Glooinchtsds. Certainly there could be a future statute, mr. E whether theres sunset clause or a reexamination. Thats kind of a coverage of the domestic legal basis for using force that i look at as a military lawyer when i advise my cliebtsds. We also pay very close attention to the use of force within the conflict itself. What we would call yugs use in bellow. Irts not just what law gets you into conflict in the first place or aut rihorizes you to be in conflict in the first place. But also, what authorizes that conflict it. Also, were very involved with drafting concise and clear rules of engagemented so that that he has e those operators who do go to combat terrorism know what their left and e and right limits are. They know what theyre authorized to do. They understand the limits of their authority to act so that commanders at the operational level and operators and the troops that we send out to do these missions understand when they can use force and when they cant. And those would become very, very critical. And then, included within rules of engagement, obviously, we have to make clear policy on things as wide ranging as Detainee Operations when we can detain, whom we can detain and for how long we can hold them in the conditions underwhich theyre held. We have to have clear policy in place in our orders that we direct, send down to the combatant commands for them to go out and take on terrorism. All of them are critical roles of military lawyers, certainly at my level and the joint staff and so forth. Now, even operationally and ta tactically, there are military lawyers involved in Counter Terrorism operations and that provide a critical role, as well. We have military lawyers who review operational plans. And they review in the drafting of those plans and helping operators and commanders think through who theyre going to take on these missions to combat terrorism in order to make those operations legal. And to keep them within the authorities that they have. We have military lawyers dra drafting supplemental rules of engagement. As we pass down rules of engagement there our level down to the soldierss, the commanders in the field, then lawyers look at that and say what else do i need . What other authority do i need. What clarifications on these rules of engagement are necessary for us to do our mission. So well often have lawyers at the operational, tactical level come back to us and ask for supplemental rules of engagement. We have military lawyers reviewing the techniques, tactics and procedures that are in use out in the field. All the policy and all the rules of engagemented in the world arent good, are worth anything if theyre not doing things that comply with those. So you have military leaders who comply and insist commanders are doing the right things. We have military lawyers briefing and training rules of o engagement. We found that its critical not to just throw up a power point slide and say heres your rules of engagement. I hope you remember them a month from now when youre in afghanistan. That just doesnt work. And the closer you can replicate come bats conditions and training and test and train those rules of engagement, the better those some jers will be able to protect their own lives and do the right thing. And then, of course, when there are civilian casualties that righthand turn included in the rules of engagement, when there are situations that require an i believe investigation in the afterman when things havent necessarily gone the way they should have. So there are military lawyers involved all up and down the chain in helpi ining commanders operators fight terrorism. Ive talked a lot about lawyers. Because i am a lawyer and, you know, thats the focus of what i do. But i think its important that we shift as a panel back to the operators. Back to the service members, the troops, who are out in the field risking their lives every day to combat terrorism. Thats really where i think we need to focus the bulk of our time here today that. s whats important. Im very much looking forward to the dialogue. Im looking forward to my panelists comments and i look forward to, if there are already questions, yona said i can take a few questions nand now and il be around for the rest of the panel, as well. [ applause ] some questions . Absolutely. Youre in charge. Lets limit it to six questions. Six or less. Okay. Go ahead. No speeches. No speeches, just questions. Sir, george michaelson, policy consultant for Counter Terrorism and special operations. You talked about statutes and everything else. A former dni, a couple of years ago, mentioned weve got title ten to e that mentions the military. Weve got title 50 that measures the agency, different rules and restrictions about the need for a h a title 60. Can you speak to that . First of all, ive had people say hey, can you bring title ten down to my office . And if youre a lawyer, you know that hitle ten is enormous. Title ten covers everything from the salary of a Second Lieutenant to the authority the secretary of defense has to run the department. Its an enormous. Its often used as code words for title 10 is the authority that the military has to conduct operations and hitle 50 is the authority that other agencies have to conduct covert action. So i think theres theres clear roles and responsibleties for the military, clear roles and responsibleties for the Intelligence Community and others. And i think theres a value there to keep in those roles and responsibleties careerer. And there are certainly times when we all work together. The interange e agency, plr e particularly since 9 11 has gotten very, very good at working together. But i dont see a need to merge those. When the military acts, we act under the law of our conneflict under hitle ten of domestic law. Mergers might not guilrez e rer those critical distinctions. Thank you. I understood the law in the war apply if and only if the combatants were recognized as such. That is if one party either takes off their uniform or does not put one on, they forfeit their rights under the Geneva Convention and generally understood the laws of war. Is that still the case . Well, it actually never was. Thats some of the mythos of the Geneva