And they have more or less supported each other in that discussion. We are now have a much clearer understanding what turkey can do for our internal politics, what jordan has been able to do and others as well. To that effect i think we are getting much better understanding and less involvement of our neighbors in our internal affairs and more toward the stability of the country. Thats a good sign. So we think that our neighbors have matured up to that challenge. Iraqis internal politics have also matured up. Not to overdepend on extended parties, because your neighbor, your Community Neighbor whether theyre kurdish, shia, others, regardless are there support you from the outside. So we are a project in the making. And we are developing in the right direction. But on the fight against isis i still think we need a lot of support. Are you finding that some parties think that isis can be useful pressure against iranian influence in iraq and can help sue for the kind of political deal afterward they want . John, were seeing isis very similar to the taliban situation in afghanistan. And we can see what afghanistan has led to with this lack of aggressiveness against taliban at the time and allowing it. We dont want to emulate that copy. We dont want to be a copycat to that situation. We want the fight against isis for their sake and our sake. That for the stability of the region and the globe as a result of that. So i think we are looking for a more responsive, mature reflection of what has taken place. And we dont want our neighbors hand to be burned by the lack of engagement in the fight against isis. Are you hearing when you travel in the middle east people who say, well, we dont want isis to win but we also dont want the iranians to win iraq completely . Is that something you hear . Certainly, john. I think to a certain extent isis is viewed still as a useful tool in checking iranian influence, especially in a postiranian nuclear deal environment. As in iraq is still viewed at least in saudi arabia and in re add and other capitals as an extension or an iranians fear of influence. As a matter of fact its definitely far from true, but it is still treated as that. That goes for both the iranian for the iraqi theater and the syrian one. Unfortunately, no one regionally wants iraq to emerge as a strong state. Iran still views iraq as a weak entity attached to it or aligned with it as favorable to a stronger iraq. I would say that saudi arabia definitely does not want the iraqi democratic experience to fully prosper. And in fact i dont think that the saudis have ever made a strategic decision to reach some form of a deal with a new iraqi system, to embrace iraq as an arab state with a new system. I think that hasnt been done before. And im not sure it will be done in the future. Can i add this small point here . Absolutely. Its important to look at isis as a global problem rather than just an internal domestic iraqi one. We have our faults. Nobodys denying that. We may have contributed to its strength, however when you have a problem in north africa or when you have chechnya or chinese or american joining isis, that has nothing to do with internal iraqi politics, has nothing to do with sunni, has to do with the global problem has to do with global resolution as much as Global Warming is a problem we have to work with. I think thats important for our audience to appreciate at least that iraqi politics internal you cant help regardless how much you help on the iraqi politics you have a global phenomenon which you need to grasp and get control of. Thats where i think may be missing. Aaron, one of the things that seems to me when people report on foreign fighters, we hear a lot about foreign fighters in syria, we dont hear a lot about foreign fighters in iraq. In fact, what we keep hearing about daesh in iraq is that its former regime loyalists or baptist who is are growing beards and putting on different uniforms. Not to dis your beard at all. Is there Something Different about daesh as it operates in iraq versus daesh as it operates in syria . Yeah, at least on the first part its definitely true. I would say vast majority of foreign fighters are actually based in syria. Though you do see foreign fighters in iraq as well, but theyre not really involved with the administration of the areas that theyre controlling. The foreign fighters are primarily used as suicide bombers in the iraqi context. Whereas the foreign fighters in the syrian context are more used in terms of the administration. So just yesterday there was a report of syrian as well as another involved in a suicide bombing in iraq yesterday, or at least thats when it was announced. So theres a difference in that context. Another thing to think about too is that this organization while many people began to repay attention to it in june 2014 after the fall of mosul, this is an organization that has had a presence nonstop since 2002, 2003 when zarkawi first came to iraq after the fall of tor ra bora in afghanistan. So they have a lot more history as well as connections. Theres a lot more local ties within the iraqi context whereas in syria the organization itself really didnt start to put down a foothold until april 2013 when abut bakr al baghdadi. Made a statement theyre going inside of syria on an official level. So they dont have the ties in syria as they do in iraq so i think those are some of the basic elements in terms of the differences. Thank you. You mentioned oil prices being a constraint on military operations against daesh. But they must be a constraint on everything the government of iraq is trying to do including being inclusive of groups who feel they dont have a share of the pie. But if the pie is shrinking, its harder to give out more shares of a shrinking pie. How does that affect all the things you were talking about, including the problem of National Unity as we see more and more that the kurdish region of iraq is exploring its own way . More since 2004 when the prices of oil boomed up and so on, we tried to use money as an enticement of the politics. That also increased corruption and increased other type of