Transcripts For CSPAN3 Korea And China After World War II 20

CSPAN3 Korea And China After World War II February 4, 2017

They talk about the rise of communist leaders in north korea and chinas mao zedong and the relationship between the two countries after the war. Atrecorded the discussion the National World War Ii Museum in new orleans. Part of it 2016 conference that focused on the year 1946. This is about an hour and 20 minutes. Welcome to the 105 session of the warrence, titled is over, but the fighting continues, a fema the conference. Peacelit between war and is not as smooth as we have been led to believe over the years. Our two speakers today, you could say they need no introduction. There are exactly the sort of people who should have them because of their achievements. Alan tart with dr. There are three of them. One who served his country, a retired colonel in the marine corps reserve. Author,is a prolific and semper won, and a third volume in preparation as we speak. A one volume history of the war coming up next week area and at that point he said that is all anyone can take on the war in korea. But a prolific and awardwinning author. 37 years at the ohio state university. And now at the university of new orleans. 1010, last time i checked, michigan state. Has turned out an army of wonderful students. You can on will tell them that when you meet them by the breath of their education and their work ethic. Works at churning out the best possible phds. Speaker, hans van de ven, teaches chinese history at cambridge university, and is a leader on history of 19thcentury china. We should stipulate, we do not bring you here unless you are one of the, or the authority on the topic. He is the author of numerous awardwinning books from a friend to comment, the formation of the communist party. War and nationalism in china, 1925 to 1945. Past, thewith the global origins of my dignity in china. His edited work the battle for wara on the sino japanese 1937 to 1945, is essential reading. I have a copy of it at home. His newest book a china at war. Will be forthcoming this summer. He is a publishing and scholarly machine. Dr. S begin by introducing millett. [applause] dr. Millett anything to take my space off the street. Thank you. I think the audience should know brilliantitino is a physician to the World War Ii Museum and i must mention he is an ohio state graduate. [laughter] [applause] i find that encouraging. Backt all of you to think to a movie that has nothing to do with korea. Butch cassidy and the sundance kid. If you are in one of my classes i would probably have to explain what that movie is about and who paul newman and Robert Redford was. But you can be comforted by the fact that i do not think i have to do that for this audience. Peak of recall at the the movie, sundance and butch are pursued by a gang of vigilantes or peace officers. They are in fact, pinkertons. But they do not know that. They continue to ask themselves as they rush through the american west, who are those guys . Who are those guys . Ask the are going to question in the korean concept, who is that man . Kim ilsung and a new korea. Surrendered the liberation of korea in 1945, the same question bedeviled americans and koreans that in october of 1945 view to three soviet generals accompanied by , pyongyang, and had discussing thely gold of soviet occupation. They were there to introduce these two korean gentleman that were expected to govern and all of northern korea and perhaps all of korea. One of them was well known to the crowd. In ancient i hesitate to use that word myself, he was known to everybody. The spiritual leader of the Christian Community, he had been a resistance leader for the , but the other man confused to the crowd. People began to murmur. [speaking foreign language] dr. Millett who is that guy . I hope nobody out there speaks korean [laughter] dr. Millett it was close enough. Somebody recognized him, a rebellious student who grew up in a village outside pyongyang. He had been expelled at the age of 17 after eight years of schooling. In 1929. Isappeared calledns call them him kim ilsung. Who is this guy . Back to theo division of korea in august of 1945. In the cairo meeting of 1943, the allies promised to restore korean sovereignty, independence, which had been lost in 1910 when korea had been annexed by japan as part of the thels of war of russiajapanese war. Liberation in 1945 meant Different Things to the allies. To the americans, it was an korea toty to come to fulfill a promise to liberate korea, to restore its sovereignty, eventually. The picture that i thought i had shows the associations between the americans and the russians of the 38th parallel, setting up the terms of the occupation. The russian attitude, however, was payback to restore at least some of the damage they believed they had felt in the settlement of the 19 note 419 of five. 19041905. It have been also, not in the sense that it killed a lot of northern koreans, but it pillaged the entire northern sector, which they occupied above the 38th parallel. One would expect a certain amount of exaggeration from refugees who fled the northern occupation zone. But we have a very detailed observations made by an oss team in pyongyang on an american mission. There were reports of what russians were doing, they were exhausted. Stive. Au they were taking human reparations, teaching treating koreans like they were japanese. Kind toe not too manchurians elsewhere. They needed some cooperation. And they found it. They included their chosen one, that is a bad pun. [laughter] dr. Millett who is that guy . In the meeting with the soviet generals whose names are forgettable but for the record this group who were responsible for the russian occupation, when looting was going on were looking for koreans they could find up the cooperative. One was supposed to pacify the christians. The question was, who would control the people outside the Christian Community . Was a hotbed of christian activity. That is the picture we really wanted. Bankommunists came in for groups, claiming legitimacy in terms of succeeding the russians and governments of north korea. One group were koreans that had lived in the soviet union for two or three generations, spoke russian better than they did korean. And rejected bureaucrats people who had come in with the occupation. These were many of the members of the red army. Also, the south korean labour party, had been wiped out six times by the japanese. Under reformed again unattractive, honest they had set, and up liaisons with the group in pyongyang, looking for a under aion of korea Domestic Group of communists. Then there were very large earlys of koreans who had members of the communist party in china. They had risen to important positions within the party and in the peopled liberation army. There was a political, spiritual and another that was a general in the Peoples Liberation army. One was very legendary, he led the advance guard, the long march. So legendary, they forgot his family name was kim kim. Of when heounts appeared, he is not in this picture. Group thathere was a had been guerrillas in manchuria, fighting the japanese since the early 1930s. The new guy, who is that man . Was part of this faction and kim ilsung, a name borrowed from another resistance leader, there notanother kim ilsung related to the eventual premiere of north korea. But he was in a kind of retirement, not entirely clear what happened to him. The other cam took his name, it is like saying, my name is bob, or changing your name to robin hood. Have to have a