Conventions. The first thing is we have the law of Armed Conflict governs our actions. We were in international Armed Conflict and noninternational armed con flikt. So there are a set of law with each of those types of conflicts. Irrespective of how we determine whether its an international or a noninternational armed con flikt. I think what youre speaking of is do certain combatants get certain protections that you would have as a Uniformed Armed soldier under the law of Armed Conflict. Do you get p. O. W. , prisoner of war status. Do you get combatant immunity. Its a casebycase basis. You ever to look at the facts. Typically, if youre not fighting and complying with the Geneva Conventions, complying with whats required under the law of Armed Conflict, youre clearly in civilian clothes, then you probably wont have combat tant community and you wont be treated as a prisoner. But we treat everybody. We go in as a policy matter assuming that were going to treat everybody as and then we sort it out as we go. Yes, maam. Thank you. To polish embassy. Two quick questions. First of all, we see bits and pieces in the press about the discussion between the congress and the white house with all the new au, how do you call it, aumf, exactly. Whats your feelings now about that . Do you need e need anyone while youre combatting isis and what the process is . Thats the first question. And the second one, about the air strikes in syria. Iraq is quiet clear, but syria might have yeah, i dont understand. So the first part of your question is do you e we need a new aumf. The president has determined he has the authority for the actions taken against isil in both iraq and syria under the current 2001 and 2002 aumf under international law. So hes determined that theres a war powers resolution thats following available on line and kind of lays that out and then i believe theres a letter from doctor from Samantha Powers to the u. N. Stating our basis for use of force and a report under article 51 of the u. N. Charter. So those documents are out there and i refer you to those. For the International Legal basis of our actions in iraq, were using the collective self defense of iraq. Weve had the request of iraq, obviously, so we have the consent there. And so theres self defense plus the consent of iraq. Weve got the 2001 and 2200 arksz22002 aumf. Yes, sir . Yes, mike kraft. In 30 some years, ive been dealing with terrorism, the use of armed drones and should we say inknow vablgs e vagss. Could you describe the rule of the jags and tar getting information with the krchc. I. A. Determining the limiting of tar gets and limiting of collateral damage. What i can address is the role of jags and d. O. D. Operations. The first thing i would tell you is that a drone is a weapons platform. Its no different than an f16. In fact, often, the video di display of a particular weapons system, which e whether it was manned or unmanned, it would mean that the pilots 20,000 feet overhead or 20,000 miles away. Its a weapons platform. I say that not to be clever or cute, but it does make a difference in the analysis as you look at it. And so as we see more and more that there are jags involved irrespective of the platform. I had a congressman ask one time how many lawyers, military lawyers, review this before it gets to the white house. And i think i said five as i sat there and counted them up. But you have at the operational level, you have lawyers looking at the operational plans, at the targeting data. And all the various things. And that goes up in a package for approval. Then you have as it goes up through the layers, you have the combat tant command. So you have a colonel, either an africon or a sencom. And then it goes through my office, and i look at it. And then it goes through the general counsel for the department of defense and his attorneys and he looks at it personally. So multiple layers of legal review as well as policy review operational review and commander review. So theres kietquite a bit of skroo skrutskru scrutiny on those type of packets. Yes, sir . Im on the advise rid board for terrorism research. I had a question. In actual operational situations, who may decide that a person may be detained and how common is it that that decision is reviewed by somebody other than the first person who decides to detain someone . Typically, lets say afghanistan or iraq, lets start there. So typically, it will literally be the senior person at whatever level of command is involved in the operation. So it may be the squad leader, if its a squad out. And they encounter an individual to detain. And then it would be the squad leader who mike e might make that decision. It mielgts be a platoon leader. It might be a kpaeb. Company. It just depends on whos the highest ranking person there. Although the decision literally might be on the soldier or the marine. So the first point that that raises, thank you again for raising it, is that, you know, weve got to make sure that weve given them clear rules of engagemented. And theyve been trained on that. They know who they can detain and whom they shouldnt detanl. And so they know their rules. They know when to detain and when to release. And so the other thing is its temporal. So if somebody detains somebody, then certainly the next level of command is that they can ae say okay, that person needs to be released right now. Or theyve screened them and determined that theyre not a threat, theyre not a combatant or an enemy and so they release them. Theres almost continuous review to make sure were continuing to detain only when when he should e should. And then if not, that i hadre transferred to, in some cases, in afghanistan theyd be transferred to the afghan government. They might be released through the International Committee of the red cross and so forth. Weve got almost a constant review i would say, not a formal review but an informal. And then we have formal reviews that go on as they get into the theater in a place like iraq. Is that a hook or a question, sir . Question. And i hope its not a hook. You know, i heard you, general gross, and, once again, im enormously impressed. Two inc. Thisethings, operatorse lawyers. My second point is a profound