All the elements of russian power, the dime concept i think were all familiar with as an acronym, in order to bring about that restoration and preservation of his power, and the point of this whole operation, therefore is not to achieve some final state but to develop these tools as you have called them, instruments of power, others would say. In order to keep the game going because that is how russia sees the world as being in any case. And second, this is the the only way that it can maximize what is the condition of its great power and the regime at home that is a fully independent, sovereign great power, which is what it says it is and wants to be recognized as. But that doesnt have to answer to anybody either at home or abroad. And thats the strategic objective. I think that things thus become much more clear to the analysts, and i think theyll become clearer to you and you can overcome the clim ma of whether hes a tactician or a strategist. The tactics serve the objective and there is no gab here. The final objective is not whether or not ukraine or some specific territory in ukraine belongs to russia but whether russia is accepted as a great power. The specific territory or parameters of ukraine are beside the point, but now everybody understands you have to deal with russia on its terms. Yes, good morning. Im tracy wilson. Im a consultant here in washington, d. C. Thanks for your comments this morning. This war game looked like it was very interesting, very enjoyable time, and i applaud you taking a structure to look into the future and helping us to understand these issues. Three quick questions of clarification, if i might you mentioned one area of cooperation that you saw iran and you mentioned syria, of course, as well. In your discussion, in your work, did the topic of threat reduction, Nuclear Security in many russia come up . Obviously thats an area on hold right now, and we have some concerns about that. So just curious your thoughts on that. Enthen a couple of reactions, if you might in recent days there have been two highlevel state department visits to sochi and moscow now. Are these positive signs, indicators of a thawing of relations . If not what should we be looking for in a future as a positive sign . And then finally russia will hold the is chair of the Security Council in september is this a concern, possible areas of mischief that could be introduced into the agenda at that time . And so i welcome your thoughts. Ctr, the u. N. Security council and department of state trips . Ill start briefly james excuse me. With the areas of corporation. The u. S. Team was very concerned about the safety and stability of the Russian Nuclear enterprise. We didnt go into great details but in some of the scenarios several team members, you know were concerned about that, and even to the expend that we might want to provide at least reassurances directly to the Russian Forces that are responsible for those sort of cooperationive threat reduction, but we didnt go into detail. But there was some nervous nousness about obviously. Particularly if the russian government became less stable due to economic crisis or regime change or Something Like that. So yeah, there was great concern. And this is tied also to your next point about how do we read the most recent contacts. During the cold war as the years went on, as you know. We developed a pretty robust series of ways to communicate and coordinate tw the soviet union, their leadership and their armed forces. It was never perfect. But there was there was channels. Everything from incidents at sea to aircraft and air space to yeah different kinds of signaling, the hot line. And there was sort of a sickening realization on the part of the u. S. Team that perhaps some of that eroded or no longer exists. Weve talked quite a bit as weve gone out to various think tanks. Weve found that the generation of soviet experts are now in retirement or and the next generation is not nearly as extensive, theyre just as iger and just as smart, im sure but there arent as many of them on the ground as there were 25 years ago. So there was a concern on the u. S. Side that perhaps theres value simply in strengthening the mechanisms. Thats how i would read, just me as a citizen reading what was happening with secretary of state kerrys visit recently auz a good thing of in general. Not because of any agreements that may or may not have been sign d at that time. But its certainly reassuring that we can talk. And i would home theres some back Channel Communication going on as well which i think is where the real work can get done. Certainly i would agree jim. I will say from the russian team perspective, looking out in the future most notably the election cycles drove a good bit of the teams analysis. It was interesting to note and came up in off conversation. Well have a new administration, new u. S. Administration in 2016. The russian team is looking for a political win, or a win of some sort in 2017 in order for putin to be reelected in 2018. So russian team discussed numerous times of what that political win or International Win might be. And it was notable they surmised it will be a new u. S. Administration facing those challenges. And again the team would hold the strategic cards, i guess, if you will. So while there might be conversations now and certainly theyre worthwhile i think the most telling point at least from the russian teams perspective, whats going to happen next year when its a new administration and russia is look looking for that win, whatever that win might be. Hi. I teach part time at Catholic University about religion and international politics. In my previous hierarchy, i was in the state department and was enabled at one time to participate in a program at the college. And we did a mini version of what you all have been participating in. And having to do with the middle east. And thinking back, it strikes me very much that in all our discussions, we paid very little, if any attention to the role of religion, which in recent years has proven to be much