great Freedom Fighter name. This picture is the hardcore of the faction. Admiring the first tommy guns, submachine gun. I will tell you who they are. Left is one of the most effective leaders of south korea , who later became the minister much bigger record than kim ilsung as a guerrilla leader in manchuria. And then, a very abled military leader. , and a general kong. Known by the americans as king kong. Denigrating his status, not a good idea. This group, along with others, had real credentials with the japanese fighters. In the early 1930s, and opposition to the japanese control of manchuria, the Chinese Communists particularly armyized a Japanese United organized in the northwest, meaning manchuria, to carry on partisan operations. The Sixth Division of the second army, which was chinesedominated, included an officer named kim ilsung. Do not be misled by the title. The maximum size had about 200 partisans. But they did conduct one meaningful raid in northern korea in 1937. That kim ilsung built his career as a great antijapanese resistance leader. Japanese had a Guerrilla Campaign that destroyed most of the northeast antiJapanese United army and kim ilsung, with six men come across the border into the soviet union. The original force had been a 15,000, which gives you some idea of japanese efficiency. Many of the survivors passed on to china proper and became part of the Chinese Communist forces in the yunnan province. Sold himself to the russians, a true marxist. Someone who was interested in collaboration with the soviets, someone who is interested in establishing a communist state in korea. The soviets created an organization, those 88 special independent sniper brigades, that had about 600 members, 100 of home were koreans. A chinesekorean force. Kim ilsung became a Company Commander in the brigade. I believe he was favored because. E spoke chinese when he had been a student in the pyongyang area, he attended regularly school in chinese and a school in korean that was run by presbyterians. s parents were, in fact, both christians. There are missionary families today in korea that can go to pyongyang because they had Never Associated themselves with the southern regime. They preyed upon their families christian influences in the early years. Returned tosung korea in september of 1945, he came a month after the soviet occupation. He was not a liberator. He came, basically, to pacify fellow koreans. ,nd his calm rounds comrades today is ann special forces in north korea, they came to help the soviet police and army keep the koreans under control while the russians looted the country. However, moscow had decided there was perhaps a purpose for stopping the looting and creating some kind of Political Base that would allow them to influence unification of korea on communist terms. Hadppears as if kim ilsung made a couple of omissions in manchuria that he was party to this planning. But the people that were most degree,e, to a large where people far more active and far more military. One of the really interesting accounts we have of this period , nowrom a korean expat deceased. He was a russian interpreter. His family had not lived in korea for three generations. He grew up in kazakhstan. Frome disliked kim ilsung the very start and became chief of operations for the korean peoples army. His pictures of kim are not attractive. He had some of the problems of hygiene and Mental Health and other things that characterized it. S favorite person was Joseph Stalin. Modeled himself after stalin in his personal life and political life, as well. The largest challenge that kim to face before 1950 was in fact an insurgency, started by the southern communists, and south korea. In south korea. Well, i am not a real believer in powerpoint, for obvious reasons. Let me draw a picture for you. The communists in south korea did everything they could to prove that the establishment of an independent south korea first of all, by blocking the creation of south koreas r. O. C. Government, and attempting to subvert it. Kim ilsung at first, knowing he cannot control this movement, did not quite ignore it because he uses south korea as a haven for southern communist rule to flee from the south. But he did not intervene for almost a year. Of 1949,the winter particularly, units of the north korean army and Border Police began to assist the southern and theirrrillas raids in the south. What he discovered, the war fed his larger purposes. Which were, eliminating his opponents in north korea, and a force, a public commitment in the invasion of south korea, which came in june of 1950. The big lesson i think he learned too well, here he is conferring with his chinese ally, was that war serves the purposes of his regime. And one hardly can argue with the because by the time armistice occurred in 1953 he had a very firm grip on north korea and then purged his potential opponents. So who is this guy . You see him in this picture next to a Chinese Expeditionary force commander. You notice kim ilsung seems to be well fed. There is a marvelous passage in atranscript that shows conversation between him and josef stalin in 1949. Stalin goes on and on about the fact the last time he saw him, which would have been the summer of 1946, kim ilsung was skinny. Stalin said, things must not be too bad in north korea, since you seem to have put on a great deal of weight since i saw you last. Ais picture shows certainly contrast of chinese commanders in their peasant garb. And the north korean officers who look like part of the soviet army. Nobody really knew who this guy was. Out we are still dealing with his family dynasty. And whether we know him or not, it is clear enough that he was a victor in the war that followed world war ii. Thank you very much. [applause] dr. Van de ven good afternoon, everybody. I first of all would like to thank nick for inviting me a second time here. It has been absolutely wonderful so far. Thank them for organizing everything, it went very smoothly. I was listening yesterday to very kennedy and he spoke eloquently about the surprising ride rise to superstar status during world war ii. As a historian i will try to explain today, just as a Remarkable Development and world war ii was the emergence from a very defeated army in 1937, to one that held the fate of china in its hands in 1947. This is a story that would have no immediate consequence, but when we still live with today. Focus on theill campaign in manchuria, which lasted from may until october 1948. Decisivewas the engagement of the chinese civil war. Defeatng the nationalist , others were to follow. 