sns. It is an important step. The ability to turn it back into a rich material is that much more difficult, yes. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Well, thank you both. Let me just conclude with summary thoughts. We all appreciate your service. No one here questions that. Its only because of the importance of the issue that everybody feels as they do. Let me just make a comment on there is a difference and i think weve gotten better at this, but, you know, notification is different than consul tagsz. Notification is when youre doing x, y and z. Consultation is we are doing x, y and z and what do you think . If and when you get to a final agreement, people will have a sense of confidence on that. So i just urge you to think not just about what youre doing, but con sulting in a way in which there is input taking place that when it can be agreed upon, can be incorporated. Secondly, and ill just say for the record, the problem, of course, iranian know. Its the lead time. Unforcue gnatly, that amount of time is greater than the break out. So thats the fundamental conflict i have about saying we can wait, but the consequences of the impact will be less so. There would be no greater thanks giving day gift than fsh all of you to be successful. But the concerns here, i think, are very legitimate. In oush nerks panel thats going to come up, which is an excellent panel, i look at the testimony iran continues to challenge the correctness and completeness of irans declaration. The legality of the iaea boards and regulations and prablg tiss and reporting its findings in its reports to the iaea board and security counsel silt. Now, that letter was just june 4, 2014. So you say to yourself, wow, theyre challenging everything the iaea is doing. But key stuff, were going to get there in four months when you dont start actually negotiate i negotiating secondly, i appreciate what treasure has been doing. Even despite what youre doing, the part of the challenge that we face is that, you know, yes, irans economy is bad. But its better than it was. And that is part of, you know, the positive sentiment that is created by virtue of the joint plan of action and its extension, which is helping, in my perspective, to create some modest growth. You know, gdp is expected to grow at 2 pbt. Thats modest. But is a huge improvement over irans Economic Performance in the 201213 fiscal year when gdp contracted by 6 . Inflation is expected to go down, so the rate of inflation dipped below 20 , but certainly less than half of the inflation that it was at 45 . The real has gone up in its value. The stock market has gone up in its value. So there are consequences. More positive consequences for iran. Negative for what we consider the continuing vice of pressure to do the right thing. Finally, i spent a fair amount of time reading, and i wont talk about which of my friends in the press with their editorials. But i went back and read years of editorials about north korea. And, my god, its amazing to me that the language that was used about the aspirations that we were seeking in north korea is the language i dont know whether its the same editors, but its the language that is being used now as it relates to iran. To be very honest with you, if there is an kpaexample that no l is a bad deal, its the division of the career. It limited inspections and we all learned that it was a success and then they put the deal in the First Nuclear explosion. We cant have that as it relates to iran. So, look. Im glad to hear you say that the iranians Pay Attention to congress. They should let go every american that they have hostage. That would send a hell of a message. And, secondly, only because the stakes are so high that the passions are so strong. And, so, we have a deep respect for what you both and those who work with you are doing, and we have a mutual goal. I believe we have a role to play to help you in that mutual goal. You may not always like it, but i think at the end of the day, it is possible. And with the thanks of the committee, this panel is excused. Let me call our next panel. We both we want to thank our witnesses who are leaving and those who are joining with them. Wed ask you to do so quietly. We want to tell our new panel that you your full statements will be included in the record without objection. And wed like you to summarize, more or less, in five minutes so we can have the type of give and take that we just had with our first panel. Id like to announce that dr. Gary simore whofgs listed on the hearing notice took ill today. So we do not have the benefit of his expertise today. But we anotherd like to do so some other time. The oa has proceeded well, but the negotiations have also seen head winds. They requested the letter in tune to the iaea and the rates that iran challenged the agencys right to complete this declarations of the iaea. This is the report of the findings. Due to the fact that iran has been running the Nuclear Program first without filling it, both with obligations and Security Council resolutions. I have recently publish ed five principles with senate negotiators. I highlight some of those basic principles. The first one, to minimize the opportunities for violations and delays in compliance. An exampleover creating an unstable situation lowering the amount of energy in iran by increasing to 10,000 or more. Keeping stocks exceedingly low would be in practice. Ambiguity leads to slippage. With regard to the practical leads, i place them here. Timely protection on the other state or states came and produced