Here and said that were about 220,000 short of in strength ground troops. Were looking for ways to make sure we can meet the threats that we have. The f 35th pilots helmet alone cost 400,000. Thats ten Million Dollars for 2,500. As we look at the cost associated with it, were facing and how most of it is ground dlet that is were facing and forcing and fighting, does it make since to spend so much money on f 35 why we spend so much on our special forces around the world. Since we have to make choices. General, what i will tell you is that the department has many different kind of choices that they have to make and try and balance their requirements with the resources that they have. I will tell you that the f 35 is a longterm investment in defense of this nation and, our future adversary ris are not sitting still and in the next, 10, 20, 30 years we may very well need the capabilities that the f 35 will provide us to maintain our leadership and the world. So i consider the f 35 as an investment in the future. And i appreciate that. And my time is up. Im saying we have 2,500 scheduled to be built, correct. Is that the number. The u. S. Services are 2,433, sir. So just for ten less aircraft we could put 650 special ops people on the front line right now. If your math is right, sir. Thank you, sir. In your prepared testimony, you state that Cyber Security deficiencies revealed deficiencies and full testing of the logistics Information System has not been permitted. Can you give us an overview of the plan Cyber Security tests and whether based on the deficiencies discovered so far you believe the testing will be adequate. If we execute the plan that my office has been working on with the joint Operational Test team and the Program Office over the next couple of years, that will be a very thorough rigorous set of Cyber Security tests, problems that were running into, as you mentioned, are that the program is reluctant to let us tests on the live systems for fear that we might damage them and they had not made provisions for back up if the systems went down,le though theyre working on that now. So up to this point and in the immediate future, we will have to test on surrogate systems and laboratory systems. Front office is making that available to us, and thats certainly better if were doing all testing and were learning from that, as is mentioned in my annual report and in my statement. But we need to do much more than that. We need to test on the live systems. Were also going to have to find a way to do some Cyber Security system assessment of lockheed systems, Information Systems because alice is plugged in to lockheed corporate network. And were working through all of those issues. What i will tell you, today alice our logistics Information System is operating on the d. O. D. Networks. And in order for me to be allowed to put the system on the d. O. D. Networks it has gone through over the last three to four years, vigorous Cyber Security testing and certification from agencies out to the nsa and dia. So the idea that the system today is somehow untested, is not an accurate statement, however, having said that, dr. Gilmore is correct. I was hesitant last year to give the Operational Test community the authority to test and to end the operational system because we didnt have redundancy in part of the system. And if the testing were to knock off that part of the system, i didnt have a backup. Were building that back up today and as soon as that back up is in place, we will give the Operational Test community full authority to test the system as it operates in the field today, and that should happen before the end of the year. When do you before the end of the year. Before the end of the year. I would like to comment, senator, that we do Operational Testing as an integral part, or Cyber Security testing of systems that have been through certifications and nsa certifications and we get into them every time. So i am not arguing against those certifications, which are specification based kind of assessments. They are certainly necessary, but theyre hardly sufficient. And commercial organizations such as microsoft have said in their the advice they provide to their customers, assume that you have been penetrated and do continual red teaming, which is what we do in our Operational Tests. So the certifications that the general talks about are certainly necessary, but theyre hardly sufficient. And mr. Secretary, over all, what are the Lessons Learned from this process . What are we applying to other acquisitions and how is Cyber Security going to be included in the requirements process, basically, what are we what are we doing to integrate requirements for Cyber Security into the whole acquisitions process. Cyber security is both e ubiqitis and problem. You have to take Cyber Security account into every phase and every aspect of it. The department is maturing in this area, but i think we still have a long ways to go. Some of our systems are in the field, were not designed with Cyber Security in mind. We have to go back and assist those. And all of our systems like the f 35 that are in development, we have to integrate it into the design process as we go, as well as into all of our business practices. It is a preva preva zif threat. You want it to connect to the internet so you can order parts and so on. So we are working this problem very very hard. It is not going to be cheap to fix it and it is not going to be quick to fix it, but we have to do something. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you. I know that senator donnelly asked about Lessons Learned from f 35 program and what we might take forward in the other programs, given that some of the challenges that this program go back to some members high school years. And i think we only got through mr. Sullivan and dr. Gilmore, though. I would like to hear the answer to that question from secretary kendall and the general. It starts with reasonable requirements. You have to have professional management. You have to have adequate resources. You have to have a system that basically will support people doing the right thing. In our system, as i think others mentioned, there is a very strong bias thats sort of built into our structure towards optimism. Its easier to get a program funded if it costs less. People want it faster, cheaper, they want it to be able to do more. Most of the problems ive seen in acquisition stem from being in a hurry and being convinced, for whatever reason, that things will be cheaper, better, faster than they will actually be, than they would be. My office was formed 1986 because this problem was so preva zif. I think weve had a mixed record of success. The things that i hope ive done over the last several years is to put more realism and more to structure programs with more highly likely who will success. A lot of the things that well do are complicated and difficult. Development is apparently very risky. When you create something thats never been created before and you do it with cutting edge technology, thats a process that has unknown to it. No matter how much production you do ahead of time. I think support for some management, ensuring that professionals are in place, resisting the tenancy to spend the money because its in your budget and youre afraid youll lose it, if you dont spend it, which i think is exactly what will happen, something that has to be reinforced throughout the chain of command starting with the secretary of defense. Thank you, senator. I wont elaborate the concurrence si and optimism piece. Ill give you two other things, sir. When you set up a large Acquisition Program like this, you must ensure that the risks between industry and government is balanced appropriately. If the risk is all on the government or if the risk is all on industry, you will get bad behaviors from both sides. So its very very important to make sure you have the incentive structures right and the risk balanced appropriately between the government and industry. We did not get that right at the early part of the f 35 program. Mr. Kendall, under his leadership, i have been trying to do that for a number of years now and it has proven to be helpful. The second thing i will tell you that people do not talk about much is leadership continuity. If you have a very Large Program and very complex like the f 35, it will do you no good to put leaders in place that are there for only two or three years. It takes them a year just to understand whats going on. I will tell you our bigger Acquisition Programs need stable leadership at the top for many many years to help. Are you talking about uniformed leadership or severe leadership. Either one, sir, government supremes and military personnel are both very capable acquisition leaders youve got to leave them there in place for enough time to make a difference. To the exaccident r tent, its uniform leadership. Is that acquisition challenge or personnel challenge. It is both, sir. It is absolutely both. How do you provide the incentives for military person to continue moving up in rank if you leave him in a job for five or six years. Thats sometimes whats necessary for very big complex Acquisition Programs. Ive heard from some of our partners overseas and i dont mean just partners in the joint strike fighter, but the Security Partners generally when talking about acquiring certain weapon systems because of their small compared to the united states, they worry about being a playing with the country rather than a country with a plane. Whats the risks that some of the partners in this program face in terms of the cost of this aircraft and the ability to acquire the number of aircraft needed to contribute meaningfully to the program. I mean, how many joint strike fighters need a country acquired to have a meaningful contribution to their defense . Thats an interesting question, senator. And i think it really goes to what each country cares about in terms of its resources and what they care to defend. What i will tell you is, even our smallest nations on the f 35 program are looking at at least two squadrons of f 35s. And the idea that the partnership will be working together to sustain, maintain and train the airplanes is a huge deal for them because otherwise they could not afford a fifth generation capability like they are today. Thank you. At at this time its not sufficiently mature. There are a number of improvements that are planned as the Program Moves forward to whats called 3. 0, the fully capable version thats meant to be available for Operational Testing and full operational capability. And if those improvements are realized they will address the number of issues that are mentioned in my testimony. In order to keep aircraft flying. Theres a heavy reliance on having contractors present, again, when we move forward to 3. 