1948ding a campaign of until january of 1949. Vestiges ofhe last chinese control. Campaign was their morale collapsed and never recovered. Today we begin by providing an overview of the campaign and i will seek to answer the question, how did communists with forcesmerge undertrained and build momentum to achieve a victory that changed the fate of china . And something i will argue in my surprise a few people, the thinking of a great prussian theorist of war had a , rather thanole the chinese theater theoretician of war. Outset,t to make at the made in the introduction, the distinction between chinas war against pan, and the national communist civil war from 1945 to 1949, is in many ways, a postwar construction. Ad the word world war ii is postwar construction. As one of my cambridge colleagues pointed out, it was only in 1947 that the british decided they had just been fighting the Second World War. An importantis thing to keep in mind. Declareded leaders world war ii over, when japan and germany fell in 1945, they articulated less a reality than there are these highly militarized organizations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world. Areas of the world, a huge amount of violence took place after 1945, in which many millions of people would die. China is an example of that. In 1937, the nationalist and communists had a united front, ending the civil war that had preceded it. The two sides did cooperate, at times. The united front held for the duration of the war, nominally. But by 1949, friction began to outweigh cooperation. Happenedolving from 1940 to 1941. After, it became clear that allies would be victorious. The civil war was expected to follow after the fall of japan. Iner the japanese offensive 1944, drove them out of much of china, allowing the communist forces to grow and influx into these areas, putting them in a poor position. The communists did not take power in china at this point. Not because of nationalist strength, but because the japanese decided it was now in their interest to support the nationalist. Believing that they were the best hope for preventing a communist takeover of the country, that would bring a revival of japanese trade. Japanese forces therefore helped nationalists recover control over china. The irony, of course, since they had lost so much blood and treasure over the last eight years and trying to defeat exactly the same people. U. S. Forces also helped the nationalist. Were in aup shanghai. Marines occupied shanghai, and an important port city. It was to facilitate the repatriation of all Japanese Forces and withdraw, so as to bring the boys home. Those were two important aspects of the Japanese Occupation occupation in japan. U. S. Was determined to stay out of a nationalist communist war. Withdrew, they officers. The soviets also decided their interests were best served by reining in the Chinese Communists to secure important concessions from the nationalists in a final soviet treaty, that also concluded before the fall of japan. It blocked in north china, the rich readers, into manchuria. Which is a peninsula between japan and china proper. Years of thetwo civil war, the nationalists appeared to have the upper hand. In spring of 1946, the nationalists went on the offensive in manchuria and drove the communists from its southern half, where one of chinas main Industrial Centers was located. One that was wanted by the japanese. The Agricultural Land was productive. One of the things the soviets did was to take back war reparations. The nationalists also made advances in north china and even succeeded in driving the communists from their Main Base Area from the communist capital. 1947, ite summer of begin to wane, and they were on the defensive. There was a severe lack of ammunition, that curtailed their power. The economy was curtailed due to inflation. The destruction of transport shortages,d food because National World<\/a> War Ii Museum<\/a> in new orleans. Part of it 2016 conference that focused on the year 1946. This is about an hour and 20 minutes. Welcome to the 105 session of the warrence, titled is over, but the fighting continues, a fema the conference. Peacelit between war and is not as smooth as we have been led to believe over the years. Our two speakers today, you could say they need no introduction. There are exactly the sort of people who should have them because of their achievements. Alan tart with dr. There are three of them. One who served his country, a retired colonel in the marine corps reserve. Author,is a prolific and semper won, and a third volume in preparation as we speak. A one volume history of the war coming up next week area and at that point he said that is all anyone can take on the war in korea. But a prolific and awardwinning author. 37 years at the ohio state university. And now at the university of new orleans. 1010, last time i checked, michigan state. Has turned out an army of wonderful students. You can on will tell them that when you meet them by the breath of their education and their work ethic. Works at churning out the best possible phds. Speaker, hans van de ven, teaches chinese history at cambridge university, and is a leader on history of 19thcentury china. We should stipulate, we do not bring you here unless you are one of the, or the authority on the topic. He is the author of numerous awardwinning books from a friend to comment, the formation of the communist party. War and nationalism in china, 1925 to 1945. Past, thewith the global origins of my dignity in china. His edited work the battle for wara on the sino japanese 1937 to 1945, is essential reading. I have a copy of it at home. His newest book a china at war. Will be forthcoming this summer. He is a publishing and scholarly machine. Dr. S begin by introducing millett. [applause] dr. Millett anything to take my space off the street. Thank you. I think the audience should know brilliantitino is a physician to the World War Ii Museum<\/a> and i must mention he is an ohio state graduate. [laughter] [applause] i find that encouraging. Backt all of you to think to a movie that has nothing to do with korea. Butch cassidy and the sundance kid. If you are in one of my classes i would probably have to explain what that movie is about and who paul newman and Robert Redford<\/a> was. But you can be comforted by the fact that i do not think i have to do that for this audience. Peak of recall at the the movie, sundance and butch are pursued by a gang of vigilantes or peace officers. They are in fact, pinkertons. But they do not know that. They continue to ask themselves as they rush through the american west, who are those guys . Who are those guys . Ask the are going to question in the korean concept, who is that man . Kim ilsung and a new korea. Surrendered the liberation of korea in 1945, the same question bedeviled americans and koreans that in october of 1945 view to three soviet generals accompanied by , pyongyang, and had discussing thely gold of soviet occupation. They were there to introduce these two korean gentleman that were expected to govern and all of northern korea and perhaps all of korea. One of them was well known to the crowd. In ancient i hesitate to use that word myself, he was known to everybody. The spiritual leader of the Christian Community<\/a>, he had been a resistance leader for the , but the other man confused to the crowd. People began to murmur. [speaking foreign language] dr. Millett who is that guy . I hope nobody out there speaks korean [laughter] dr. Millett it was close enough. Somebody recognized him, a rebellious student who grew up in a village outside pyongyang. He had been expelled at the age of 17 after eight years of schooling. In 1929. Isappeared calledns call them him kim ilsung. Who is this guy . Back to theo division of korea in august of 1945. In the cairo meeting of 1943, the allies promised to restore korean sovereignty, independence, which had been lost in 1910 when korea had been annexed by japan as part of the thels of war of russiajapanese war. Liberation in 1945 meant Different Things<\/a> to the allies. To the americans, it was an korea toty to come to fulfill a promise to liberate korea, to restore its sovereignty, eventually. The picture that i thought i had shows the associations between the americans and the russians of the 38th parallel, setting up the terms of the occupation. The russian attitude, however, was payback to restore at least some of the damage they believed they had felt in the settlement of the 19 note 419 of five. 19041905. It have been also, not in the sense