shame as to the world that does not realize how important lawyers are or how important law is. I used to be chairman of the aba. The moest impressive were the jg generals. I do take opportunities to speak at places and to share, you know. We do care very passionately about the law. We care very passionately about doing the right thing. Heres how you get away with something thats wrong. Its not what we did. Our job is to say to the commander, hey, sir, hey, man, you cant do this. But heres another way to do what you want to do that is legal. That is et k58. That is moral. And were not their ethical and moral advisors in a sense, but we had this perspective. My hitle is legal counsel. Ive been blessed with clients who are willing to take that council. Fits counsel, if its just heres some thoughts that arent legal, then i recognize and they recognize its one opinion among many. But its a perspective from somebody who thinks about these issues. Thank you very much. Our next speaker is dave responsibleties who works with us here. Hes got a long and distinguished background, principally in logistics and what that means. But what e when you real isle eely understand what logistics is all about, theres no more important aspect in operations. I worried about two things. Who was going to run the 18 dhield care centers back on the basis. The warriors took care of everything else. But dave has probably as much experience in dealing with any american in dealing with the tribal chiefs and all of that in iraq. I think youll find what he has to say very, very interesting. Always dangerous to follow a lawyer. In dealing with this topic, there are rules that guide what the military can do. And then there are perceptions what the American People, what the military, should do. Also, whats remembered is that there are limits to what the military is able to do. Both there a capability stand point and from the Vantage Point of what is required to be accomplished. Enthusiasm is not a capability. The military does possess a wide array of skill sets. Simply, when given a mission, the military puts a Single Person in charge and focuses on mission accomplishment. Anything short of this is failure. The complex issues of declaring war on terrorists, offensive or defensive oplations. Are all factors that need to be carefully considered. Most feel that the preemption is relative. This is expensive and difficult. Our military forces lay on the ground to shape behavior and gain insight that could do harm to the u. S. Or do we watch engaging country y which just happens to be engaging in country x. When do we act . And if the actions are conducted too late, the average american will ask you knew about this and you didnt stop it because of you fill in the blank. There is lastly the unwanted imagery. Our nation should be aware of deceptions. There is a delicate balance between assisting and a military being perceived as the emperors force. And this balance is timeless. There also a knee jerk reaction. But common cause is a willing coalition to put together at times. Whether the military is the right or wrong approach, id reich to offer a thought relative to the fiber of the young men and women who are performing these tasks. We have an allvolunteer, allrecruited force. In dealing with terrorists, the high visibility forces gained attention in the news media with high profile rates. They are superb. There are simply not enough of these forces. They are superb, also. They need no training and demonstrate care and compassion. This can be articulated by state department generals. By the impact via example and demonstration of righteousness is powerful and lagsing. Our young men and women will never let us down. This applies to the applicability of skills that are potentially priceless in taking the fight to the terrorist and creating the most robust tool set possible. Thank you very much for the inviet today. As i mentioned, we had the one seminar yesterday from the biodefense. And, again and again, the role of the military became so critical. I mean, we talked about the civilian, but can you make any comments on that . For example, and the present ebola situation. And, also, in general, the weapons of mass destruction, how the military is prepared to respond to such an attack. Yes, thank you. First of all, the military responding, sometimes, its the only entity that can get there the most and the quickest. Thats a unique capability. And thats tapped by our National Command authorities for those reasons. The ebola case is an instance where i think we leveraged the military capability and the train i traini training along with some of the inter anyonen sill on board. Once again, thats one of those capableties for the sbant response. But i want to go back across the interagency. Obviously, thats been highlighted since 9 11. Thats critical. We still see instances where sometimes intelligence is not shared properly. That could be firewalls and just clearances as much as anything else. Well get better. We continue, probably, and will need to get better on those lines. But its those catastrophic threats, ebola, that some people consider one of those things. Or the wmd that we are going to need a capability be it inside or outside conus, where the military will respond. I know the marine corps has a force called the c force, thats deployed in support of the olympics and several other things. Those capableties are tapped in a defensive mode. Not offensive, obviously. And those walls that govern all of those things. The military can just do it sometimes and thats why theyre asking. Dr. Wallace . General, i think you put your thing on everything. I mean, youve explained the milita military, the american military, tremendous capacity and all sorts in every variety. To me, the question is this. Should it be our military or someone elses . And i see a total dilemma. What the u. S. Military has is probably unparalleled in history. But the fact that we had that may not necessarily work that well in some parts of the world where, as you suggested yourself, were not loved. The short answer is well train them up. But i do think that is a key issue. But what i saw in iraq, and i think most of us have seen everywhere, the