mismanagement or bad governance of the institutions. In the fall of mosul with a real soul searching going on, changes the political process in iraq as well, now we have said that this is nonsustainable. And we cannot proceed with such a strategy of only enticing people through financial ways. And by the way, majority of the enticement were for politicians for the communities, so that effect i think we have learned the harshness. And now the Prime Minister he has the mandate to reform and also to start new areas of looking for revenues such as government bonds, investments and others. To that effect iraq has done tremendous change, a big sea change in policies for reform in relation to funds and financial and extended support with the world bank and others as well. Thats taking place. But i take your point and i agree with it. We need to be very careful as not to really alienate people because were saying to them we havent got moneys to restructure your schools and others. To that effect the allied half are aware and are working on what they call postdestabilization projects. To that effect we have to seek support from the gulf countries when they talk about marginalization in iraq we say, okay, these areas have been liberated, tikrit, others as well. Put in your money wherever you have been talking about marginalization. How is that going . Not to the extent we wanted, to be honest. Because it goes back to the fundamental point which talked about and this is an area of frustration by the way. This is an area which says to the iraqis who is supporting you at the moment you need and the shotgun of isis next to your head . You have the neighbor next door who says im happy to help. And youve got all of the other neighbors saying, well, were conditioning our support. When your house is burned up, would you want to have a conditional support . Or would you want an open spot . Thats the problem we have. Well get to your neighbors. Addressing irbil, what is the mood there . How does the situation on the ground far away from baghdad relate to the strategy in baghdad . Well, i think one, on the isis front, things arent going well. We still have very coherent cooperations by the peshmerga, so thats a positive aspect. But i think politically were seeing clearer signs of a split about what to do with kurdish as an entity, what relationship does it have with turkey, iran and officials in baghdad . That point i think and the extension of the term for the next two years or potential extension, it really expose where the clergy is. It has disagreements. There is real political debate around how to function either within iraq or otherwise. I think that at this stage the u. S. Can actually help in creating more unity between the kurdish parties. Encouraging reform within the krg because the krg does need reform. Uniting the peshmerga, unifying those forces and encouraging kurdish parties to have a broader dialogue internally and with officials in baghdad. The solution thus far has been to just mostly blame the Central Government for the problems kurdistan faces. I think if we begin to have a broader discussion of what needs to be done, kurdistan would probably move forward even as a democratic process moves forward there. Would a more given what weve seen of opinion polls in the kurdish areas suggest overwhelming support for independence from iraq. Would this sort of reform democratic process, would that make it harder to keep iraq as a whole together . Well, i think its difficult for anyone to say that theyre against independence formally. But there are definitely different opinions of when do you get there, in what form and what sort of a relationship do you have with the rest of iraq . I think they are disagreeing when it comes to that. Some favor an incremental process that keeps baghdad closer, eventually these are kurdistans neighbors, you need to deal with them at the end of the story. What needs to be done, i think, is just encouraging that sort of debate between tehran and baghdad and kurdish officials. Certainly reforming these institutions i think in kurdistan is key. Forming the government, having a process that is much more representative, i think thats key to having a more stable kurdistan be it that an entity formerly within iraq or an independent entity. Aaron, the peshmerga have been some of the most effective fighters against daesh, but daesh seems principally focused on iranian influence. Is there a changing way that theyre talking about kurdish fighters, about battling kurds as this battle unfolds . Well, just like the iranians or any other entity, they view them as an enemy. Obviously theyre using different types of derogatory terms for kurds as they do with other groups of people, but i think they realize that theyre not going to be able to push any farther north at least in the iraqi context where the kurds have been able to hold the line since the u. S. Coalition started doing things a year ago. Therefore theyre focused more on the broader sectarian issue, i think, because it probably gets a little more played possibly. As a result, you know, you see more fighting in that regard instead of them trying to push back into northern iraq. But at the same time that doesnt mean that if there isnt an opportunity that theyd be willing to do it. As weve seen every once in a while, there will be like a suicide bombing that sneaks through into kurdistan. So for the Islamic State its an expansionist imperialistic type of entity. And as a result nothing is out of bounds for them. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the reliable neighbor next door. And the reliable neighbor next door, iran, is also thought to have a whole series of ties to the Popular Mobilization forces that is accused of being a sectarian militia attacking sunnis. What is the strategy for creating a genuine, capable Iraqi National army that doesnt rely on foreign trading, foreign funding, sectarian implications, those kinds of things . How do we get from where we are today to where youd like to be . We talked about the construction, that includes the military, after the fall of mosul there has been and will continue a significant restructure. At this moment the end game of the setup of the army is still not complete. We need to understand what do we need to protect and therefore how should our army structuring be mirroring that whether its a border, internal, so on. We also note that important projects such as National Guard legislation requires very careful handling politically and very careful handling structurally as to who do they report to. We dont want to create and fund local politicians to have their own forces under the title of National Guard. So we are still careful to that effect. At the same time we know that the majority of those people who have joined the Popular Mobilization cause are doing it lifting arms based on the call, for the protection of their country. And they are less ideological and more nationalistic. And theyre also not looking forward for being permanent members of these military setups, but want to do it just for the sake of liberating the towns and then going back to their jobs for us to create opportunities for them at least. In that context i think there is here in washington an overselling of this issue of ideology attached people to iran. In that context, i think there if you look at the numbers, they dont represent less than 30 of the per use, who are the three main blocks to represent the political attachment. But at the same time these are iraqis, who want to defend their country. They may have some ideological differences, belonging to iran, but that doesnt take away from them the iraqi and protection and they have blocks in parliament that represent them as well. So we are talking about a National Political process, democratic process taking shape in effect. When we talked about the project in the making, i dont think anybody has a clarity as to what the end game should be like, as much as destabilization and federalism. To that effect, the Prime Ministers Main Objective is making sure that hes commanderinchief and everybody adheres to his command. In tikrit when the enhanced military setup didnt want to participate, the Prime Minister said you are okay and free not to participate but you dont have the veto. I have the veto as to when you can participate and the extent of your participation. The same goes in anbar and so on. So to that effect the conditions we want to confirm and cement at this moment, is that the Prime Minister can manage the components to whatever the political end the process leads us to. So that is the long answer because i dont think there is say short answer. But it is interesting, because it is in part about centralizing and regularizing and institutionalizing and decentralizing, giving more local control. It seems to be pursuing two goals simultaneously. But lets also be honest among friends. A lot of americans, when they talk to us about National Guard, they have the current concept of National Guard in the current u. S. Setup but you have a revolution of the National Guard from the revolution to this stage. We went could cant go through a crash course of this. We need time. We need time and dialogue and to do it free from the shotgun to our head. Whether it is isis or militia or anybody else. That is what were trying to work on. I am when the Prime Minister was here in april, in this room, i asked him if there are any limits or red lines tor for decentralization in iraq and he said there are no red lyons. How do you see that process unfolding as the bast talked about, of spinning and devolving more control to different places . Well, i think that there are definitely constraints on where iraq could head. But the conversation is at the very beginning. It is very difficult to ask iraqis to do reform on every level and figure out their end state of their political system while they are fighting isis. Especially for supporters of the government at this stage. This is not the sort of discussion that is either popular or they even want to have. I think in many respects, effort to push the iraqis closer to our concept of decentralization could backfire. This actually needs fire. You also need part of the current areas held by isis to be liberated and gather more traction behind the government. One point i would mention here though is the discussion over the National Guards law, that is a key part of an equation that unites iraq. Not necessarily divides iraq. For a body to move forward with a series of reforms on different fronts, scrapping the Vice President ial roles, the deputy Prime Minister rolls, to do that and leave a key component of the reform process to the end i think is part of what builds some form of a confidence crisis between iraqs community. That is one area that we can actually move forward with. Aaron, do you see sort of a nascent sunni leadership fights against isis fighting against isis or isis is fighting against in its country. I havent seen anything similar to what weve seen in terms of 2005 and 2006 as part of a tribal awaking. Part of this is learning the lessons from the mid to late 2,000s when they started to go back in and start the military campaigns in 2012 and 2013, they started to reach out to smaller clans within tribes to try and cooperate, whether it was with money or weapons and dividing and conquering the tribes and it has been effective in many respects. And on the other hand, if there has been a group of people that tried to go against them, they would go against them. Weve seen them with the tribes and in different regions in syria. And a couple of weeks ago, in libya when they were trying to do something in cert. So part of the issue is that the Islamic State has a monopoly and violence in their area and it is difficult to go against them unless there is outside assistance at this juncture because they have been able to institutionalize them locally in some respects. So what you are saying is it is extraordinarily hard to see any bottomup politics. I do think in in juncture, in the areas they control firmly. There are areas that are in between which could be peeled off. But in terms of the core areas that they are in, especially in the western part of iraq, where they are the strongest, i