that it killed a lot of northern koreans, but it pillaged the entire northern sector, which they occupied above the 38th parallel. One would expect a certain amount of exaggeration from refugees who fled the northern occupation zone. But we have a very detailed observations made by an oss team in pyongyang on an american mission. There were reports of what russians were doing, they were exhausted. Stive. Au they were taking human reparations, teaching treating koreans like they were japanese. Kind toe not too manchurians elsewhere. They needed some cooperation. And they found it. They included their chosen one, that is a bad pun. [laughter] dr. Millett who is that guy . In the meeting with the soviet generals whose names are forgettable but for the record this group who were responsible for the russian occupation, when looting was going on were looking for koreans they could find up the cooperative. One was supposed to pacify the christians. The question was, who would control the people outside the Christian Community<\/a> . Was a hotbed of christian activity. That is the picture we really wanted. Bankommunists came in for groups, claiming legitimacy in terms of succeeding the russians and governments of north korea. One group were koreans that had lived in the soviet union for two or three generations, spoke russian better than they did korean. And rejected bureaucrats people who had come in with the occupation. These were many of the members of the red army. Also, the south korean labour party, had been wiped out six times by the japanese. Under reformed again unattractive, honest they had set, and up liaisons with the group in pyongyang, looking for a under aion of korea Domestic Group<\/a> of communists. Then there were very large earlys of koreans who had members of the communist party in china. They had risen to important positions within the party and in the peopled liberation army. There was a political, spiritual and another that was a general in the Peoples Liberation<\/a> army. One was very legendary, he led the advance guard, the long march. So legendary, they forgot his family name was kim kim. Of when heounts appeared, he is not in this picture. Group thathere was a had been guerrillas in manchuria, fighting the japanese since the early 1930s. The new guy, who is that man . Was part of this faction and kim ilsung, a name borrowed from another resistance leader, there notanother kim ilsung related to the eventual premiere of north korea. But he was in a kind of retirement, not entirely clear what happened to him. The other cam took his name, it is like saying, my name is bob, or changing your name to robin hood. Have to have a great Freedom Fighter<\/a> name. This picture is the hardcore of the faction. Admiring the first tommy guns, submachine gun. I will tell you who they are. Left is one of the most effective leaders of south korea , who later became the minister much bigger record than kim ilsung as a guerrilla leader in manchuria. And then, a very abled military leader. , and a general kong. Known by the americans as king kong. Denigrating his status, not a good idea. This group, along with others, had real credentials with the japanese fighters. In the early 1930s, and opposition to the japanese control of manchuria, the Chinese Communist<\/a>s particularly armyized a Japanese United<\/a> organized in the northwest, meaning manchuria, to carry on partisan operations. The Sixth Division<\/a> of the second army, which was chinesedominated, included an officer named kim ilsung. Do not be misled by the title. The maximum size had about 200 partisans. But they did conduct one meaningful raid in northern korea in 1937. That kim ilsung built his career as a great antijapanese resistance leader. Japanese had a Guerrilla Campaign<\/a> that destroyed most of the northeast antiJapanese United<\/a> army and kim ilsung, with six men come across the border into the soviet union. The original force had been a 15,000, which gives you some idea of japanese efficiency. Many of the survivors passed on to china proper and became part of the Chinese Communist<\/a> forces in the yunnan province. Sold himself to the russians, a true marxist. Someone who was interested in collaboration with the soviets, someone who is interested in establishing a communist state in korea. The soviets created an organization, those 88 special independent sniper brigades, that had about 600 members, 100 of home were koreans. A chinesekorean force. Kim ilsung became a Company Commander<\/a> in the brigade. I believe he was favored because. E spoke chinese when he had been a student in the pyongyang area, he attended regularly school in chinese and a school in korean that was run by presbyterians. s parents were, in fact, both christians. There are missionary families today in korea that can go to pyongyang because they had Never Associated<\/a> themselves with the southern regime. They preyed upon their families christian influences in the early years. Returned tosung korea in september of 1945, he came a month after the soviet occupation. He was not a liberator. He came, basically, to pacify fellow koreans. ,nd his calm rounds comrades today is ann special forces in north korea, they came to help the soviet police and army keep the koreans under control while the russians looted the country. However, moscow had decided there was perhaps a purpose for stopping the looting and creating some kind of Political Base<\/a> that would allow them to influence unification of korea on communist terms. Hadppears as if kim ilsung made a couple of omissions in manchuria that he was party to this planning. But the people that were most degree,e, to a large where people far more active and far more military. One of the really interesting accounts we have of this period , nowrom a korean expat deceased. He was a russian interpreter. His family had not lived in korea for three generations. He grew up in kazakhstan. Frome disliked kim ilsung the very start and became chief of operations for the korean peoples army. His pictures of kim are not attractive. He had some of the problems of hygiene and Mental Health<\/a> and other things that characterized it. S favorite person was Joseph Stalin<\/a>. Modeled himself after stalin in his personal life and political life, as well. The largest challenge that kim to face before 1950 was in fact an insurgency, started by the southern communists, and south korea. In south korea. Well, i am not a real believer in powerpoint, for obvious reasons. Let me draw a picture for you. The communists in south korea did everything they could to prove that the establishment of an independent south korea first of all, by blocking the creation of south koreas r. O. C. Government, and attempting to subvert it. Kim ilsung at first, knowing he cannot control this movement, did not quite ignore it because he uses south korea as a haven for southern communist rule to flee from the south. But he did not intervene for almost a year. Of 1949,the winter particularly, units of the north korean army and Border Police<\/a> began to assist the southern and theirrrillas raids in the south. What he discovered, the war fed his larger purposes. Which were, eliminating his opponents in north korea, and a force, a public commitment in the invasion of south korea, which came in june of 1950. The big lesson i think he learned too well, here he is conferring with his chinese ally, was that war serves the purposes of his regime. And one hardly can argue with the because by the time armistice occurred in 1953 he had a very firm grip on north korea and then