more important. Certainly in our involvement in iraq. And syria. But im kind of surprised that in looking at the russian bear, with Everything Else in there theres nothing about religion, and it strikes me that the certainly Important Role of the Russian Orthodox church, which is kind of come back more into popularity, also with mr. Putin should be considered here not just because of its relationship with western orthodox syy, if you will, the Christian Church in the west, but also you know, islam, and i wonder, to any extend, did religion play in i role in the considerations either on the u. S. Or on the russian side . Okay. Next ill direct the gentleman right in front of steve. Thank you very much. I am with the National Defense university fellow pakistan. My question is that you mentioned that ukraine is the Perfect Place to confront russian ya. But in this war game, were they factored out in this war game as well . For example if the confrontation, the inclusion of conflict, both parties dont have to agree to expant. If one expands unilaterally, then how do you deal with that. Number two u. S. Air got allies, was it also considered what allies they have . And number three is that when you say putin, do you mean russia . That is also another important factor. And last but not least was factor . Do you think china has any real threat and if they have, from where . Thank you. Thank you, reporter from voice america. A followup question about china factor. Actually im looking at this russia figure too, at the far corner of the figure talking about the chinese assurance could you elaborate on that. Second is about a consulate in china. The growing relationship between china and russia theyre talking about. So who poses greater threat to u. S. . China or russia . Thank you. Back to the panelists. So, sir, in regards to your question on religion, it zid come up in the initial testament, mainly in relationship to the orthodox church. While you dont see it on the sexual diagram. We characterized it pretty much as a tool of russian nationalism, frankly we didnt see it as a driving factor as much as a resource that could be used to continue to push forward on russian nationalism. On the question about russian allies, i dont we didnt consider that as a major factor within the artificial construct of war game. We know that russia has reached out to particularly central asia and some of the countries there. But we didnt see that as those partnerships as really contributing much either to russian policy or to the russian impact in the situations we were trying to look at specifically. Russia will never be able to recreate the warsaw pact. And even the warsaw pact was an alliance of unequals much more so than nato, i would argue. But no we didnt take those allies into account. A eni think thats an opportunity for the west, actually, to make a very, very telling point through the International Media frankly, that, you know anyone who understands the world situation today with any degree of clarity can see that you have a group of 28 democracies at different stages of development who are cooperating and trying to create a security ark kekture for europe, and then you have one power that is throwing its weight around and violating some of the norms of the International Environment in reaching out to, frankly some of the countries they have reached out to are more in line with the russians idea of how a government in an economy should run than western europe. So i think thats something that the west could use to its advantage to make sure that that message is loud and clear. You have 28 democracies confronting countries that have fought into controlled by a very different system. Actually i was going to pile onto jims comments on the alliances. What we didnt see was and ill let the russian team speak to this clearly but as they would come into each of the preliminary sessions we saw continually reaching out of bilateral relationships that facilitated a purpose, as any relationship would do. And thats what we saw in the chinese relationship frankly. As far as where the assessment was as russia would turn towards china, they they really have the lower end of the bargaining relationship. China had the upper hand and russia needed china but not russia needed china. Thats why the chinese relationship was one of risk for the russians. They could play to it but they were coming into it having to negotiate less than their optimal deal if you will. Just a quick comment. The u. S. Needs to be aware of its own seams and weaknesses. And i think one of those is now we tend to view the world regionally. There is some broad transnational threats. We get that. We have functional combats and commands. But in general terms we have this of course goes back to the cold war. One combatant command focused on europe and russia and one focused on the asiapacific region and china. So we tend to want to put our problems into those bins and assign our military commander to do it. That said, theres a huge amount of cooperation that goes on with other u. S. Government agencies as well and were finding more and more that perhaps that regional regional structure for the defense commands is not as helpful in places like the arctic, where you have several u. S. Fourstar commands that have some involvement. So that is something we need to be aware of on the u. S. Side. And think about perhaps ways we can overcome that in the future. You would have enjoyed it last week. I proposed there be a new senior directorship from asia. From europe to asia to russia to india, its a large continent eurasia, so you overcome some of the stove piping. Okay. Paul . Thanks Paul Schwartz from csis. I had a question about the the disparity in the way the two con tes tes con contestants view how they are and how that actually played itself out in the the exercise. In addition, i tend to agree with the findings on that currently the likelihood is that russia will pursue a frozen conflict in ukraine, given that theres little to gain from seizing and much to lose. But that will