0, the plan is. Lieutenant general, can you comment on dr. Gilmers assertion that with the current number of aircraft planned for testing use and 80 aircraft availability rate is needed to officially accomplish the integrated complicated test and evaluation unscheduled, what would you assess as the current aircraft availability rate and does the jpo current protections estimate that the ability rate will be up to 80 by the time its scheduled to start. It seems as though right now youre not making that and yet youll have more challenges between now and then to meet that to meet the deadlines youve laid out. Doesnt appear as though its possible. Can you comment on that and give us your thoughts, please. Im not sure where the 80 comes from, but i think if you take the number. If you have the number of aircraft, put the number of hours and test youve got to do. To finish. You havent done that yet. To finish iot we meet within a year. I do not believe well buy the team starts to get anywre near 80 . Today the fleet is hovering around 60 . The best weve seen so far is the u. S. Air force, airplanes at the air force base when they deploy this winter. I will tell you it is unlikely we will get to 80 . What that means is, iot may take longer than we anticipated and that will be the major result of that. As i look back at the information thats been provided for us, if you compare the two aircraft today, the time on stations, hour to hour and a half, f 35 b and this is, from what i can see, the planned. Which suggest that were also going to need additional capabilities just to service them close by those areas on the gun itself, the f 35 and this is the way it was designed in the first place, apparently. F 35 apparently wasnt designing with a gun in mind. A military cannon, 420 rounds total four second bursts. 1,100 go around, 17 seconds. And around is double the weight of that carried by the f 35, clearly when we talk about having the similar mission, were talking about doing the job and completely different ways, would that be a fair assessment, dr. Gilmer . When youre talking about it, it would look much differently than the a 10 and were going to do those comparison tests of the ability to perform between the a 10 and f 35 as part of the Operational Testing. And were not going to say that, you know, the f 35 has to perform tests the same way the 10 does but left the pilots take advantage on the systems of the aircraft deal with some implementations you mention as well as they can. And see how well the missions are carried out in terms of the ability to strike in a timely manner and accurately and report on that. And there are numerous arguments about how well each aircraft will do under certain different circumstances and dicht threats. And higher threat and environments. And so the comparison testing and our report will eliminate all of that. I just think secretary looks like he wants to response and give him an opportunity. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Im an army officer. It was purposely designed. And it was a very good design for that purpose. But if you asked to do air to air, its hopeless. The f 35 is designed as aircraft that can do a variety of missions object to the form innocence strike. It does support differently. It does have the features you mentioned. But whats different now than what the time being, the ability of wide variety of aircraft to put ammunition like a small bomb exactly where they want it to go. And the air force today would be one bombers, for example, something that would not be possible. Times have changed. If we could afford it, i think everybody would like to be the inventory because its a special purpose aircraft for that one mission. Given the constraints we have and the Financial Resources that we have, maintaining a one Mission Aircraft and the air force, which is not something they could fit into the balance were trying to achieve. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. On behalf of chairman mccain. Thank you mr. Chairman for calling this hearing and thanks to all of you, witnesses for your testimony today. You taught delegation as had the opportunity to witness firsthand the roll out of the f 35 and the air force as the 388th and the 419th Fighter Wings at Hill Air Force base in og den, utah prepare to reach initial operating capacity or ioc later this year. Weve also been able to see the development of logistics and maintenance functions of the f 35 a at the Ogden Air Logistics complex that have been so effective that theyve been called to assist both the marine corps and the navy and meeting the goals for their respective variance of the f 35 and were very proud of them. The men and women who are working to train on tests and to keep these jets in the air are models of American Ingenuity and i hope this congress will provide them with the resources that they very much need in order to continue succeeding in their mission. General, one of the main obstacles for the f 35 a reaching its ioc goals this year, of course, involves the continued development of which is, of course, used to manage the logistics and supply chain for maintaining the f 35, not just now during the roll out, but throughout its lifetime. Can you tell me how is the joint program Office Working with industry to ensure that this capability is functional and is fully integrated into this weapons platform in a timely and effective manner . Thank you, senator. The system right now that the air force needs at Hill Air Force base is on track to be about 60 days later that we planned and the Biggest Issue we have right now is getting the maintenance and supply chain and Configuration Management of the engine, the f 135 integrated into the system. That is proven to be more difficult than we had anticipated, but it kind of requires both Lockheed Martin and whitneys back end erp, enterprise Resource Planning systems to talk to each other and to connect with alice. We sent weve worked with lockheed partner across the whole company, as well as some of their teammates and we have brought in some Software Experts from within d. O. D. To try over the last few months to figure out where those difficulties lie. The good news there is we understand where the difficulties are, now we just have to go and execute and like i said, i think were probably going to be about two months late getting that done, but i think we, from a technical standpoint, will be able to get it done. Thats good to know. Its good any time you can at least contain a delay and look forward and conclude that youve got a known quanti