purged his potential opponents. So who is this guy . You see him in this picture next to a Chinese Expeditionary<\/a> force commander. You notice kim ilsung seems to be well fed. There is a marvelous passage in atranscript that shows conversation between him and josef stalin in 1949. Stalin goes on and on about the fact the last time he saw him, which would have been the summer of 1946, kim ilsung was skinny. Stalin said, things must not be too bad in north korea, since you seem to have put on a great deal of weight since i saw you last. Ais picture shows certainly contrast of chinese commanders in their peasant garb. And the north korean officers who look like part of the soviet army. Nobody really knew who this guy was. Out we are still dealing with his family dynasty. And whether we know him or not, it is clear enough that he was a victor in the war that followed world war ii. Thank you very much. [applause] dr. Van de ven good afternoon, everybody. I first of all would like to thank nick for inviting me a second time here. It has been absolutely wonderful so far. Thank them for organizing everything, it went very smoothly. I was listening yesterday to very kennedy and he spoke eloquently about the surprising ride rise to superstar status during world war ii. As a historian i will try to explain today, just as a Remarkable Development<\/a> and world war ii was the emergence from a very defeated army in 1937, to one that held the fate of china in its hands in 1947. This is a story that would have no immediate consequence, but when we still live with today. Focus on theill campaign in manchuria, which lasted from may until october 1948. Decisivewas the engagement of the chinese civil war. Defeatng the nationalist , others were to follow. 1948ding a campaign of until january of 1949. Vestiges ofhe last chinese control. Campaign was their morale collapsed and never recovered. Today we begin by providing an overview of the campaign and i will seek to answer the question, how did communists with forcesmerge undertrained and build momentum to achieve a victory that changed the fate of china . And something i will argue in my surprise a few people, the thinking of a great prussian theorist of war had a , rather thanole the chinese theater theoretician of war. Outset,t to make at the made in the introduction, the distinction between chinas war against pan, and the national communist civil war from 1945 to 1949, is in many ways, a postwar construction. Ad the word world war ii is postwar construction. As one of my cambridge colleagues pointed out, it was only in 1947 that the british decided they had just been fighting the Second World War<\/a>. An importantis thing to keep in mind. Declareded leaders world war ii over, when japan and germany fell in 1945, they articulated less a reality than there are these highly militarized organizations in Southeast Asia<\/a> and elsewhere in the world. Areas of the world, a huge amount of violence took place after 1945, in which many millions of people would die. China is an example of that. In 1937, the nationalist and communists had a united front, ending the civil war that had preceded it. The two sides did cooperate, at times. The united front held for the duration of the war, nominally. But by 1949, friction began to outweigh cooperation. Happenedolving from 1940 to 1941. After, it became clear that allies would be victorious. The civil war was expected to follow after the fall of japan. Iner the japanese offensive 1944, drove them out of much of china, allowing the communist forces to grow and influx into these areas, putting them in a poor position. The communists did not take power in china at this point. Not because of nationalist strength, but because the japanese decided it was now in their interest to support the nationalist. Believing that they were the best hope for preventing a communist takeover of the country, that would bring a revival of japanese trade. Japanese forces therefore helped nationalists recover control over china. The irony, of course, since they had lost so much blood and treasure over the last eight years and trying to defeat exactly the same people. U. S. Forces also helped the nationalist. Were in aup shanghai. Marines occupied shanghai, and an important port city. It was to facilitate the repatriation of all Japanese Forces<\/a> and withdraw, so as to bring the boys home. Those were two important aspects of the Japanese Occupation<\/a> occupation in japan. U. S. Was determined to stay out of a nationalist communist war. Withdrew, they officers. The soviets also decided their interests were best served by reining in the Chinese Communist<\/a>s to secure important concessions from the nationalists in a final soviet treaty, that also concluded before the fall of japan. It blocked in north china, the rich readers, into manchuria. Which is a peninsula between japan and china proper. Years of thetwo civil war, the nationalists appeared to have the upper hand. In spring of 1946, the nationalists went on the offensive in manchuria and drove the communists from its southern half, where one of chinas main Industrial Centers<\/a> was located. One that was wanted by the japanese. The Agricultural Land<\/a> was productive. One of the things the soviets did was to take back war reparations. The nationalists also made advances in north china and even succeeded in driving the communists from their Main Base Area<\/a> from the communist capital. 1947, ite summer of begin to wane, and they were on the defensive. There was a severe lack of ammunition, that curtailed their power. The economy was curtailed due to inflation. The destruction of transport shortages,d food because International Trade<\/a> things had been upset by the Second World War<\/a> in east asia, which also affected japan. Withdrews in manchuria into large cities. Namely, from the north to the south, we will give you a map in a minute. This background that the laotian campaign took place. By 1948, forces in manchuria numbered 500,000 troops. Hadthe soviet command 700,000 troops. The laotian campaign happened in may of 1948. The everlasting spring is not a description of reality, but an expression of hope. Were temperatures well below freezing for half the year, at least. Even today, travelers are inised to warm their mobiles the winter because it is so cold they will not work at that time of year. Time, mao zedong and were discussing which city to attack first, for some time. And he prevailed in his view. Northe it was closer to manchuria, which was under communist control, reducing logistical difficulties. Of the general had doubts his forces to take large cities. Understandably so because in 1947, he had lost 60,000 troops in a battle. It was the first communist attempt to take a large city in china. The need for caution was born out by a disappointing beginning to the communist attempts to take the city with 100,000 nationalist troops. He failed, allowing the two divisions to drawback into the city. Happened, he decided to starve the city to death. There are very few illustrations of this, but this is one photo what isustrates happening. To make sure no food led got the the city, they denied agricultural areas close to the city where vegetables were grown. There is an interesting report from the communists manchurian o, not allowing the starving people to leave the city and pushing back those who is extremely difficult to explain to both the starving people, and more in their minds, around soldiers. The starving people, begging to be let through. Some had babies and children, and ran away. Some