hold up only, unless and until russia starts to see that perhaps as ukraine policy is headed for a second collapse as dr. Kutchison described the first one. Im curious how that played out in the scope of the exercise. Thank you. Thank you. Kyle scott. I want to turn to your policy consideration to clear the articulating a policy towards russia, Eastern Europe and ukraine. Im sure my colleagues in the state department would argue that we in fact do have the clearly articulated position. But im going to say that youre correct and then challenge you. What you all did all the studying what would you articulate as what the policy should be . And after i hear that ask colonel if he could state whether the europeans agree with that policy. Thank you. Hi. Im actually based in berlin nowadays at Energy International affairs and im actually here as that fellow at the American Institute of contemporary german studies to actually interview american experts and officials and their take on Energy Vulnerabilities in europe. So you can imagine as ive been talking to energy and a lot of people about. Its sort of coming down to a few scenarios. I just want to im not saying thises the most likely scenario but it goes alittle bit along with lines as schwartz pointed out and you pointed out i dont get so much out of this as theres Something Else that can happen. Its not just a matter of what the u. S. Wants to do how it reacts to what russia does, mr. Putin does. Its the flow of objective circumstances that gets out of hand if people dont take ahold of the situation. A lot of people so a lot of people certain people i think well a lot of people have been telling me they have a clear feeling the european attitude is please take this problem away. You know, they dont want to really face up to whats there, and frankly that theres a similar situation on our side and somewhere that goes along with what youre describing and the reactive nature. And so the objective things that are developing is if the ukrainian economy collapses in a couple years or completely collapse major demonstrations, you have huge amounts of refugees in europe. You can have all sorts of things happening to the energy passage. You dont know who did it. What about that sort of situation as things basically collapse . If theres not a Major Program of the west to get involved and sort of help them take control of their economy and rebuild it. Fine. If people dont want to send military aid, fine, for whatever reasons, but take control and do something proactive, otherwise it degenerates and really both sides lose control and then you get a situation, and i think its true, as mr. Kutchins said about what happened when the agreement fell apart. Things get out of control on both sides. Thest a question of rea. I apologize if it was too please. If i may address the first question from a russian perspective of what the policies are and the objectives in ukraine. As i previously mentioned the russian team had no desire to escalate the conflict. They were not planning on failing nor were they planning on giving back crimea. One of the final terms was the demise of putin, a new alternative form of government arises, what are the first actions. The russian Team Immediately said that we will not give back crimea. It was a political win that we do not intend to turn back on. In terms of escalating to conflict, again, they had an appetite for increasing the conflict whatsoever. Of course, come 2017 when theyre looking for a political win, if that happens it would be a target of opportunity. Certainly it was one that the russian team had addressed. Like wise to return to a previous question regarding china, as we saw it play out although we didnt explore a lot of the chinarussian dynamics, the russian team during one of the terms chose to undermine that as much as possible through backdoor deals sweetheart deals, if you might, and primarily the reason they were so interested in doing that is to maintain an economic dependence of europe on russian energy. And that was weighed against some of the economic deals that were most recently made with china, which were not so favorable for the kremlin. So i guess from a minor perspective, thats how i would grease the question, as we saw it play out in the game. And that was really the only time that china came up in the discussion, was with regards to economics and energy. The Eurasian Economic Union was mentioned briefly but thats not where they focused their discussions. While the russian team said they would turn to china, they would much rather maintain the European Market that they now enjoy. Reference the policy Going Forward. That was probably the greatest challenge of the war game, frankly, and thats part of the reason you see that as an outcome. In each turn there was just a lack of clarity. At one point the discussion was we continued to say we want a europe thats whole, free and at peace, but maybe this is the good, fast and cheap discussion. Do we want a europe thats whole . Do we want a europe thats whole and free . Do we want a europe at peace . A and we look at historical examples of when that may have been the case. So i think we do want a europe thats whole free and at peace. And i think our policy is we do want a democratic ukraine and we do want the respects for international borders. The challenge is how do you then clearly articulate it, and then what is the strategy linkage to the the policy. So if thats the policy, what are the methods and mechanisms that were going to use to then continue to advance that, and i think that gets to your point sir, reference, how do you prevent the spillover and how do we encourage a democratic ukraine that then becomes stable in a prospering member . Thats probably where your answer is and once that linkage is correct, then we can probably have a clearly articulated policy towards those three areas. Europe. Yeah, its our and that was our second consideration. It came actually from the western europe and the Eastern European countries as well. Because they need to know what u. S. Sta