is a complex task. There are aspects that we dont know. The iaea must provide the correctness and completeness of declarations, establish the total number by iran and the size of its uranium stocks. People and materials. Sure that the iaea has legally binding authorities to conduct the additional verification work. The agreement with the end in the u. S. Security council. Possible military dimensions. Irans most senior verification remains with the unwillingness of its Nuclear Program. For the iaea to conclude that all Nuclear Material is used, this is not possible unless iran satisfies in this key area. Such additional long term monitoring took place until the iaea Nuclear Material was in peaceful use. The simple fix is for iran to move the current and replace with a smaller, not able to hold enough natural uranium to run the reactor. There will be no need to be used in this reactor and a heavy one out. That would exceed the cap on the number. If not removed and rendered harmless, iraq would constitute operations and create a sizable breakout capability. An agreement must provide specific time from their findings from means. Its the more difficult and time consuming portion. Material would vanish. It could be small in size without visible signatures as was the case in south africa. In summary, the actual verification process will be timeconsumed. Especially for a Nuclear Program that had been largely in nature. It took for the iaea in europe, European Countries with the comprehensive safe agreement and implementing about five years with all Nuclear Material in peaceful use. Forthcoming in iran for the country to have in place a limited Nuclear Program. A rubbage verification system by the u. S. Security council is needed to support iran. Ive been involved with the p5 plus 1 talks. Im concern that had we are not close to a true diplomatic resolution. In fact, if we have a deal, its likely to be one which, in fact, postpones a real diplomatic resolution and weakens our ability to achieve such resolution. If we have a deal in this next fourmonth period, im concerned its going to be one that falls short of our minimum requirements. Its not likely to require iran to dismantle, anyway. It would permit iran to engage in more activity. It wont deal with Ballistic Missiles which are a threat in stages weve seen in other reports. And what we get in exchange for this deal is to permit Nuclear Weapons. We would also get enhanced inspections. But i do think that were placing too much stock in what inspections can actually achieve because theyd be hampered by first just the sheer size of Irans Nuclear position. And by irans refusal to come clean on his past work. Frankly, the absence in the clear part of the willingness or the International Community to enforce those inspections rooirmts. And i think that the more Nuclear Program we leave in place, the less likely its going to be to punish those obligations. The uranium plays a major role in supporting terrorism. Frankly, the arms embargo thats in place against iran, which would address, for example, its provision of rocketings and groups like hamas that come ins 1747, which could get lifted as part of a deal. It would give incentive to match Irans Nuclear capableties. It would encourage that technology to other places. And i think, frankly, would damage our own influence and prestige which are already pretty damaged. And this is the issue, i think, upon which those thing that is will be mostjudged in the middle east. How have we reached this juncture that were at right now . If you look at jpoa, in exchange for temporary reversible steps by iran, we made major concession that is the iranians have been seeking for a long time. It would be very difficult to take back these negotiations. We also, frankly, havent put forward a threatening alternative to an agreement. Which i think is later onto threaten sanctions and weve not responded to oil exports. Our military threat with the paralyzed situations in syria, iraq, ukraine and elsewhere. I think that it was an error for us to stray from our previous approach which was dismantling for dismantling. Ir iran, as stated before, has no need for those activities to forego. It does have a need a deep need for sanctions relief. I think we should be prepared. The only one is one in which we see evidence of a broader strategic shift. I think we needs to enhance our leverage. Yes, more sanctions will follow an agreement. I think we need to act more energetically in response to participation, as some of the members said. And i think we need to strepgtsen our military event. To kournter that perception that iran gets a free pass. So just to end this, i worry that we have become captive to this sort of false choice between a flaw deal and this prospect of a military conflict. I reject that false choice. I think a true choice is a deal which well set back our interest and a further approach to diplomacy which holds back those issues. Thank you both for your testimony. You bring up some very important points. Can you explain if two sets of principles youre referring to behind the p5 plus 1 and the yud rain yun positions and why those two sets of positions make it more difficult . Negotiations have been going eleven years. This is a story of now 4009. We include uranium enrichment and plutonium in a heavy reactor. And how he was able to rescue the uranium conversely. So then we looked at talks out today. So we want to have 190,000 uranium fuel for reactor. Its clear the bottom line has to survive. And then you look at the challenges that