had ropes and hanged themselves in front of our sentries. It is an utterly horrible siege. N which communists used famine communists used famine as a weapon of war. This would not be concluded until the end of the laotian campaign, the war for manchuria. You can see the city of us talking about in the north, 250 kilometers to the south. I will talk about how this played out further on what was septemberseptember 7, 1948. This is one of the most impressive operations. They moved to under 50,000 soldiers. They surrounded the city and besieged it. They put in blocks to the south and north. Less than 900 no cannons around the city. They had their tanks ready. They were ready to pounce. It is inortant because a corridor between china proper, to the south, and then there is manchuria. If the communists took it, the consequence would be, the nationalist troops in manchuria could not withdraw into china it istionalists of nationaliste position that they wanted to take back. In, theye troops moved made a counter move which, had it worked, it might well have changed the fate of china. He ordered his generals in north china to make a counter encirclement of the 250,000 communist troops who were now ready in position there. They would bar his american commander later, saying, have orders been followed, it would have succeeded. Who knows, that is of course afterthefact analysis. Hisproblem was that generals were very reluctant to move. Flyingan image of him back and forth between these places for 10 days or so, trying to convince his generals to move, and they didnt. General i have a picture of him. A is a painting, derived from picture. A very happy man, i do not know when this picture was supposed to have been. This was so dangerous, he end and maohe thought about this. Able move now, we will be to win. Ling yao to move, and he did. This was a surprise, he took the city in one day. The fear the communists had had battle defended by u. S. Armed nationalist, and it in one day. It is because they had the artillery. And the disaster got worse and worse. The general started debating with each other. Got the forces out, surrounded them, defeated them. At that point, the city was also surrounded. By october, the communists had shocking victory over the communists and the whole situation unraveled after that. What i want to do in the remaining few minutes that i have, is explain a little bit of how come the communists were able to do this in a shock tempo, almost. There is one important point i should make. I put it in the context of the emergence of National Liberation<\/a> war, which became so important after world war ii in east and Southeast Asia<\/a>. An important point to make is that mao never thought that guerrilla war, asymmetrical warfare alone, could deliver victory. Thathing he learned was defense is the stronger form of war and that it could be used to weaken the enemy. Once the enemy had been sufficiently weakened, he said it was important to go on the defensive and wage conventional warfare. Visionas always a maoist of war. It was building up the force in the countryside to make the transition from small kale smallscale guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. Im to campaign, they had do command train the commanders and mobilize the people behind their cause. Ii iny during world war the early 1950s, people were sent to the soviet union, to gain the training they needed to conduct these kinds of operations. The top communist command, including ling yao, has spent a lot of time at the military academies and so on. There were the just go people, well, that transforms them enabled them to transform into a powerful force. They also needed the weapons. Extent, communists were not the beneficiaries of the geopolitical situation at the time. Both the usa and ussr thought they could not allowed to afford the other control of the vast resources of northeast asia, japan, korea, manchuria, siberia. Hink these all to come these all come together as one story. There was a pillar of Japanese Military<\/a> minds. With the ussr or china, south of the great wall, the threat from this area would surpass anything of wartime japan. So it would not be allowed to happen. Martial Marshall Mission<\/a> may be we can talk his aim was to, repatriate all the japanese, create a unified government, but secure nationals control of manchuria. That is why they supported the nationalist going into manchuria. But he was in some ways not that different from marshall, but he wanted to inflict defeat on the communists before negotiations. Therefore, the relationship broke down so that marshall began to lose his control over weapons as the u. S. Support for the nationalists, as a means of trying to make Chiang Kaishek<\/a> more clients. So they stopped supplying. The soviets did not want a confrontation with of the americans over manchuria. Because these were not it was an arm to communism. I have the figures from chinese historians today, as well as british intelligence, they do not entirely trusted. The numbers of arms that were handed to the communists, huge amounts, hundreds of thousands of rifles. I am not going to go through details. But any idea this is an under armed communist force being more clever than the nationalists, no. Thatnk the reality is more communists were probably after the americans stopped supplying the nationalists. There is another important aspect of this. This is the artillery that was used. This is land reform. Mao had been good at mobilizing the populace. But he knew morale was key. Shadow ofe, in the what he was saying, to mobilize the people that is virtually starving, without food, that was an enormous achievement on the side of communism. They faced desperate situations. But they pooled to achieve the mobilization of morale both for the armies and the people, a land revolution. Off the land, to take the lands, and redistribute them to the people. Only for us,urse, important to presence. Land is far more important than money. Especially at a time of hyperinflation. That is your food. That is something that helps you sustain your children. The best promise, giving the take in thes revolution is one thing. The communists had to get 700,000 troops into the field but also mobilize hundreds of thousands of people to do the carrying, also feeding animals. The land revolution was very, very important. And i will stop here. I could say more. But it was not a nice thing. I have read horrible, horrible accounts of it. It also showed the communists had the power to create a new communist reality on the ground. And part of that revolution was to attack their own communist officials who had been corrupt. They were showing, we really, really stand with the peasantry. And we have the power to make it stick. That is one thing mao also learned. And i think he learned to something else, something people have not quite understood. Saw was the essential importance of and having the military under the control of top. Olitical and it was, that is why in the 1940s, they conducted the same rectification campaign. Created,nist purge was party of iron discipline, able to enforce its will. Became ao why mao politician and made sure he used whene party to make sure they had been so divided, there was one central political control over all of these armed forces. The most important thing he learned from clausewitz was the enormous significance of the political and that he not had not seen or done before, really, clausewitz. He had not had that kind of control over the political reality. That leads me to my final point. This kind of warfare that mao, National Liberation<\/a> war, mobilizing a population, moving from guerrilla warfare, to this more conventional kind of warfare in which artillery is important, is clearly in the case in vietnam, as well. But that kind of warfare has an influence over postworld war ii developments, broadly defined. As important as technological inventions like the nuclear bomb. It reshaped east asia, Southeast Asia<\/a>. And it has an influence today. I read some account of the they allof a strategy, know there mao their mao. It is an influence that has continued for a very long time. Point to finish with the that people have referred to already. While writing the book i am writing now, i was very interested in clausewitz. Boy, that is clever. That is good. We cannot think of examples where clausewitz needs updating, as they say. Warfare, economic warfare. I think all the talks we have had today illustrate that. When clausewitz was writing, and the more thats ending the war was not that hard. But it was critical to conducting war successfully. Japan,done so well in much less well in other areas of the world. Needs updating, i am not sure he does, it needs updating in the question of, how do we end war . That is an important aspect we need to think about. It needs to be a part of military planning. That lesson needs to be learned. Thank you very much. [applause] mr. Citino we have time for questions. In the back of the room, in the center. A question for dr. Millett hate we hate and properly dictators, usually verizon element of popularity, or they initially stood for something. Like how Joseph Stalin<\/a> was quite popular in his country. Itn you look at kim ilsung, does not seem, from what i he was not a Korean National<\/a> list. He was helping the soviets plunder his own people. He was not a true believing marxist. He did not seem to stand for anything. How did he ever gain the see heity, or control we and his son and his grandson have . Dr. Millett he got a lot of help from the soviets and the chinese. One of the burdens he carried, to some degree, could be presented by the southern externals a tool of interests. Which in many ways, he was. Though he broke loose in the mid1950s, basically by purging any north korean that had strong loyalties to china, to the soviet union, to any external authority. He was pretty ruthless in eliminating competition. One of the reasons he allowed a lot of people to leave north korea before 1950, it was a cheap way to get rid of dissidents. And he confiscated property and money, and the like. He shifted his dissidents south. Expats from north korea turned bulwark of the south korean regime. Today, about one third of the population of south korea has north korean antecedents. He was very clever. He played people and elements against each other, and like other dictators of his ilk, he found ways to accuse his opponents of being spies for the cia, for being dupes of the south koreans. His largest rival was the vice premier and foreign minister. He had them tried for treason and was executed in 1954, 1955. Few breaks ony him. He had not yet developed his mantra. It is amazing, north korea had never been independent or selfsustaining. They were really autonomous. They said, we can play off everybody against each other the definition of autonomy. Quite amazing to go against all of those people. They find out they are the sons and grandsons of the fact, and other faction, and other people connected to the kim family. Stalin was his model, and he said that continuously. He said, when desalinization started, he opposed it. The russians told him, you have to go along with moderation and modify the economic system. He refused to do that. His family has been difficult in their relationship with the chinese. Chinese are scared that if there is any conflict, the whole population of north korea will go to mention area. Manchuria. I cannot imagine anything worse they cannot imagine anything worse. In some sense, a divided korea is something that the chinese want. That makes korea less of a problem. I think that many other powers think the same way. Both south korea, as well as china, are afraid of the consequences if the whole thing collapses. In men sharia manchuria a little while ago. Part ofprosperous china. The chinese were trading foreign cigarettes to the North Koreans<\/a> in the middle of the river because they were getting goods and quality from the North Koreans<\/a>. The North Koreans<\/a> were desperate for cigarettes that were not made in north korea. One can imagine how wonderful they are. The chinese can hardly stand to deal with them. There has to be more trade with oil and things like that. It has to be done. This question is for hans. What influence did vinegar Joe Stillwell<\/a> avenue on Chang Kaishek<\/a>. That is a long story and im not sure it is relevant for this period. I say, oh, dera, because i have written about him and negative terms. I could go on about that. I think that there were all kinds of problems between Chang Kaishek<\/a> and stillwell. What i would like to emphasize the way that i write about americas relationship with mightduring world war ii, take on this way that i developed his ideas in the book i just finished. A, we have talked too much about stillwell, and it shouldnt overshadow everything else. The most important thing that america did for china in world war ii was to support chinas morale. It did so in a number of ways. Support,ugh military which was not that significant, and often misguided in my view, but by such things as not just inviting churchill, but also met him john to the madam john. She stopped traffic across new york. There was the Hollywood Bowl<\/a> thing. That gave people great hope. She addressed the American People<\/a> over the famous radio link. Lead inica took the abolishing the unequal treaties. They invited the u. K. To join that as well. It is not true that the u. K. Was unwilling to do so, but the timing was awkward given the quick india campaign. But the u. K. Said before that they were prepared to do so. It is increasing the prestige of china and incorporating it. Have, thed, as i diaries of people, china, youngsters and so forth, they are full of praise about roosevelt. When roosevelt died, classes were stopped and Walt Whitmans<\/a> captain,s read, oh my captain. We are close to harbour, but you are dead. It is very emotional and very sincere. That is the important american role. Next question on your right. Reading in a book that you edited about world war ii china, im in interested in finding out more about that. Is it something similar to the conference here . The series of conferences . Thank you for bringing that up. , likenvolved with others a professor at harvard university, for bringing chinese and japanese professors together to ensure there is dialogue. A measure that they need us, i am not sure that they need us, but there are scholars who have had the most serious issues about japan. In china we have done some various places. We began in the comfort of hawaii, which created a comfortable situation with lots of historical issues that could be discussed more pleasantly. We will go to japan. That is part of a general effort to keep that dialogue together. Serious. Ellectually the book we referred to argues that we begin world war ii in asia with highly militarized empires. The dutch, my own country, the british, the japanese. With china as the semicolonies, they still feel under the sway of these greater powers. We end with china in a different position, and the world decolonizing rapidly. That is a kind of change