iran is facing, if they want to produce. So what good is it if youre able to do enrichment if youre not able to find soil . So when you look this one, look at the fuel manufacturing in which they dont yet have. This whole reason is they want to preserve the program. And then the other side of the gulf is that actually we dont want to have an Enrichment Program with iran. Now, its 190,000 its a great number. What is in your testimony by the uranium ambassador questioning all of the iaeas authorities in this regard . Is this buying time . Is this extending the period . What do you think is the intent from your experience at the iaea . I think that the agreement will be there, whatever will be. And we will end up at this itch leaptation. So youre saying even presume that can negotiators can reach an agreement in four months, that then there will be a whole nother set of negotiations with the iaea as to how how those agreement wills be enforced. Let me ask you, then, what lessons should we draw from the failure of the Framework Agreement with north korea as we deal with this one. Yes. I was part of the iasi in 1994. Challenge the authority of the iaea. You remember that north korea was about to leave the npt. And, therefore, they said thatter in not found in the process of the safeguards agreement. And therefore, the iaea didnt have any authority to do so. They challenged every step that the iaea did practice. And ill give you an example. We were not able to use the inspection. Recently, mr. Sour has challenged some of the statements by iaea with regard to the military dimension. Its a very different interpretation so whechb i hear secretary sherman say that will be based upon actions litigated for some time. In terms of the enforcement on all of the dimensions of the possible weaponization, elements while the sanctions release is suspended. I think this is a good remark. The only thing i would say is noncompliance has consequences. Is the South African model which you want matly, admitted in 1993 to possessing a Nuclear Program with military dimensions and then showed unpres dented cooperation by allowing anywhere, any time inspections. Whats your per semgss of that . Its a less of a program, its more of a program. They have much more declared before and there was a history of enrichment for 20 years. Why it was sexist, actually, the government had changed their view. They had given up their Nuclear Weapons program. They wanted to close that chapter, the history of south africa. In order to do that, they needed someone to certify that. And that organization was the iaea. So the goal operation was there. Once they did disclosure in 1993, it was easy to take over because the whole government was set up to help the iaea to complete its mission. But if that doesnt take place in iran, they want to come clean from their past, its going to be difficult. So even though, in this case, south africa had determined as a got that it wanted to end that chapter in its history, wanted to end its Nuclear Program, it took 17 years to get a clean bill of health with a government willing and wanting to end its Nuclear Program. I think thats pretty instrujtive as to when we say long term verification and enforcement agreements. Its very different than where iran is out and where south africa is at. Having this negotiation after the fact, i know thats the way it has to occur. I wondered. We keep stressing about the full transparency in the past. Relative to what iaea would be doing in the future, how important is that to understand fully what their program was in the past . You dont need to know every one from the program. You need to know how much you agree with the number of ser ten tangs. If you saw a break out support. So certain that enrich. Came up. Thats one reason. Therefor, you need to know what was done and how it was done. The iaea inspectors to confirm that those actions are not reconstitutes. I say thats a very important setting in the baseline. So that the proper rely monetary scheme can be established. How do you know when people were sharing with you what they do in the past, how do you know that that was, in reality, what they were doing in the past. Its actually a number of things. You normally call it multianalysis. You look what the people tell you. You look what they have been doing. Do they make sense. Do they fit the Nuclear Program at that point in time. You can indirectly confirm it by seeing the equipment that thef with all of that and some others that have taken place. So you have pieces all over and then we have some caps. But you can easily establish a relative picture of what has been taking place. And then theres out liars and no con sis sis ten sill. One question along those lines. I think with a country like iran that has multiple silos and arrangements with entities and sometimes that are a part of government and sometimes are not, how do you know that there isnt some clandestine program and iaea goes in, they inspect what we know of. How do you have assurances with some other activity taking place and what kind of abilities does the organization have to actually figure that out . Iaea has its own authorities and its own practices and skills. It heavily draws from the Member States. What they have seen, what they have been told wharks is where. So that the Member States can have their own means to find some of those or have fought their own picture about the Nuclear Program. Can see if this is consistent. And thats why distance made quite a lot in his letter. He doesnt like the way they put technica