and a roll of chinese diplomats. That is the role of the british, the americans, and so on. The associates that are illustrated in that particular book. Thank you for allowing me to pluck that particular book. Here in the front. Another it is implicit in much of what you said, but would you be more explicit about chinas reluctance to control north koreas Foreign Policy<\/a> . You are probably much more qualified to do that. S off on a a nice pas tough question. [laughter] the koreans are totally unpredictable. That is part of the problem. Beijing likes control and predictability. They have a clear view of what their own interests are. In the sense of North Koreans<\/a>, they have to be dealt with, but on the other hand they are an unpredictable element. The koreans have by and large attempted to increase their power or protect themselves by playing great powers against each other. I think no one trusts them very much. R. O. K. Asies to the well. They are much alike. I think the chinese do not feel that they want to take responsibility for what happens. The japanese feel the same way. It is a tough situation to come in and say, they are your neighbors, you take terror of them. And they say you take care of them. And they say, thank you, but it do not think we are going to. The divided korea illustrates that world war ii, in some ways, has not ended in east asia. There are some here he serious historical legacies. This is why both china and japan are not thrilled with the idea of unification. Like Charles De Gaulle<\/a> said about germany, i like it so much, i would like to have two of them. [laughter] i think the chinese and the japanese attitudes pretty much look that way at the koreans. It is doubly difficult because somebody koreans live in china. It illustrates the complexity of chinas borders. That is something i am not an i. R. Specialist, but they do not realize how complex the borders are. How are you going to deal with this . One final question in the front. Europe and partially answering the question you have been partially answering the question i have. There is this long, intense hostility between korea, north and south, and japan. Since the korean war in particular, there has been striking success, prosperity in south korea, not north korea. In south korea and japan. Think, and both have been within the u. S. Security umbrella, i would think that there would be far greater interest in both places, in if somed south korea t of joint activity [inaudible] more interested now in striking some kind of common cause and, negativity in common activity, in a security arrangement that is perceived to be, at least as real as article charter, innato terms of mutual action that involves the United States<\/a>, on behalf of both. That is a comment more than a question. It is a question. One thing to note here is th at taiwan belongs in that circle, which is very important. That was sort of one question. I think that it goes to the experience of occupation, which in taiwan was easier than in korea. Where it goes to which elites profited most. South korea collaborated more closely with japan. There is a deeper question. Solidaritysies. The solidarities run strong in many ways between korea, taiwan, japan, china itself. But they often go through popular redemptive movements, like which are not trusted by politicians. These things play out rather differently than you might expect. The reality for all of them is that china is the big guy in their area. Balancing acareful ct to play. The one thing that struck me very much, and i will go back to history, but in the time of the American Occupation<\/a> of japan, there was a wonderful moment. Japan was officially occupied by all allied forces, though macarthur dominated. Macarthur wanted to do away with the japanese script and use some latin eyes for latinized form of it. Which could be done with japanese. The chinese were worried about this. O the Prime Minister<\/a> at the time, and they had a lovely lunch with nice cigars and said, you dont want to do that because we are an area of the world combined that have an asian script in common. The pragmatist or said, this is what the Prime Minister<\/a> said, this is what they want, but they are not going to succeed. That suggests the commonality and the differences tween these countries between these countries. You have a script in taiwan as well as hong kong and singapore. The japanese partly is it. The koreans script is partly derived from chinese characters and partly not. Vietnam is the same way. It is an area full of commonalities and strong contradictions that go deeper into history. If i could pick up on that theme, the chinese regard the koreans as cryptojapanese. They have never shaken off the japanese culture. Dna that has proved the koreans are closer to the japanese than the chinese. The chinese are in a huff about that. They are concerned that the americansouth koreanjapanese conspiracy which has been at the heart of communist rhetoric since the lat e 1940s. They are concerned about the fact that power is imbalanced neoimperialist, capitalist, conspiracy. I was in beijing about a year and have a go, a year and a half ago, and i was visiting a guy running a chinese foreignpolicy think tank. He said lets talk about relations. I could not do much damage so i said i will see what they have to say. He said, if the United States<\/a> would balance its policy in such a way that we felt we were on equal status with japan, we would get along a lot better. I said, what do you have in mind . He said, there is something you could do to improve relations. Give us taiwan. [laughter] i said, i dont think it is ours to do that. It seemed to me that that was asking a great deal and the taiwanese would have something to say about that. There is that sense of victimization and deprivation which gnp and growth rates are not going to make go away. Part of the problem is that we assume economic growth, for some reason, modifies all resentments. I think it enriches them in some ways. Now we have better weapons. There is a lot of payback out there. Nobody forgets anything, as far as i can tell. Examplerean army for still sees itself to some degree as an extension of the japanese past. Not their association with the United States<\/a>. They say, we will quit meeting the troops because americans dont like that, so if they are watching we will not do it, but if the cameras go away, we will whack the troops to shape them up. It instills discipline. Its hard to get people to change what they think represents their true being, their way of life. That is what you are up against. Thank you, gentlemen. [applause] americanekend long, history to the is joining our Comcast Cable<\/a> partners to showcase the history of fresno, california. To learn more, visit cspan. Org citiestour. We continue with a look at the history of fresno. A lot of people probably cannot think of agriculture. You think of hollywood, san francisco, the golden gate bridge. You probably forget about","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"archive.org","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","width":"800","height":"600","url":"\/\/ia601901.us.archive.org\/9\/items\/CSPAN3_20170204_213200_Korea_and_China_After_World_War_II\/CSPAN3_20170204_213200_Korea_and_China_After_World_War_II.thumbs\/CSPAN3_20170204_213200_Korea_and_China_After_World_War_II_000001.jpg"}},"autauthor":{"@type":"Organization"},"author":{"sameAs":"archive.org","name":"archive.org"}}],"coverageEndTime":"20240627T12:35:10+00:00"}

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